# . . . From Confederation to Nationalization

## 1867-1927

# The Port of Saint John

# The Port of Saint John
# Volume I:
# From
# Confederation to Nationalization
# 1867 - 1927

*A Study*
*in the*
*Process of Integration*

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Within the Port Flag the light blue horizontal band indicates the sky, the gold suggests the future of the Port-city and the dark blue represents the harbour waters of the Bay of Fundy.

Within the crest, the seventeenth century galleon symbolizes the 1604 arrival of Samuel de Champlain on June 24th, St. John the Baptist Day. In contrast, the modern container vessel reflects the Port's contemporary world-wide service.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# INTRODUCTION

During the years encompassed by this study, 1867-1927, technological developments in transportation systems and the corresponding increase in the interdependence or vertical integration of society characterized North America. These twin patterns of modern society were addressed by many scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and within Canada by H. A. Innis.[1] Innis was influenced by the work of Thorstein Veblen and Emile Durkheim, each of whom had studied the interrelationships among population, environment, technology and organizations.[2] Consideration of these variables, which are commonly acknowledged as the bases of a modern ecological approach, formed the underpinnings of Innis' work.

In his 1923 study, *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* Innis employed a modern ecological approach when he analyzed a national community (Canada) in terms of a population adjusting to its environment by means of technological equipment and simultaneous patterns of social organization.[3] However, in that study Innis dealt at the national and regional levels, giving minimal attention to the Maritimes. When Innis wrote *The Cod Fisheries* in 1940 he observed: "The task of indicating the significance of the fishing industry has been difficult, particularly for an Upper Canadian familiar with the centralizing tendencies of the St. Lawrence which are so strikingly apparent to a student of the fur trade and the Canadian Pacific Railway".[4] From a Maritime historical perspective, a problem seemed to arise for Innis when he attempted to analyze Canadian national development by examining how the various sections of the country were integrated. The Maritimes were perceived regionally as a discrete whole. This approach, however, revealed a fundamental weakness in the C.P.R. study: Innis neglected to examine how that railway, as a transportation agent, had contributed to the integration of points or nodes across the country.[5] Innis' apparent reluctance to see the holistic nature of Canadian national development was, in this case, a consequence of employing a regional approach derived from an emphasis on water transportation technology. A "nodal" approach based on a combination of water and land transport technologies, in connection with simultaneous organizational development, would have produced a more thorough investigation of the Maritime role in national transport development. Nevertheless, Innis' transportation studies were solidly historical and ecological: a fluid blending of meticulous research with a systematized introduction to the variability of distance.[6] Influential for the three decades of his scholarly life, H. A. Innis' work retains its provocative quality for contemporary researchers concerned with transportation and the organization of society.

In tracing the growth and integration of the Port of Saint John, 1867-1927, the theoretical perspective utilized by Innis, but modified in terms of a nodal emphasis, is employed in the following to examine the process by which one urban community was integrated segmentally, as a transport node, within a larger system of cities. The transport node of the City of Saint John provides an exemplary model of an agent of integration, since it is generally recognized that a significant correlation exists between the sophistication of a society's instruments of transport technology and the organization of that society.[7] Similarly, it has been suggested that transportation systems are closely related to the operation of urban systems, and, hence, a nodal focus can offer some indication of Saint John's place in the functional hierarchy of cities.[8]

Previous research has revealed that, from its earliest beginnings, the transport node determined the primary functions of Saint John.[9] As Jean Gottman noted, Atlantic seaports served as "hinges" between the interior and Europe.[10] For Saint John, this interior was largely based upon a provincial lumber and shipbuilding wealth.[11] Consequently, the technological and organizational revolution of the nineteenth century, which disrupted this base, forced the city to seek integration in an industrializing system emphasizing continental linkages. Thus, following the decline of its port-based wealth in the 1870's and having realized by the 1880's that the basis of that previous prosperity would never be regained, the city worked towards acquiring a rail connection to central Canada. Acquisition of this connection was predicated on the ability of the city to provide a particular service to the larger system, that is, as an ocean port. Hence, during the 1880's the significance of the transport node for Saint John resulted from the eventual perception by the municipal government of economic recovery's synchronous nature in the port and in the city. However, unable either to expend the necessary funds itself or secure these in sufficient quantity from the provincial government, the city resorted to a common alternative in the late nineteenth-century North America — federal aid.[12] This alternative singularly demonstrated the increasing scale of transport and organization throughout the country.

Seeking federal assistance, however, was not without difficulty. Competition with Halifax for winter port status resulted in a sobering realization of the position of the port within the transport hierarchy. Dependent upon an external agency — the federal government — Saint John waited until the mid-1890's before linking into a national transportation system. Throughout the negotiations with Ottawa and the Canadian Pacific Railway, the city presented the port as a winter appendage to Montreal.[13] This civic response to integration suggests the need for analyzing transport nodes within a national administrative unit.[14] For although concern over the competitive abilities of Portland, Maine was real, by positioning itself within the Montreal transport matrix, Saint John hoped to diminish that threat through a Canadian inter-nodal association.[15] Again viewing Saint John within a national system of cities, Ottawa's role in encouraging cooperative competition between Canada's two Maritime ports becomes apparent. Consequently, the presence of two port cities on the Atlantic resulted in the recognition by Ottawa of a dual transport primate within the Maritimes.[16] This recognition was sustained during the early years of Prime Minister Borden's government. However, increasing use of Portland, Maine, especially after World War I, threatened the Maritime ports and contributed to the rise of the Maritime Rights movement. For the Port of Saint John, one result of the Duncan Commission's Report[17] became the nationalization of the harbour in 1927. This development at once removed local control from the community, while intensifying the level of vertical integration within a national system of transportation.

Although not experiencing population growth similar to other Canadian cities,[18] Saint John as a socio-spatial unit still underwent organizational and spatial changes resulting from nodal integration into a national system of cities. These changes were observable in the occupational structures[19] and relationship between the city's power centres — the elected members of the Saint John Common Council and the voluntary membership of the Saint John Board of Trade. Each performed a function in regard to the port.[20] The Common Council was primarily concerned with civic self-service functions, such as operating the ferry, disposing of water lots and other "housekeeping" duties associated with port management. The Board was more intimately connected with the performance of external functions.[21] Struggling to gain greater control over the port facilities which increasingly became identified with trade potential in the 1880's and 1890's, members of the Board of Trade succeeded in obtaining positions in the municipal government. Thus, organizationally at the municipal level, increasing participation by the Common Council in discussions related to the external functions of the port indicated an emerging coalescence of opinion stimulated by the presence on the Council of Board of Trade members. In this regard, members of Saint John's power centre experienced changes similar to other late nineteenth-century cities.[22]

Associated with the above organizational changes, the spatial evolution of the Port of Saint John reflected the extent to which national integration had contributed to the process of succession in types of land-use. In particular, each of the following areas, during the years indicated, displayed varying degrees of social and spatial dominance along the waterfront:[23]

1. The Market Slip-Long Wharf, encompassing that section of harbourfront extending from the Long Wharf to approximately Reed's Point and dominant during 1867-1879 (Part One, Chapters I-IV);
2. The Reed's Point-Lower Cove section located at the southern end of the main peninsula and dominant during 1879-1895 (Part Two, Chapters V-VII);
3. The Carleton or West Side waterfront, incorporating the entire harbour area of the Carleton peninsula and dominant during 1895-1911 (Part Three, Chapters VII-X);
4. The Port of Saint John referring to the three major harbour areas with a consideration of Courtenay Bay and dominant during 1911-1927 (Part Four, Chapters XI-XII).

In summary, by focusing on a transport node — the Port of Saint John — the chapters to follow attempt to illustrate how the relationships among population, environment, technology and organization — the four central variables of the ecological perspective — effected, and were influenced by, the city's endeavours to cope with its changed situation.[24]

# PART ONE: 1867 - 1879

## MARKET SLIP-LONG WHARF:
## THE ATLANTIC YEARS OF A MARITIME PORT


LILY LAKE
LOVITT'S POINT
FERRY
ST. JOHN
Spar Cove
Creek
INDIANTOWN
L A N D
EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN RAILWAY
MARSH CREEK
Fort Howe
MARBLE COVE
RIVER
P O R T
UNION POINT
Reversing Falls
LEES COVE
KINGS
WELLINGTON
DUKES
QUEENS
SYDNEY
HARBOUR
Navy Is.
Strait Shore Road
FERRY
COURTENAY BAY
CROUCHVILLE
FAIRVILLE
GUYS
ROONEY SLIP
REED'S POINT
LOWER COVE
BALLAST WHARF
SAND POINT
PROTECTION STREET
ALBERT
BROOKS
LANCASTER
HEIGHTS
CARLETON WEST SIDE
MAIN PENINSULA EAST SIDE
EAST SAINT JOHN
DUCK COVE
—1867—
The City of Saint John
0
923
1846
2769
3692 FT.
Port
Development

Figure 1

# CHAPTER I

# *The Pedestrian Waterfront of a Confederation Port — 1867*

Revealing his intention to write a general history of New Brunswick in 1895, William F. Ganong suggested: "First of all must be treated the physical environment . . ."[1] Perhaps this foremost New Brunswick scholar would have agreed that the Port of Saint John, located at the mouth of a significant river system which emptied from a "well sheltered nook"[2] into the Bay of Fundy on the Atlantic Ocean, depended for its growth, as did its mercantile contemporaries,[3] on the central position it occupied in a water-based transportation network.[4] For the port-city of Saint John this inevitably meant that the focus of localized activity centred along the waterfront area.

Ironically, the river system from which the port drew much of its wealth was responsible as well for dividing the city and surrounding area into a number of peninsulas which subsequently affected not only early and future urban development[5] but also helped to determine the spatial relationships within, and organization along, the harbourfront. Three rather distinct areas of activity emerged: The Market Slip-Long Wharf area, the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area and the Carleton or West Side Waterfront.[6]

## The Market Slip-Long Wharf Area

Taking a walk along the compact Saint John waterfront in 1867, a pedestrian would have concluded that the harbour area was not only ". . . the focal point of all the main transport systems in the City . . ."[7] but, in particular, that the Market Slip-Long Wharf area was the vortex of an extensive inter- and intra-city transport network. Here at the head of Market Slip was the junction of Prince William and King Streets, the principal thoroughfares of the city, with Water and Dock Streets also playing important roles.[8] At the beginning of the nineteenth century almost the entire business district had been confined to these streets.[9] Piers were constructed and most of the basic outlines of the Market Slip-Long Wharf area were completed during the first twenty years of the city's existence.[10] By mid-century this area had emerged to its Confederation dimensions.[11]

Dominating the Market Slip wharves in the 1800's and retaining their prominence throughout the century were the commission merchants, brokers and auctioneers whose personal wealth was intimately tied to the port.[12] Commissioning ships to carry timber overseas, acting on behalf of foreign exporters, and conducting an extensive trade with the up-river communities as well as the Bay of Fundy outports, their influence was not limited exclusively to the economic sphere.[13] Contributing also to the commercial atmosphere of this locale was the Market Square situated at the foot of King Street to which farmers came with their produce — often from as far away as Sussex.[14] Hence, within a relatively small subsection of the harbour exchanges ranging from penny market purchases to major import-export negotiations proceeded simultaneously. Prominent, too, among the Market Slip retinue were the unemployed workmen who congregated along the busy sections of the waterfront providing a constant pool of casual labour.[15]

In 1839, Lauchlan Donaldson[16] observed the pivotal location of this area ". . . trade never seems to run to the lower parts of a Harbour bordering on a peninsula and where the roads leading into the country must of course lead from the upper parts . . ."[17] Donaldson's intimation that the Market Slip had become the natural focus for traffic confluences in this mercantile community was no doubt reinforced by the new street additions made to expedite surface traffic to the outlying areas of the city.[18]

Leaving Market Square and walking on to Prince William Street one entered an extension of the Market Slip. On the corner of King and Prince William Streets, in the early years of the city, the "Exchange Coffee House" served as a business and social centre until 1853 when it was removed to be replaced, eventually and perhaps appropriately, by a bank.[19]

The buildings along Prince William Street, as in most of the city, averaged about two or three stories, giving Saint John the appearance of a large town.[20] The street itself appears to have been dominated by the nineteenth-century communications men. The Saint John office of the American Telegraph Company was located here, as well as the majority of the city's bankers, printers, insurance agents, and lawyers. The latter were especially prominent on the street with some twenty firms offering their legal expertise. Some of the more notable law offices, such as Forbes and Sinnott, advertised their political and commercial references, among them: The Hon. S.L. Tilley and P. Mitchell, both of Ottawa, and The Wright Brothers of Liverpool — names which represented a new political, and an old commercial, linkage.[21]

Interspersed among the establishments depending primarily on port related activities for their livelihoods were the various specialty shops and services: merchant tailors, milliners, watchmakers and jewellers, hairdressers, a photographer and an upholsterer, the last catering, perhaps, to numerous business offices. Some dry goods stores were also on Prince William; however, by Confederation King Street provided the city with the more fashionable shopping address. In delineating areas of dominant activity in Saint John, however, it must be recalled that the peninsula formation placed a natural restraint on the availability of space, augmented by the lack of an internal transport system. Thus, the principal streets reflected a mixed land-use pattern.[22]

**The Reed's Point-Lower Cove Area**

Continuing down Prince William Street, past Chubb's Corner (site of the long-established firm of H. Chubb & Company) a walking tour would lead to the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area, the landing place for most of the Loyalists.[23] The location of the first framed house in Saint John, a church erected on the east side of Germain between Duke and Queen Streets, further substantiates the initial importance of this area.[24] As well, when the Lower Cove Breakwater[25] was built in 1815, ". . . quite a number of old coffins were found in the bank, containing the bones of some persons who had been buried there . . ."[26] But to an observer in 1867, having walked the area from Market Slip to Saint James Street and thus seen what Robert Hazen[27] in 1839 referred to as the "entire business range,"[28] the Lower Cove represented a different use of waterfront space. Here, for instance, was the Military Ground with its barracks accommodation of 2,000[29] which had been built in that area around 1820.[30]

To the harbour of Saint John at Confederation, the Reed's Point area represented the focus of technological change in ocean transport. This was visible, not only in the larger wharf areas[31] which departed from the narrow slips outlining the harbour north of this area, but, more importantly in the communication alternative presented by the several lines of steamers which headquartered at Reed's Point.[32] Although steamships would not revolutionize shipping in the Maritimes until the late 1870's,[33] they affected passenger travel years earlier.[34] Civic recognition of these transport changes was reflected in the construction of the Reed's Point Wharf, commenced in the early 1850's by the City of Saint John.[35] Subsequent City *Annual Reports* also reflect the financial commitment involved in the "Reed's Point Steamboat landing . . ."[36] By 1867, steamers to Windsor and Digby, N.S., as well as to Portland, Maine and Boston, Massachusetts departed regularly from this section of the harbour.[37] Reed's Point was the most popular departure area for Bay of Fundy destinations and Halifax until 1873 when an all rail Saint John-Halifax route provided another transport alternative between these two cities.[38] Reed's Point was also the first part of the "inland route" to Canada which involved a steamer to Portland and, then, the railway to Canada. Prior to Grand Trunk service in 1853, the route followed was a steamer to Boston or New York and then a railway to Canada.[39]

To the casual stroller in 1867, the historical development of the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area would not have been immediately apparent. However, the presence of Small and Hatheway's Union Line Bay and River Steamers servicing the Saint John-Nova Scotia routes and the International Company's coastal operations to Portland and Boston foreshadowed the future locale of the first federally sponsored deep water terminus at Saint John.[40] Having completed a tour of this harbour area, it would be necessary to retrace some steps along Prince William Street before being offered an alternative route, *via* Water Street, to the ferry which served as an internal highway between the the main peninsula on which the city proper was located and the western peninsula, Carleton, the site of the third primary harbour area.

Turning left off Prince William Street *en route* to Water Street several fish stores and a few vacant lots would be passed, the former of which provided a suitable introduction to this "most waterfront" of streets. Beginning at the Market Square, Water Street ran in a southerly direction for three blocks where it intersected with Duke Street. Claiming among its buildings a high proportion of the less visually attractive structures of this mercantile city, Water Street had evolved in 1867 as the "back alley" of Prince William Street. In fact, at least one wholesale grocer, Jardine and Company, fronted on Prince William Street, while its warehouse fronted on Water Street.[41] The activity located on Water Street presented a striking contrast to the proliferation of municipal, business and legal offices on Prince William Street. Proceeding onto Water Street one would first encounter the Fish Market Wharf, located within convenient access to and yet, a respectably inoffensive distance from, the Market Slip area. Here, in this principal outlet, a dozen or so fish dealers and fishermen, whose surnames generally reflected a later than Loyalist migration, haggled over prices with a clientele drawn throughout the city.[42]

The Princess Street steam ferry which operated in 1867 represented almost three decades of scheduled service between the two sides of the harbour.[43] Prior to 1840 crossing the harbour was effected in the less than regular running of small boats and scows.[44] It was not until 1837 that residents in Carleton and the city proper began to agitate for better internal communication.[45]

In response to this demand and, also recognizing the need, the Saint John Common Council, reflecting its concern for the intra-city services of the harbour, purchased a lot at the foot of Princess Street[46] which, in 1867, continued to serve as the East Side ferry slip landing. Significantly, the ferry landing was located as near to the Market Slip as possible while enabling it to draw on the east-west surface traffic on Princess Street.[47] Assistance towards improving the service was granted in 1839 by the New Brunswick Legislature.[48] As well, the terminal points of the service were completed in 1840 when the city acquired a lot at Sand Point, Carleton, thereby establishing the first ferry landing on the West Side.[49]

By Confederation, however, improvements on the Carleton Mill Pond had permitted the construction of various slips along the point of that peninsula. And so the ferry ran from the Princess Street Slip to Rodney Slip, Carleton ". . . except at low water [and] spring tides, when the passengers [were] landed at Sand Point."[50] Before boarding the ferry an adult paid four cents to the collector. Thus, having walked about a mile along the East Side of the waterfront, the passenger could contemplate the approaching visit to Carleton as the ferry, which some referred to as the city's highway,[51] made its short journey across the harbour.[52]

## The Carleton or West Side Waterfront

Approaching Carleton, one of the many place names in Canada which commemorated Sir Guy Carleton,[53] the landscape of this least populated part of Saint John[54] appeared to ascend steadily from the Flats of the Mill Pond to the hill on which Martello Tower stood.[55] Disembarking at Rodney Slip and walking along the planked wharf to Union Street, the pedestrian was immediately introduced to the future pivotal section of Carleton's waterfront. Union Street, from which the largest Carleton wharves fronted, roughly followed the contours of the dyke shown on earlier maps. Construction of these wharves had been retarded by the presence of the Mill Pond (bounded approximately by Union, Watson, Saint John and Rodney Streets). As any nineteenth-century walker had to notice, the Mill Pond continued to obstruct street access to the Wellington, Nelson, Rodney and Sand Point Slips.[56]

In turning left and walking down Union Street towards the Sand Point Slip, the stroller traversed a part of the future route of the Carleton Branch Railway.[57] Recognition of the transport potential of Carleton's waterfront location,[58] and thus, the beginning of a more complete economic and social integration within the City of Saint John, had begun in the mid-1850's when reciprocity raised the spectre of a possible railroad connection to the United States.[59] Eventually becoming known as the Western Extension, the genesis of this road had emerged first as a small but crucial link in a grander scheme, the European and North American Railway, proposed by John A. Poor,[60] a Maine entrepreneur.

By the mid-1860's, however, Western Extension had become almost synonomous with anti-Confederation sentiment in Saint John.[61] When negotiations with Canada regarding an intercolonial road stalled, the prospects of the temporarily dormant Western Extension project received renewed encouragement.[62] Under authorization from the Provincial Secretary in 1863, Edward R. Burpee, Poor's agent in New Brunswick,[63] surveyed the possible routes through which a rail connection between Saint John and the border could be effected.[64] Essentially the two alternatives hinged on whether or not to bridge the River at the Falls.[65]

In 1865, a company heavily subsidized through the provisions of the Railway Facility Act of 1864,[66] began construction of the road to Maine near Fairville,[67] a locale from which either of Burpee's harbour alternatives could be pursued.[68] Although this first attempt at constructing a road west failed in part because the Reciprocity Treaty was abrogated,[69] a second attempt begun in August 1867 and considerably supported by the Province,[70] completed the 88 miles between Fairville and McAdam, N.B. in 1869.[71]

Standing at the corner of Union and Minnitte Streets which became the approximate location of the freight spur of the Carleton Branch, one of the alternatives originally surveyed by E. R. Burpee, the Confederation pedestrian might not have imagined that the waterfront before him "... where vessels ... |laid| ... aground and load|ed| lumber and shooks ... ,"[72] would in thirty years embody the major waterfront activity of the port and symbolize not an anti-Confederation venture but rather, both the participation of the Carleton within Saint John, and Saint John within a Canadian system of cities.

Turning and walking up Union Street the stroller would pass the Mill Pond on the left and the potentially commodious, although currently silt-filled, Carleton slips on the right. Perhaps noting the location of Carleton's Water Street, the pedestrian might have perceived the Union Street development as a challenge to the logic of the eighteenth-century surveyors who indiscriminately stamped East coast cities with repetitious gridirons[73] and confidently presumed, in an age of water-based transport, that population and activity would continue to focus on the area which they had designated as Water Street.

The street patterns of Carleton were oriented towards the Falls and the Portland Straight Shore, as well towards the Fairville area. Moreover, in the early nineteenth century a West Side promoter had "... proposed a bridge in extension of Watson Street, West, to cross the river to Portland below the gorge."[74] And so it may be fairly assumed that in the early development of Carleton, Prince and Watson Streets served a function similar to that of Prince

William and King Streets on the East Side. Hence, the initial waterfront function of Carleton was primarily to handle internal harbour and river system traffic and, thus, by inference it was subsidiary to the waterfront function of the East Side. By mid-century, however, the demands for waterfront space by industries which required a fair amount of land area[75] had prompted the improvements on the point of Carleton peninsula. Union Street became the locale of lumber and shooks while Water Street retained a local service character. In regard to waterfront functions, then, Carleton experienced two types of change: first, it moved from a primarily internal service harbour to a combined internal and external service harbour; and secondly (and this change it shared with the East Side), it moved from a water-based transport node to a water-rail based transport node. In the first change, however, the combined service had resulted not in an imposition of external functions upon the Water Street harbour but rather in the development of a new harbour locale, Union Street, to handle the external functions. Thus, in 1867 and for some time after, the Carleton Waterfront had less internal cohesiveness than its harbour partner on the East Side. Or as one tourist guide advised: "The streets of Carleton are as yet in a transition state, and do not invite a long sojourn."[76]

Reaching the corner of King and Union Streets and turning on to King Street, a walker would pass the firm of Andrew F. Andrews, the first brush manufacturer in New Brunswick.[77] By Confederation, King and Union Streets contained sixteen of the twenty-two retail grocery outlets in Carleton. Predictably, most of these stores were located in Guys Ward, the most populous West Side ward, and the majority also had a King or Union Street address.[78] Walking along King Street and arriving at the Market Place intersection, the pedestrian would be reminded again of the isolated development which Carleton had experienced despite its political integrity within the City of Saint John.

In the era prior to a bridge at the Falls or regularized ferry service" . . . farmers living on the western side of the Saint John did all their business in Carleton and did not cross the harbour at all |thus| the farmers living along the Kennebecasis had a practical monopoly on |the more lucrative| East side market."[79] In fact, the community life of the two sides of the harbour was perceived to be so independently self-contained that a visitor in 1844 had remarked: ". . . the city |East Side| presents itself with its houses appearing like so many blocks of wood piled one on top of another in strange disorder . . . |whereas| . . . Carlton |sic| is a pleasant place . . . and the day is not far distant when Carlton |sic| will be to Saint John, what Brooklyn now is to New York."[80] By 1867 the coming addition of the railroad to Carleton's transport node was accelerating the West Side's economic and social integration within the city.

Having completed a stroll of the major waterfront sections of the city, an alternate route back to the Market Slip-Long Wharf area was provided by the Suspension Bridge. The third and only successful attempt to span the harbour,[81] the Suspension Bridge completed in 1854 had been designed by Edward W. Serrell and promoted by William K. Reynolds, a New Englander who resided in Saint John.[82] Hiring a hack at the King and Ludlow Street livery stable of William C. Brittain,[83] the waterfront pedestrian would be driven out of Carleton *via* a slightly circuitous route along Water Street and thence on to the Prince Street extension to the bridge. Before turning right at the intersection of Manawagonish and Bridge Roads, the Provincial Asylum, "a splendid building"[84] erected in 1848 by Otis Small of Small and Hatheway,[85] would be passed. From the bridge approach a glimpse could be obtained of several sections of the harbour and Navy Island. Midway across this only toll bridge in the province,[86] a factor which undoubtedly impeded its extensive use by all classes, the lumber mills between Union Point and the Lower Falls came into view as the hackney entered the Portland peninsula—a functional extension of the Market Slip-Long Wharf area.

## Return to the Market Slip-Long Wharf Area via Indiantown and Portland Point

Having crossed the Suspension Bridge, and again resumed walking, a right turn would bring the waterfront pedestrian onto the Straight Shore. Previously the location of several shipyards, this stretch of harbourfront was now dominated by saw mills and the combination shipyard and saw mill operations of Thomas Hilyard.[87] As Allan Pred has observed, heavy consumers of waterfront acreage were located at the peripheries of urban areas.[88] In this respect then, the presence of the saw mills and the earlier occupation by the shipyards along the Straight Shore, suggests the Confederation periphery of population density within Saint John.

To the Confederation observer, perhaps, struck by the diminution of shipbuilding along the Straight Shore, only upon reaching Thomas Hilyard's operation would any vestige of the earlier industry be visible. The remaining Saint John ship builders whose yards generally were composed of a skilled shipwright and a gang of men handy with axe, edge and auger,[89] were now largely concentrated in the Courtenay Bay area.[90] Unable organizationally or technologically to compete with developments in British shipbuilding,[91] or to gauge the market conditions in Liverpool,[92] they and Hilyard watched as their industry underwent several changes[93] against the background of a province-wide depression.[94]

Among the immediate changes were the departures of some prominent shipbuilders, notably Richard Wright in 1857 and his brother William who joined him in Liverpool in the spring of 1867.[95] For those who stayed, specifically Thomas Hilyard, adjustment in business operations were mandatory. Hence, the Hilyard shipyard in 1852 became the Hilyard Shipyard and Steam Mill in 1854, the latter having been effected ". . . partly to maintain his business during the frequent ebbs in shipbuilding."[96] Further adaptations within the industry were acknowledged by J. W. Lawrence when in 1867 he touted the facilities at Saint John for repairing ships, claiming that ". . . this is a new branch of industry."[97] Perhaps Lawrence was thinking of, among others, Hilyard's shipyard which by 1870 included, specifically for ship repairing "a marine railway to carry vessels out of the water."[98] In this respect then, the ability of Thomas Hilyard to sustain his shipyard may have been partially attributable to further diversification and a possible re-emphasis from the manufacture to the service and repair of ships.[99] However explicable, to the waterfront pedestrian of 1867, Hilyard's shipyard represented all that remained of a once vibrant shipbuilding industry on the Straight Shore.

Leaving Hilyard's at the foot of Sheriff Street and walking up towards Main, a left turn would bring the stroller on to the principal highway between the Market Slip wharves and Indiantown, a section of Portland.[100] The streets of Portland, having escaped the gridiron pattern[101] and having evolved instead in response to the demands of commerce and within the limits of topography, might have appeared "somewhat irregular"[102] to the pedestrian who had just completed a tour of Carleton and the East Side of the harbour. Walking along Main Street the pedestrian would cross Douglas Avenue, which ran parallel to the Straight Shore Road on the Portland peninsula. By at least 1862 Douglas Avenue was becoming a residential area for some of the Portland commercial elite who could afford harbour view homes within reasonable accessibility to their work locations.[103]

## Indiantown — A Secondary Harbour

Continuing along Main Street, ". . . the great thoroughfare leading from the Market Square, in the City of Saint John, to Indiantown . . .,"[104] the pedestrian strolled along one of the busiest streets at the mouth of the River and passed a number of stores which compared favourably to those on King Street.[105] Through its stores, factories and residences, Main Street reflected the typical mixed land-use of urban areas patterned before the advent of internal surface transit systems.[106] Thus, the homes of the prominent men shared the same street address as Prince and Shaw, the largest carriage manufacturer in the County.[107] Walking leisurely towards

Indiantown Harbour, the pedestrian would pass the major streets which touched Main: Adelaide, Albert, Charles, and Bridge Streets. Noticeable also would be the increasing density of land-use within the two block approach to the Indiantown harbour front.[108] Main Street, over which much of the merchandise passing up or down the River was carried,[109] led directly to the Public Wharf and Hamm's Building, the principal office building in Indiantown.

Standing on the Public Landing, the approach to which was delimited on one side by Hamm's Building and on the other by Carle and Vaughn's retail grocery,[110] a glance in either direction brought all the activity of this tributary to the harbour of Saint John into view. Bounded on the north by the saw mills of Robert Rankin and Company,[111] and on the south by Rowan's Shipyard, the latter, however, not as active as in earlier times,[112] the Indiantown waterfront displayed the same land-use characteristics as the harbours of Saint John and Carleton: large consumers of waterfront acreage were located at the peripheries.

The central focus of this secondary harbour was the Public Landing from which ferries departed across the River to Pleasant Point as well as to destinations on the Saint John tributaries. Many of the latter retained their earliest Indian place names: Kennebecasis, Washademoak and Jemseg.[113] The cross river ferry, when linked to the street railway which would run from Hamm's Building in Indiantown to the Market Slip wharves, provided a more accessible route to the centre city for the lumber mill communities on the upper west side of the river than did the Carleton Ferry.[114] Similarly, the up river steamers, capable of making a round trip to Fredericton within a day,[115] underscored Indiantown's position as a transfer point in a transportation continuum which had existed since 1779.[116] Further, the occupations of some prominent Bridge Street residents such as John Tapley, a steamboat owner, David Johnson, a hotel proprietor and Moses Tuck, a lumber surveyor, reinforced the dual function of this harbour community towards transport and lumber. Indiantown represented a community which had emerged through, and was sustained by, its "gateway" position.[117]

## Portland Point

Hiring a coach from among the many which generally congregated along Bridge Street awaiting the arrival of up river steamers,[118] the water front tourist would begin the approximately one-mile journey back towards the Long Wharf-Market Slip area on the Main Street route eventually to become the site of the first street railway.[119] As the coach passed between Adelaide Street, the road farthest removed from Indiantown harbour, and Fort Howe Hill, a glance to the right would again reveal the Douglas Avenue artery of the Portland peninsula with its residential profile. Similarly, glancing left would disclose the non-extensive land-use beyond those structures which fronted on the north side of Main Street.

To a Confederation visitor the difference in degree of settlement between the area north of Main between Adelaide and Fort Howe Hill and south of Main between Harrison and Portland Streets would have been most apparent. The latter area had been originally established by the trading firm of Simonds, Hazen and White in the 1760's.[120] At the foot of Portland Street, known originally as Portland Point, and which later researchers were to call "the crossroads of New Brunswick History,"[121] was the site of the firm's, long since decayed, main trading post. Although the primary intention of the company had been trade and not settlement,[122] a community composed of the company's employees and their families did evolve in the Long Wharf vicinity prior to the arrival of the Loyalists.[123] In fact, Portland's Main Street had been originally laid out as the "Road to Ye Indian House," the latter having been established in 1779. In 1867, however, the area bounded by Main on the north, Straight Shore Road and Camden on the south, Harrison on the west and Acadia on the east was composed largely of workingmen, a significant number of whom identified themselves as labourers.[124]

## Arrival at Market Slip-Long Wharf

Leaving the Portland Point area and continuing on Main towards the Mill Bridge which led to the Market Square, the coach would pass Long Wharf, the most prominent Portland wharf extending into the Saint John harbour. Long Wharf, the Market Slip wharves, the harbourfront which they encapsulated, and the surrounding surface area constituted the focal point of the internal and external transport systems at the mouth of the river.

As the coach passed over the Mill Bridge, constructed in 1786[125] to facilitate communication between the Market Square and Indiantown,[126] a glance to the left would have revealed the Harris Foundry.[127] This enterprise had occupied the same site since 1831, having been built on the north side of the then existing Mill Pond. To the waterfront observer, Portland, which served as the locale of several highly visible industries, such as the foundry, shipyards, lumber mills, a cotton mill and the largest carriage factory, might have been suggested visually as the most extensive site for manufacturing in the harbourfront community. Nevertheless, manufacturing industries were scattered throughout both Portland and Saint John City in an essentially mixed land-use pattern common to pre-internal surface transit cities of the nineteenth century,[128] and augmented by the peninsula formations comprising the City of Saint John.

Approaching the Pond Street intersection and continuing to glance left, the waterfront tourist would observe the rail line of the

European and North American Railway as it skirted the northern rim of the city. The linkage of rail and water facilities within the perimeters of the Long Wharf-Market Slip area signified the dominant position of that waterfront locale, which had been evident from the early 1800's. Moreover, while the railway was an indication of expanding commercial interests, it also symbolized a steadily growing emphasis on the importance of agriculture and home manufactures.

In this context the general applicability of Allan Pred's observation that "by the 1850's far sighted communities realized that commerce exclusively would be limiting"[129] is underscored by the 1840 formation of the New Brunswick Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture, Home Manufactures and Commerce.[130] Undoubtedly the 1846-1848 import-export returns for the Port of Saint John as well as the prevailing opinion of the lumber trade "that . . . as . . . the leading industry . . . it overshadowed and lowered the social condition of every other," had stimulated consideration of other alternatives.[131] Thus, in 1847, the railway report of M. H. Perley, the Government emigration agent,[132] pressed for the extension of a railway "eastward through the fertile vale of Sussex to Shediac . . ."[133]

Predictable inter-community jealousies in a Province drained by two significant river systems, prohibited immediate governmental assistance for the project.[134] Hence, it languished until renewed stimulus came from the Portland (Me.) railway convention of 1850, held to promote the international scheme of John A. Poor—the European and North American Railway. Speaking at that convention on behalf of the businessmen of Saint John, James McFarlane pledged the city's financial community to the spirit of the meeting and added: "the trading class . . . would contribute to the full extent of their means."[135] Reflecting growing public support for the line, the Saint John-Shediac railway was to be built, but now, in conjunction with an international scheme. It was called, therefore, the European and North American Railway and through it, the Port of Saint John already touching Bay and River waters, would eventually touch the Northumberland Strait.[136]

Viewing the wharf which served as the Saint John freight terminus for the railway, the waterfront tourist might have assumed that rail-water connection was an integral part of the original plan. However, this had not been the case. Surveys were taken initially from the head of the Mill Pond at Saint John to Milner's Point at Shediac,[137] and in 1852 the Province contracted the promotion-construction firm of Peto, Betts, Jackson and Brassey to build the road.[138] At Saint John, in September 1853, three months after the opening of the Grand Trunk Railway to Portland, the first sod for the European and North American Railway was turned to the applause of various notables, among them, Samuel Leonard Tilley, who became a director in the company.[139]

Despite the enthusiastic beginnings, the contractors went into bankruptcy before completing the first portion of the road: Shediac to Moncton.[140] As a result, the Province took over the railway and appointed three commissioners, one of whom was Robert Jardine,[141] a prominent Saint John grocer,[142] as well as one of the founding members of the New Brunswick Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture, Home Manufactures, and Commerce.[143] The commissioners made a few slight alterations in the route and were assisted in this readjustment by Henry G. C. Ketchum, the first candidate to receive a civil engineering diploma from the University of New Brunswick.[144] Each section of the generally well constructed road was opened upon completion, with the first through run taking place in August 1860.[145]

Although the Perley railway report had emphasized the potential benefits to be gained by the port in the transshipment of intervale produce and Gulf fisheries, in both the report of 1847 and the report of John Wilkinson in 1850, the authors had stressed the reciprocating dependence, which would emerge "between the producer and consumer or between town and country," as a result of the railway.[146] Specifically, Perley suggested that "manufacturing villages would be established near the Railway stations," although he lamented "that no effort has yet been made to ascertain the condition of [the already existing] several branches of industry" in Saint John.[147] The absence of such an industrial survey might be explained in the nature of the well developed Saint John industries. In common with those of other mid-nineteenth century east coast cities they were "either directly or indirectly linked to mercantile functions . . ."[148] and, hence, were perceived as adjuncts to, rather than distinct from, factory enterprises.

In the early 1860's the City of Saint John witnessed, together with its railway connection, a stimulus in manufacturing occasioned by the U.S. Civil War and the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty.[149] A substantial number of factories were located in Kings, Prince and Wellington Wards producing articles primarily for local use, but increasingly for a Provincial and export market.[150] Thus, the railway proved to be a paying investment and its freight traffic necessitated both an enlargement of storage space and a rail extension along the Mill Pond to the waterfront.[151]

Although the Mill Pond had not been included in the original railway survey of 1850, it had figured prominently in the station alternatives proposed by the government railway commissioners after 1857. Surely the desirability of acquiring waterfront acreage within the confines of the Long Wharf-Market Slip area focused attention on the Mill Pond. Its location at the head of the main peninsula had helped to determine surface traffic patterns since the early nineteenth century, and would have provided the railway with a compactly integrated rail-wharf and rail-yard.

More recently, however, the Mill Pond had become the object of severe citicism following the cholera epidemic of 1854.[152] In fact, its condition was considered so detrimental to public health that Doctor William Bayard suggested the "whole of the pond be filled up as soon as practicable with solid material having proper drains running through it."[153] Quite possibly the railway commissioners concurred with Doctor Bayard's observation, but as Robert Jardine reported in 1858: "Finding that the price demanded for the five acres in the Mill Pond was £39,000 . . . the Commissioners after much consultation with the Chief Engineer . . . determined to place the passenger station on the track between Dorchester and Garden Streets . . . and the engine and car station at Gilbert's Lane . . ."[154] By 1864, however, traffic demands had persuaded the Province to extend the freight terminus to the waterfront and, thus, the railway commissioners could report that in the following year, "there |would| be sufficient track to hold thirty freight cars, and 1,120 feet of wharf face for the accommodation of vessels and scows . . ."[155]

Perhaps the events culminating in the location of the first railway wharf at Saint John might have been unknown to the waterfront tourist of 1867. Nonetheless, the immediate effects resulting from the presence of a railway terminus, within the perimeters of the busiest section of the waterfront, would have been unmistakable. Aside from forming the centre of "a broadening urban network,"[156] the railway wharf reinforced the dominant section of this peninsula city.

Similarly the railway contributed to the already perceptible stirrings of suburbanization in the surrounding area. A mid-century visitor to Saint John had remarked that "the town . . . situated upon a rocky peninsula . . . is now extending itself in various directions over the adjoining crags and hallows |sic|."[157] However, it appears that the cholera epidemic of 1854 initially "led many to consider the advantages of suburban residence."[158]Thus, for I. Allen Jack the significant period was 1855-1865 when, following the construction of the railway, "the population and number of holdings became larger" in the Valley vicinity."[159] Here the prominent such as Edwin Fisher, a timber merchant, William Venning, a jeweler and Robert Reed, a merchant and tobacco manufacturer, built their homes on or near Mount Pleasant Avenue. This street afforded its residents the prestige of a select locale, both removed from, and yet accessible to the central business district.[160]

Railway-induced suburbanization was scarcely limited to the more desirable areas of Portland. In fact, with the apparent approval of Robert Jardine, the railway surveyors of the mid 1850's had made up a number of place names along the route of the European and North American Railway.[161] At one such station, Quispamsis, a "shanty town" was established "to accommodate the Irish labourers" who were working on the line.[162] Also, in reducing the time and cost of travelling between the centre city and outlying area,[163] the railway enabled a village such as Rothesay to develop partially as a commuter community.[164] Essentially, however, the effect of the railway on the several Kennebecasis communities through which it passed, was similar to its influence on the Long Wharf-Market Slip area: It reinforced a dominant area which had been predicated on water transport and, thus, confirmed the pre-railway spatial patterns.[165]

## Market Slip: The Focus . . . of the Ecological Complex

Surely this dominance would have been evident to the waterfront tourist as the coach which brought him from Indiantown moved in concert with the continuous traffic directed towards the Market Slip area. Passing along Dock Street, the variety of businesses again unveiled the familiar mixed land-use with its complement of manufactures, druggists, clothiers and retail grocers. The last, perhaps, serviced the Irish labourers who inhabited the immediate neighbourhood in a residential pattern analogous to that of other nineteenth-century cities.[166]

Reaching the Market Slip wharves, from which the initial stroll had commenced, the waterfront tourist would have returned to the hub of the city's internal and external transport systems. Here at the head of the main peninsula, the several transport life lines converged to sustain the dominance of the Market Slip-Long Wharf area. Poised at the nexus of King and Prince William Streets the Market Slip area radiated its influence throughout Saint John harbour and equally through the Saint John river system with the assistance of the Mill-Main Street thoroughfare and Indiantown harbour. The railway provided this area with an opportunity to reinforce its connection with the Kennebecasis communities and to extend its system of tributaries to the Northumberland Strait. Similarly, the Market Slip exercised control over the city's internal transport as it contained the ferry terminal and would become the terminus of a proposed street railway.

Glancing around the Market Slip area in 1867, a waterfront pedestrian might not have guessed that the next thirty years would find this section important largely in the city's internal transport system. By 1897 Carleton emerged as the centre of the city's external connection. The latter permitted Saint John to enter the Canadian system of cities by providing a national service through its transport node.[167]

## CHAPTER II

# *A Maritime Port: Consolidating the Pre-Confederation Transport Network 1867-1872*

At the Port of Saint John the years immediately following Confederation were characterized by efforts to integrate the subsystems of the city's transport network: the streets, the railways and the ferry.[1] Viewed independently these segments of the transport complex might appear only superficially related. However, when they are considered interdependently it becomes apparent that by the early 1870's these components of an essentially pre-Confederation transport inheritance had coalesced to re-affirm the continuing dominance of the Market Slip. By examining in this chapter the city as a socio-spatial unit, this dominance emerges in a social sense through the Common Council's attempt to improve streets and docks; the Board of Trade's concern over railways, and the ferry difficulties which plagued both. Moreover of equal importance, the dominance of the Market Slip—in itself merely a spatial expression of the local social system within which these transport developments occurred—is sharply defined.

### The Streets and Docks of Saint John

Within the City of Saint John the civic elite[2] comprising the Common Council directed the ordering of streets and the construction of docks. Each activity reflected the city government's pre-occupation with the internal functions of the port. Early twentieth-century commentators were to observe that road construction "in the provinces down by the sea . . . followed closely the direction of the coast and the important river valleys."[3] The port-city revealed a similar orientation towards the heavy traffic areas along the waterfront which determined the priorities of new street construction and repairs to existing routes. In the city's *Annual Report* of 1867 the greatest expenditure for street work was occasioned by the widening of Cross Street which ran between King and Church Streets—one block from the Market Square.[4] Although this work was in part a reflection of the extensive up-grading of streets which had been undertaken in the mid-1860's, the concentrated attention given by the aldermen to construction within the Market Square vicinity and towards the European and North American Railway terminus demonstrated both the dominance of the area and the Council's concern for local implications of port development.[5]

Some indication of the emphasis within the city may be gleaned from an 1866 report, written by the city engineer Hurd Peters, who referred to the allocations for Mill and Union Streets in Kings Ward as well as the placing of plank sidewalks along Mill and Germain Streets. In Queens the ferry approach on Princess Street had been repaired and the sidewalks within the Ward had received "very extensive gravelling . . ." Farther away from the Market Slip, Dukes and Sydney Wards had essentially received maintenance attention. Although at the neck of the city, the Prince Ward streets including St. David, St. Patrick and Brussels had been graded and gravelled, reflecting in part their functions as exits from the city.[6]

The large scale efforts within Kings and Queens Wards noted in this report continued to characterize the city's street work into the early 1870's. In fact, together with Cross Street, later proposals were made to extend Water Street down the harbour to St. James and to widen and straighten Dorchester Street, an access road from the Market Square vicinity to the railway station.[7] Street construction and improvement within the city also tended to fan out from the Market Square.

Consequently, friction arose between the aldermen representing Kings and Queens and those representing Dukes and Sydney, who repeatedly argued that appropriations within the city unduly favoured Kings Ward. Although disagreements among the aldermen over street allocations were generally restricted to the main peninsula, the Carleton members occasionally participated in the dispute generated by Street Committee reports.

Symbolizing both the differing needs and the diffusion of municipal planning within the city, each peninsula determined and directed the street appropriation on its side of the harbour.[8] Under the original City Charter a common fund had been provided for the extension and maintenance of services. However, during the 'thirties and 'forties, Carleton had not grown as rapidly as the main peninsula and thus its need for services declined in proportion to its contribution.[9] The dissatisfied West Side residents were granted the right to assess themselves separately for public services and liabilities under the 1853 Act of Settlement. By the mid-1860's the street construction and improvements anticipated with the coming of the railroads had intensified.[10] Thus the Carleton aldermen repeatedly sought and, frequently were granted, the services of the city engineer, although he was salaried exclusively from East Side or main peninsula funds.[11] The final result for Carleton, and eventually the entire city, was an inferior West Side system of sewers and streets which revealed the absence of professional direction.[12]

At the same time, East Side aldermen in response to the pressure of present rather than anticipated traffic needs, continued to receive tenders for the paving of the well used access roads such as Dock and Mill Streets. Hence, experiments with cobblestone and wood block paving were frequently tried, although by 1871 some aldermen referred "to the folly of spoiling the streets and squandering money in repeating experiments . . ."[13] Perhaps attempting to resolve the street question Alderman Rowan suggested that the city engineer visit other cities to see how streets were constructed.[14]

Summarizing his impressions after a city-funded journey to Portland (Me.), Montreal, Toronto, Detroit, Chicago, New York, and Boston,[15] Peters recommended that "one or more of our main thoroughfares be laid with wood block pavement."[16] Accordingly one of the most frequented city streets—that portion of Prince William between Duke Street and the northerly side of the Market Square—was eventually constructed with "the Boston Wood Pavement".[17] During this period, the issue of street paving overshadowed much of the discussion at Council Meetings and perhaps, for many of the aldermen, it was a more visibly relevant concern than its surface corollary: dock management.

All incumbents were sensitive to the internal dock rhythms of the port city. Especially during the "Atlantic Years", these rhythms were highlighted by the coming of spring.[18] This season signalled the first of Council's annual port duties: the selling of the harbour revenues. Through this process the city managed the wharves, slips and other port connected income properties by leasing them for one year to successful bidders.[19] Other revenue was derived from the port through the selling of the harbour fisheries. Until 1864, the city had simply parcelled out its coastline "into lots of various degrees of eligibility, commencing with No. 1, and declining in value to No. 100."[20] Each January, the Freemen of the city assembled and drew for the fishing berths—those who were successful but not engaged in fishing could sell their lots. This system gained the city nothing. And, quite possibly, in response to the debts incurred through the upgrading of harbour facilities as well as the construction of public works, the Common Council decided to appropriate the fisheries for the city revenue.[21] Since the fisheries had been largely patronized by the Carleton residents, the acquisition may have helped to intensify West Side demands for professional assistance from the city engineer to upgrade their streets. However, Peters had been engaged by the city to advise the aldermen in their most pressing responsibility regarding the internal activities of the port—namely, maintenance and acquisition of wharves on the main peninsula.[22]

Against the vicissitudes of an uncertain economic background,[23] Council acted within its sphere of control over the physical port. It proceeded with its plans to expand the already existing Reed's

Point steamship facilities initiated in 1860 by Mayor Thomas McAvity,[24] and it sought to enhance the attractiveness of the waterfront. Hurd Peters, therefore, as the first engineer hired by the city, inherited the task of integrating the harbour improvements—maintenance of wharves and dredging—with street improvements. As well as overseeing repairs accruing from normal use and those resulting from the Saxby Gale in 1869,[25] Peters supervised the acquisition and the construction of the New Pier in Dukes Ward, which followed the extension of Water Street from Duke to St. James Street. The city's Harbour Committee Reports during 1867-1870 quite clearly indicated the desire of the Council to make all wharf areas on the main peninsula easily accessible to the Market Square.

While the interests of the aldermen towards street repair appear to have been connected with political self-interest, initiatives toward harbour maintenance frequently took shape with prodding from the business community. In the late 1860's the Mayor's Office was occupied by a doctor—the first non-commercial man ever to hold the position. His incumbency dating from April 1866 may suggest a temporarily diminished interest on the part of a business community which had previously ensured that one of its members held the key civic position. In any case, Mayor Alward's lack of commercial expertise was called to the attention of the municipal electorate in 1868 when *The Morning Telegraph* wrote:

> If the Mayor of St. John were a sharp business man—one thoroughly in earnest in cutting down useless expenditure and advancing the *real* interests of the City much might be done to bring about an improvement in those advantages which our Port offers to the commerce of the country . . . A candidate with a good business record stands a better chance of election now than at any date for many years past.[26]

The reference to "cutting down useless expenditure" was directed at the extensive street work undertaken while the "real interests of the City" included, among other demands, "further wharf accommodation."[27]

Not until 1869 when the city again had a businessman at the helm did new wharf construction quicken.[28] Furthering its attempt to merge the management of all wharves under its control, the city purchased the Pettingell lease in 1870[29] and thus commenced extensive enlargement of piers designed to accommodate steamships. In fact, the street work which had been carried out in Sydney Ward was generally seen as preparatory to a future development to be undertaken after British troops had vacated the Barrack Grounds.[30]

Together with the city-supervised work which was progressing on the main peninsula several proposals for erecting a marine railway on the West Side and/or at the Lower Cove on the main peninsula were brought forward "... to facilitate and induce ships to come to our Port for Repairs ..."[31] More successful than these were the proposals from individuals who apparently agreed with the Council that "... building a Dry Dock or Docks ... would be of great benefit to the City ..."[32] Although a proposal headed by Lauchlan Donaldson was turned down because the "company had not yet been incorporated"[33] another offer asked that a site be granted either at the Lower Cove or Rodney Slip in Carleton.[34] Continuing its efforts towards the main peninsula, the Council rejected the Rodney Slip suggestion despite the opposition of some West Side aldermen and granted an area in the vicinity of the Ballast Wharf and the Charlotte Street Extension.[35] Although no group succeeded in meeting the terms of the proposed agreement and thus, no dry dock was constructed, these efforts along the waterfront served to illustrate the direction—spatially and economically—which the city was taking to meet its altered circumstances.[36]

By 1872, the major repair work in the area around the Port which had been started twelve years earlier was complete.[37] The Market Wharves had been widened,[38] the series of narrow slips between St. James and Queen Streets in Dukes Ward had become the city's New Pier[39] and the general traffic patterns along the East Side harbourfront had been integrated more smoothly from the Market Square to the Lower Cove. Across the harbour in Carleton, however, attempts at achieving similar internal harmony were largely stimulated not by the Common Council but, rather, by the Board of Trade whose members initiated the railway activities of the period.

## The West Side Railways: External Links to the Port

As an appendage to the main peninsula, Carleton's role within the City of Saint John had evolved as supportive rather than pivotal to the external linkages of the port. Consequently, procedures which both recognized and reinforced this role—such as the 1853 Act of Settlement—guided the Common Council towards equating the West Side harbour with the internal or local functions of the port.[40] Hence, not until Carleton's locational potential had been recognized by railway promoters did that area begin to undergo changes in types of land-use. Such changes responded to the growth of improvements in railway development initiated by the business elite who continually nourished the external links of the port.[41]

Three years prior to Confederation an Act incorporating the European and North American Railway Company for Extension from Saint John Westward (or Western Extension) had been passed.[42] Almost all of its officers were members of the Board of Trade executive.[43] In 1866 the City of Saint John had acquired $60,000 in Western Extension railway stock.[44] Needing additional funds before beginning construction, the company requested $50,000 in June 1867.[45] A City Council Committee composed of Alderman Thomas Jones and two West Side Aldermen, Robert Allan and William McCordock conferred with railway President William Parks and recommended that the city could "with safety and propriety take further stock."[46] The railway directors claimed that $250,000 had been pledged by American interests. Since their goal was $300,000, the extra amount sought from the City of Saint John "would show that local and interested parties believed in the success of the undertaking."[47]

Presumably most of the aldermen felt the earlier acquisition of $60,000 was a sufficient endorsement because the Council meeting called to discuss the question failed to constitute a quorum.[48] In fact among some members, doubt as to the eventual completion persisted into mid-1868 when Alderman Bartholomew Coxetter suggested that his civic colleagues visit the railway construction site to determine if the work warranted "the payment of the Council shares" pledged in 1866.[49] Although Coxetter's motion was defeated questions about the future of the Western Extension continued. As the projected completion date approached—August 1869—discussions as to the precise terminus of the road became more frequent.

In the original survey taken by E. R. Burpee, a bridge at the Falls or use of the ferry from Carleton had been offered as alternatives to transfer passengers and freight from the West to the East Side of the harbour.[50] A year before the Fairville completion, the officers of the railway held a meeting of the West Side ratepayers to solicit their opinions regarding a Carleton terminus. The Carleton residents expressed their desire that a railway be built through that section of the city.

Perhaps, due to the preoccupation of the aldermen with certain liquor license scandals,[51] it was not until January 1869 when Alderman Michael Maher, always skeptical of the railway company, convinced his peers in Council that payment on the Western Extension stock should cease until a committee had learned "the probable plan of the Eastern terminus".[52] With another East Side alderman, Archibald Rowan, Maher interviewed railway President William Parks on the terminus question.

During this interview, Parks assured the aldermen that the Western

Extension terminus would be located on the East Side at the present station; furthermore, he knew of no intention to adopt "any other route".[53] Despite this assurance West Side Land Committees continued to handle leases, such as that of John Collins, in which the petitioner agreed to surrender the lease should the railway "wish to occupy the [Carleton] Pond . . ."[54] More important Parks wrote the Council recounting a March 17th Carleton meeting and urging the aldermen to grant the request contained in a resolution passed by the Committee of the inhabitants of Carleton who desired that the Western Extension be given 2,000 feet of harbour frontage extending southward from Protection Street.[55] Referred to a Council committee headed by William McCordock and composed entirely of West Side members, the railway petition was granted with only a small change being made.[56] Within a month the East Side Land Committee endorsed the action of the Carleton aldermen.[57]

Possibly the acquiescence of the main peninsula committee—which included Alderman Maher—was prompted by recalling a provision of the 1866 Act which stated that as soon as the Western Extension built a road into Carleton, the West Side residents would have to assume one-fifth of the assessment towards the debenture issued for the construction of the Western Extension from Fairville.[58] Thus far, the entire financial burden of the Western Extension city-owned stock had been borne by the East Side.

In late 1869, the members of the Carleton business community—a group interested in seeing a terminus established on the West Side—had devised a plan which would lead to that goal while also eliminating the undesirable assessment feature of the 1866 Act. Thus, William McCordock, John C. Littlehale, Daniel W. Clark and James Stackhouse sought incorporation of the "Carleton City of Saint John Branch Railroad Company." Some East Side members suggested collusion between the incorporators of the Carleton Branch and the officers of the Western Extension because "the Carleton people were only bound by the Act [of 1866] for the amount [one-fifth] if [a branch] line was built by the Western Extension Company, but if transferred to any other Company they were not responsible."[59]

In defense of the Carleton Branch proposal a West Side alderman pointed out that the Western Extension had been granted lands but could not fund the building of an extension. It was well known that the road was having difficulty collecting "the subscriptions of private parties in New Brunswick."[60] Alderman Littlehale, one of the incorporators, remarked "if the railway was not brought through Carleton the West Side would not have to pay one cent and [thus] the East Side could be no better off if the present Bill [re: Carleton Branch] were killed."[61] However, largely due to the efforts of two

West Side Aldermen – William McCordock and H. Adam Glasgow – the newly proposed company was granted an act of incorporation in April 1870.[62]

The degree to which the Carleton Branch Railroad was largely a West Side project is revealed not only by the limited number of original incorporators who were members of the Board of Trade's executive but also, and more importantly, by a section of the Act of Incorporation which provided that the City of Saint John could appoint two directors for the Company "with a majority of [the] west side Members of the Common Council agreeing to such appointment."[63]

In response to a petition from the Carleton Branch the city agreed in July 1870 to purchase $40,000 in stock. However, the Council Committee appointed a member from the West and East sides to represent the city's interest. Opposition to this action was voiced by McCordock who claimed that naming an East Side director would "in effect be saying that [Carleton] had not two members fit to be directors." Further, McCordock acknowledged that two West Side members were needed because the directors of the Carleton Branch were "anxious to transfer the property and all over to Western Extension."[64] Hence, he moved that Alderman Glasgow of Brooks and Benjamin Tippett of Guys be appointed to represent the city's holdings in the newly formed company.[65] A month later Glasgow and Tippett together with the other directors of the Carleton Branch met with E. R. Burpee and several members of the Western Extension, and an agreement leading to the eventual leasing of the Carleton Branch by the Western Extension was concluded. Thus the extension of the railway to the Carleton waterfront could become a reality when the West Side contained aldermen who were also members of the group which had been incorporated as the Carleton, City of Saint John, Branch Railroad Company.

Throughout the fall of 1870 Carleton Railway matters intruded upon all dimensions of municipal life. To help construction, an assessment on the $40,000 stock was levied on the ratepayers of the West Side.[66] In September residents in the Sutton Street area of Brooks Ward were seeking leases of other lots as the railway acquired individually leased lots on the "southern route."[67] And by mid-October, Alderman Glasgow reported to the Council that E. R. Burpee, the engineer and managing director of the Western Extension who had contracted to build the Branch line for $104,000 would complete his work in February 1871.[68]

Prior to the May 1871 departure of the first trains from the Carleton station, the city received a land grant request to erect ". . . Work Shops, Locomotive House and Car Sheds [in the area bounded by| St. George, Union, Charlotte Streets and Market Place."[69] However, before these railway support facilities were constructed, Philip Denhay, a liquor dealer, complained to the city about the obstruction created in front of his Union Street business by the railway cars left standing in the Street.[70]

Possibly both Denhay's petition, which underscored the clash of land-uses so common to nineteenth-century cities, and the presence of the Pullman Palace Cars which traversed the route between the Carleton Wharves and Bangor, Maine convinced the aldermen of the merits in granting the extra land sought by the company.[71] In any event, one month before the October 1871 official opening of the completed European and North American Railway, the City granted the Lower Mill Pond area of Carleton to the railway and, thus, began the gradual encroachment on the timber pond by the railway yards—a process of change which eventually contributed to a more differentiated pattern of land-use on the West Side, and indeed, within Saint John.

Of more immediate concern to the railway men of 1871 than land-use differentiation was the issue of crossing the harbour. Establishing a Carleton railway depot had only narrowed the distance from Fairville on the East Side by three and a half miles. Transferring through freight and passengers from the Rodney Slip, Carleton to the main peninsula Market Square vicinity station remained a problem still to be solved. Directors of the European and North American Railway were compelled to incorporate the ferry into their transport system. In large measure this would be effected, like the railway system had been, by the influence brought to bear in the City Council by those aldermen who were either members of the Board of Trade or closely allied with the external functions of the port.

## The Carleton Ferry: Saint John's Inter-Peninsula Highway

Considering the various parts of Saint John's transport system, Common Council addressed the needs of the streets fairly well. Similarly, the Board of Trade successfully initiated the railway promotion, and with the assistance of the Council, established the earliest beginnings of a railway-port. However, neither organization—business nor civic—cheerfully welcomed the challenges posed by the ferry. And yet, this "ricketty old institution"[72] was to become of vital importance to the port. Until this linkage had been completed, however, the city continued to control what was, in effect, Saint John's inter-peninsula highway.

Although the ferry claimed only the third largest expenditure in the city's *Annual Report* of 1867,[73] its relatively modest allocation belied its foremost place as a source of civic irritation. Control of the ferries had been vested in the City of Saint John. In the late 1840's the city had managed the ferries through a Council appointee. Becoming dissatisfied with this method, however, the city had decided to lease it at a public sale in 1851 to John McSweeney.[74] The duties which McSweeney undertook included maintaining the ferry floats and approaches and providing two boats. With the exception of 1853 and 1859 he was the exclusive lessee from 1851 to 1870—having been awarded a ten-year contract in 1860 which, in addition to the above duties, included an annual rental fee of $2,400.[75]

By the time Confederation occurred three years remained on the lease, and in anticipation of its termination frequent discussions were held as to its alternate management. Not surprisingly, the current lessee after providing a public service for many years had incurred everyone's ire and, with the Council which supervised him, was a visible target for public criticism.[76]

Despite the fact that the ferry was intended to effect closer relations between the two sides of the harbour, many in the city were dissatisfied with its efficiency and safety. Generally, the aldermen had not given the ferry the same degree of attention which they had bestowed on the streets and wharf expansion.[77] Instead the lessee had been assigned all the responsibility.

In September 1868, the Council empowered the Ferry Committee to lease the service on November 1, 1868 for ten years commencing in July 1870.[78] A group of Carleton residents headed by Daniel W. Clark, Thomas M. McLaughlan and Joseph Coram petitioned against leasing the ferries. Clark—an incorporator of the Carleton Branch Railroad—and the others wished the West Side to have more control of transport facilities affecting their area. Thus they wanted the city to forego any lease arrangements and manage the service as it had been done before 1851.[79]

Their efforts resulted in both a postponement of the Council order to sell the ferries[80] and a proposal from the city that a commission be established, composed of West Side members who would take over the responsibility for the ferry and its accumulated debt, since it was deemed to be of greater importance to Carleton than to the East Side.[81]

This proposal would have rid the city of the ferry—a situation which would have delighted the aldermen. However, the Provincial Legislature, whose approval of all arrangements regarding fiscal matters had to be sought, did not agree. Thus in June 1869 the Alderman from Brooks, moved "that the Ferry Committee be authorised |sic| to advertise the sale of the Ferry—seeing that the proposed legislation for a radical change in the old system had not been secured."[82] However, even at a considerably reduced rental the ferry did not prove attractive and following the auction the Committee had to report that "no person having bid any amount for the said revenues there was no sale."[83]

Unable to secure legislation enabling them to transfer the ferries to a commission and also unsuccessful in selling the ferry revenue, the city prepared in September 1869 for the coming July when it would have both the responsibility for and direct management of the ferry.[84] Actually this was an alternative with which the Carleton Aldermen were not entirely displeased. If the ferry could not be placed in a commission controlled by Carleton, then the next best situation was to have direct city management. By this means the West Side aldermen would have more influence than acting as part of the entire Council and managing through the city's surrogate — the current ferry lessee.

Faced with the necessity of providing a new ferry steamboat, the city began investigating ways of reducing the cost of operating the service. Most attractive was a reduction in the distance across the harbour by establishing ferry terminals more directly opposite each other than existed at the time.[85] Even before it had become obvious that no one was interested in providing the ferry service, Alderman Maher had suggested a trip reduction by establishing the main peninsula terminal on the Pettingell Wharf near Queen Street in Dukes Ward.[86] Among the competitors for the area were Hatheway and Small who wished to extend their lease of the Pettingell Wharf in order to expand their steamship operation. They were granted a lease renewal and the Princess Street ferry terminal was retained.

This decision meant the necessity of providing and operating two ferry boats because of the oblique course required to cross to Rodney Slip from the main peninsula. The West Side members had been very anxious to get the Pettingell location possibly because proximity to the Market Square was not as crucial to Carleton as it apparently was to those on the main peninsula. Despite some support from main peninsula aldermen, the West Side lost in its attempt because the location would jeopardize the externally-based operation of Hatheway and Small. Reflecting the frustration of the Common Council to accommodate the wishes of the two peninsulas Alderman Archibald Rowan moved that Carleton cease to be a part of the City of Saint John and become a part of the Parish of Lancaster.[87] Although at the request of the Mayor, the resolution was subsequently withdrawn, it did underline the divergent interests within the city which were readily identifiable simply along peninsula lines.

As the last months of McSweeney's lease came to an end, the aldermen revealed their uncertainties about the ability of the city officials to manage all aspects of the ferry service. Their greatest concern was the monitoring of fare collection. When the ferry was directly managed by a lessee this was not a city problem. But under the direct management of the Council, composed of men whose full-time occupations would not permit continual surveillance of the ferry employees, accounting for the exact number of passengers using the service would be difficult.

Three days before McSweeney's lease was to expire the city had yet to determine who was to be appointed collector of the fares on the ferry. Anticipating that it would find all applicants for the position unsatisfactory, Council voted that "the tolls be collected by a person employed by that Committee [Ferry] for the purpose until arrangements for running the boat be perfected."[88] Within a month after the city had assumed the operation of the ferry, complaints as to scheduling, poor maintenance of the approaches and floats on either side of the harbour, in addition to accusations against Alderman Maher for suggesting that his brother become the ferry collector, had served to reinforce the belief held by many on the Council that the city was ill-prepared to manage this service.[89]

Strengthening such an impression of ineptitude was the furor which arose in the tendering of the ferry float contract. After soliciting a number of tenders, the Council chose that of Samuel Smith. Upon completion of the floats in September 1870, Hurd Peters inspected the work and concluded it was of inferior quality.[90] Later discussion on the float matter revealed the lack of direction which the Ferry Committee provided either Smith or Peters in constructing or assessing the floats. The crux of the problem as stated by the Alderman from Kings Ward was that "the Committee was composed of men who knew nothing about wood or work of this kind and hardly knew one wood from the other."[91]

Although this remark was something of an exaggeration, it does help to explain why the city actively pursued the possibility of leasing the ferries to virtually any takers, and why the Common Council accepted an offer made by the Western Extension Railway in December 1870 to lease the ferry service. At precisely the time when the railroad was seeking a means of transferring its passengers and freight from the Carleton Branch which it leased to the East Side, the city's ferry problems were at a critical stage following the termination of the McSweeney lease.

According to Alderman J. Gordon Forbes, chairman of the Ferry Committee and prominent shareholder in the Western Extension Railway,[92] the most important factor influencing the city's decision to accept the offer was the "present liability . . . for any damage . . .

even the slightest . . . to persons crossing the Ferry."[93] No opposition to this proposal was voiced by any alderman. Most appeared to agree with an influential editor who commented that "the interests of the Railway Company are in accordance with the interests of the citizens of both sides of the harbour, so far as maintaining an efficient ferry is concerned."[94]

Despite the eruption in the press over the comparative merits of McSweeney's past efforts and the projected future of the ferries under the Western Extension's control, the contracts were similar in terms of lessee liability.[95] A major difference centred on the length of the lease and the annual rental to be paid by the railroad. In contrast to McSweeney's lease the Western Extension would hold the ferries for twenty years at an annual rental of $4,000 per annum—a fee which included the purchase of the ferry boat the city was turning over to the company.[96]

In March 1871 Council passed the proposition of the railway to run the ferries, but not without some discussion. When moving that the railway ferry lease be taken into consideration, Alderman Forbes explained that although "he opposed leasing them to a private individual |who| would manage it only for the purpose of making money out of them," the Railway "would increase the facilities and add to the usefulness of the ferries for the furtherance of their Railway interests."[97] Thus, in his opinion the ferry could serve both the external demands of the railway and internal needs of city traffic.

Those who objected did not address themselves directly to the question of whether or not the ferry could serve two masters. Generally most East Side aldermen were pleased that the railway was taking over the service. However, Alderman Maher felt that more than $4,000 could be secured from a private lessee. But Alderman Rowan, who a year earlier had moved that Carleton be made a part of Lancaster Parish, disagreed with this, adding that "if the railway |was| provided with proper ferry facilities it |would| prevent the building of a bridge at or near the falls for some years and thus, St. John |would| be kept from becoming a mere way station."[98] Rowan's comment illustrated the real concern of many East Side aldermen who had voted for the railway ferry lease. Maher and the four other Alderman who believed "too much discretion had been left to the railway company" were voted down, and the Council decided to sell the ferries to the Western Extension.[99]

In May 1871 the Western Extension placed its advertisement in the local papers announcing that tickets for the ferry steamer and train to Fredericton and other points could be purchased at the office on the Princess Street ferry landing.[100] The city had thus succeeded in divesting itself of the responsibility for operating an inter-peninsula service which now provided a cross harbour linkage between the railway touching the West Side waterfront and that located in the Market Square vicinity.

## The Consolidation of Pre-Confederation Transport Networks: The Market Slip and the Atlantic Ocean

Stimulated by the needs of the port, the various parts of the waterfront had been joined together by their mutual dependence on the inter-peninsula ferry. However, the integration of the streets, railway and ferry was a reflection of more significant processes both in the physical city and in the relationship between the Board of Trade and the Common Council.

Paralleling other nineteenth-century councils,[101] the Saint John aldermen were keenly involved with street work and internal transport—an association underscored by Hurd Peters' fact-finding trip in 1871. More intimately involved in external transport linkages, the Board of Trade dominated the water-based traffic and initiated the railway development of the 1860's. Too, through those aldermen who engaged in trade occupations, the internal and external transport linkages of the city were merged in the railway-ferry lease. This agreement initiated the practice of selling city-controlled transport allied properties to agencies or agents not directly answerable to the Council. Hence, the foundation for future similar transactions—which culminated with the Dominion Government's takeover of the harbour in 1927—had been established.

However, beneath the activity which produced the transport integration and re-institution of closer Common Council and Board of Trade dealings in the first few years after Confederation, there still existed by 1872 a commercial city which was largely pedestrian. Furthermore, the new technology offered by the railway to Boston served to reinforce the city's Atlantic coastal connections.

A salient reminder of Saint John's pedestrian character occurred in 1872 when the street railway had to terminate its service because of the limited patronage it received especially between the Market Square and Reed's Point.[102] Too, the continued importance of the ferry in the internal or local transport system of the city was suggested by the lengthy petition sent to Council in October 1871 in which more than seventy West Siders—among them Daniel W. Clark, Robert Allan and Andrew Buist—complained of the poor service being provided by the new railway lessees.[103]

Quick to recognize the inadequacies of the internal ferry service now being provided by the railway, few had grasped the full potential of Carleton's railroad waterfront although one editor had written: "In short the railroad by transversing so much of the Western side of the City would give it, in some respects, an advantage over the East Side."[104] Most, however, were inclined to agree with Francis Giles a civil engineer, who claimed that the Western Extension was primarily a part "of the great road between the U.S. the Maritime Provinces and Europe . . ."[105] In short, the railway reinforced the Atlantic orientation.

Within Saint John the railway also spatially underlined both the Atlantic orientation and the pedestrian character of the city. Its official title was the European and North American Railway Company for Extension from Saint John Westward. Yet, athough it was referred to simply as the Western Extension (within Carleton, as the Carleton Branch Railroad) its passenger fare rate structure began with the Princess Street ferry on the East Side.[106] As well, the major station was not the Rodney Pier in Carleton but rather the Dorchester Street Station in the Market Square vicinity. Thus, this railway, which operated down the coast to Boston with its terminus in the Market Square, reinforced both the Pre-Confederation Atlantic transport orientation and the dominance of the Market Slip area—now a terminus of the railways from both sides of the harbour.

# CHAPTER III

# *Re-examining the "Export Function": The Transport Node as a Microcosm of Change — 1872 - 1876*

It is commonly recognized that a city possesses an "export function" which "results in the production, transfer and distribution of goods and services for the population of areas outside the city itself."[1] In Saint John, like many port cities, that particular function involved both the exporting of lumber and wood-related products and the importing of basic necessities and other merchandise throughout much of the nineteenth century.[2] Consequently, the city's growth from a trading depot to a commercial centre had been predicated on the flow of goods across the piers.[3] This necessitated the enhancement of transport facilities. In fact, the most explicit symbol of Saint John's "export function" was the physical plant which comprised the port facilities towards which the European and North American Railway and the Western Extension Railway had been directed. Moreover, waterfront-associated issues provided the forum within which the Common Council and the Board of Trade both defined and refined their relationship to the city's "export function". Here the presence of the federal government was first visibly felt when the city entered a new political system having a continental as well as a coastal transport orientation.

## Emerging Continentalism: The Coming of the Intercolonial Railway

Two railways touched the harbour of Saint John in 1872. The more recent arrival, the European and North American Railway for Extension from Saint John Westward or, as it was known simply, the Western Extension, had been opened for traffic in 1869. The other, the European and North American Railway, located on the East Side, had been operating prior to Confederation. This railway had been purchased by the Government of New Brunswick in 1856 and taken over by the Dominion in 1867.[4] Other than the transfer of management authority from New Brunswick to Ottawa the European and North American remained outwardly familiar to Saint Johners. The previous resident superintendent Lewis Carvell retained his position, but now took orders from the federal government. Although the Common Council was most involved with the Western Extension and Carleton Branch Railways, developments on the East Side of the harbour had not been ignored during the 1867-1870 period. In fact by 1872, events which had been initiated three years earlier were again resurfacing and demanding renewed attention from the aldermen.[5]

Shortly after the route of the Intercolonial Railway had been chosen, the federal government made overtures to the city regarding the extension of the European and North American Railway (now a part of the projected Intercolonial Railway) within Saint John. This initiation was presented in writing by Lewis Carvell to the Common Council in March 1869.[6] In brief, Carvell asked about the possibility of the federal government being granted free of charge a certain section of waterfront land if it decided to extend a branch of the European and North American Railway from Haymarket Square to the Reed's Point area. Specifically, Ottawa desired a forty foot-wide right-of-way which would extend through all of the west side of Courtenay Bay, proceed to the southerly tip of the Barrack Grounds and thence to the Breakwater or Ballast Wharf. Control of the area south of that Wharf, known as the Ballast Wharf extension, would rest with the federal government. Upon reaching the Ballast Wharf the government proposed to construct a wharf across the Lower Cove Flats from the Breakwater to the Reed's Point Wharf.[7] Further, the proposal called for laying railway track on portions of Charlotte, Main, Britain and Water Streets. In short, the government wished to encircle much of the main peninsula with railway track.

This proposal reached the Council at a point when it was also considering the Western Extension Railway request for West Side lands.[8] Although there was some reservation about being too generous with railway requests, both the Western Extension, and Lewis Carvell received affirmative responses on April 20, 1869—but with an important difference. With regard to the Carvell communication, greater caution was exercised in the disposal of land privileges on the main peninsula. Therefore, the city recommended granting the forty foot right-of-way, permission to build a wharf and drawbridge between the Ballast Wharf and the Reed's Point Wharf, and the right to lay track on the streets indicated in Carvell's letter. However, the aldermen reserved wholly to the city the control of the Ballast Wharf area.[9]

Writing in May 1871, Carvell claimed that the city's offer rendered the proposal "useless" because the government could not construct sufficient railway tracks south of Charlotte Street.[10] Further, Carvell noted: "I may add that unless this property be had at a nominal price the expense of providing deep water accommodation will likely be much less in the direction of the Straight Shore than at the Ballast Wharf."[11] Softening a threat which could pit the local communities of Saint John and Portland against each other, Carvell concluded with a tempting offer: "The surveys are now being proceeded with and if the City are [sic] disposed to offer the necessary room these important works will no doubt be fully completed during the present year."[12]

The aldermen remained intractable, reiterating "that this Board cannot grant any greater facilities than those offered in the resolutions of April 1869 and now declined by the communication of Mr. Carvell."[13] Neither the Council nor the federal government in the person of Lewis Carvell pursued the matter until late December 1871—a few months after the official opening of the completed Western Division. At that time, Carvell again initiated discussion on the railway extension. In this letter, unlike prior correspondence Carvell sought "the terms on which the City [would] concede fully the privileges sought" by the federal government.[14] This was the first suggestion that the government was willing to defer to the city's demands in order to secure the land it desired in Sydney Ward. Replying to Carvell in February 1872, the aldermen rescinded the previously granted drawbridge privilege between the Ballast Wharf and Reed's Point, and offered instead the extension southward from the Ballast Wharf area. In taking this action the aldermen claimed that a drawbridge would obstruct the approach to the flats in the Lower Cove "to such an extent as to materially injure its usefulness."[15]

At the Common Council meeting of February 14, 1872 the indecisiveness of the aldermen was apparent. Nearly half of the 1872 Council had also been members in 1869 and their decision now wavered considerably because they were not able to ascertain just how potentially lucrative the Lower Cove Flats would be. Earlier, in an attempt to get a railway extension around the main peninsula they had agreed to the drawbridge in 1869. Objections in Council had been raised to closing off the wharves which extended from Britain Street and the Charlotte Street extension area primarily because the Flats were used by small craft having no other place for docking in the harbour.[16]

Nevertheless, in the Council discussions which followed Carvell's latest communication, Alderman Forbes of Dukes Ward argued that the railway would "enhance the value of a large number of Corporation lots between King Street East and Courtenay Bay as well as tend to build up and increase the value of the lower portion of the city." Forbes claimed that in denying the government all of its request, negotiations would be terminated and thus the city would miss an opportunity to increase its transport facilities.[17] The dilemma which faced the aldermen consisted in deciding whether the city should gamble on a future railway-associated prosperity which would enclose part of the waterfront area or, allow only a partial extension of the railway and keep the Lower Cove Flats available for small craft. Understandably, the aldermen were hesitant. They were faced with a question which demanded that they accurately assess the future development of transport technology. They expressed a need to consult with the Board of Trade.[18]

However, consultation with the latter on any matter involving the harbourfront property rights officially vested in the aldermen would perhaps result in a blurring of their respective jurisdictions over the "export function" of the city and the external functions of the port. The civic and business groups zealously guarded their port-related prerogatives while at the same time negotiating together on behalf of the city.

Hence the renewal of negotiations initiated by the federal government in 1872 was to eventually compel them to cooperate in securing the best arrangement for the city in the railway harbourfront matter. As for the Common Council, the presence of an outside agency such as the federal government had the same effect as had the Western Extension earlier. It forced the aldermen to address themselves to the external functions of the port. With regard to the Board of Trade, the newly reorganized business group continued to press its influence on all matters affecting those external functions.

Thus the years between 1872 and 1876 were crucial in the foundation of federal-civic relations because at the national level of organization the city by its offer of February 1872 determined to treat the entire railway discussion as a new matter. At the local level jurisdictional tensions emerged between the Board of Trade and the Common Council. Yet, to fully understand the perspective from which each group dealt as it simultaneously advanced its opinions on federal proposals, ultimately leading to a loss of autonomy for the city, it is necessary to consider the relationship of both the Board of Trade and the Common Council to the "export function" of the city.

### The Board of Trade and the "Export Function" of the City

Undoubtedly one of the reasons which led to the suggestion that the Board of Trade be invited to offer its opinions regarding the railway extension matter was directly related to the renewed and comparatively dynamic leadership of that body. For most of the 1860's it had been led by Lauchlan Donaldson as President with J. W. Cudlip serving as Vice-President. Perhaps owing to his advanced age, the former was unable to exercise vigorous leadership, and, in fact, the Board was frequently criticized for this during the last years of his tenure.[19] In late December 1870, C. H. Fairweather and J. C. Brown moved towards achieving a more energetic business organization within the city. Thus, from the early 1870's the Board took an increasingly active role as an organization in the affairs of the business and port activities of Saint John. Indeed, the reorganization of the Board had given that body a widened scope of authority—possibly comparable to that which it had exercised during the decades of the thirties, forties and fifties.[20]

Like the Board of that earlier period the business elite of the 1870's were intimately involved with the external functions of the port. During this decade the questions which the Board addressed revealed the changing technology of the oceans and, more important, the changing organizational structure within which Saint John and they were to operate. As the city was drawn into a widening net of new influences, the Board attempted to deal with those questions which touched the external functions of the port—issues which clearly underscored the Board's pivotal role as a local body while simultaneously illustrating the city's diminishing ability to direct the course of those external functions.

Ironically in the year of the Board's reorganization (1870), a resolution was introduced in the British Parliament which caused considerable anxiety among the merchant shipowners on both sides of the Atlantic. Soon to become known as the Plimsoll Bill—after its originator Samuel Plimsoll—this resolution initiated a campaign against "unnecessary loss of life and property at sea."[21] It specifically advocated a compulsory deck load-line on ships. The proposed legislation did not gain extensive publicity until 1873 when a British Government Commission conducted an inquiry into the charges made by Plimsoll. In Saint John concern was raised that a deck load-line law would severely restrict the competitive ability of the port in transporting lumber to the West Indies.[22] As reported in the newspapers of the day the original comment from the Board of Trade "was to the effect that certain evils complained of existed to a great extent but that owing to commercial competition it was difficult to prevent this."[23]

More indicative of the Board's reaction, however, was the resolution passed at its meeting in late April condemning the Plimsoll Bill on the grounds that "undue discrimination may be made in favour of iron ships . . ."[24] By late 1875 the Board feared the passage of this Bill which, as one newspaper explained, would in addition "to favoring iron ships, give sailors and others power to detain ships on small details and confer arbitrary authority on petty officials to interfere with loading, etc. . . ."[25] When, in 1876, Plimsoll's Bill—known as the Merchant Shipping Act—was passed and the overloading of ships was thus prohibited, the Board could only lament that "recent legislation not only of the English but also of the Canadian Parliament is crushing our shipping."[26] In essence, the Board was commenting on a situation in which the city as a unit was tied economically into one system and politically into another. With respect to the former, the city was powerless to hamper the passage of legislation adversely affecting its technological link—the wooden ship—to the Atlantic system. As for the latter, the city found itself part of a national system more interested in a policy of Protection than shipping.[27] These issues affecting the external functions of the port bore heavily on the Board of Trade as did another problem associated with the harbour: the growing strength of waterfront unionism.

Equally indicative of the Board's role in regard to the external functions of the port was not only the part it played as the local "barometer" of business trends, but also its relationship to the labouring class on the piers. When, as one historian has noted, the city's economy began to falter, the disruption could be measured in the turbulence of the waterfront.[28] Significantly, the activity centred on the East Side in the area between the South Market Wharf and the Customs House Wharf—the latter being the area which characterized the focus of shipping activity and traffic patterns within the city during 1867-79.[29]

Although the waterfront had witnessed disturbances prior to Confederation and in the first years after 1867, the thrust of union activity was felt in 1873-75.[30] It has been more recently established that the turning point in the economic fortunes of the city occurred in late 1873 or in the spring of 1874—an opinion indeed, held by members of the Board of Trade themselves during that period.[31] In fact, in early spring 1873 shipbuilders claimed that they were "afraid to contract not knowing what moment prices might be so raised as to ruin them."[32] Three months later C. H. Fairweather, President of the Board, blamed "the labor combinations in the Port—|for|—driving away tonnage to the great loss of the community." Continuing, he remarked on "the surplus of labor in many of our places of business, yards, mills, etc., but these organizations forced wages to an unnatural figure."[33]

By June 1873 the labourers, scowmen and tug boat men were united in an association. In the fall the labourers exerted pressure on the merchants to hire fellow association members in the loading of vessels. In addition, various Board of Trade members complained that labourers were striking in sympathy in order to force reluctant shippers to hire members of the Labourers' Association. This tactic proved successful, though it was condemned as "an additional injury done to the reputation of the Port abroad."[34]

In the spring of 1874 the millmen in the city, as well as in Portland and in the surrounding vicinity, formed an association of approximately 500 members.[35] Within a month these workers were encouraging all their compatriots to join the association. Alarmed at the prospect of such a large association of workingmen, the major mill owners in Saint John themselves joined in an association, known as the Lumbermen's Exchange.[36] Yet, the degree of antagonism between mill owners and the Association appeared to be less hostile than that between the Labourers Association and the city's ship owners.

By the fall of 1874 city reporters were visiting the peak centres of waterfront activity and describing the idleness caused by the strikers. At the Railway Wharf off Mill Street in Kings Ward, "a dozen or more" Society men were "pitching tents" while others were "sleeping off a drunken spree."[37] Not all newspapers printed such a grim picture, however. T. W. Anglin's *Freeman* defended the demands of the labourers many of whom, as their surnames and addresses indicated were Irish Catholics.[38]

As Saint John entered the second year of economic difficulties, the waterfront crises did not abate. In the spring street fights occurred between members of the labourers society and non-members. An officer in the Board of Trade, J. W. Scammell, a commercial merchant of Scammell Brothers, a firm located on Smyth Street, was attacked and beaten by an unknown group, who were suspected to have been members of the Labourers Association.[39] The President of the Labourers Association, Mr. Daley,[40] condemned the attack, although most of the city papers believed that an Association man had committed the offense because the victim was generally known to be unsympathetic to unions.[41]

The Scammell attack was followed by "the most serious crisis known to the history of the labor contest in this important commercial and industrial centre."[42] Association men refused to unload any vessel employing a non-union man.[43] In an effort to guard against an outbreak of serious disturbances the Mayor, A. Chipman Smith, ordered extra policemen on duty at the Market Slip and in the waterfront vicinity generally. The merchants were attempting to break the union by hiring enough non-Association men even from abroad to counteract the strength of the labourers' society. Moreover, the Labourers Association was seen by the Board as the source of its current grievance.

Thus, the workers and the employers had each formed associations to deal with the current difficulty. The basis of the employers association was the Board of Trade and the organization comprised of lumbermen exclusively. Presumably members of the latter felt their opinions would be less effective in the Board of Trade whose members were drawn from a number of business interests. Attempting to settle the strike, executive committees from both the labourers', and merchants' associations met to discuss the problem.[44]

In the meantime, a fund established by the merchants had acquired enough money enabling them to advertise for 300 men to handle the accumulated shipping in the harbour.[45] As a countermove the Labourers Association asked all of the other unions in the city to join them in their strike. The labourers reasoned that if the businessmen would threaten to break their strike by bringing in extra men, the same tactics could be used to disrupt a future strike by carpenters, riggers, masons or shoemakers.[46] Within a few days the Riggers Union was also on strike, and the merchants threatened to send to Boston for riggers to finish vessels currently under contract. The strike also created a slight difficulty for the aldermen when the regular policemen complained that special constables were paid $1.50 per day while regular members of the force "[received] only $1.25."[47] By mid-May the strike ended with the return of the labourers to the unloading of vessels.

The strike—which had been called, it appears for the purpose of extending the authority of the Labourers Association over the hiring of men to load and unload vessels—had involved the Board of Trade and its members more than it had concerned the Common Council. However, included among the aldermen on the Common Council in 1875 were two lumber merchants—Henry Duffell and Jarvis Wilson—and also one caulker, J. Alfred Ring of Carleton. The latter's presence may have been significant. At the time when the Labourers invited the riggers and caulkers to join them in the strike the Riggers Union claimed it was in sympathy with the Labourers. The generally less skilled Caulkers Union of about 80 members said "it would be next to impossible for the merchants to get men to fill their places . . ."[48] Eventually the Riggers Union joined the Labourers while the Caulkers Union refrained from doing so. One historian attributes the action of the Caulkers to a conservative leadership.[49] Another possible explanation may have been the existence of a closer affiliation with management on the part of the craft union through J. Alfred Ring who sat on the Common Council and represented Brooks Ward.

In any case, during the Council meeting which followed the conclusion of the strike, the aldermen raised the pay of Constables with six months service on the force to $1.50 per day; those with less than six months received $1.25 per day. No doubt the aldermen may have been influenced by the striking labourers and, in the difficult times of the mid-1870's, had no desire to precipitate a municipal workers strike. Nevertheless, aside from the demands made by the policemen, the Common Council was not directly involved with the day-to-day labour developments along the waterfront as was the Board of Trade.

It appears that the Board of Trade—as demonstrated in the Plimsoll legislation and the waterfront strikes—addressed itself more directly to the external functions of the port than did the

Common Council. Just as the Board reacted to the changes of the mid-1870's which affected those functions, so too the Common Council dealt with those questions which touched upon its Charter prerogatives regarding the port. Specifically, the changes—both technological and organizational—which shaped the economic and political outlines of Saint John in the 1870's were met by the Council's suggestion that the harbour properties of the city be controlled by a harbour commission.

### The Common Council and the "Export Function" of the City

By 1872 comparisons between the Port of Montreal—which was *not* managed by the aldermen of that city—and the Port of Saint John—which was under the direction of the Common Council—were appearing in the local press to illustrate the perceived ineffectiveness of the aldermen in the realm of external port functions. By their own admission many of the Saint John aldermen knew nothing of port management. In fact, one former alderman T. R. Jones, then on the Board of Trade, remarked in January 1873 that "little or nothing could be done towards making the harbour what it ought to be until the Common Council divested themselves of control."[50] Sensitive to what it presumed to be an unwarranted infringement upon its sphere of authority, the aldermen believed that discussion on the matter should "emanate from the Common Council."[51] The aldermen were fully aware that the harbour, like other ports at the mouth of a river, was subject to a silt problem and that wharf accommodation was limited. However, they were reluctant to establish a harbour commission because it would significantly reduce their control.[52] Nevertheless, the aldermen faced pressure from the Board of Trade which in the fall of 1873 recommended that the harbour be governed by a commission as existed in Montreal and Quebec. Such an arrangement would have enabled the port to be improved without direct taxation on the city's residents. In addition, the Board attempted to counteract the Common Council's claim of being solely responsible for the harbour by inserting in its report that the Board of Trade was "with all our citizens—interested in the reclamation, protection and extension of our harbour . . ."[53] Within the Common Council only one member—Alderman J. O'Brien a shipcarpenter from Brooks—consistently suggested that the harbour be placed in the hands of the Dominion Government, which would be responsible for the appointment of the commissioners. Most of the aldermen, however, agreed with Archibald Rowan and John Ferguson who urged that the entire Council join with the harbour committee to study the alternatives.[54] This action was not met with any great enthusiasm; as the editor of the *Telegraph* correctly observed: "There is almost a total absence of men of large commercial experience, and those most intimately connected with our shipping interests."[55]

In early 1875 the Common Council affirmed "the principle of placing the harbour in the hands of a commission, provided the details could be arranged to suit all."[56] However, in a lengthy speech Alderman McCordock remarked that the proposed harbour commission scheme included the most valuable parts of the West Side waterfront where Carleton members "had hoped one day to see a large manufactory or a dry or wet dock." Further the Albert Ward representative accused Alderman Ferguson of Prince Ward of carefully preserving the back lots of the main peninsula while allowing the Carleton lots to be handed over to a commission. While implying the existence of intra-city conflict in any scheme which proposed to give Charter authority to another agency, McCordock also reminded his peers that although "a great many merchants [were] in favor of a commission . . . the Board of Trade [was] not responsible to the people."[57]

Two months later the aldermen proposed a plan under which the harbour was to be managed through a commission. Essentially the commissioners who were to manage the harbour were to be appointed by the Dominion Government (which would finance the scheme), the Board of Trade and the Common Council. The Corporation of the City of Saint John was to receive $556,000 for the transfer.[58] However, the amount sought was $56,000 more than an earlier estimate made in the fall of 1874. The additional sum covered an extra valuation of the Rodney Wharves and the area below Sand Point.[59] As both these sections of the waterfront were on the West Side, the additional valuation may have been made to placate Alderman McCordock and others in Carleton who felt the initial estimate of the West Side had been too low.

Within a few days the Board of Trade brought in its report on the harbour commission proposal, and although, "in full agreement with the aldermen regarding the advisability of the management of the harbour being placed under the control of a Board of Commissioners . . . ," they believed the request for the additional sum of $56,000 displayed a "too exacting" attitude on the part of the city. Further in reprimand of the aldermen, James A. Harding of the Board of Trade remarked: "They are the conservators *only* of this property and should give their adhesion to any plan to increase the trade of this Port."[60]

The Board of Trade in contrast to the Council was composed of men possessing a keen interest in the port. In fact, among the aldermen who formulated the harbour commission proposal could be found the usual mixture of grocers—some with extensive business experience such as James L. Robinson and John Melick of Kings

Ward and others of perhaps more modest establishments such as Samuel Clark of Albert Ward. Also characterizing the 1874-1875 Council was the presence of a theatrical manager and a marine artist[61]—each representing Brooks Ward and perhaps indicating the degree to which that section of Saint John was removed from both the external functions of the port and the "export function" of the city. Nonetheless, by April 1875 the city secured through an Act of the Provincial Legislature permission to transfer the harbour properties. The Council, however—possibly because of the unpleasantness which had emerged in regard to the externally managed ferry service—initiated no further action on this matter at this time.

Although as James Harding had pointed out the aldermen were "conservators only" of the harbour, the Common Council throughout the harbour commission discussion had been simultaneously dealing with another related problem which had arisen as a consequence of selling the ferry rights for an extensive period to an outside agency—the European and North American Railway for Extension from Saint John Westward. The aldermen had concluded their agreement with the railway in the expectation of securing a more efficient service to finally silence the many complaints addressed to them during the McSweeney era. Yet, within a few months after the new lessee began running the ferries in 1871 a petition from the Carleton residents complained about the delays in the service.[62] Through its investigation the city learned that the railway was running the ferries to accommodate railway passenger schedules at the cost of inconveniencing local traffic.[63] In short, the internal ferry traffic was being relegated to a minor position as the railway's foremost concern was its through passengers. Although this situation could have perhaps been anticipated, it appeared to disturb only the Carleton members who had always been opposed to the leasing of ferries to an outside agency.

The most serious difficulty which rose in city-railway relations regarding the terms of the railway-ferry lease was stimulated in part by the difficult economic times of the mid-1870's. In late 1874 discussions were carried on between the European and North American Railway Company for Extension from Saint John Westward and the European and North American Railway Company of Maine for the purpose of consolidating the lines. It was well known at the time that the Western Extension was in financial difficulty.[64] In 1875 under a new corporate name—Consolidated European and North American Railway Company—the railway management delayed in paying its annual ferry rental of $4,000 to the City of Saint John. Although the Dominion Act confirming the consolidation provided that five of the thirteen directors of the company be residents of New Brunswick,[65] a majority of the directors were Americans residing in Bangor, Maine—the company's headquarters. The ferry lease which the new company acquired thus placed this internal harbour service of the City of Saint John under foreign control. Apparently a ferry lease in a city of another country was not a pressing matter for the railway company because in late 1875 the aldermen ordered the City Recorder to "commence proceedings against the lessees of the Ferry to recover the amount of rent due . . ."[66] In December the Recorder, W. H. Tuck, and Alderman Duffell travelled to Bangor to collect the back rent. The officers of the railway company—the President, Mr. Jewett, and the treasurer, Mr. Woods, both from the State of Maine—paid part of the rent due and promised to meet their financial obligation within a short time. The significance of this journey for the city meant that a prime internal transit service was being controlled from outside Saint John—in fact, from outside the country.[67] Thus, the city had learned by this experience that the participation of outside agencies in the ordering and maintaining of the various functions of the harbour was not a *bona fide* resolution of port-related problems. The subsequently more tentative approach on the part of the aldermen to government participation in railway-waterfront matters appeared to derive both from this experience, which eventually became an issue for the Courts in New Brunswick,[68] and from as well a concern for the Charter-granted jurisdiction which designated the civic elite as the "Conservators" of the Harbour of Saint John.

## The Jurisdictional Priorities of the Board of Trade and the Common Council

The aldermen were the civic representatives of the city, and under the Charter had the power to order and maintain the harbour. Yet their decision in 1872 to invite the participation of the Board of Trade into the pending railway discussions represented a tacit admission of the city's inability to come to terms with the question of railway extension along the East Side waterfront. However, while at the same time seeking the involvement of the business elite, the aldermen were equally, if not more, concerned with the question of increased local self-government. In this regard at the meeting during which the railway matter had been considered, Alderman Gilbert Pugsley a lawyer representing Queens Ward, offered a comprehensive report on increasing the powers of city self-government. The report essentially was an attempt to gain greater independence from the Provincial Legislature in the matter of "legislating on all matters of a local or private nature in the city [and] borrowing money . . ."[69] And so within a climate of opinion in which the civic elite were conscious of the limits of their jurisdiction within the Province, the relationship between the Council and the Board of Trade with respect to the port could almost be predicted.

At the first Board of Trade meeting held after the City Council had accepted Alderman Rowan's resolution, suggesting cooperation in determining harbourfront usage, Mayor Thomas Reed, and Aldermen Maher and Rowan together with the city engineer discussed the railway extension. Present also was Alderman Forbes, a member of the Board of Trade (although not on its executive), and Lewis Carvell. Before any discussion on the extension had begun a difficulty arose as to the jurisdiction of the city representatives present at the meeting. The Board of Trade's Vice-President, George Thomas, claimed that the railway matter should have been brought forward as a formal resolution from the Council to the Board. However, John Cudlip and J. Walter Scammell disagreed, stating that "anything affecting the interests of the City and the Harbour were within the province of the Board to discuss and act on its own motion."[70] Although the discussion on jurisdiction which centred on the precise function each organization had in relation to the harbour was brief, it illustrated the competitive power relationship between the Common Council and the Board of Trade in decisions regarding the port.

After an extensive discussion during which Carvell claimed that the federal government was as interested as the city in maximizing the potential of the waterfront area, Rowan cited a telegram he had received from S. L. Tilley in which the New Brunswick cabinet minister had urged cooperation with the government's request in exchange for the possible construction of wet and dry docks on the Lower Cove Flats. The question as Rowan saw it was simply: "Would it be worth while to give to the railway people the privilege of building across to Reed's Point from the Breakwater for the sake of securing the proposed dry and wet docks?"[71] At least two of the more influential Board of Trade men felt Tilley's telegram was rather "ambiguous" because it did not specify whether the federal government would bear the cost of the docks. In any event, the Board of Trade at that meeting was unable to arrive at a decision regarding the problem. However, the skepticism prompted by Tilley's message and the suggestion by Carvell that Rankin's Wharf in Portland might be utilized just as well as the Lower Cove area on the main peninsula were indicative of the direction which their decision did take in March.

Having considered the dimensions of the 1869 offer and that subsequently proposed by the Council in February 1872, the Board decided against the drawbridge "which would enclose a valuable city property now yielding a large revenue," favouring instead the Ballast Wharf area.[72] The aldermen armed with the support of the Board of Trade determined to take the matter to the Minister of Public Works, Hector Langevin.[73] Hence Archibald Rowan and J. C. Ferguson were sent as delegates from the city to Ottawa. In their Ottawa April meeting, the Saint John delegation successfully persuaded Tilley and Langevin to accept the city's objections to the government's request. As they noted in their communications, their "success was largely due to the assistance received from Mr. Tilley."[74] Thus the City Council had managed to convince the government to extend its railway south from the Breakwater—an extension requiring considerable building up of the Ballast Wharf area—rather than across the Flats from the Breakwater to Reed's Point—an idea which the government now "completely abandoned."[75]

The government continued the surveys which had commenced in 1869 in anticipation of arriving at terms agreeable to the city. By mid-spring 1873, Mr. Henry Perley of the Department of Public Works advised the Mayor that the government desired an enlargement of the facilities agreed to the previous year at Ottawa. Specifically, the government wanted to purchase for the sum of $20,000 "the northern part of the Ballast Wharf with a portion of the flats, being a strip of property 600 feet long by 180 feet wide . . ."[76] In early September the city rejected the Public Works Department's offer.[77] However, the government, although having promised to build its railway wharf south of the Breakwater, had not initiated any preliminary work in the Ballast Wharf area. Nevertheless, on the strength of only a verbal commitment to do so, it had begun site preparation for the railway extension which was only part of the total projected agreement. This action plus Perley's request which implied that the wharf construction south of the Breakwater would not be undertaken, thus violating the spirit of the 1872 Ottawa meetings, caused amazement in both the Common Council and particularly within the Board of Trade. Although the aldermen had been content to merely return a written refusal to Perley's offer, the business elite invited Perley to attend a Board of Trade meeting in mid-September 1873 to explain the government's apparent reversal in the railway negotiations.[78] At the conclusion of the meeting Perley remarked that he had sought a meeting with the Common Council's harbour committee but was denied the opportunity. The Board of Trade decided to visit the land in dispute and then meet with the aldermen and the railway officials at a later date.[79]

Within two weeks this meeting was held and obviously it was deemed so important that Perley also came to explain the government's position to the business and civic elites of the city. During the meeting T. R. Jones and others of the Board of Trade "urged their views" while the aldermen were "reticent and non-committal." However, several members of the city's civic elite pointedly remarked that the earlier agreement was not being kept. Nevertheless, the combined meeting of the Board of Trade, Common Council and Mr. Perley produced no new developments. Further, the original position of the city aldermen appeared to have hardened as the Mayor reported in Council that the aldermen" . . . refused to make themselves amenable to any resolution, holding that being Conservators of the harbour they were not in a position to move." Mayor Reed also remarked that "his view was to hold on to all the available harbor space, enough had been already built over."[80] Demonstrating the city's more visible concern for its Charter prerogatives involving the ordering and maintaining of the harbour, the aldermen responded both to the initiation of railway construction along the west side of Courtenay Bay in the absence of a right-or-way having been granted and to the pressure to sell the additional ballast Wharf area. They formally protested the federal usurpation of Charter granted city rights. In an unusual move, this resolution, moved by Alderman Kerr, passed the Council without debate.[81]

The Board of Trade, however, continued to pressure the Council to arrive at an affirmative decision in regard to the additional property sought by the government. In fact, the Board suggested that as the government and the Council were also in disagreement over the cost of the extra land, the city should surrender it in any case, and negotiate for compensation at a later date in order not to delay the railway extension.[82] During a Common Council meeting in October 1873, the West Side members encouraged their colleagues to accept the Board of Trade's decision. Nevertheless, the harbour committee reported that "they |were| not ready to evaluate positively the terms which the Government may wish . . . and |recommended| that the Common Clerk request the Government to furnish a statement in writing with full information as to the lands required at the Breakwater."[83] Under pressure from the Board of Trade, however, the aldermen did submit an appraisal of the property amounting to $100,000.

Before a formal response to that offer had been received from Ottawa, the terminal question was discussed in the House of Commons. There in reply to a question from James Domville, the Prime Minister indicated that a purchase price was no longer at issue. In fact, Mackenzie remarked that no wharf extension would be made to the Barrack Grounds because he believed "a mistake was made in trying to reach deep water at this point." Further, the Prime Minister introduced a suggestion which Lewis Carvell had made a few years earlier when he tried to wring a commitment from the aldermen regarding the Lower Cove Flats: "The Government would, probably, make a terminus between Rankins' wharf and Navy Island."[84] In the meantime James Domville a Saint John businessman currently sitting in Parliament as a member from Kings County, New Brunswick suggested one explanation for the Liberal Government's view of the Ballast Wharf problem: that the member from Saint John, Isaac Burpee, was behind the current move to locate the deep water terminus at Rankin's Wharf. According to Domville, Burpee who lived in the Town of Portland was "personally interested in the Western Extension and bridging the river St. John." The latter vehemently denied this, arguing that there was some difference of opinion within the city itself over the best location.

No doubt stimulated by the Parliamentary exchange which had mentioned the Rankin Wharf and therefore implied construction of a bridge across the harbour, the aldermen sent a petition to the Governor General outlining their position on the bridge question: "The present channel used for general navigation is between Navy Island and the Portland side and a Bridge that would close that channel would most seriously obstruct the navigation and cause incalculable damage to the Port of Saint John."[85] For the moment no further mention was made towards constructing a bridge at Navy Island. However, neither was a favourable response received to the proposal of $100,000.

The railway extension matter had now reached such an important status in civic affairs that it was no longer a matter of concern merely for the harbour committee. B. L. Peters, the Common Clerk, could respond to Ottawa in June 1874 that the General Committee (comprising all the aldermen) was willing to negotiate with the Department of Public Works.[86] As no response was made to this letter, A. Chipman Smith wrote to the Prime Minister in early March 1875 assuring him of the city's desire to "renew the correspondence for the purpose of ascertaining what facilities the Government want[ed] in the vicinity of the breakwater and what sum the Government [would] pay for the facilities required."[87] Clearly the city was now the supplicant having retreated from its earlier price and, indeed, position regarding which extra lands were to be granted. In December an extensive resolution passed the Common Council in which the Mayor was directed to communicate with Mackenzie regarding the facilities that were sought by the federal government and the price which Ottawa would be willing to pay. Further in an attempt to resolve the issue the resolution also suggested that if the government had decided to abandon the Breakwater railway extension "appraisers [should] be appointed without delay to decide what amount of compensation [should] be awarded to the City of St. John for Corporation grounds, at present occupied by the Dominion Government for the purpose of such railway extension."[88]

In late March 1876 James Domville again raised the deep water terminus question in the House of Commons. He intimated that Burpee was pressing for the Rankin's Wharf location to hasten the construction of a bridge at the Falls which would then enable the Western Extension—according to Domville now "hopelessly bankrupt"—to join with the Intercolonial system. Both Domville and A. L. Palmer, the member for Saint John City and County, rejected the Rankin's Wharf terminus as a completely undesirable location since it was adjacent to "a thickly settled part of the city."[89]

In the Common Council the report on the Parliamentary discussion involving the railway extension was read by Alderman Duffell of Sydney Ward. Following that he moved a resolution which by now contained the standard phrases instructing the Recorder to contact the government in an effort to determine its intentions with regard to the railway wharf. Duffell's resolution differed from the others in that the Recorder was also empowered "to commence proceedings against the Government in the event of the question's not being satisfactorily answered."[90] In preparation for that situation the aldermen ordered the printing of all communications between the city and Ottawa regarding the extension question.

However, by early August proceedings against the government were unnecessary. The question of the railway terminus had been referred to Mr. C. J. Brydges, whom Mackenzie had appointed to head up the work on the Government Railway.[91] Brydges visited Saint John in late July, and met with the Mayor and Aldermen Duffell and Ferguson. At this meeting the Common Council committee reviewed the negotiations which had transpired since February 1872, and to demonstrate the sincerity of the city on the extension question they offered to sell the area requested in the Perley communication of 1873 for $60,000—a substantial decline from the earlier figure of $100,000. Brydges, however, preferred not to discuss money but rather the specifics of the railway extension, and asked the city committee under what terms it would be willing to extend and double track the railway from the Ballast Wharf Grounds in Sydney Ward to Robertson's Wharf in Kings Ward. Such a suggestion meant that the entire main peninsula from the Haymarket Square to the South End and then on to the Market Square would be laced with a railway track. Reporting to their colleagues the committee suggested that Brydges' proposal be rejected and that the Ballast Wharf area negotiations be pursued.[92] This latest action of the Council was viewed even by some of that organization's former critics as a positive attempt to bring matters to an issue. Further, within the city any delay which would follow the Council's latest move would have been viewed locally as indicating that the government had no intention of erecting the proposed works.

This, however, was not the case. Within a week after the city had proposed to sell the area for $60,000, the government returned a counter-offer of $40,000 which the city accepted. The government received the tract of land extending 1,500 feet southward from the foot of Sydney; then 450 feet westward to the harbour line and then northward 1,700 feet until reaching the line extending from the Charlotte Street extension and thus encompassing the extra land sought by the government.[93]

When the Mayor reported the agreement to the Council, only Bartholemew Coxetter criticized the bargain, adding that "a grain cry reminding him of the Fenian cry had been raised [and] no member of the Council would have given the land away if it had been his own private property."[94] Most of the Council, however, were satisfied with the price received for the additional area. Concluding his report, the Mayor said that Isaac Burpee had promised the city a fair allowance in the improvements which it had made to the Ballast Wharf and Charlotte Street Extension in the interim between 1872 and 1876. Further, Mayor Smith reported that the government had agreed to let the city continue to collect revenue from the area until the property had been formally transferred. Most important, in regard to the terms of the sale was the city's agreement that the government could "do as they pleased with the property."[95] That the sale had been unconditional reflected the city's desire to gain a railway terminus in that area at almost any cost—including obviously the relinquishing of its Charter right to order and maintain all of the waterfront area. In late December the Council drew up the deed authorizing the transfer of the Ballast Wharf harbour lands to the federal government—thus formalizing what would be a continual national presence at the port.[96] The federal government would henceforth be a partner in the activities of the port so critical to the economic future of the city.

## The Port and the City in 1876

By the end of 1876 several significant events associated with the functions of the port and, thus, with the economic base of the city, had occurred. The waning timber industry received a further set back with the passage of the Plimsoll Legislation reducing deckloads. Moreover, the decision of the British Admiralty to use steel in the construction of its ships[97] heightened the precarious situation of wooden ship technology. As well, the extension of the Intercolonial Railway to Halifax and hence to Saint John together with the transferral by the city of the portion of its Charter-granted waterfront to the federal government affected the local power centres. The Common Council, which had previously addressed itself to the local consequences of port development, and the Board of Trade, which had been primarily concerned with the external links of the port, were now constrained to cooperate by circumstances emanating from across the Atlantic and within the Continent. By inviting the presence of the federal government to the waterfront—the physical plant of the transport node—the Common Council and the Board of Trade implicitly acknowledged their diminished ability to direct either the technological or organizational influences affecting Saint John's "export function" and thus the city's place in a system of cities.

## CHAPTER IV

# *Disruptions in the Atlantic Rhythm of a Maritime Port: 1876-1879*

In the folklore of Saint John the "Great Fire" of June 20, 1877 emerges as the most propitious occurrence of the late 1870's. Undoubtedly this view gained its initial credence through the efforts of two writers who rushed their accounts of the calamity into print shortly after the fire had burned over much of the main peninsula.[1] Coinciding with the altered and still changing position of the city within an Atlantic system of cities, the fire provided a more tangible focus and background against which the diminished fortunes of the port could be explained. Thus in the mid-nineties the Liberals of the city would attribute the decline of manufactures to that event,[2] while a later generation would view the fire as unequalled "in the destruction it wrought in the lives and plans for the future of the people living here, at that time."[3] However, while the fire contributed to the preoccupation of the aldermen with the local importance of the port during the last years of the seventies, the disruptions stimulated by that event were short-lived in comparison to those created within the city through the presence of outside agencies which controlled harbour facilities.

### Local Responses to External Influences: The Main Peninsula Versus Carleton

Although there had appeared to be unanimity among the aldermen when the bill committee was directed to prepare a measure empowering the Council to transfer the Ballast Wharf property to the federal government,[4] not until that committee had produced the necessary bill did the Carleton members raise an objection. Under the leadership of Alderman Glasgow of Brooks Ward, the Carleton members demanded that the bill of transfer be amended to enable the West Side to receive part of the money due on the property.[5] The question was referred to the City Recorder who advised the Council that the West Side was entitled to no such funds derived from the sale of East Side lands.[6]

This temporary skirmish between the East and West Side receded in importance when compared with the ongoing difficulties of the ferry. It was providing poor service and, under the control of the railway, making very slow payments on the annual rental fee due to the city. As Edward Willis noted in a brief sketch applicable to other facets of the economy, "the Western Extension, like other railways, has not been making money . . ."[7] Consequently, the ferry boats and the leasing privileges had been usurped by the railway's creditors. The aldermen would not have been averse to having the ferry managed by the credit agency of a now bankrupt railway system. However, Mr. J. Collins-Lloyd, representative for the creditors, agreed to let the city manage the ferry service until clear title to the boats could be established in Court. Thus, once again the difficulties of relinquishing control of a harbour-related facility became apparent. As a consequence of the ferry lease, the city would now be dealing with not only the railway but its creditors in an attempt to provide an inter-peninsula service. The development of this issue strengthened the commitment of the West Side towards bringing the ferry service under the direct control of the aldermen without any leasing arrangement and consequent intermediary relationship between Council and citizen.

The return of the ferry service to the city preceded the annual civic elections by a few weeks. In the election of 1877 Dr. Sylvester Z. Earle became mayor of the city. Exercising the prerogative of his office he appointed the aldermen to various committees, at his discretion displacing former chairmen.[8] By naming four East Side and two West Side aldermen to the ferry committee Earle attempted to secure the chairmanship of that committee for T. B. Hanington of Wellington Ward. As guardian of inter-peninsula travel, the ferry committee was one of the most important committees of the Common Council. The aldermen, within their prerogatives, enlarged the commitee by adding enough West Siders both to secure the chair for Alderman Glasgow of Carleton and to thwart the Mayor's attempt at dictating to the Council. Under severe editorial pressure and reported criticism of his encumbency Dr. Earle retreated by endorsing Glasgow as the chairman of the ferry committee.[9] This incident illustrated the priority given by the Council to harbour-related committees and the attendant prestige attached to the chairmanship of this particular committee.

Within a few months after the initial disagreement between the Mayor and aldermen, the chairmanship matter had retreated in the wake of the service demanded of the ferry as thousands from the main peninsula were transported across to Carleton following the destruction of June 20, 1877. In fact ferry usage increased so dramatically that Alderman Glasgow predicted the service would soon operate debt-free and even return a profit.[10]

More than insuring a profitable ferry service however, the fire served to introduce many East Siders to Carleton for their first lengthy visit. Newspaper reports noted that the displaced persons were "impressed with the possibilities in store for the Western section of the city."[11] Possibly for some of the main peninsula residents the West Side appeared to be an asset rather than a debit. Consequently, both sides clamored for increased ferry facilities under the pressure caused by the fire.[12] Within the Council Alderman Glasgow continued to chair the ferry committee and attend to many details associated with the service. In fact, it had become apparent after the fire and the increased traffic that either the ferry service should again be leased or a full-time superintendent should be appointed by the city.[13]

In Carleton a petition signed by John C. Littlehale, George H. Clark, and R. R. Allan proposed that the ferry be made a free service as the Suspension Bridge had been made a few years earlier.[14] Within the Council a special enquiry into the ferry management question endorsed the work of Alderman Glasgow under whose tutelage the ferry had earned $18,462.78 from may 1st to November 1st, while expending only $12,202.18 in the same period.[15]

Throughout 1878 Alderman Glasgow continued to chair the ferry committee and to assume responsibility for the operation of the service. Although the ownership of the ferries was still in question, the railway creditor, J. Collins-Lloyd, had given the city the right to operate the service for the benefit of the residents. In June the Supreme Court of New Brunswick decided that title to the ferry boats should be vested in J. Collins-Lloyd. Following this decision the city purchased the boats from Lloyd and again became the proprietor and manager of the ferry service and boats.[16] The re-acquisition of the ferry boats stimulated another round of debate on the desirability of city management. A special committee formed to consider that question, and chaired by Alderman Glasgow, recommended that tenders be advertised for a period of between ten to twenty years, and that the lease be "purchased absolutely."[17] Glasgow who had previously championed city ownership and management now declared that "he was in favor of selling the ferries because it took all the odium off the city authorities."[18] His West Side civic peer, Alderman Brittain of Guys Ward, objected and reminded the Council how difficult and expensive it had been to get the ferries back after the railway-ferry lease had failed.[19] Most of the aldermen appeared to favour more the possibility of lessee bankruptcy than the aggravations of a city-managed public service.[20]

Within six weeks, however, the ferry committee reported that only one tender had been received and it had been "unanimously rejected as not either offering a reasonable sum as purchase money for the boats or an adequate annual rental for the ferry privilege." Consequently, the committee recommended that Alderman H. Adam Glasgow be appointed as Superintendent of the Ferries at an annual salary of $800.[21] Some discussion arose not on Glasgow's abilities but rather on the size of the proposed salary which, considering the "dull times and scarcity of money," Alderman Domville believed to be an excessive sum.[22] Nevertheless, by a margin of one vote Glasgow became Superintendent of the Ferries. The city reluctantly assumed responsibility for providing another municipal service.[23] Thus, a combination of circumstances including the railway failure, the fire and the inability or unwillingness of any local individual to lease the ferry, had led to a situation long favoured by most residents of Carleton. The ferries were now to be directly controlled by the city and a West Side resident had become Superintendent.

Although the fire had provided an immediate impetus for the re-organization of this service, the problems of ferry management in the mid-seventies had been accentuated by the railway-ferry lease of 1871. Under that arrangement the city had divested itself of the immediate mundane details of operating the ferry in exchange for linking the ferry service inextricably with the fortunes of an outside agency: the railway. When the railway encountered financial problems, so also did the city through the ferry lease. And yet, even after re-purchasing the ferry boats, the city had been willing to try another leasing arrangement if a lessee could be found. The inter-peninsula traffic generated as a result of temporary residential dislocations had crystallized the ferry issue and prompted some attempt at resolving the issue within the city government organization. Although still separated physically, Carleton and the main peninsula through the civic superintendency of the ferry service had been brought closer together organizationally. West Siders voted for Glasgow and some East Siders voted in recognition that civic responsibility for urban services would have to be eventually initiated.

The same phenomenon — external influences — which produced the new management scheme for the ferry service was also, not surprisingly, responsible for the renewed harbour commission efforts within Saint John during the late 1870's.

## Institutional Responses to External Influences: The Board of Trade Versus the Common Council

The reluctance demonstrated by the aldermen in taking over the management of the ferry service was magnified many times in relation to the total harbour. The aldermen, as discussed in Chapter III, were cognizant of their limitations in business expertise but were nevertheless hesitant in relinquishing too much control over the port facilities. In part this reluctance may have been produced by the railway-ferry lease experience. However, the Ballast Wharf transfer which installed the federal government at the Lower Cove did suggest to the aldermen a pattern for turning over poorly managed properties to outside agencies. Within the city, therefore, the issue was not one of deciding on the establishment of a harbour commission or even which organization should direct its activities. Instead the problem for the Saint John business and civic elites was to decide on the mode of payment which should be requested of Ottawa in exchange for a greater national presence along the waterfront.

In the early spring of 1877, while the aldermen were considering the ferry matter which had been thrust at them through the misfortunes of the railway, members of the Board of Trade were ruminating over a letter from the Hon. A. J. Smith advising the businessmen that "he was not disposed to take upon himself the responsibility of preparing a bill to lay before Parliament in reference to placing the harbour of St. John in the hands of a Commission."[24] Smith suggested the Board confer with the Common Council. The President of the Board, W. C. Watson, a merchant, believed the federal government was attempting to avoid the issue. The Board voted to continue its efforts to place the harbour under the control of a commission. At the Board's annual meeting in December, however, it was acknowledged that the defeat of the bill to place the harbour under a commission was attributable to "the financial difficulties which stood in the way of a graving dock for Halifax . . ."[25]

Despite this setback, however, the aldermen faced with the massive task of rebuilding much of the city wharf property which had been destroyed, particularly between Duke and Union Streets, began reconsidering the harbour commission possibility in early January 1878.[26] Although the motion to reconsider the commission question had been made by Alderman Ferguson of Prince, one of the major influences guiding the Council at this time was James Domville, also a member of the Board of Trade. While several of the aldermen objected to sending a delegation to Ottawa because it would have cost too much, the Mayor and Domville were empowered to present the city's case for a commission.

In early March the Mayor, H. A. Glasgow, James Domville, and the city engineer, Hurd Peters, met with members of the Cabinet in Ottawa, and proposed that the harbour of Saint John be placed in commission under the following terms: harbour properties on the Eastern and Western sides — $515,753, and future harbour improvements — $500,000. During these negotiations it became apparent that the city's desire to receive a cash payment for the properties and future improvements would not be fulfilled by the government. The federal ministers advised the Saint John aldermanic delegation that the harbour improvements would be made with cash payments advanced to the commissioners, three of whom would be appointed by Ottawa and two by the Common Council. In addition, citing Montreal and Quebec as examples, the Cabinet ministers stipulated that the city must accept harbour commission bonds for the property and rights it was transferring.[27]

The Council delegates urged the federal government to pay the $515,735 in cash. The ministers declined, assuring the Saint John men that the sum "would be secured by inserting in the Act a clause that the Government assumed the liability of seeing that such rates should be levied as would insure the payment of interest and sinking fund for the redemption of the principal."[28] This guarantee by Ottawa was accepted by the city's delegates and by the Council.

The reaction from the Board of Trade was swift. They opposed the plan accepted by the aldermen because "the properties and privileges connected with the harbour should, to make them advantageous, be purchased at a price that would not materially increase the expenses of the Port . . ."[29] The Board suspected that Ottawa's guarantee of securing the purchase price of the property and privileges would be done at the risk of placing high charges on the trade of the port and thus driving away shipping business, particularly during "the great depression in our trade."[30]

Certainly not content to remain in Saint John and merely react to proposals from the Common Council regarding the harbour, the Board of Trade sent a separate delegation to Ottawa to discuss the terms under which a commission scheme might be effected. The business elite wanted the Board to be formally represented along with the federal government and the Common Council. Moreover, the Board of Trade disagreed with the Common Council on precisely how the necessary funds should be allotted from Ottawa.[31]

The aldermen favoured a system by which the government would set a fixed price for the harbour properties: $515,753. They also wanted the cash advances to be granted to a commission for upgrading facilities. Although the Board of Trade agreed with the aldermen on the latter proposal, its members vehemently opposed fixing any price for the harbour properties which would involve giving a cash grant of $515,753 to the City Council. In Board member James Harding's view the city would use the cash ". . . for the improvement of streets, and for the lighting of the streets and the building of the City Hall when the Wharf property required attention . . ."[32]

After the Board of Trade delegates visited the federal ministers, however, it became apparent that the government also desired only to advance the $500,000 for harbour improvements and not set any fixed price for the properties. As Conservators of the harbour, the aldermen felt that the city should get a cash recognition for the properties if the Dominion was to form part of the commission membership. At this point the negotiations reached an impasse: The city wanted both a cash grant of $515,753 for the harbour properties, and $500,000 towards improvements but would settle for harbour commission bonds for the former. The Board of Trade, on the other hand, desired the future improvement advance, but disapproved of the bonds issue for the harbour properties. Finally, the Dominion Government appeared to be more willing to advance the funds towards improvements but reluctant to give a cash grant for the properties. As the agency in charge of the harbour properties, the city declined to proceed with the negotiations in the belief that the cash advance only for future improvements would give the Dominion unwarranted control over a harbour the facilities of which had not been purchased — an unwise bargain, the aldermen were convinced, for their city.

As had been the case with the ferry, the aldermen again were unsuccessful in divesting the Council of the responsibility for a port-related function. Consequently, in the late 1870's the Common Council was solely responsible for the ferry and the harbour facilities — a fact created as much by default of outside agencies as by Charter.

## A Fusion of Interests: The Memorial from Saint John to Ottawa

At least one newspaper blamed the interference of the Board of Trade in the harbour commission discussions for bringing the negotiations to an abrupt end.[33] It is difficult to determine, indeed, the dimensions of the Board's culpability. The Council's commitment to developing the harbour facilities at any cost was also questionable. If the aldermen had been solely interested in the port, they could have accepted the $500,000 advance for improvements. However, their insistence on a guarantee for the fixed value of the harbour properties and privileges suggests that they were also guided by a desire to alleviate the city's debt in areas other than port facilities. In this respect James Harding's suspicion had not been unjustified. In receipt of the $40,000 given by Ottawa for the Ballast Wharf property the city had paid off debts accumulated through other municipal expenses.[34] In defense of the aldermen, however, they surely must have been influenced by the presence of displaced and unemployed workers — many of them Irish Catholics from Kings Ward — who inhabited the hastily erected shanties on Kings Square following the fire of 1877.[35] Moreover, after the harbour commission issue receded from the agenda of Council meetings, more pressing questions of rebuilding streets and establishing building codes commenced with fervor. For example, Canterbury Street was extended to Britain Street, thus providing another access route between the Market Square and Reed's Point.[36] And, "the local plague spots" in the vicinity of the Mill Pond and the Prince Ward lower areas became more of a nuisance with the overcrowding accentuated by the fire.[37]

As the elected representatives addressed these problems, initiatives towards stimulating the external functions of the port languished somewhat under the leadership of Mayor Sylvester Z. Earle. Undoubtedly, the scheme of priorities in Earle's administration was determined in part from his own occupational background as a physician as well as from the circumstances produced by the fire. Thus, not until the mayoralty contest of 1879 when Saint John again elected a commercial merchant, Charles R. Ray, could the business elite concur with the opinion of the recently established *Sun* which declared that the new Council best exhibited the make-up of the community.[38]

In his inaugural address, Mayor Ray directed his remarks to the city's current depression. Initiating a new and more fiscally conservative regime, Ray announced a policy of retrenchment, which in the cut back of expenditures contrasted sharply with the extensive street grading of the early 1870's.[39] By 1879 the reason for this new financial policy was, as Ray reminded his listeners, "owing largely to the limited demand and decline in price of the staple export, lumber, as well as the lessened demand for vessels built in and around the City."[40] Ray's terse synopsis was consistent as well with the trends revealed in the import and export columns which sketched the trade of the port.[41]

The city in which Charles Ray became chief magistrate in 1879 had experienced, and would continue to experience, the attendant disruptions associated with changes brought to bear on the external functions of the port. Following the passage of the Plimsoll Bill in1876, membership in the Board of Trade had dwindled to about two dozen members. So inactive had the organization become that in early 1879 it was unable and unwilling to send a representative to the Dominion Board of Trade meeting. James Harding remarked that "St. John merchants were not particularly exercised, as a body, over any particular question."[42]

This apparent post-Plimsoll lethargy — briefly interrupted only by the harbour commission discussions — was also reflected in the departure of merchants and ship brokers to England. The newspapers of the day were dotted with business announcements such as that of the Robertson brothers, ship brokers, who had decided to relocate their business to London.[43] The occasional editorial recanted the now familiar tale of "many who commenced life in a humble way in St. John and who . . . acquired a considerable degree of wealth [and now] found it to their interest to leave . . . and live in England because from there they [could] manage more effectually their ships."[44]

Those deserting Saint John however, were not exclusively men of capital. Young men and women, of lesser means, were "tempted away by the reported increase of business in the United States . . ." Editorialists generally bemoaned the departure of men of means, yet applauded the removal "of the surplus, unemployed population [because] the labour market [would be] restored to a normal condition."[45] Clearly in 1879 the idle shipyards and mills did not indicate "normal conditions."[46]

Ironically, the steamship departures that removed these segments of the city's population occurred within only a few blocks of the Ballast Wharf, which the aldermen had sold to Ottawa in the hope that trade would be stimulated. The federal government's decision to rent the grounds to the Barnum Circus in June 1879 could hardly have been encouraging for the city.[47] Three years after the Intercolonial had reached the Ballast Wharf, it had become apparent that the railroad was not the expected source of relief from the economic malaise of the 1870's. Instead of contributing to a transport system predicated on the export of lumber, the I.C.R. introduced territorial realignments which further disrupted the external functions of the port.[48] Although the railway symbolized a potential link to the interior, the absence of a route across the continent cast the Intercolonial as the agent of competition between Halifax and Saint John for the limited carriage from the North Shore of New Brunswick and the more distant areas outside the Province.[49] Thus, the railway had contributed to the difficulties of Saint John by creating a competitor for the port as it sought to dominate the outlying areas within New Brunswick. Moreover, the I.C.R. reinforced the emerging significance of Saint John's place within a national, rather than a provincial or even regional, system of cities.[50]

In this way the railroad changed forever the dimensions of Saint John's hinterland.[51] Not coincidentally, the year in which the I.C.R. had arrived at Saint John — 1876 — the lumber-based firm of Rankin Company had officially closed its operations.[52] The railway was at once a revolution both in transport technology and in the functional emphasis of Atlantic ports. In short, the railway meant the beginning of a transition from timber to grain as the export for future Atlantic railway-port nodes.[53] In the interim, however, the Atlantic Port of Saint John would endure the consequence of having a transport link to Central Canada which enabled Maritime markets to be flooded with Canadian manufactures.[54]

For men like Charles Ray who chose not to desert the city immediately by relocating to England or the United States the course which Saint John had to chart in light of the developments of the 1870's was quite clear.[55] In a tacit recognition that the fortunes of the port — through population change and technology — had been entrusted to Ottawa, Mayor Ray and the aldermanic Council sent a Memorial to the Governor General seeking his assistance in the granting of a steamship subsidy to Great Britain to encourage agricultural production within New Brunswick as well as transshipment of that produce from Saint John.[56] Acknowledging their place within a continental system of cities, the civic petitioners observed:

> Your Memorialists are aware that at present the attention of the Dominion is largely directed towards the development of the West. Still they presume to hope that the East will not be forgotten so that prosperity may be assured for the whole.[57]

This initiative taken by the Common Council in a matter pertaining to the external functions of the port signalled the beginning of a period in Saint John's history in which the city attempted to secure a place within the Canadian system of cities through the integration of its transport node into a national system of transportation.

Furthermore, during the years between 1879-1895 when the port severed its exclusive dependence on the Atlantic system of cities and moved towards a position of balance between continent and ocean, parallel changes occurred in the civic elite. As in other cities, the businessmen from those occupations contingent upon the external functions of the port as a transport node, together with the manufacturers and the professional colleagues of the business community — the lawyers — were to guide the port-city into a situation which they believed best approximated the pre-depression era.[58]

They had an unenviable task. For as their petition revealed, they implicitly recognized the view which their port presented to incoming ships. In 1879 the railway-laced port presented a rail-water transport development common to most nineteenth-century cities.[59] Although the two railways within Saint John had been constructed to the water's edge, they now were desperately seeking a place in a Continental system of transport nodes in which the port could become the axis between Atlantic water and Canadian soil. Until the city could secure this function for its harbour the Port of Saint John's role in an Atlantic system of cities would continue to diminish.

# PART TWO: 1879 - 1895

## REED'S POINT-LOWER COVE: THE TRANSITIONAL YEARS OF AN INTERSTITIAL PORT


LOVITT'S POINT
RIVER
LEE'S COVE
UNION POINT
Falls
FAIRVILLE
LANCASTER
HEIGHTS
EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN
(CARLETON BRANCH - WESTERN EXTENSION
DUCK COVE

Figure 2


JOHN
Ferry
Spar Cove
Creek
INDIANTOWN
MARBLE COVE
Fort Howe
Douglas Avenue
Strait Shore Road
HARBOUR
LILY LAKE
INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY
MARSH CREEK
Freight
HAYMARKET SQUARE
COURTENAY BAY
CROUCHVILLE
REED'S POINT
SAND POINT
Ferry
MILITARY GROUND
—1880—
The City of Saint John
0 923 1846 2769 3692 FT.
Port
Development

## CHAPTER V

# *Diminishing Functional Distance: The Railway Bridge at the Falls — 1879-1885*

The challenge which faced the City of Saint John in the late 1870's and early to mid-1880's was, as the Common Council's Memorial to Ottawa illustrated, the achievement of an appropriate role within a national system of cities. Until such time as the city, through its transport node had re-established itself as a functioning part of a definable system, it would remain an interstitial port — that is, a transport node located on the perimeter of both a now declining Atlantic system and an, as yet, undeveloped Continental system. The eventual construction of the railway bridge at the Falls in 1885 was to effect gradually the Continental thrust of Saint John's transport orientation.

In this initial period of development, which would link the port to the two systems — Atlantic and Continental, the city passed through a transitional phase characterized, in part, by the technological changes apparent in steamship and railway transport. Such increased mechanization was to shorten what some scholars term "functional distance"[1] — that is, the time/cost of travel and movement — as distinct from physical distance (measured on an absolute scale in terms of miles). Functional distance shrinks as transportation and communication systems become more efficient.

In the development of the Port of Saint John, the addition of the railway bridge at the Falls illustrates the tensions within the city between the Common Council who wished to diminish functional distance, but also maintain the integration of the local and external functions of the port, and the Board of Trade who wished to achieve this same end by focusing almost exclusively on the external functions of the port. Each local elite group attempted within its sphere of influence to diminish the functional distance now perceived to be hindering the prosperity of the port and city.

With regard to Saint John it may be argued that the notion of "diminishing functional distance," as it applied to integrating the port into a national system of cities, was not particularly encouraged by the declining population rate.[2] Paradoxically, the retention of a pedestrian commercial area, which underscored the Atlantic orientation, was being undertaken at a time when the city was simultaneously exploring new linkages through which it would become part of a wider national system of cities. Quite possibly, this apparent lag in the scale of spatial orientation between the local urban system — as suggested in part by the aggregate census returns — and the wider national system into which entry was sought, may well have reinforced the differing viewpoints held by the Common Council and the Board of Trade. By considering in this Chapter the city as a socio-spatial unit, the significance of the railway bridge at the Falls emerges through the divergent opinions held by each local elite group.

### The Board of Trade: Diminishing Functional Distance by Focusing on the External Urban System

For the business community, the railway-ferry system which had become operative in 1871 upon completion of the Carleton Branch was never wholly satisfactory. By building into the system a "break-in-bulk" transfer situation the train now running from Boston to Halifax could not be considered a through system. Nor would those trains eventually to run from Central Canada *via* a short line to the Maritimes be considered through in the absence of a bridge at Saint John linking both sides of the harbour.

The question of the railway bridge across the harbour, *via* Navy Island or the Falls, had received substantial attention in E. R. Burpee's survey of 1865 and in the railway construction activities of the late 1860's and early 1870's. Although discussions of railway matters in the late 1870's regarding the port had been frequently associated with internal traffic or railway-ferry relations, the necessity of bridging the Saint John river or harbour had always been viewed by a number of influential businessmen as inevitable. And thus, against a background of national railway development focusing on the C.P.R. to the West, the railway bridge at Saint John once again appeared a potentially prime contributor to the welfare of both the port and city.

It is difficult to identify the immediate stimulus for this concentrated renewal of interest but certainly a flurry of activity regarding railways, bridges, and future winter ports on the Atlantic Coast is perceptible in the city's newspapers following the signing on October 21, 1880 of the Canadian Pacific Railway contract in Ottawa. Although this agreement engaged a company to build, and then operate, a railway west, within a month various newspaper articles assessing the feasibility of Saint John and Halifax as potential winter ports began appearing regularly.[3] In some ways these were reminiscent of the discussions held ten years earlier concerning the efficacy of the Megantic Line in Quebec and (potentially through) Maine as a solvent for the trade lost through the construction of the Intercolonial along the North Shore and to Halifax.[4] Saint John readers were alerted to a communication received within a month of the C.P.R. agreement by the Halifax Chamber of Commerce from Sir Charles Tupper. He advised the Nova Scotian businessmen that their city would become the Winter Port of Canada. While specific reference was made to Halifax's Intercolonial line, as the agent which would insure this development, such assurance following the C.P.R. contract did not proceed unnoticed at Saint John.[5] More important, it underscored the lack of equilibrium between these Atlantic cities now forced to compete within a national system of cities for the future title: Winter Port of Canada.[6]

It was against this background of national railway development that the bridge at the Falls issue received new life in 1881. A few of the principals of the bridge promotion were, not surprisingly, remnants from the days of the old Western Extension — now called the St. John and Maine Railway but still identified on contemporary maps as the European and North American Railway.[7] Foremost among these Board of Trade railway bridge promoters were Thomas R. Jones, John H. Parks, and J. Murray Kay — the last two being from Portland. They insisted that a bridge was necessary because the ferry system was inadequate to handle the transshipment business now being done.[8] Indeed they argued that three times more freight was being handled at Halifax, thus giving that city a trading advantage over the merchants in Saint John regarding the business in eastern and northern new Brunswick. A railway bridge, they claimed, would increase the degree of import business now being done at Saint John because the city could advertise a through railway service.[9]

In terms of seeking a means of diminishing functional distance the railway promoters appeared to be on the side of technological progress. It was recognized by most that sailing vessels could no longer compete with steamers.[10] Although at least one local shipyard — Hilyard's — was building a steamer,[11] those Saint John businessmen desiring a combination of quality construction and the latest technology, such as Jacob Troop were going to England to purchase steamships.[12] In addition to transport development the telegraph had in December 1880 provided Grand Manan Island a communication link with Saint John.[13]

In this climate of developing communication, there was virtually no disagreement as to the necessity of a railway bridge. There was, however, debate as to its location. Thomas R. Jones, a member of the Board of Trade and also a former alderman and Mayor of the city during the late 1860's and mid-1870's, argued that the Falls site rather than the Navy Island locale was the best location. He claimed that the Falls had been the originally intended locale when the European and North American Railway Company for Extension from Saint John and Westward had been incorporated in 1864. In support of Jones' position, the *Sun* pointed out that the Railway Incorporation Act had referred to the "river St. John" which in its opinion clearly pointed to the bank next to the Suspension Bridge.

With the Conservative press behind them the promoters presented their case to the Board of Trade in February 1881. Within a few weeks this body met to hear the recommendations of its committee regarding the feasibility of the project. That body recommended that the bridge be constructed at the Falls and built "to run along the wharves in front of the Town of Portland as nearly as may be practicable."[14]

Some on the Board of Trade wanted the bridge promoters to assure them that the railway would run along the straight shore in Portland having as its final destination the I.C.R. terminus on Dorchester Street.[15] J. Murray Kay, a promoter and member of the Board of Trade's executive, stated further that his intention and that of his colleagues "was to identify themselves as closely as possible with the business interests of the City and Portland."[16] Kay believed that Navy Island would be too expensive a route largely because of the precautions in construction which would have to be undertaken to preserve the channel traffic in the harbour.

Objection to the Board's support of the proposal was raised by newspaper editor J. V. Ellis, who claimed that the benefits to the city had not been clearly demonstrated.[17] His oppostion reflected the view of some members on the Common Council — particularly from Carleton. However, the majority of the businessmen were in agreement with Andre Cushing. He correctly pointed out that the present gap in the railway system resulted in the absence of a "means of transportation of our fish and produce at a price which would enable us to derive the profit they were entitled to."[18] Anticipating the fear which some held, C. H. Fairweather asked "was there any business properly belonging to St. John that this bridge would carry past us?" For this merchant the answer was a negative one, adding "that the Canadian Pacific Railway would be built in a few years and that we shall feel the volume of the winter traffic coming to us."[19] For Fairweather and most of the members present, the through railway service would more than compensate for the lost revenues derived by the hotels and hacks, who depended upon the overnight stay in Saint John of passengers travelling through the city. In a similar vein, James Holley of Portland reminded Mr. Ellis that "other portions of St. John County had claims as well as Carleton." he believed it unfair that "a car of lumber from Westmoreland to Boston must be ferried across the harbour to Carleton so as to benefit the Carleton Branch."[20]

With the possible exception of J. V. Ellis who was always concerned with what he felt was Carleton's slower growth, the majority of the members voted against Ellis's amendment to forestall the project, thus supporting the passage by the Provincial Legislature of a bill to incorporate the railway bridge. As a result, they sanctioned a procedure for diminishing functional distance by focusing on the external elements of the transport system into which the city had to integrate. Less concern was given to the particular effect their decision might have on the Carleton Branch Railroad and consequently on the local urban system.

On March 25, 1881 the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company was incorporated to connect the Intercolonial Railway and the Saint John and Maine Railway by crossing the River Saint John.[21] Despite the fact that at least one Portland businessman James Kirk, a prominent lumber mill owner, and James L. Dunn of the Board of Trade had wanted the company to spell out precisely the direction which track construction would take on the Portland peninsula, section 6 of the act stated "the route of the said Railway . . . shall be selected by the company where the same shall be deemed most suitable and in order to select the same, the company is hereby authorized . . . to enter upon the lands . . . of all persons, companies, corporations or municipalities necessary for the purpose . . ."[22] The company had argued, apparently successfully, that a precise identification of the route would result in seriously inflated land values of those lots to be appropriated: J. Murray Kay in his appeal to the Board of Trade for approval of this course of action had questioned whether it would "not increase the land damages to have the route definitely stated."[23] Most agreed; no sizeable opposition to this section of the act emerged. Possibly opposition to this provision had been defused because of Portland's intense support of the project. Not only were two of the three principal incorporators — J. Murray Kay and John H. Parks — residents of the area, but the Portland Town Council strongly supported the proposal. In the words of one Portland Councillor: ". . . we feel that yet this port would become the foremost one in the Dominion . . . were this bridge built . . . St. John would be in a better position than to ask aid from the Dominion government to build elevators."[24]

Greatest opposition to the bridge at the Falls scheme occurred among Carleton residents who had a vested interest in that area's railway. Additional opposition came from non-Carleton residents, such as William K. Reynolds. He questioned the wisdom of entrusting such a vital communication link to private hands. He would have preferred either to terminate the project or to encourage the federal government to take it over as a national work. With the Board of Trade firmly committed to supporting the project, thus closing an avenue of both formal and informal protest, only the Saint John Common Council emerged to speak against the

Falls and in favour of Navy Island — thereby endorsing its commitment to diminishing functional distance by focusing on the internal urban system.

### The Common Council: Diminishing Functional Distance by Focusing on the Internal Urban System

Although the aldermen were to agonize over the relative merits of a railway bridge at the Falls which they believed would negate any possibility of turning the Carleton Branch into a successful financial venture, nevertheless, they were aware of the newer hierarchical structure in which their city had to function. Furthermore they displayed a sensitivity to examples of what might be considered indices of urban status. For example, early in 1880, a special Council meeting was called to discuss the advisability of moving the provincial seat of government from Fredericton to the port city.[25] Such a move was interpreted as potentially enhancing the welfare of the Province since it would strengthen the major urban centre of New Brunswick. Members of the civic elite kept a watchful eye on the activities of the Intercolonial, grumbling publicly when the railway located its New Brunswick representative at Moncton rather than at Saint John.[26] In addition, the Council's *Minutes* reflect the tensions between the old and the emerging avenues of transport development. In the fall the City of Boston had invited members of Saint John's municipal government to attend the 250th anniversary of its founding. Responding to this gesture Alderman C. N. Skinner observed:

> . . . and whereas by reason of the intimate social and commercial relations existing between citizens of Saint John and the large number of persons now residing in Boston who first had their homes in New Brunswick . . . His worship be requested to accept . . . |and| . . . to make manifest to the City of Boston that the citizens of Saint John are desirous that both countries will in future see their way to widen rather than to narrow the channels of trade between them . . .[27]

Contrasting with the strong sentiments expressed in regard to what had been a major coastal association was the discussion held two months later during which the aldermen criticized the poor services offered by the Intercolonial — the link with the Dominion — to the business interests of the city.[28]

Against this welter of commentary which bore testimony to the transport alterations occurring in the larger urban system, the city under Charles Ray's leadership continued to address itself to managing carefully its limited disposable revenues. A sample of several decisions made by the aldermen regarding transport and communication serves to indicate not only the city elite's concrete priorities but more important what these symbolized. In 1880 expenditures were approved for street repair at the neck of the main peninsula and for ferry management but the installation of a telephone connection was rejected despite the fact that several businesses in the immediate vicinity had telephones.[29]

The Council's proclivity to do this was encouraged now, of course, by its close association with the ferry — the smooth operation of which continued to tax the administrative abilities of the civic elite. When the service had been reacquired from the Western Extension in 1877, it had enjoyed a temporary increase in patronage.[30] However, both the declining population and the weakened economic position of many residents had resulted in a decrease in passengers. Many who needed to cross the harbour used the Suspension Bridge which had been bought by the Province and made toll-free in the mid-1870's. Diminished revenues made upkeep of the ferry service difficult without increasing the tolls — a prospect never warmly received by the West Side aldermen. It was against this immediate background of fiscal retrenchment and local transport problems that the bridge at the Falls proposal emerged in the fall of 1880. Such a scheme, in diverting the transfer of passengers and transshipment of goods from the Carleton Branch, and hence from the ferry, was seen as removing a source of local revenue and as permanently disrupting any economic potential that the Carleton Branch might possess. This would remove any possibility of the city gaining a return on its $40,000 investment of the early 1870's — an investment which had yet to pay a dividend.

That the ferry should re-emerge again as an important issue in the early 1880's, after having been presumably settled with the appointment of H. Adam Glasgow in 1879 as superintendent, is not surprising. Although the city had reacquired the ferry and seemingly embarked on a more rigorous course of its management, this vital inter-peninsula link served both local and through traffic and continued to remain a pawn in the discussions between the aldermen and railway directors. For the Common Council the ferry was part of the civic mandate which included internal transport but, for the railway men it was merely a link — and an inefficient one at that — in an external transport system.

Early in 1880 the ferry committee increased fares on the service in an attempt to offset the losses being experienced as a result of poor business and competition from the Suspension Bridge.[31] In mid-September letters appeared in the paper from Carleton residents protesting the treatment of the West Side in the ferry matter.[32]

Raising the fares had the immediate effect of requiring hundreds of West Siders to use small boats to cross the harbour and also had reinforced the arguments of the railway bridge promoters that the ferry was inadequately managed by the city.[33]

At the time at which Common Council was grappling with this latest ferry problem reports of the group planning a railway bridge at the Falls emerged. The aldermen turned their attention to this newest potential alteration in the city's transport node which would affect the operation of the ferry. Assessing the ferry dilemma and the railway bridge, the local Liberal paper asked "would it not be well for the people of St. John to try to secure an efficient ferry on their harbour . . . Before we extend our external communications we should perfect our internal ones."[34] While that paper was able to distinguish between internal and external forms of port-related transport, emphasizing such a dichotomy in this instance revealed more than its distrust of the railway promoters. Specifically it unveiled a problem which the *Globe* shared with the protagonists in the ferry dilemma: an inability or unwillingness to see the dual role played by the ferry in harbour transport. For this newspaper and some of the West Side aldermen this inability arose through a one-dimensional view of the ferry as a result of perceiving the service primarily as an internal highway.[35] Furthermore, the *Globe* wanted to see coastal rather than continental transport links encouraged. Ultimately, it saw the Falls bridge as rendering irretrievable the Carleton investment.[36]

Early in 1881 when the railway bridge matter occupied the attention of the city's editors, the Common Council appeared to agree with that objection voiced by the *Globe:* a railway bridge at the Falls would cripple the already weak Carleton Branch. Many on the Council, particularly the West Side aldermen, agreed with the advice offered to the Board of Trade as that body met to consider the proposal: "What do we want to bridge the St. John River for at all?" the writer of a letter to the *Globe's* editor asked rhetorically. "Let us build up St. John on both sides of the harbour; and say positively and determinedly that we want to make this port a shipping port and not a place which freight and passengers will pass by."[37]

A week before the Board of Trade held their meeting to consider the merits of the railway bridge, the aldermen met and discussed at length its implications for the local urban system. A general committee of the Council reported that it was the duty of the elected representatives of the city "to oppose the bridge at the Falls and use every exertion to have it built at Navy Island."[38] One of the Queens Ward members, Harris Allan, favoured Navy Island because "a bridge there might do away with the Ferry and save the City a large expense."[39] However, East Side opinion was not unanimous. Alderman George F. Smith, a commercial merchant representing Kings, felt the ferry question should not influence the Council's decision-making because that service could not "be done away with." Not surprisingly, the most vocal opposition to the Falls bridge came from Aldermen Glasgow and Brittain — two West Side members who had enjoyed the voters' confidence for a number of years.[40]

Glasgow, the most persistent opponent of the bridge scheme, began his critique of the proposal by arguing that "a bridge at Navy Island would be a benefit to both sides of the harbour. Carleton, he reminded his listeners, "[had] spent $40,000 in building a branch from Fairville and if a bridge was put up at the Falls the branch would be useless." Appealing to the Portland Town councillors who would read the newspaper accounts of the alderman's deliberations, Glasgow observed "that the [proposed] Act gave great powers to the company with respect to running through Portland, and he thought it would be better for the Town to have a bridge at Navy Island, as it would not interfere with their streets." He urged the Portland Council "to come to the aid of the West Side" in this bridge question. Quite possibly, in this last suggestion, Glasgow may have been attempting to capitalize on the overtures lately undertaken by the civic bodies of Saint John and Portlant regarding a union of the two communities. Glasgow's remarks were also endorsed by Alderman Jarvis Wilson, a lumber merchant from Albert Ward in Carleton, who cautioned his civic colleagues from both sides of the harbour against letting "the Board of Trade alone take action in the matter."[41] In concluding the West Side case against the Falls bridge, Alderman Samuel L. Brittain appealed to the interests of the city as a whole, not merely those of Carleton.

Alderman Charles N. Skinner from Prince Ward summarized the opinions of the Common Council by stating that this was "one of the most important measures that ever came before the Board." Succinctly he focused on the essence of the problem: "the movement was not originated in the civic interest, but by those interested in through traffic between the east and west." But on the other hand, Skinner recognized that as "there was no public opinion against the bridge — all persons should see that [it] was located where it would do the most good." Skinner really reflected the dilemma faced by the countless municipalities in the 19th century who wanted to diminish functional distance, but not at the expense of the local urban system.

He and his colleagues on the Council were sensitive to the changes taking place in the development of transport systems. Skinner prefaced his brief summary of impending railway developments by noting that "the railway system of this country was about to take a new departure." In his mind the central components of this "new departure" included the Megantic Line and the Pacific Syndicate's [C.P.R.] reported intentions of trying to reach the Atlantic coast of Canada. For both the civic and business elites the injustice which Saint John had to bear through the territorial realignments occasioned by the Intercolonial Railway was about to end. In Skinner's words, and to applause of the aldermen, "the railway question was righting itself, and St. John was now about to get what she ought to have had long ago."

Combining the Common Council's interest in both the internal and external functions of the Port, Skinner and the West Side aldermen thought "if the bridge were built at Navy Island for railway, foot passengers and carriages, it would undoubtedly lead to a great impetus to railway and other traffic encircling the city with an iron band along the wharves." Such a man-made structure, they believed, would make the East and West Sides of the city one and eventually "sectional feeling [would be] strangled." A clue to Skinner's perception of the scale of Saint John's urban system is suggested in his reference to a Navy Island bridge which, in addition to providing for the expedition of wheeled rail and carriage traffic, also included a provision for pedestrians or in the more precise understanding of the 19th century walking city "foot passengers." In the interests of "building up" the city and port internally and externally, Skinner and most of his civic peers were willing to endorse a bridge at Navy Island, although such a construction might interfere slightly with harbour traffic. From the alderman's point of view "you can't build up cities without navigation giving way a little."[42] In this case navigation would be "giving way a little", but the Carleton Branch would be rescued.

Trying to convince the Provincial Legislature as the legal body empowered to incorporate the railway bridge promoters, the Common Council forwarded a petition to Fredericton acknowledging their support of a railway bridge — one built not at the Falls but at Navy Island. As a further rationale for their position, the aldermen offered the opinion that a bridge could be constructed at the Navy Island location which would not unduly obstruct harbour traffic. The editor of the *Sun*, who supported the Falls scheme, expressed amusement at such a suggestion coming from a "Council who have failed utterly in harbour management, [and now] undertake to declare that a railway bridge at Navy Island will be no obstruction to harbour navigation."[43] While this judgment was perhaps harsh and ignored the attempts of the Council to deal with transport problems, it did not address itself to a major component of the official civic oppositon: the money invested by the city in the Carleton Branch Railroad was at stake.

Indeed, so intense had feelings become on the West Side that, following the Common Council meeting of February 23rd, a petition was circulated in support of the alderman's stand taken against the proposed Falls bridge scheme. In several tightly worded clauses, the 469 petitioners revealed their underlying concern about Carleton's future:

> The Petition of the Undersigned humbly sheweth: —
>
> That the City of Saint John (West Side) invested $40,000 in the Stock of the Carleton Branch Railway, together with about $5,000 stock subscribed by the residents of Carleton.
>
> That the City gave important deep water privileges, extending 1600 feet along the harbour front, besides valuable lands given by the West Side — equal to about thirteen acres of lands and flats — immediately in rear of the Deep Water Line, and in the Mill Pond.
>
> That the earnings of the Railway since its construction have been used to meet interest on the Bonds issued by the company and in payment of bonds matured.
>
> That no funds, have been available to meet the Coupons payable by the City on the Debentures issued to purchase this Stock in the Branch, and an Assessment yearly of about $2,800 has been levied on the property and inhabitants in Carleton therefor; and if — as under the contemplated route by bridging the River at the Falls — the Carleton Branch would practically be abandoned, the said assessment would continue and no benefit be received, either direct or indirect.
>
> That while we acknowledge the convenience of a bridge to the through level, we deplore the atempt that is being made to obtain legislation to locate it at the Falls — completely destroying the Carleton Branch — and materially injuring the property and inhabitants of the West Side when, *in our opinion, every public interest, as well as the interests of St. John and Portland, would be better served by having the Bridge constructed at Navy Island.*[44]

From the West Side through the leadership of H. Adam Glasgow, who had ten years earlier encouraged the building of that road, came allegations that the incorporators of the bridge at the Falls scheme, especially T. R. Jones and John Parks, were committed to the Carleton community because they had suggested that the Branch be built to aid the Western Extension. Although such an argument, even if it were indisputably true, would have no legal bearing on the question of Jones and Parks now building a bridge at the Falls, Glasgow and the West Siders hoped to discredit the bridge promoters at least in the eyes of the Provincial Legislature which was considering the bill in March 1881.

It was chiefly T. R. Jones who presented refutations to the Legislature regarding the alleged commitments undertaken by the Western Extension towards the West Side. He did so because, as one of the incorporators of the original Western Extension, he wished to clarify the nature of the particular commitment which that road had made in its act of incorporation regarding its responsibilities to Carleton. Jones claimed that, contrary to the recent statements from the Common Council and in particular from H. Adam Glasgow, the Western Extension had not been involved in the Carleton Branch promotion. Instead, he pointed to the Western Extension's repeated attempts to promote a bridge at the Falls during the past twelve years. For his listeners at least T. R. Jones' final comment on the matter may have secured his position: "He was a member of the Common Council at the time and knew the intentions."[45]

The Common Council may well have endorsed the Western Extension with the understanding that a bridge across the Falls was the Company's ultimate goal. However, faced with the economic circumstances of the late 1860's, the Western Extension was not able to fund such a project. A letter reprinted by the *Globe* in March 1881 suggested that the President at that time, Alexander Jardine, a member of the Board of Trade, was "willing to construct and maintain a Railway from the main line in Fairville to the wharves in Carleton . . ."[46] This underscored the tone of the negotiations carried on by the Parks and the West Side in the late 1860's,[47] and now it provided support for Glasgow's conclusion that the "Carleton Branch was built to a large extent at the instigation of the Western Extension Company . . ."[48]

The entire anti-bridge argument of the West Side rested on the assertion that construction of the Carleton Branch meant a departure from the original intention of the Western Extension to construct a Falls bridge, and Glasgow and his West Side coterie were arguing in 1881 that this departure in construction plans had implicitly committed the railway people not only to the Carleton Branch Railroad but also to building up Carleton. No doubt Glasgow must have realized that construction of the Branch line had been an expedient choice in the late 1860's[49] An interpretation of his public statements suggesting his belief in a permanent railway commitment to the West Side based on an expedient choice made more than a decade earlier is questionable. More likely his position in 1881, while stemming from a disappointment at the possibility of not realizing a richer development through a Carleton Branch – Navy Island scheme, must also be seen as the scaffolding on which demands for compensation for their investment would be built.[50]

It does appear however, that the Carleton Branch route had been chosen only when it became apparent that the Falls bridge would not be constructed. The railway company well may have encouraged the formation of a Carleton Branch to be the legal overseer of the project. Yet, both the Carleton residents who responded quickly to the opportunity of a railway waterfront connection, and the Western Extension which had no other choice, knew that the Carleton Branch was an "after thought" if not in the original survey, then, certainly in its application. The agitation of the West Side members from the Common Council was an attempt to retain a railway. More important, they sought to build a case for the eventual control of the Carleton Branch by the federal government which would then absolve the West Side from paying interest on the $40,000.[51]

Although the West Side in attacking the Falls bridge proposal had the support of a majority of the East Side members of the Council, when the Provincial Legislature passed the Act of Incorporation in March 1881, only the Carleton members maintained a vocal opposition. Within two weeks of the Act's passage, the West Siders again claimed that the Falls bridge "would injuriously affect the Carleton Branch Railway."[52] This time, however, a protracted discussion of the proposal's disadvantages did not occur. In fact, it appears that the city accepted the existence of a company committed to erecting a bridge which would eliminate its investment in the Carleton Branch. Objection after March 1881 must have appeared useless to most of the aldermen. Part of the explanation for both the West Side's continued opposition and the less than enthusiastic support of their position by the East Side also rests in the election returns of April 1881.

Carleton returned its members uncontested, and while most of the East Side wards returned the same representatives, a significant change had occurred. The new Mayor was Simeon Jones, a brewer, who had formerly represented Queens Ward. More important, in the context of the bridge location, he had been the only alderman to have advised his colleagues that the issue "was a matter more for the merchants and citizens, than for the Council."[53] This opinion contrasted somewhat with that of this mayoral predecessor, who had appeared reluctant to endorse a proposal which would injure the city's potential for profit in the Carleton Branch. However, Jones in an inaugural address which acknowledged a "time of rigid economy" proposed that the stringent measures introduced by his predecessor, Charles Ray, be incorporated into a more efficient form of organization whereby the city would continue to practice measures of economy but at the same time also perform basic services for the citizens. For Jones this meant proposing a Board of Works embracing "water sewerage, streets, sidewalks, wharves, public buildings, in short every department where labour has to be performed."[54] His plans also included leasing the ferry — a suggestion never agreed to by West Side aldermen.

In choosing to suggest that the city remove itself from the management of the ferry — an internal transport service of the harbour — Jones moved the Council with the cooperation of the East Siders closer towards the Board of Trade's realm of port development — the external port-related services. In addition, he continued to refer to Board of Trade concerns by mentioning the import trade of the City which was now being carried on

> through Halifax and part of the United States . . . but I have no doubt if the Megantic Railway [through Maine] be completed — the trade of this Port will be so increased that direct steam communication with Europe will be established . . . and I recommend that the Council hold out every inducement within its power for the erection of warehouses, elevators and other public works, and for the granting of all facilities necessary to the successful carrying out of their enterprise.[55]

Certainly as a brewer whose business was located at the neck of the main peninsula, Jones could see the potential benefits in a Falls bridge for expediting the manufactures of Saint John through the counties traversed by the St. John and Maine Railway and the Intercolonial.

By November of 1881 with the bridge question having been settled at least as far as location was concerned, Alderman Skinner, who previously had advocated a bridge across Navy Island, proposed that a committee from the Common Council meet with similar committees from the Board of Trade and the Portland Town Council "with a view to joint action upon the following matters namely: to ascertain the prospects of any Railway Extension being made into this City or suburbs." Skinner also suggested correspondence be initiated with the railway companies to determine what accommodations they required, such as land and other facilities. With Mayor Jones as its chairman three East Siders and one West

Sider, H. A. Glasgow, formed the committee.[56] Although the Mayor and the majority of the East Siders appeared to have been prepared to accept without further resistance the Falls bridge scheme, they were not as readily agreeable as the Board of Trade had been. The presence of H. Adam Glasgow on this newly formed committee suggested that the city could not entirely abandon, at least without some compensation, a consideration of the effects which diminishing functional distance would have upon the internal urban system. Like a few of the Board of Trade men such as Reynolds and Dunn — who had objected to a private corporation gaining control of such a facility,[57] the Common Council decided to approach Ottawa regarding the whole question of transcontinental lines and Saint John's future role.

## The Federal Government: Arbiter of Diminishing Functional Distance

Within a month after the aldermen had decided to solicit Ottawa's participation, a joint meeting of the Board of Trade and the Common Council took place. During the discussion, Mayor Jones declared that the "general impression" regarding the St. John and Maine Railway — now controlled by J. Murray Kay and expected to benefit greatly from the Falls bridge scheme — was that it was about to be acquired by the Minister of Agriculture in Macdonald's Cabinet, John Pope. The news that a Federal Minister was to become so closely involved with a local transport property prompted several present to suggest writing to Sir S. L. Tilley regarding the city's interests.[58] This suggestion was pursued. In response, Tilley met with the representatives of the Board of Trade and of the Municipal Councils of Portland and Saint John. Resolutions were passed regarding the future role the area would play in transport development.[59]

This was not the first time the federal government had been brought into the bridge question. Nonetheless, its earlier participation is less easily identified or measured. But it does appear that following the passage of the Canada Railway Act in the fall of 1880, several members of the Saint John business community — specifically, Messrs. J. Murray Kay and Thomas R. Jones — had gone to Ottawa to secure a subsidy for their proposed bridge at the Falls.[60]

While the results of this trip were not published, following it the bridge promoters had their proposal introduced into the Provincial Legislature. At only one point throughout these discussions was the federal government mentioned. This was with respect to the right of Provincial Legislatures to bridge navigable bodies of water.[61] Opponents to the bill's passage had argued that, in addition to the Navy Island scheme being of greater benefit to the city, only the federal government could authorize the incorporation of a company planning to bridge a navigable body of water. Nevertheless, the New Brunswick House decided that, since the proposed bridge at the Falls would not interfere with navigation, the Legislature could allow the company to be incorporated.[62] Displaying a concern for its sphere of influence in relation to that of the federal government, a member of the Legislative body noted that "it is not for the Legislature to abandon its powers — even doubtful ones; at least, not until they are called in question by the Courts." In addition, he noted: "the tendency of the decisions [by the Courts] is to cut down its powers sufficiently, without the legislature voluntarily surrendering them."[63] The protectiveness of the House towards its realm of jurisdiction was not unlike that which the city expressed towards the powers of the House. This, indeed, illustrated the tensions among various levels of government as the city, province and nation were being knit together in a more formally organized society.

By late fall of 1881 and early winter of 1882, the reason why Jones and Kay had just gone to Ottawa became clearer, although it had always been suspected by opponents of the bridge scheme. Chartered since March 1881, the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company had made no attempt to initiate construction because the incorporators had been unable to secure sufficient investment capital to begin even preliminary work. A few of the bridge opponents began asking pointedly when construction was to commence. In the meantime, discussion as to an eastern winter port of the C.P.R. was aired in the *Telegraph*, *Sun* and *Globe*.[64] The *Globe* suggested that Saint John would get little or none of the winter port business because it simply was farther from Montreal than was Portland, Maine.[65] Others argued the bridge would only be the beginning.

The Common Councils of Saint John and Portland (N.B.), in conjunction with the Board of Trade, sought clarification from Tilley as to the future of Saint John as the C.P.R.'s winter port. They were concerned about reports that the C.P.R. was investigating Portland (Me.) as a possible winter port. Tilley assured them that "the report recently put in circulation that the Canadian Pacific Railway Company are arranging to have their eastern terminus at a port in the United States is without foundation in fact."[66] Lending further authority to this remark, Tilley added: "I am authorized to make this statement on the most distinct and positive form."[67] It is true that the Pacific Syndicate was investigating a variety of outlets for the eventual produce of the Northwest. However, the source of Tilley's assurance, who was not made public, may have been Sir John A. Macdonald.

In March of 1882, a year after having secured a charter, the company sought another year's delay before beginning construction. It still had insufficient capital.[68] Within a few days Jones and Kay had written to the Minister of Railways, Sir Charles Tupper, regarding the Falls bridge. Essentially, they were again seeking the Dominion's assistance in guaranteeing the interest on the largest part of the projected loan necessary to construct the bridge. Strengthening their case to the Nova Scotian Minister, they re-iterated the spirit of an earlier communication in which they had observed that such a bridge "would have the effect of enabling express trains, in the matters of speed and comfort, to be run as to make Halifax more and more, the point of arrival and departure for ocean steamers . . ." As with former statements on the bridge the previous representations made in the early 1870's by Jones were recalled. However, the 1880's delegates observed, "now that the lines from Saint John are reorganized this scheme for the bridge and connections is revived with more certainty than ever."[69]

It was, indeed, this revival with "more certainty than ever" which had lent suspicion to the project because the prime mover in the revival had been J. Murray Kay who had acquired the Western Extension after it failed and re-named it the St. John and Maine. Many including the editor of the *Telegraph* had urged that the bridge be built with government assistance and as a government work rather than remaining "in private hands subject to a change in their personnel and even in their nationality . . ."[70] Accelerating this increased involvement by the federal government with the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company was J. Murray Kay's other avenue of entrance to Ottawa, the St. John and Maine Railway. In 1881 John Pope, the Minister of Agriculture who controlled the Megantic Line, took control from Kay of the St. John and Maine — giving Pope a presence in New Brunswick and an interest in the bridge which would surely benefit the bridge promoters. In May of 1882 Pope also acquired Kay's share of the Carleton Branch which Kay had acquired from E. R. Burpee two years earlier.[71] Thus Pope controlled the rail line approaching the water from the Western side of the harbour.[72]

It was generally well known, or at least suspected, that the railway bridge promoters wanted government assistance. Since most including those opposed to a privately financed project would have preferred the government to fund and direct the construction, it came as no surprise when a resolution was introduced to the House of Commons on May 15, 1883 "respecting a loan to the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company."[73] Within a week the House of Commons considered the resolution at Sir Leonard Tilley's suggestion.

In his initial remarks, Tilley pointed out that Jones had sought aid in 1871-72 for a bridge, and that the subsequent difficulties of the Western Extension Company had postponed the possibility of initiating further action until the late 1870's-early 1880's. He claimed that the Minister of Railways, aided now by a report from the Chief Engineer of the Dominion, had determined both the importance of the work and the cost of completion. As a result of these deliberations the government had decided to offer the company not a subsidy but a loan for 80% of the work at 4% interest — 2% less than the current market rate of 6%. As the company had accepted the offer, it now remained for the House to give permission "to grant the loan on a lien of the line, and if the bridge is not completed within the time specified, the Government will have the right to take it out of the company's hands and construct it."[74] This last aspect of the agreement, no doubt, was designed to counter the arguments made against the delays of the company to date.

Tilley, of course, was not insensitive to the Carleton objection to the Falls bridge proposal. Tilley referred to the $40,000 investment made by the city and borne by the Carleton residents, observing in reference to the latter that "it would gratify a portion of my constituents very much indeed, and a portion to whom I am greatly indebted, if the scheme was not completed . . ."[75]

Tilley was certainly aware of the latest Common Council resolution passed in May requesting the House of Commons delay action "in appropriating monies in aid of the Bridge and Railway Company . . ." The resolution was a reminder that the Carleton Branch had *never* paid a dividend. Further, it contained the aldermen's principal objection to the proposed Bridge construction: it was impossible for the city to "ever expect any return from the Branch and a certainty that the interest on the Railway Debentures will have to be assumed on the Western portion of the City for all time and not even the smallest indirect benefit expected as the operation of the Branch in our opinion will be practically abandoned and eventually pass out of the Cities [sic] control."[76]

Construction on the project began soon after. With the bridge a certainty the future of the Carleton Railroad was also assured — an assurance acknowledged in the previously cited Common Council resolution. Indeed early in January 1884 when the impending bridge construction was a central topic in political discussions at the local and federal level, the Common Council again introduced the Carleton Branch issue. This time the now familiar particulars of the Carleton Branch dilemma concluded with a new proviso: "Therefore, resolved that a memorial be prepared by the Common Clerk and presented to the General Government setting forth the facts in the case and asking the said government to take stock held by the West Side of the City of Saint John in the Carleton Branch Railway.[77] This proposal emerged at a time when the C.P.R. was reportedly considering Boston and Portland (Me.) as Atlantic coast winter ports. Presumably, it was judged as appropriate to remind Ottawa of the Falls bridge injustice and the suggested threat to the entire city in the winter port matter. As well, the impetus to gain compensation for the Branch Railroad may have been stimulated by Tilley's acknowledged recognition of the $40,000 potential loss.[78]

In any event, in response to their Memorial Tilley did meet with representatives of his West Side constituency in September 1884. Spokesmen for the group pointed out that the loss of the Carleton Branch's business would have repercussions throughout the Carleton community and the city at large; many of the Carleton people were employees of the railway and thus would be unemployed. It was apparent that Tilley wished to assist Carleton. Alderman Smith of Albert Ward observed that when the Falls bridge opened the Carleton Branch would "be practically useless but if the Megantic [Short Line] is carried to the south or even to the north of Moosehead Lake [Maine] the company might use the branch in preference to going around by the bridge." Smith continued: "there are excellent facilities here for a wharf terminus."[79] Alderman Brittain, an original proponent of the Carleton Branch, observed that "Sir Leonard promised to do what he could." Brittain noted that Tilley reminded the West Side of Ottawa's commitment to the Short Line, and furthermore, that Carleton would gain if it were built and "the matter was delayed only by the Quebec members."[80]

Discussion of whether or not the new transcontinental railway system should be on all Canadian soil had preoccupied the City of Quebec. Indeed F. Langelier, Mayor of Quebec City, had written Mayor Jones in December 1883 seeking Saint John's assistance in having the C.P.R. use Quebec City in the summer and Saint John and Halifax in the winter.[81] As this proposal had been made more than six months after the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company had been guaranteed a loan from the federal government, the Common Council did not wish to close its options, although the all-Canadian route looked less and less a likely possibility. Nevertheless, the aldermanic committee headed by E. B. Colwell of Guys Ward recommended that Saint John meet with Quebec and Halifax "with a view to united action in a matter so important to mutual interests."[82] The resolutions passed at the eventual tri-partite meeting held in Ottawa during February were innocuous enough to be acceptable to all. Quebec was to have access to the C.P.R., and the federal government was "requested to assist with subsidies and otherwise any line or lines of Railway that will *shorten* the route to and make the said Winter Port in the Maritimes."[83] While this joint action from three eastern Canadian cities was designed to discourage any attempts at establishing C.P.R. terminals in the U.S., the cooperation among the three diminished as the West Side sought some accommodation for its loss in the Falls bridge scheme. And thus a meeting with Tilley had been held.

The meeting of representatives from among three Eastern Canadian cities, as well as the numerous gatherings held in Saint John regarding both the Falls bridge and the C.P.R.'s projected East Coast terminus, provide another insight into the well known circumstances surrounding the C.P.R.'s involvement with the Short Line. Indeed, with reference to the terminus issue the Maritime and Quebec M.P.'s had to be given guarantees in exchange for supporting the necessary measures designed to insure completion of the Railway construction in the West.[84] For the Maritime politicians specifically Tupper and Tilley, the Short Line under the C.P.R.'s control was a potential endorsement in the developing of a Canadian winter port.[85] For John Pope, deeply involved in the International Railway and with a considerable interest in a New Brunswick railway, a personal financial nemesis had been removed.[86] And so, George Stephen, faced with little alternative, satisfied his political supporters by agreeing, with reluctance, to a C.P.R. take over of the projected Short Line to the Maritimes.

Through 1885, the West Side committee in charge of pursuing the Carleton Branch compensation continued to be in touch with Tilley. When the Dominion Government included in the supplementary estimates of 1885 sufficient money to purchase the Branch, that committee publicly acknowledged Sir Leonard Tilley's "personal efforts."[87] In November Alderman Baskin of Guys Ward advised the Council that Ottawa would accept the stock owned by — as Pope wrote — "the *Cities* of Carleton and St. John."[88] Thus, by the end of 1885, the city, especially Carleton, had been relieved of the burden of the Carleton Branch stock through the federal government which had also made possible the opening of the Falls bridge that same year.[89]

The coming of the Falls bridge ended the ferry's dual role in the internal and external transport functions of the port. It now reverted largely to the role which it had fulfilled before the coming of the railways — the cross-harbour link between the two peninsulas. Indeed, shortly after the House of Commons had agreed to fund the railway bridge in 1883, the leading bridge opponent from the West Side, H. Adam Glasgow, resigned his aldermanic seat and officially took up the duties to which he had been appointed four years earlier.[90] Just as Glasgow's initial reluctance to accept this post reflected undoubtedly the uncertain railway bridge development, his subsequent acceptance, in turn, symbolized the Common Council's constricting sphere of influence over external transport development. In the end Glasgow, who had been unable to halt the Provincial Legislature's awarding of a charter to the Company or the federal government's advancing of a major loan to the promoters, had to be content with the superintendency of an internal port-related transport service — the harbour ferry.

During these years 1879 - 1885, civic unanimity regarding railways had been secured only when the natural internal spatial development had not been threatened. This had been the case with the Carleton Branch. However, to achieve integration into a larger unit of organization Saint John had to depend upon those elements within the local urban system, generally associated with or centred on the Board of Trade, who were willing to participate in planned transport schemes largely ignoring the immediate spatial development of the local system. In this endeavour men such as the transport promoters Thomas R. Jones and J. Murray Kay found an amenable partner in the federal government, which was attempting to knit the country together and had to depend upon nodal connections based on transport and communication.

In essence, all three units of organization, the Common Council, the Board of Trade and the federal government were committed to diminishing functional distance. The latter two, however, were prepared to tolerate, and even encourage, alterations in the internal spatial development of the local urban system to achieve this end. On the contrary, the aldermen as a collectivity in response to direct pressure from individual segments of the city could not do so. And yet, it seemed clear that the process by which functional distance was to be diminished, and a resultant appropriate role within a national system of cities insured, would involve a continuous surrender of control by the civic elite over the spatial organization of the local urban system. Moreover, it appears that a number of the elected officials began to develop strategies for functioning within this new national system, characterized by an inverse relationship between national integration and local control. Many had recognized earlier what Mayor Simeon Jones was to observe again in 1884: "The Building of Railways in Canada and especially in the Maritime Provinces during the last fifteen years whilst adding greatly to the general facilities for trade in the Provinces have by reason of opening up new channels for business so disturbed the old order of doing things as to materially effect the commerce of the Port."[91]

Increasingly, the tone of the pronouncements from the city's Mayors, however, was to suggest a newly articulated concept of the city, such as that contained within the 1885 inaugural address of Mayor J. S. B. DeVeber: "The City belongs not to itself alone — the whole country is interested in its welfare and development, lying as it does at the mouth of the greatest river between the Hudson and St. Lawrence."[92] Suffering the effects of an arrested population growth which, it could be argued, restrained the city fathers from engaging in a confident boosterism fueled by expansion, the city was presented by DeVeber as an interdependent entity whose potential contribution to a national system of cities rested on the development of its transport node — the port.

# CHAPTER V I

# *"Mails, Steamers and Termini": External Dependence and Internal Transport Development, 1885 - 1889*

In 1885, Mayor DeVeber claimed that the city belonged to the country as a whole.[1] Certainly the resolution of the bridge controversy could have fostered this belief among many of his constituents. As they assessed the events of the two preceding years, it must have been apparent that Ottawa had been involved with both the bridge and anti-bridge factions. In the former instance, the federal government had eased the financial worries of the bridge incorporators, and likewise the Dominion treasury had softened Carleton's tax burden by acquiring the city's interest in the Carleton Branch Railroad. Thus, for each side — the Common Council who wished in 1880 to diminish functional distance by focusing on the internal urban system, and the Board of Trade who shared that goal but instead by focusing on the external system — Ottawa in the end, had become the final arbiter. The significance of this development was, in fact, as important as the location of the bridge itself because it established more firmly the role of an outside agency in resolving external transport decisions, while also participating in the resolution of a problem related to internal transport — the burden of municipal taxes in Carleton.

In the years culminating with the arrival at Saint John of the Short Line in 1889, decisions made within the city regarding the future development of the harbour were undertaken within the context of the port's developing role in a national system of transportation. During these middle years — 1885-1889 — of the transitional period, the elite of Saint John were to demonstrate more directly the implications of being part of a larger political unit. Moreover, they illustrated the consequences of being part of a larger transport system by their increasing recognition and acceptance of the need to consider, and even involve, outside agencies in the decision-making process leading to the establishment of Saint John as a winter port of Canada. In the late 1880's the beginnings of a policy combining outside *and* local participation in the development of the transport node emerged. This intermediate position in itself symbolized these middle years during which the port and city moved towards eliminating its transitional state — between an Atlantic to a Continental orientation.

## The Coming of the Short Line and the Re-emergence of the Winter Port Question, 1885-1889

The possibility of a Short Line which would connect Montreal and Central Canada with a winter port on the Atlantic had been discussed in the early 1870's.[2] However, it was the subsidy granted by the federal government in the mid-1880's authorizing construction of "a line of railway connecting Montreal with the harbours of Saint John and Halifax", which fired the aspirations of the Saint John civic and business elite.[3] A rail link by means of the Short Line would provide a workable transport connection between the city and Central Canada — an accomplishment which the I.C.R. had never realized. At the political level, the anticipation of the benefits to be gained by the city through the Short Line were underscored in the Conservative by-election victories of October and November 1885.[4] However, the introduction of the Short Line issue into the existing transport system of the Maritimes affected not only Saint John. As had the Intercolonial in the preceding decade, this new line of railway threatened to upset the delicate regional relationships now predicated on a transport system which included the I.C.R. based in Halifax. The extent to which the potentially affected centres viewed the significance of the proposed Short Line may be surmised by the protectiveness with which each attempted to defend its current status while developing a future role within the still emerging, and consequently relatively fluid, Canadian national transport system.

Since 1853, the City of Portland, Maine had served as Canada's Atlantic winter port.[5] However, discussions leading to the construction of a national transcontinental system within Canada had, on occasion, united Saint John and Halifax in a common demand that a national winter port be established in the Maritimes. In September 1885, John Stairs, a prominent Halifax Conservative, advised Macdonald that any rumored arrangements being made between the C.P.R. and Portland or Boston "before they gave connection with the Maritime Provinces . . . will be all against us in Halifax and deservedly so".[6] Stairs echoed the sentiments in Saint John when he implored the Prime Minister to induce the C.P.R. "to commence a short line at once".[7] Two months later, the Prime Minister assured Charles A. Everett, a prominent Saint John Conservative, that the International Railway Company, of which George Stephen was a director, had secured a contract to construct a line from Montreal to Moncton,[8] the Harbours of St. Andrews, Saint John and Halifax. Construction was to begin within six months and be completed within four years.

As one writer has observed, this message helped to guarantee a Conservative by-election victory that month.[9] By including all the potential contenders in the Maritime winter port sweepstakes, and carefully acknowledging Moncton's growing function as a railway centre, the Prime Minister had no doubt avoided alienating potential political support. Again, the necessity of appeasing so many centres, illustrated the level of fluidity at the Maritime end of the developing national transport system. Thus, when considered within this framework, the reaction of Saint John to the government's mail contract tender of 1886 is understandable.

Inclusion as a port of call in the government-sponsored, trans-Atlantic mail service was an important index of the position which a port held in a national transport network. Following the by-elections of 1885, the excitement surrounding the Short Line had abated. Almost a year after Macdonald had sought to assure the Maritimes about the future of their ports, the government solicited tenders for the carriage of mails between England and Quebec in the summer, and Portland and Halifax in the winter. Saint John had been omitted from the proposed scheme. Reactions from the latter's Board of Trade were swift; members were angered that a foreign port would receive preferential treatment over Saint John. At the same time, it was acknowledged that while the Short Line was to come, its present absence lent a certain advantage in the selection of Portland. Nevertheless, the general impression was that Saint John had been slighted.[10]

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the Board of Trade felt Saint John's position minus the Short Line was truly competitive with Portland. Possibly their reaction was in part aimed at sustaining the city's claim as a future winter port when the Short Line was eventually built. Certainly the remarks by a prominent Liberal, C. W. Weldon, would appear to support the latter. He claimed that Portland, which had been named in the tender, was originally intended as the great Winter Port of Canada, but that "the heavy grades" between Montreal and the Maine city had lessened its attractiveness as a great freight port.[11] Weldon believed that "the projectors of the Short Line were endeavouring to build that line with such low grades as to obviate any difficulty in carrying freight to this Port."[12] He thus encouraged the Board of Trade to press the potential of Saint John as a freight port.

By early November, however, the objections of the Board of Trade had not altered the terms of the tender; Saint John was still to be excluded. Consequently, the Board decided to send a delegation to Ottawa to present the reasons for the city's opposition.[13] Although the Board of Trade had been most vocal on this issue, both the Common Council and the Portland Town Council also added their protest. Following a public meeting of members of the Portland (N.B.) and Saint John business and civic communities, a delegation comprised of Messrs. Weldon, Everett and Barker, M.P.'s, and James A. Harding, President of the Saint John Board of Trade, went to Ottawa. As spokesman for the group, Harding addressed himself initially to the Bay of Fundy, which had been described as a "terrible place". Harding presented statistics on tides, fog and other information relevant to navigating the Bay. He pointed out that insurance rates by agents in Saint John were the same "on vessels and cargo" coming to Saint John, Portland and Halifax. He thus concluded "that if the case had been made that Portland was no better harbour than Saint John, that the latter should have preference".[14]

Although this Ottawa meeting had emerged through the efforts of the Board of Trade, the civic elite, nonetheless, were concerned with the outcome of the discussions. While the delegates were still in Ottawa, the aldermen met and unanimously agreed ". . . it is the duty of the Government . . . to develop Canadian trade through Canadian ports, so that the Eastern termini of our costly railway system may be within our borders . . . [and] that . . . the terms of any new ocean postal contract entered into by the Government of Canada should be so drawn as to include the Port of Saint John as one of the winter ports of call . . . and that foreign ports should be excluded therefrom".[15] This resolution, moved by T. Nisbet Robertson[16] — a Queens Ward Alderman and co-owner of the Liberal daily the *Globe*, was forwarded immediately to F. E. Barker, the Saint John M.P. currently participating in the winter terminus discussions.[17]

Meeting with the federal representatives, who included Sir Alexander Campbell and Sir Hector Langevin, Barker discovered their apparent doubt as to the city's ability to provide adequate cargo for steamships calling on a regular basis. The Saint John M.P. argued that as the mail contract was not to commence for two years, by then they hoped to have the Short Line built which would therefore allow the port "to draw upon the West for the mixed cargo required with the same certainty as Portland did". Barker assured the federal representatives that "the people of Saint John would not be found wanting in business enterprise".[18]

All three M.P.'s and Harding of the Board of Trade recognized the trade "limbo" which presently characterized Saint John. The traditional products for export from the city were not in great demand. The industrial sector of the city, which received attention in the 1880's, served a largely local market, and the railway communication links to the West were simply not developed enough to even "force" the trade to Saint John.[19] The indignation which the city felt at having its port ignored in the mail contracts may well have reflected the frustration of not being able, in 1886, to meet any of the above mentioned prerequisites — any one of which the federal government could, from its point of view, justifiably demand of a port to which it would send subsidized steamers. The mission of this delegation, therefore, was to acknowledge the present deficiencies of the port while balancing such an acknowledgement with the demand that Saint John — as a Canadian port soon to be connected to western lines *via* the C.P.R. Short Line — should not have to suffer unfair competition with Portland, Maine merely because the latter had a rail connection to Montreal. Briefly, their function in Ottawa was to keep the interests of Saint John alive.

To some extent they succeeded. Sir Alexander Campbell admitted that the Saint John men "had cleared up a good deal of prejudice about the Bay of Fundy . . ." He pointed out that Halifax did not have adequate freight, and this necessitated naming Portland "or such other port as the Postmaster General of Canada may designate . . ." He declared that "such other port" was not intended to infer another American port. Steamers, he emphasized, required access to freight. Since this could not be obtained at Halifax and thus, presumably not at Saint John, Portland had been chosen. Campbell appeared to understand the objections from Saint John, and advised the delegation that the city's case would receive a hearing before the Privy Council.[20]

No doubt, anticipating the impending federal elections, the government dared not to face Saint John without in some way rectifying what the city's residents perceived as an injustice. Thus, in December, the last clause in the government advertisement was changed to read: "making Halifax the first port of destination and the last of departure in Canada."[21]

Although the Saint John area had never before sent three Liberals to Ottawa, it did so in 1887. The adverse publicity generated by the mail tender had not been overcome either by Ottawa's alteration, or the declarations of support for the winter port by the Conservative candidates.[22] The election of 1887 is important to an understanding of port development because it demonstrates that the voting public was sufficiently concerned about the future role which the port and consequently the city was to play in the emerging national transport system. At the immediate level, the focus of activity had been the mail tender, but at a more abstract level, the excitement over the tender had reflected the degree to which port preeminence was still undetermined. In short, the rebuke which the Macdonald Government received in 1887, as illustrated through the election, suggested that the Port of Saint John was not established securely in a national transportation system.

In fact, not only had the port to contend with Halifax, but in addition, competition for winter port status from within New Brunswick had emerged as soon as Parliament had granted subsidies for the construction of a Short Line in 1884. The civic and business elite of the city knew that they could not expect or solicit the support of all sections of the Province for their claims to winter port status or the eventual direction of Short Line construction within New Brunswick. The position of the Province, at least as expressed by the Provincial Legislature, had been made apparent only shortly after the federal election of 1887. Although the City and County of Saint John had declared its position on the port's future role in a national transport system, there was considerably less enthusiasm on the part of the M.L.A.'s in Fredericton to follow suit.[23]

No doubt influencing the mind of each M.L.A. was the, as yet, unresolved aspect of the entire Short Line and winter port issue, the construction of the Harvey-Salisbury Line. In exchange for their support of the C.P.R. bill, New Brunswick and Nova Scotian M.P.'s had been assured of the Short Line. Saint John had presumed that the Short Line would then incorporate the already existing railway facilities on the East Side — encompassing both the Market Slip-Long Wharf area and the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area. However, the Short Line proposal had been agreeable to Halifax, Moncton and Fredericton only if a line were to be constructed between Harvey, about twenty miles from Fredericton, and Salisbury, not far from Moncton. Construction along that route, of course, would enhance Fredericton and Moncton, and would guarantee Halifax the distinction of winter port. At the same time, it would diminish the competitiveness of Saint John.

Concerned as the citizens of Saint John were about the route, one recent writer has questioned the sincerity of the Macdonald Government's commitment to the proposed Harvey-Salisbury Line.[24] Even before the Short Line was near completion, Sir Charles Tupper was attempting to gain support for the Conservative candidates in 1887 by declaring in response to local fears that while the C.P.R. would attempt to secure trade arrangements with U.S. ports "the line they own will be the one to Saint John and the line they will own will be the one over which they will bring every ton of traffic and every traveller they can get".[25] Nonetheless, the Short Line contract had been formally entered which guaranteed construction of a line from Montreal to Salisbury near Moncton by July 1, 1889. One month before the scheduled completion of the entire line, the first Short Line train arrived at Saint John on June 3, 1889.

In the years since construction of the Short Line commenced, however, there had been no action on the Harvey-Salisbury link. Again, a general anxiety swept the cities most concerned — virtually all the Maritime cities except Saint John.[26] Indeed, there appears to have been little or no concern demonstrated within the port-city regarding the Harvey-Salisbury Line until 1889.[27] In that year, six months prior to the running of the first Short Line train into Saint John, delegates from Fredericton, Moncton and Halifax visited Ottawa and pressed their demands for the additional line between Harvey and Salisbury. They pointed with concern to the same fact that encouraged confidence by Saint John — the C.P.R. had a substantial interest in the New Brunswick Railway from Harvey to Saint John and presumably would be uninterested in building a potentially competitive line.[28] Aware that the C.P.R. preferred not to construct the alternate route, Saint John could bask in the relative security of being on the same side as the railroad in this dispute. Nonetheless, the city's fortunes in the matter were not completely resolved. Macdonald, under pressure from the other Maritime politicians, had to act decisively on the Harvey-Salisbury Line. Thus, the Prime Minister introduced a bill for the funding of construction of the line. Immediately, the Saint John Liberals, elected in the 1887 winter port backlash, attacked the government.

The M.P.'s were supported by the Board of Trade which at the end of April 1889 advised the Prime Minister that such a railway line would "discriminate by sectional legislation against the business interests of this city . . .."[29] Furthermore, in the opinion of the Board, such legislation was "intended to neutralize the advantages of position enjoyed by this port . . ."[30] In early May, only a few days after those telegrams had been sent, the Senate defeated the Harvey-Salisbury proposals.[31]

From a Saint John perspective, the opposition to the Harvey-Salisbury route can only be understood in relation to the winter port question. Saint John's concern regarding that line was not an isolated protest, but part of a larger movement to integrate the port into a national transport system. To do this, the city had to entice the services of railways to its harbourfront and of steamers to its docks. In both instances, it was dealing with external agencies.

Reference to the winter port question echoed the sentiment expressed two months earlier, when the Board and the Common Council had joined forces and mailed a joint resolution to the Prime Minister requesting "the Dominion Government to consider the advisability of making Saint John the principal Winter Port of Canada and the terminal point of all Canadian subsidized trans-Atlantic steamers during the winter season."[32] In view of the C.P.R.'s expressed desire to gain access to Halifax, these resolutions must be seen as a part of Saint John's continuing attempt to gain a share of the expected freight which was to come from the West, while recognizing that eventually it must share part of this expected trade with Halifax.

From the C.P.R.'s point of view, the initial year of operation of the Short Line was "far from satisfactory".[33] Continual squabbling erupted between the I.C.R. and C.P.R. over rates between Halifax and Saint John. In October, 1889, Cornelius Van Horne wrote Macdonald reminding him that the company "would never have undertaken the building of the Short Line were it not to supplement an Atlantic Steamship Service . . ."[34] This clearly underscored the attitude of the railway towards Atlantic ports. From its point of view, Saint John or Halifax were merely potential connecting links between land and water transport. The civic and business elite in Saint John knew this as did their astute Liberal M.P., Charles N. Skinner, who had sought, in an earlier letter to the Prime Minister, the forming of a timetable to secure "a through express from Montreal to Halifax *via* Saint John".[35] Not until July 1, 1890, however, did the federal government reach an agreement regarding C.P.R. running rights over the I.C.R. line from Saint John to Halifax.[36]

The years between 1885 and 1889, which focused on the Short Line and winter port discussions, produced in Saint John an organized effort between Board of Trade and Common Council regarding the potential rail traffic which would utilize the port facilities of the city. However, the negotiations and planning for such eventual traffic were largely determined by outside agencies with local political input taking the form of reactions to unfavourable decisions. Indeed, the only aspect in the evolution of the city's function within a national transport system in which the local elite could initiate action concerned the actual physical facilities of the harbour. While the federal government and the C.P.R. wrestled with steamship subsidies, fast lines, and alternate railway lines — all questions generally removed from the local forum — the city elite turned its attention to the question of harbour improvement.

## Retaining the Harbour Properties: The Harbour Commission Issue, 1885-1889

In July of 1886 the harbour commission issue — that is, the question of placing the management of the wharf facilities under the control of a special committee representing the city, Board of Trade and Ottawa — was re-introduced into the public forum. It is quite understandable how this issue would emerge at such a time. Everywhere in business and civic circles transport conversation was directed towards the opening of the C.P.R. from Montreal to the Pacific. Additionally, for the Maritimes and Saint John in particular, the prospect of the Short Line and steamship subsidies focused attention on the maintenance and future expansion of local facilities.

Doubts as to the capability of the Common Council's competence to adequately manage facilities servicing outside transport agencies had arisen almost as soon as the port began receiving railway lines. Indeed, on several occasions through the 1870's some aldermen had publicly declared that the city's representative body did not possess the expertise which the new transport affiliations increasingly demanded. Self-doubt intensified as harbour management increasingly involved dealings with outside agencies — a contrast to the days when the Common Council, as managers of a local civic body, could also feel somewhat confident in overseeing a port in which the principal business interests frequently had close personal ties in the city. However, the scale and pattern of transport development through the 1870's and 1880's generated an anxiety within Saint John which periodically manifested itself in the harbour commission debate. The re-emergence of the harbour commission discussion in the mid-1880's was, in a way, a continuation of the negotiations which had been undertaken in the previous decade and the early 1880's.

In the summer of 1886, a joint committee from the Common Council and the Board of Trade met to consider "placing the harbour in commission . . ."[37] Within three weeks, this committee resolved to amend the Dominion Act of 1882 — "so as to place the whole harbour, its wharves and rights, under one control . . ."[38] This resolution incorporated a proposal made by Alderman J. MacGregor Grant in 1882. In that year Grant had led the Council's opposition to the Dominion Act, by contending the government could never buy private wharves and improve the harbour with the funds provided in the legislation. The joint committee, in asking that the Act of 1882 be amended so that all waterfront property was brought under one control, was implicitly acknowledging Grant's point. In short, representatives of the Common Council and the Board of Trade were agreed on one major object — the harbour commission should be enacted, but only under conditions by which Ottawa became responsible for coordinating *all* harbour activities. A year later, however, the government had shown no interest in funding a commission at Saint John beyond what was perceived locally as the limited terms of the current legislation.

In the meantime, a committee of the Common Council had been working on the entire question. Its report was offered in mid-June 1887. Under the direction of Aldermen J. R. Woodburn, J. O. Stackhouse and T. W. Peters, the minority report endorsed the harbour commission idea but was vague on the funding needed from Ottawa for improvements. In response to their opening comments, Mayor Henry J. Thorne, a hardware merchant, remarked that a number of citizens had privately informed him that more information was needed.[39] No doubt Thorne's concern in part arose from the financial implications of the proposal. These were addressed directly by Alderman Samuel Tufts, a Dukes Ward grocer. Implying that port revenues were on the decline, he asked Queens Ward Alderman Woodburn exactly what the city had been getting from the port revenues. Woodburn responded that the net revenue for the past six years was approximately $22,000, from which the Harbour Inspector and the Harbour Master received their salaries and expenses — a deduction leaving the city with $20,000. Brooks Ward Alderman, George A. Davis, claimed it would cost about $40,000 a year to maintain a commission. How then would the $18,000 deficit be handled? Those in support could only respond that a commission would stimulate traffic thereby raising revenues and thus eliminating any possibility of a deficit. However, Woodburn's most elaborate comments did not focus on the financial aspects of the proposed commission: "We as a council do not think we have the ability, do not think we are capable to make the improvements that are required". Moreover, he added, "if the harbour is placed in a Commission, the Government will be responsible for the interest". Woodburn referred to the "frenzy" created earlier in the year over the winter port and the resulting change in advertisement which had been secured. He asked that the same enthusiasm be directed for a commission because it, like the winter port and the railway agitation, was designed to make the Port of Saint John a primary trade centre.[40]

Alderman Patrick McCarthy, a carpenter from Sydney Ward, remained unconvinced. Reporting the opinion of the majority of the harbour committee, McCarthy expressed concern about supporting a commission structure. In addition, his sub-committee believed the citizens should have a direct voice in resolving the matter.[41] On a July evening, five weeks later, the harbour commission scheme was aired publicly at the Mechanics Institute with many Board of Trade Members present. C. N. Skinner, formerly a member of the Common Council, supported the commission idea, but only if private wharves were included in the transfer. James A. Harding of the Board of Trade agreed with those who pointed out that when the harbour commission idea had been first advanced, the revenues from the port were in the vicinity of $34,000 per year and generally did not go below $30,000. Changed conditions in Saint John's trade meant that he could no longer support any such proposals because the city's trade was insufficient. George Robertson, however, who would eventually be Mayor and President of the Board of Trade, disagreed and endorsed Skinner's position. Although Robertson was an influential businessman, his support of Skinner was insufficient to have the M.P.'s resolution passed. Those present voted with Samuel Schofield, also of the Board of Trade, who moved "in the opinion of this meeting, it is neither necessary or desirable in the interests of the trade of this Port to place the Harbour of Saint John in commission".[42]

After the public meeting of July 1887 and lingering newspaper exchanges scorning or praising the proposal, interest in the matter waned until early February 1888. Then in preparation for the *Annual Report* of the city, Alderman T. Nisbet Robertson offered the harbour committee's financial statement regarding port revenues. The returns showed a surplus which, in the minds of anti-commission aldermen, demonstrated the city's ability to manage the port.[43] Alderman Peters challenged the harbour committee's report arguing that while 1887 appeared successful, the preceding years had not been.[44] Peters received support mainly from the West Siders and the harbour commission matter continued unresolved. As the fall approached, Short Line discussions and matters regarding needed development of the East Side railway system captured the attention of the City Council. With the exception of the Carleton aldermanic contingent led by Aldermen W. D. Baskin, and the few East Siders who were persuaded by Peters' arguments, the commission proposal generated little enthusiasm. Perhaps Peters recognized this when he re-introduced the issue in September 1888 and advised his colleagues of "his intention to move resolutions" concerning the harbour commission at the next meeting.[45] Less than ten days later, however, Peters deferred his previous notice without explanation.[46] In the intervening time, the harbour commission received attention as an integral part of a railway-port development. Indeed, attention to harbour improvement increased as the city anticipated the arrival of the Short Line. Although City Council had taken no action on the harbour commission matter because it was recognized that a necessary two-thirds majority in favour could not be secured, Peters, Woodburn and Baskin kept the question alive. For these supporters of the proposal, a commission was the only sensible way to manage a harbour about to gain access into a national transport network, and — for Baskin at least — reduce the West Side debt through government purchase of Carleton's wharves.

In an attempt to resolve the issue permanently, Alderman T. Nisbet Robertson, an outspoken opponent of such a federally dominated scheme, moved that prior to taking any action on the Dominion Act of 1882, the tax payers of the city should indicate by a majority, their "willingness to have the harbour placed in commission".[47] The motion was carried and although the election was to have taken place in early May, it was postponed until

September 1889 in order that residents of the newly amalgamated Portland area could also vote. Robertson's motion received strong support from the majority of the East Side aldermen who believed their constituents would vote against the proposal.

They had every reason to be optimistic. The harbour commission scheme was defeated overwhelmingly. Voter turnout was larger than anticipated. Of the three areas — the main peninsula (or the East Side), Carleton (or the West Side) and Portland — the West Side vote was narrowest, representing in part the intense interest in the proposal from Carleton tax payers anxious to rid themselves of lingering debts.[48] On the East Side, Queens and Dukes were most favourable, although here too, as in all wards, the proposal was defeated. In part, the measure may have been defeated because the city engineer, Hurd Peters, had claimed the city's port facilities would not be enhanced by such an organization.[49] There was also the appeal made especially by the *Globe*, but shared by the *Telegraph*, that the harbour in essence represented a part of Saint John's historical legacy and should not be traded away. This somewhat romantic notion, however, disguised another more potent reason, one which in fact was the root of concern regarding all federal-local relationships — the question of control. Those who argued against the harbour commission's weaknesses generally acknowledged the potential benefit of an ideal scheme — unity of management. But even George Robertson, one of the proposal's staunchest advocates, had in 1884 cautioned again the inherent weakness of any such scheme in terms of the loss of control.[50] By the late 1880's, Robertson and a coterie of the Board of Trade members were convinced that a form of centralized regulation would stimulate Saint John's growth as a transport centre, outweighing any dangers associated with diminished local control.

In 1889 these men were in the minority, and since the proposed harbour commission had been defeated, it was now time, in the words of Samuel Schofield to "adopt some definite plan of action — or else our chances of securing the benefits expected from our new railway may perhaps be lost by the competition of rival ports".[51]

### Harbour Property Ownership: The Carleton Development, 1887-1889

The arrival of the Short Line in 1889 — an event seen as moving the port city more securely into the context of national transportation development — was an important step in the journey towards eliminating transitional status. From a local viewpoint, however, it must be seen as part of the overall thrust in transport development which included as well, recognition of the port through steamship subsidies from Ottawa and, equally important, preparation of local facilities at which rail and ship would meet. The subsidy question was not to be resolved until the mid-1890's, but the more immediate problem of providing adequate facilities had only been partially resolved in the harbour commission vote of September 1889.

In committing itself to continued harbour property ownership, the city now faced the problem of actively participating in the necessary revitalization of its waterfront. The eventual decision was to centre a concentrated effort upon the Carleton waterfront, but prior to this undertaking, the transport developments between 1885 and 1889 serve to illustrate the transitional nature of this period of harbour development.

For example, the Short Line which arrived at the I.C.R. station in June 1889, reinforced the earliest dominance within the port of the Market Slip-Long Wharf area. Travelling over the relatively new bridge at the Falls and thus bypassing Carleton, its route strengthened the latter's isolation from the main peninsula. Indeed, for many of Saint John's civic and business elite, the Short Line was not seen as simply providing a potentially fruitful connection to Central Canada. Rather, it was intended to stimulate the development within the city of an extensive rail and port complex on the East Side. The original station site located within the Market Slip-Long Wharf area was envisaged as a potential passenger station. In turn, the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area would handle potential steamship cargo.

There had been hints at this projected rejuvenation of the main peninsula's past dynamic waterfront activity during the negotiations surrounding the bridge at the Falls.[52] As the Short Line drew nearer to completion, greater attention was directed towards developing the Reed's Point-Lower Cove section[53] — a move seen as finally realizing the hopes of Saint John when it had sold the Ballast Wharf to the federal government in the 1870's.

In the latter half of the 1880's, most port-related discussions eventually turned to the possibility of extending the tracks of the I.C.R. from the Ballast Wharf along the East Side waterfront. Such a suggestion was not novel. The extension had been sought by the federal government in the early 1870's, and rejected by the Common Council of that day; in part this was because the city aldermen felt they could not judge the future direction of, or emphasis within, transport technology and the accompanying demands on port facilities.[54] The projected Short Line, however, had changed this somewhat.

Early in 1888, David Pottinger, the I.C.R. manager, had remarked that the road was interested in extending its tracks along the harbourfront.[55] When a federal Public Works Department representative visited the city at about the same time, a joint committee from the Portland and Saint John Common Councils pressed for an extension at least as far as Reed's Point. Of equal importance, they sought an extension for the I.C.R. station to Robertson Wharf in Kings Ward as well.[56] Representatives from the Board of Trade also outlined the urgency of such an extension.[57]

Anxious to secure adequate rail facilities in anticipation of the Short Line's expected stimulus to trade, the Common Council, in July 1888, passed a resolution allowing the Dominion to extend its railway track from the station in Kings Ward along Smyth Street towards Robertson Wharf on the harbour.[58] In addition, the city granted Ottawa the right to extend its track, which terminated at the Ballast Wharf in Sydney Ward, to the Corporation Pier in Dukes Ward. To reach the new pier in Dukes, however, the government would have to lay track through Charlotte and Britain Streets. In short, although the city greatly desired the freight business of an enlarged railway facility, it was still not prepared to allow an I.C.R. extension to be built across the Flats from the Ballast Wharf to Reed's Point. Thus, in this transitional period prior to the emergence of a national port, the Common Council continually struggled with the dilemma of planning the physical development of the waterfront within the context of meeting the needs of both local small craft and future large-scale trade. Its decision in the late 1880's regarding the East Side development was viewed as a compromise. Small craft would still have the shelter of the Lower Cove, while future trade needs would be met by a more extensive railway network along the harbour front. By developing the East Side, and thereby illustrating at the local level an immediate effect of the Short Line fervor, the Saint John aldermen had the support of the Portland aldermen and business community. This alliance of interests between Portland and Saint John's main peninsula was the product of a development born with the earliest establishment of settlement at the mouth of the river. By the late 1880's, this relationship had been nurtured for more than a century through a mutually shared geography and social organization focusing on the Market Slip-Long Wharf area.[59]

Just as the arrival of the Short Line may be viewed as an index of the scale and pattern of national transport development in 1889, so too may the union of Portland and Saint John be interpreted as suggesting the organizational scale and pattern of development within the urban area at the mouth of the river in that year. The Act of Union which took effect on May 18th, the anniversary of the landing of the Loyalists, meant that all the waterfront areas including Indiantown were now under one local jurisdiction — the Common Council of the City of Saint John. Reflecting its extended territorial boundaries that body now encompassed a membership of twenty-six aldermen, two from each Ward, and the Mayor.[60] Although discussed on numerous occasions, serious attention to a political union at the local level had emerged during the bridge at the Falls controversy.[61] At that time it had become apparent to both local Councils that outside transport agencies were "uniting" them. Committees from each Council began meeting and weighing the implications of a union. Although amalgamation of smaller communities with their larger neighbours was a familiar pattern throughout North America during the late nineteenth century, the most common scenario witnessed such a union against the background of a population boom — or an increase in the physical scale of the cities involved. The union of Portland and Saint John, however, was due largely to an increase in the technological and organization scale of the larger society into which the port and its immediate local community were being integrated. As they faced questions surrounding the future of the port in a national system of transportation, their diverging interests were muted in one voice seeking railway and steamship services from the federal government: the latter increasingly viewed both Portland and Saint John as a single entity in national transport terms.

Through their union in 1889 the communities of Portland and Saint John tacitly acknowledged the increasing scale of national organization with which the newly created city would have to cope. At the same time that the role of external transport agencies — in this case the Short Line — and the need for amalgamation were recognized as coterminous elements of increased organization, the new City of Saint John chose to retain its harbour property ownership in September 1889. Superficially, it might appear at first that an incongruity existed between the acceptance of outside control in railway matters and the retention of local control over waterfront properties. In fact, however, the city's decision to retain its harbour properties resulted from several factors — some of which were indicative of the transitional status held by the port. Although the Short Line was now coming to Saint John, the railways were only one element in the development needed to securely guarantee the city's position in a national transportation system. The second prerequisite was a firm guarantee of federally subsidized steamships calling regularly at the port.[62] The third requirement was, of course, port facilities. Lacking the necessary number of subsidized steamships, the city could not risk abandoning the only element in the transport node over which it still retained some degree of authority. It especially could not do so in the face of unsteady port revenues. To effect such a transfer in 1889 would have meant the possibility of incurring a debt to support the commission structure and a loss of control in the future direction of transport development at the port.

Rejecting a commission structure for the city meant going ahead with harbour improvements previously set in motion and predicated on the arrival of the Short Line. But even these plans which focused on the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area were not wholly satisfactory. The aldermen were still demonstrating their lack of confidence in determining the future role of the Flats in the Lower Cove. Moreover, upon learning that the I.C.R. could not construct a bridge, but would instead be extending their tracks along Charlotte and Britain Streets in order to reach Reed's Point, several residents of Sydney Ward objected to the suggested changes in their environment such an alteration would effect. In addition, it was presumed that a certain amount of expropriation would be undertaken and this too was received unfavourably. Consequently, the Reed's Point area seemed fraught with difficulty.[63]

In part at least, it was against this background of tension surrounding Reed's Point that Carleton interests were again able to introduce their section as a desirable terminus for the Short Line. The West Siders, it will be recalled, had succeeded in getting Ottawa to purchase the $40,000 city-owned stock in the Carleton Branch which they had been supporting through their assessments.[64] As early as 1887 during a West Side public meeting, the suggestion emerged that the Dominion Government, as owner of the Carleton Branch, should develop it and the adjacent waterfront property in Carleton to handle the increased freight which would come to Saint John as a result of the Short Line.[65] Although attended largely by West Siders, at least one well known Liberal was also present. Acknowledging the thrust of main peninsula development, John V. Ellis remarked that a prominent (but unnamed) Conservative had claimed Ottawa would never build up Carleton as the federal government already owned too much on the East Side.[66]

In the meantime, the Common Council continued to prepare for the arrival of the Short Line by focusing on the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area with its unresolved difficulties. At this point as well, the C.P.R. was still in the process of objecting to the construction of the Harvey-Salisbury route. In the course of its objections, the strongest argument for not building such a line was the existence of the Carleton Branch connection to theWest Side waterfront. In fact, as late as March 1889, Cornelius Van Horne of the C.P.R. had criticized the bridge at the Falls because it claimed a toll on trains passing over it. Van Horne also added "facilities in Carleton might be sufficient" for the development of a terminal trade.[67]

Interpreting Van Horne's remarks in the context of both railway and harbour development, a local paper concluded, "apparently the fact is becoming clearer and plainer every day that for the dispatch or loading of ocean borne freight, Carleton will offer sufficient facilities for some time to come . . ."[68] The defeat of the harbour commission idea encouraged the veteran alderman from Guys, James Stackhouse, to move in Council that communication be sent to Ottawa ". . . asking if it is their intention to make such improvements and extensions of its wharf at Sand Point, Carleton as will give sufficient accommodation facilities for the transfer of cargo from one or more large ocean steamers to the railway cars or from cars to steamer and further asking if such is not their intention, upon what terms they will transfer their frontage on the harbour to this corporation for the purpose of providing such accommodation and facilities".[69]

Finally several events had combined to force the issue of harbour improvements and the city's initiative in furthering the rejuvenation of the port. Stackhouse's motion carried. Its directness crystallized the ever apparent bind in which the city's transport facilities functioned. The Short Line was now a scheduled part of the national transportation system into which Saint John was integrated, but the harbour facilities were not yet ready to receive large amounts of trade or to encourage the shipment of large cargoes through Saint John. The harbour commission had been soundly defeated.[70] The federal government was firmly established through the I.C.R. in both the Market Square-Long Wharf area and the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area — the latter of which was still not completely reconciled with local wishes. From a local viewpoint, initiative could still be generated through the West Side waterfront. Thus by 1889 it appeared that outside agencies having brought the railways to the city, and in lieu of the harbour commission defeat, would determine the pace at which harbour facilities were to be improved. As Stackhouse's motion indicated, the only remaining area of initiative to which the Council had any recourse was the West Side. Here too, however, the federal government, through its Carleton Branch purchase, had an interest, but as yet undeveloped. The newly formed City of Saint John — with its more broadly based area of strength, was now forcing the issue of harbour development, but with an important difference. Should the federal government not wish to develop the West Side, the Common Council, in its desire to establish the port as a functioning node in the emerging national transportation system, was offering to do so. Approaching the last decade of the nineteenth century, the city was beginning to demonstrate a commitment to local initiative in transport affairs, tempered by both a continuing acknowledgement and appreciation of the need for sustained involvement by outside agencies.

# CHAPTER VII

# *Restructuring Local Perceptions of Waterfront Land-Use Functions: The Emergence of the Carleton Waterfront, 1889 - 1895*

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, a number of theorists attempted to develop explanations for the specialized functions emerging in various locales through the influence of increasingly more sophisticated forms of transportation.[1] Generally addressed to national situations, the more abstract of these formulations sought to explain the relationship of cities within a system of cities, each having a specialized function. Analogous to this is the notion of internal sections of cities developing specialized functions in response to the larger system of which the city as a whole is a member. It is in this latter regard that the impetus within Saint John towards developing both the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area and especially the Carleton waterfront must be viewed as the port and city became integrated into a Canadian national transportation system.

In Chapter VI it was noted that the Short Line spurred a renewed interest in developing the Market Slip-Long Wharf and the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area.[2] Hence, it must be concluded that this development in external transport efficiency as reflected in the Short Line, resulted in a re-emphasis of the importance of the main peninsula. Indeed, so important was the effect of the new railway connection believed to be on the main peninsula, that a street railway company was organized to service the East Side and Portland.[3] However, attention turned to Carleton when difficulty arose in the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area because agreement could not be reached regarding the functional emphasis of that section of the harbour or the impact such an emphasis would have on the adjacent residential areas.[4] Thus, City Council began to assess the means of making the potential of Carleton's waterfront operational.

## From a Local to a National Function: Altering Perceptions of the Carleton Harbour, 1889-1891

Historically the Carleton waterfront played a secondary role in the functioning of the port.[5] Prior to the construction of the Carleton Branch Railroad, the West Side waterfront had received attention almost exclusively relating to the ferry. The coming of the railways had provoked innumerable problems focusing on railway-ferry relationships, but ultimately illustrating the tension which can develop within an area previously identified with one function and then having another function thrust upon it. This had been the case in Carleton in the 1870's when an external transport agency — the railway — had been linked up with the ferry. The entire railway-ferry conflict of functions had been removed by the construction of the bridge at the Falls, which had the effect of once again reducing the ferry to the almost exclusive status of a local transport function. To some extent, this resumption of the ferry's pre-railway status in the mid-1880's had, when coupled with the build-up on the East Side in response to the projected Short Line, tended to reinforce the old image of Carleton's waterfront as a secondary area of activity within the port. An index of the persistence of this image of the West Side may be seen in the action which the Common Council took in response to Alderman Stackhouse's motion of September 1889.[6] The Guys Ward alderman, it will be recalled, had urged his colleagues to determine future federal development on the West Side or undertake such action on its own. Within a few weeks, the aldermen were considering proposals for the construction of a dry dock in Carleton.

Dry docks had received intense if passing consideration by the City Council before 1889. But the arrival of James D. Leary represents a turning point in dry dock discussions within the city.[7] An important consideration to recall in terms of the function of the port is that dry docks related to one of the earliest activities of Saint John — shipbuilding. Leary's plans were somewhat of a compromise between the "old" — shipbuilding — and the anticipated "new" — western trade. He called for erecting both dry and wet docks. The latter were to accommodate large trans-Atlantic cargo ships. Leary was willing to build a dock at Sand Point, Carleton "if he obtained reasonable subsidies from the civic, Provincial and Dominion Governments".[8] The desire of the City Council to proceed with some form of development on the West Side was apparent from its virtually unreserved endorsement of Leary's plan.[9]

No doubt the extent to which Leary's plans gained support was in some way influenced by a communication received from Ottawa a few days earlier in response to the Stackhouse motion. That motion, in the form of a memorial, had sought to determine the position of the federal government regarding its Carleton Branch Railraod property. The government informed City Council that the railroad was under a lease to the New Brunswick Railway Company, and that essentially "no disposition can be made of the property except with the consent of the said railway company". At the Common

Council meeting in November 1889, Alderman Stackhouse admitted he was disappointed that Ottawa had mentioned nothing about either repairing the wharf property it had secured with the Carleton Branch, or suggesting specific terms "by which they would transfer the wharf to the City".[10] At this same Council meeting which had preceded the general committee meeting discussing Leary's plans, a message received earlier from the federal government was also read. The communication was equally discouraging from the Council's viewpoint because it meant further delays in the development of the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area. Specifically, the government had refused to absorb any of the expropriation or auxiliary construction costs which might be incurred through the extension of I.C.R. track on Charlotte and Britain Streets.

Clearly, the appeal of Leary's plans — dry and wet docks — must be seen against the background of such recent disappointments for the city. The desire to stimulate an extension of harbour facilities may also explain Council's comparative generosity towards Leary. The New York dock builder claimed yearly combined subsidies of $50,000 would be necessary. The aldermen agreed that $10,000 of that sum should come from the city.[11] The granting of the subsidy was conditional on the submission by Leary of detailed plans.

The meeting at which Leary's proposal had been given instant acceptance — that of the general committee — was merely a preliminary forum for discussing major city-related issues. On December 13, the aldermen sat for three hours during a Council meeting reportedly well attended by residents for whom the Leary scheme was seen as important in terms of harbour development, just as the earlier harbour commission hearings had been. The primary object of this second meeting was to decide whether or not Leary's plan should be endorsed by voting a grant of $10,000 per annum for twenty years towards the project. Moreover, the aldermen wished to hear exactly how many ships could be accommodated at his facilities. Leary proposed that three or four of the world's largest steamships and four to six 2,500 ton sailing vessels could be easily handled. A few aldermen objected to the scheme because they felt the city knew little about the details on which the proposed subsidy was based. Nonetheless an overwhelming majority of aldermen supported James D. Leary by a vote of 19 - 6.[12]

Between the December 13th meeting of the Common Council and the January 29, 1890 meeting at which the dock plans were to be presented, two major developments emerged in the Leary matter.[13] First came the Provincial election of 1890 in which the Andrew G. Blair Government's Saint John candidates, including the Provincial Secretary, David McLellan of Portland, were defeated.[14] During a campaign trip at which both McLellan and Blair were on the same podium, the latter promised to do all he could for Saint John. McLellan, in turn, knowing the support which Portland was giving the dry dock scheme, read the contents of a telegram received from J. D. Leary. The dock builder wrote that he was ready "to go ahead immediately on the additional subsidy being granted".[15] Furthermore, he added, "I wish you and your ticket success".[16] It is apparent that the provincial government was attempting to use its endorsement of the Leary plan as an inducement for Saint John's support. The dry dock proved inadequate to the task; the government did not gain sufficient support in Saint John. A week before the election, an opposition candidate, Dr. A. A. Stockton, had suggested that the Leary supporters were involved in a kick-back scheme that would guarantee an additional $7,500 subsidy from the provincial government in exchange for support from within Saint John.[17] When Stockton was elected, he lost relatively little time in moving that an enquiry be made by the House of Assembly in Fredericton into all the arrangements between the government and Leary in the dry dock matter. A majority report eventually acquitted Blair of any wrong doing, but the associated publicity for Leary and his dry dock supporters helped to hasten the demise of his scheme.

Its failure was not only the result of bad publicity. When the Council granted Leary his subsidy, it was on condition that the plans and specifications meet with the approval of a city-designated engineer. On January 29, Leary appeared at the Council meeting with his plans.[18] Two engineers, F. W. Holt, familiar with the West Side, and J. C. Allison, the resident federal civil engineer, subsequently condemned Leary's plans as being "in very crude and unfinished state".[19]

These reports spurred two reactions at the March meeting. The anti-Leary sentiment meant returning the plans to the dock builder with instructions to alter them accordingly.[20] Leary supporters, particularly Alderman Baskin, argued such a move was an attempt to "break down" the Council's prior endorsement of the dry dock scheme. Instead, Baskin moved that Holt's report be submitted to a committee of five, including the Mayor, to take into consideration the entire matter together with Holt's opinion.

After much discussion during which the principal objection raised to Leary's plans appeared to be its feasibility as both a dry and wet dock, a vote was taken on the Baskin motion. In contrast to the earlier confidence displayed in December, Baskin's motion passed 13 - 11.[21] Four of the new anti-Leary men were from Portland, and perhaps they may have had a reason to suspect that the "kickback" allegations were true. In any case, weakening the Portland support signalled the end of the Leary scheme as that area had enthusiastically supported the initial proposals. With the Mayor, Aldermen Baskin, Lewis, Kelly and Shaw were appointed to consider the entire question.[22] Desertion from the Leary scheme — no doubt stimulated partly by the questions being raised regarding the past election, but perhaps more by sectional interests within the city — had already begun.

At the end of April, Mr. George Boswell, a civil engineer from Quebec City, sent his report on the Leary plans to the city.[23] Boswell had been selected by the special committee considering Leary's scheme and the Holt report because he had been the government engineer responsible for inspecting the Halifax dock works. In general, he approved of the plans.[24] Essentially, his conclusions sustained the opinion of Alderman Baskin and the others who had wanted the Holt report reviewed prior to deciding on the final outcome of the dry dock question.

When the Council met to consider Boswell's report, it reaffirmed its initial support of Leary, but not before discussing many of the familiar arguments for and against the proposal. Supporters such as Baskin pointed to Leary's willingness as stated in his letter of May 5, 1890 to make alterations as suggested by Boswell.[25] In their report to the Council, the special committee recommended that their report be adopted. Before a vote could be taken, however, the Leary opponents rose to condemn both the dry dock scheme and Leary's plan in particular. Marshalling their opposition around two central points — control of a major portion of the waterfront by one man and lack of necessity for a dry dock — several aldermen argued that the future development of the port depended on the proper disposition of these matters.[26] In response to these objections Alderman McCarthy tried to reduce the city's share of the outlay by proposing that "the words ten thousand dollars" be removed. Instead, he wanted "one per cent per annum for 20 years on the certified expenditure". McCarthy, who was in general against the Leary plan, claimed that his basic objections would thus be met. Alderman Kelly, a loyal Leary supporter, immediately seconded McCarthy's amendment, which was seen as a compromise measure.[27] No doubt Kelly, who was anxious for the plans to be accepted, seconded it in the hope that further delays would be avoided. The report was accepted 15 - 10.

Leary found the financial change unacceptable, describing it and the new time framework for completion of the project as a "most radical change from the original decision".[28] Within a month, he had submitted a new plan to the Council in which he now sought only a $5,000 per year subsidy towards the construction of a wharf and warehouse accommodation in Carleton, with the dry dock portion of the scheme to be undertaken after this work was completed.

It was apparent from his letter that he was interested in doing business with the city, but his support among the aldermen was beginning to falter.[29] On June 13th, the aldrmen met to consider the latest Leary proposal. The West Side aldermen were still in support of the $5,000 subsidy with all work to be completed by March 15, 1891. Baskin, perhaps unable to accurately gauge the support for Leary and anxious to have the works constructed, amended his own motion by adding that Leary would eventually have to sell to the city any properties he developed. Baskin's motion then passed by a vote of 13 -12.[30] Voting against were the majority of main peninsula aldermen. The only two from Portland also voting against Leary believed the work should be done — *not* by a private individual, but rather by the city.[31]

The resolution which Council passed called for the city and Leary to sign a contract within twenty days. This deadline passed, and no contract was signed because the provincial and Dominion governments had not yet responded to the Memorials soliciting subsidies.[32] In an attempt to clear up the subsidy question at the federal level, Alderman Baskin had gone to Ottawa and met with Macdonald, Langevin, and George Foster. He had been informed, however, that the government would not make any commitment until it knew what the C.P.R. wished to do in Carleton, since that organization was then in the process of acquiring the New Brunswick Railway which controlled the Carleton Branch.[33] Control of the New Brunswick Railway did pass in the summer to the C.P.R., and throughout the fall little was mentioned at Council about the Leary plan.

Not until December 1890 did Alderman Baskin re-introduce the matter by suggesting that contracts be prepared for Leary.[34] Baskin's motion prompted a spirited discussion in which several aldermen quoted the comments of Van Horne and T. G. Shaughnessy to the effect that the C.P.R. would have nothing to do with a private individual.[35] One alderman reminded his Council colleagues that the C.P.R. was emphatic about controlling its own harbour improvements.[36]

The city was in a difficult position. It was trying to improve the West Side, but was somewhat uncertain as to whether it should contract with Leary or work out an arrangement with the C.P.R. As an individual force in port development, this major railroad was only beginning its association with Saint John. Yet even now, the aldermen were reluctant to vote any measure which might jeopardize the city's chances of having the C.P.R. use the West Side. Nevertheless the intentions of the C.P.R. in regard to the city were as yet undefined, and so the aldermen decided to draw up a contract with Leary.[37]

This decision provoked a response from the Board of Trade which had not offered an opinion on earlier Leary discussions. In March, William Thorne urged the Board to pass his resolution advising city and county representatives to oppose the current legislation in the Fredericton House authorizing the city to enter a contract with Leary.[38] The following day the Board met and voted 39 - 12 against the Leary scheme.[39]

The immediate effect of this Board of Trade vote upon the aldermen was evident at the meeting of March 27th. Alderman Forrest, a Leary supporter, moved that the Council request the following changes be made in the current pending legislation: "That where the name J. D. Leary occurs in the said bill, the words 'or any other person or persons with whom the City may wish to enter into a contract for harbour improvements in Carleton' be added".[40] The defeat of the Leary bill by the Board of Trade and the retreat from wholehearted support of Leary by his former enthusiasts on the Council indicated what was to come when the bill was voted upon in the local Legislature. The Saint John members were unanimously against it on the basis that the C.P.R. would do as well, if not better, than Leary.[41]

The Leary issue was finished. A new civic administration headed by the leading anti-Leary exponent, T. W. Peters, now prepared to concentrate on extending the railway in the Lower Cove area and developing a terminal facility with the C.P.R. on the West Side. The Leary interlude, however, stands as a significant benchmark in the history of the evolution of the Port of Saint John from a Maritime harbour — presided over by a local elite having strong business ties to the economy of the port and city — to a national harbour, the destiny of which was to be in large measure determined by outside agencies whose allegiance could not be claimed by any one transport node or city.

"Learyism", as J. D. Leary's plans began to be called when the issue dragged unresolved into its second year, focused sharply on one critical process under way in Saint John. That process concerned a changing perception of the "export function" within Saint John Harbour which was to be emphasized as the city undertook its development program following the defeat of the harbour commission scheme of 1889. "Development" and "dry dock", two terms which became fused in the Leary scheme, stemmed from both the abortive harbour commission proposals of the 1880's and the surviving interest in and association with the city's former primary dual activities — timber shipment and shipbuilding. As mentioned above, the Leary scheme gained some adherents when the dry dock aspects were dropped and wharf construction — increasingly associated with trans-continental rail shipment — was stressed.

Within the immediate range of priorities, dry dock construction, or certainly the development of a dry dock in an area beginning to be viewed as the future focus of a large Western-based trade, began to diminish. This change of emphasis from dry dock to wharf construction was a microcosm of the more significant change in function of the Port of Saint John from a timber-shipbuilding centre to a grain-railway port.

## Fishing Weirs to Railway Piers: The Transformation of Reed's Point-Lower Cove and the Carleton Waterfront 1891-1893

Two sections within the harbour were to undergo changes in their physical appearance and function which underscored the more general shift in emphasis occurring to the port as it integrated into a national transportation system. Following the April 1891 meeting, during which Mayor Peters began his term, Ottawa was informed that the city had obtained legislation to authorize the I.C.R. extension through Charlotte and Britain Streets and thence on to the Pettingell Wharf in the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area.[42] Responding in October, the government had objected to any proposal making it responsible for "damages . . . claimed by property holders . . . along Britain Street".[43] Attempting to resolve this dilemma, Alderman Blizard of Dukes suggested that the best solution lay in constructing a trestle bridge from the Ballast Wharf — the current Sydney Ward terminus of the I.C.R. — to Reed's Point. Equally important, the traffic patterns could continue relatively undisturbed as Britain Street would not be "taken" by the I.C.R.[44]

The plans as finally presented by the Dominion and accepted by the city, provided for a trestle with a drawbridge designed to ensure, at least partially, the continued use of certain wharf facilities existing in Lower Cove.[45] Initially, the city would have preferred the Britain Street route as it would not have disturbed the familiar waterfront land-use patterns in the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area. It had been forced to the "trestle position" by Ottawa. Yet, the drawbridge helped to retain some of the Lower Cove's image as a "haven" for small craft. Nevertheless, as the *Annual Reports* of 1893, 1894 and 1895 indicated, the trestle bridge had drawn this "corner" of the harbour into the sphere of railway functions which were gradually transforming the Port of Saint John into a railway-port centre.[46]

On the West Side, railway development to the waterfront through the Carleton Branch had been undermined by the bridge at the Falls. Furthermore, the city's decision to sell its stock in that company during the mid-1880's had underscored the failure of the West Side railway. Thus, in Carleton, the initial railway experience had not contributed to a complete change in the perception of the area as a secondary harbour within the Port of Saint John.

Moreover, the continued association of Carleton with the earliest port-related activities of the city was annually reinforced each January when the city's harbour fishery lots were sold at auction.[47] Invariably, the greatest interest and participation in this traditional activity came from West Siders. Through the 1870's and 1880's, East-West splits on measures which were seen as potentially adverse to the harbour fisheries occurred frequently enough to suggest a separation of interests between the two sides.

The instrument of technological change which eventually transformed the Carleton fishing weirs to railway piers was the Canadian Pacific Railway. Mayor Peters believed Saint John would have benefited more directly from the C.P.R. if the harbour facilities had been ready to receive the traffic, but he explained the "uncertainty of the projected volume of business made many citizens timid in the race for commercial supremacy . . ."[48] Temerity was no longer a factor in the planning of harbour improvements he felt, and he exhorted his civic colleagues to "proceed as one man |towards| making this Port capable of handling all the business that may come to it . . ."[49]

The "uncertainty" to which Peters referred was contingent on the role which the C.P.R. was to play in the transport node of the city. Indeed, as mentioned above, some of the ease with which Leary's plans received acceptance may be attributed to the lack of information which the Council possessed regarding the intentions of the Canadian Pacific Railway or the federal government. Most shared Alderman Stackhouse's regret in November 1889 that Ottawa, in response to the Council's Memorial of September 1889, had not been more direct beyond reiterating the common knowledge that the Carleton Branch was under lease to the New Brunswick Railway Company until 1893.[50] In fact, the possibility that nothing could be resolved in regard to the West Side before 1893 only increased local anxiety as to the potential role of the port in a national transport system.

The aldermen, however, had not been alone in their efforts to secure some definite indication as to the federal government's plans regarding West Side development. Before Ottawa had even answered the city's September, 1889 enquiry, F. W. Cram, the general manager of the New Brunswick Railway Company, wrote Sir John urging that the lease due to expire on January 1st, 1893, be extended "for not less than 99 years".[51] Cram mentioned that he had been recently "approached by several committees from the City Government . . ." He referred to the potential advantages the Short Line connection could stimulate and suggested a possible course of action to the Prime Minister by adding "... if the way were now opened to an improvement of the harbour facilities, they [City Council] are ready to move in the matter providing the conditions appear to favor such control of the improvements as will insure development of new ocean-rail traffic".[52] Macdonald solicited the advice of a prominent New Brunswick Conservative, George Foster. Responding in a detailed memo, Foster outlined the federal government's relationship to the Carleton Branch noting that as a financial proposition "no income could be got from the Government administration of it that would at all compensate us for the necessary outlay to put and keep it in good order".[53] Furthermore, the Kings County M.P. reminded Sir John that little had been done for Saint John "in the way of promoting trade facilities" and thus for Foster "the time seem[ed] opportune just now for securing for western freight an outlet as St. John ..."[54]

During the summer of 1890, some intimation of the events which were to follow was revealed in the C.P.R.'s lease of the New Brunswick Railway Company. For some time, George Stephen had been a principal stockholder in the New Brunswick Railway Company.[55] Early in June, he advised the Prime Minister that "although the application is made by the N.B. Railway, it is in reality the C.P.R., as the C.P.R. Co. have decided to lease the N.B. Railway."[56] Stephen then reminded Macdonald that "the Carleton [Branch] is or rather will [be] the extension of the C.P.R. to deep water in the harbour of St. John".[57] Nonetheless, by July, the government had still not announced its decision about the Carleton Branch. Foster once again urged immediate action as "it is of great consequence to the trade of St. John".[58]

The Common Council waited throughout the summer, and finally as the "first anniversary" of the original memorial to Ottawa approached it was decided to send the Common Council Clerk, B. Lester Peters, to meet with the Prime Minister. In October, Peters reported the results of his discussions. The federal government offered to transfer the Carleton Branch to the City for $50,000 — $10,000 more than it had paid. Peters also visited Van Horne in Montreal, who promised if the C.P.R. received the Branch it would be put in shape; the Company would repair the wharves and "make them ready for the import and export trade".[59] Van Horne also "pointed out that in view of the large interests the railway had in this City, it would be more to their interests than to the City's for them to develop trade".[60]

The Council voted to pay $50,000 for the Carleton Branch, realizing nothing could be done until the property had been re-acquired from the federal government and offered to the C.P.R. George Foster wrote Sir John claiming "... that $40,000 is all that the City can give — that the amount will be cheerfully given — that to adhere to the $50,000 offer will result either in the failure of the attempt to utilize the Branch which would have a very bad effect on us and on the city's prospects, or in the feeling that the Government was not willing to give the city a reasonable chance to have these now unused facilities realized".[61] Apparently, the wisdom of Foster's advice, based no doubt on the Conservatives' disastrous showing in Saint John during the last federal election, had some effect on the Prime Minister. Within a few days after Foster's letter, the city received a telegram from the government accepting $40,000 as payment in the Carleton Branch transfer.[62]

During the same Council meeting at which the successful exchange was reported, the committee appointed to discuss specific negotiations regarding the transfer of the Carleton Branch to the C.P.R. advised its civic colleagues of the railway's terms. Specifically, the Canadian Pacific Railway Company proposed that the Carleton Branch and its properties be leased to them for 999 years at a nominal rent and the property be tax exempt for 20 years. Moreover, with regard to improvements and extensions Mr. Van Horne said "that the Company would . . . neglect nothing that will tend to promote [the] trade".[63] Alderman T. Nisbet Robertson believed "that this was the best arrangement that could be made for the City". The Council agreed that the nominal rent should be one dollar per year for the duration of the lease and the report was unanimously adopted.[64] The negotiations in the fall of 1890 were largely the preliminary foundations of the important role which the C.P.R. would have in developing transport facilities at Saint John and in anchoring the focus of the city's external transport system on the West Side.

Commencing in April 1891 the aldermen pressed development of the West Side. In November, the city's bill committee was authorized to prepare the necessary statement permitting the civic government to issue debentures to cover the transfer cost of $40,000 for the Carleton Branch.[65] By the spring of 1892, with the support of the Board of Trade, the City Council committed itself to developing the Sand Point properties for deep water facilities.[66]

Following the Council's decision to build up Sand Point, Mayor T. W. Peters met with Van Horne to discuss the city's expectations from the C.P.R. Van Horne "made no formal proposals". However, Peters said that the C.P.R. executive suggested "the Council should ask the Dominion Government for assistance for [a grain] elevator . . ." Van Horne assured the Mayor that the C.P.R. directors would spend money in Carleton "provided the City was prepared to expend some money themselves".[67] Together with demonstrating its preparedness in the matter of spending money to build up Sand Point, the city referred to a special committee the suggestion that

Ottawa be asked to grant $40,000 towards the erection of a grain elevator.[68]

Events moved swiftly after this meeting. During August, tenders were called for and received on the Sand Point project. The lowest tender — $132,902.72 — from the Quebec firm of N.K. and M. Conolly was accepted by the city.[69] In September, the city sent memorials to the Dominion Government and the C.P.R. for funds towards harbour improvements. In addition, it was decided to have the Mayor and George Robertson of the Board of Trade go to Ottawa and Montreal.[70]

The delegates from the city were unable to convince the Prime Minister to grant assistance to Saint John in its harbour improvement program.[71] Instead, as a result of his conversation with Mr. Timmerman, the Atlantic Manager of the C.P.R., George Robertson reported to the Board of Trade that the City Council be asked to grant $40,000 to the C.P.R. provided that the railway erect a grain elevator of 400,000 bushel capacity and complete the project before February 1, 1893.[72] Peters too presented a synopsis of the Timmerman meeting to his civic associates and after much discussion, the Council agreed to grant the $40,000 to the C.P.R.[73] The cost of erecting the elevator was quoted as being about $80,000.[74] Indeed, if the city was to prepare its waterfront for the grain trade, it really had no alternative but to grant the money to the railway. More important than the actual construction, however, would be the eventual management of such a facility. Increasingly, harbour improvements implied auxiliary businesses — such as grain handling — which the aldermen were ill-prepared to administer efficiently. Thus, the C.P.R.'s offer also meant that the city was removing itself from the managerial aspect of the grain trade by having the railway supervise the elevator.

The Port of Saint John, at the end of 1893, through the Carleton construction of a large wharf and grain elevator, had made the transition in physical facilities from a lumber to a grain port. Emphasis in the build-up on Carleton had included also the construction of an I.C.R. grain elevator on the East Side; the Lower Cove was being enclosed by a trestle drawbridge enabling the I.C.R. to circle the main peninsula from the Long Wharf in Portland to the Corporation Pier in Dukes Ward. It had long been realized that the development of the port and city as a distribution centre was predicated on the existence of three components: substantial terminal facilities, railway access, and steamship connections. The I.C.R. was established within the city. But more important, as the Board of Trade's stationery proclaimed, "Saint John [was] the Great Atlantic terminus of the Canadian Pacific, the only railway running on its own rails from the Atlantic to the

Pacific".[75] The city, for its part, had met the railway more than half way by transferring the Carleton Branch and assisting in the construction of the grain elevator for which it then assumed the insurance premiums.[76] The only element needed to complete the transport triumvirate insuring prosperity to the port was steamship facilities. In this instance, too, as in the acquisition of railways and facilities, steamships would arrive through an amalgam of events occurring both within and outside the city.

## Completing a National Transport Node: Securing Subsidized Steamship Lines for the Port, 1894-1895

The city's decision to proceed with harbour improvements in conjunction with the C.P.R.'s West Side presence was designed to stimulate greater trade through Saint John. In fact, as part of its bargain with the city, the C.P.R. had promised to "promote" trade over its tracks to the West Side. During the Leary matter and the excitement generated by both the I.C.R. extension on the main peninsula and the C.P.R. build-up on the West Side, little specific reference had been made to the overall purpose of these efforts: establishing the Port of Saint John as the winter port of Canada. Only an occasional reference to the "winter port question" appeared in the press in the early 1890's.[77] In November 1891 when the federal government announced its planned steamship subsidy to Portland, Maine for a fast line of mail and passenger steamers, the Board of Trade approved of the action. It asked that equity be created between Portland and Saint John by having a line of freight steamers subsidized to the Canadian port.[78] A week later, an influential member of the Board of Trade, W. Frank Hatheway, suggested the federal government should turn its attention to distributing the Atlantic trade between Halifax and Saint John. "Give Saint John the fast freight to Liverpool", Hatheway argued; implicitly acknowledging the existence in the Maritimes of a dual primate city, he added, "Give Halifax the fast mail line".[79] In assigning Halifax this line and also the passenger trade, Hatheway was also acquiescing to that city's historical claim of such a function.[80] More important, he was acknowledging the stated position of the Conservative Government on the question of subsidies to be distributed between Saint John and Halifax.

In the mid-1880's, the civic and business elite had visited Ottawa and pleaded with the Macdonald government not to overlook the potential of the Port of Saint John merely because it then lacked facilities.[81] But much of Saint John's problem rested on the fact that the federal government was interested in a Canadian Atlantic fast line which would ferry passengers and mail between Great Britain and Canada. In this context Halifax provided the shorter Atlantic route. Saint John civic or business elite did not argue this point. On the contrary, what they feared was that freight would following the passenger-mail since Ottawa was so preoccupied with this more glamorous and, in terms of speed, prestigious aspect of the Atlantic trade.[82]

In the 1890's and especially when the city had undertaken considerable expense in harbour improvements, Board of Trade men continued to acknowledge the Halifax claim to mail and passengers, but increasingly they added the demand that Saint John be established as the freight port.[83] By early 1894, the Board of Trade, under its newly elected President, W. Frank Hatheway, began to assume a more aggressive posture when extolling the benefits of Saint John as a freight port. In March, when the federal government announced that James Huddart, general manager of an Australian shipping firm,[84] proposed to run four Atlantic Steamers with Quebec to be the summer terminus and Halifax the winter terminus, the Board of Trade denounced the government.[85] The company was to receive a subsidy of $750,000 per year. Hatheway claimed the Port of Saint John could never compete. Accurately claiming that thousands had been spent in Carleton, he wondered, "were we to reap no benefit from that great expenditure?"[86]

Sharing the disappointment of the business elite at Ottawa's latest subsidy proposal, the Common Council received with approval a resolution passed by the Board of Trade urging "the appointment of delegations to proceed to Ottawa in connection with the proposed fast line Atlantic mail and passenger service and the granting of subsidies to freight lines . . ."[87] In June, a combined civic and business delegation met with Sir John Thompson and George Foster. Hatheway insisted his intention was not to deny Halifax, but to argue that three-quarters of a million dollars was an unwarranted expenditure for Canada to gain a fast Atlantic service. Addressing the issue of freight, he advanced the position of Saint John. He thought neither Saint John nor Halifax were capable of becoming terminals for a fast passenger service because from each there was "too long a railway journey to important centres".[88] But, claimed Hatheway, should the expenditure be made, only one port should become the "terminal point". Although he still felt that the freight trade was the most significant aspect of Atlantic trade, Hatheway's arguments had shifted somewhat since the days when he advocated Halifax for mail and Saint John for another function. Now, he chose to emphasize Saint John's competitive edge in that regard by arguing that freight should determine the choice of an Atlantic terminal port.

In the fall of 1894, as yet another economically dismal winter season approached bringing the depressing prospect of idle West

Side facilities, George Robertson delivered what in retrospect would be considered an important address to the Common Council. He enumerated the city's efforts towards securing the trade of the West, which included the purchase of the Carleton Branch and the presentation of it as a "gift" to the C.P.R. Noting as well the granting of the site for a grain elevator and the construction of new and extensive wharves,[89] Robertson accused the government of doing little to develop trade through Saint John. He recommended that the aldermen appoint a committee to confer with the government, the C.P.R. and the newly formed Maritime Board of Trade "to consider in the fullest and widest sense this great question and to ascertain what can be done to meet our expectations and secure our *rights* with regards to the same . . ."[90] Robertson's message to Council generally was well received by the press.[91] More important, it began to appear that these resolutions might lead somewhere. Within a few days, the Mayor met with a Council committee to discuss exclusively the winter port question as it related to: "[first] — the probable quantity of freight which can be collected in the Maritime Provinces for shipment to England from this port, [second] — the approximate quality of Canadian exports forwarded to England from the ports of Portland and Boston, and [third] — the approximate cost of and need for the extension of the railway to the new wharf at Carleton and the erection of a warehouse thereon".[92]

In early November, it became apparent why Robertson had undertaken the "resolution and winter port committee route" once again. Representatives of the Beaver Line had made overtures to the city regarding the possibility of establishing a line of freight steamers at Saint John. They currently ran a fortnightly winter service from Portland and indeed had investigated the possibility of stopping at Saint John during the fall of 1894. Founded in 1867 by Montreal merchants, the Beaver Line, or as it was officially known, the Canadian Shipping Company, enjoyed limited economic success. By 1894, the company was near bankruptcy.[93] Hence, attention was directed towards the Port of Saint John with its increased facilities and incessant clamoring for subsidized steamship service as a means by which the Line could conceivably gain more freight by adding the New Brunswick port to its scheduled stops. The company needed the Saint John port, and in Mayor Robertson's opinion, the port needed the company to help launch its reputation as a winter port. Thus, in early November, George Robertson went to Ottawa with former alderman and now member of parliament, John Chesley and J. D. Hazen, M.P.[94] Although the newspapers intimated that Robertson's October "message" to the Common Council had been made with prior knowledge that the Beaver Line was preparing to solicit a federal subsidy to establish a Saint John service, the official Common Council *Minutes* and *Papers* contain no correspondance or reference to that company.

Only the newspapers reported the Ottawa discussions following the return of the Saint John delegation. While the Mackenzie Bowell government was slow in announcing its decision, the local delegates claimed the Beaver Line would be granted the subsidy, as indeed it was.[95] Full disclosure, however, of the particulars outlined during the Ottawa meeting were not made public. But, thirty years later during another winter port season, a local newspaper fondly recalled the efforts of George Robertson: "St. John had got what was asked for, but . . . would not have got it at all only for the persistency of the Mayor [Robertson]".[96]

Announcement of the subsidy in mid-November 1895 prompted a more thorough exposure of the role played by the Board of Trade. Aware that the Beaver Line had not operated during the past winter season, and knowing that the company's annual meeting was to occur on October 27th, the Board had sent a letter to be read during the proceedings. This merely described in detail the facilities offered by Saint John, and promised support if the company sought a government subsidy.[97] The President of the Board of Trade claimed that Mayor Robertson had not known about this letter when he gave his message to the Council on October 24th. This, however, is highly unlikely as Robertson's message so closely coincided with the date of the Board note to the company. Yet despite the Board's low profile, it had been instrumental in sustaining the beleaguered company's interest in the port. At its annual December meeting, the Board's executive congratulated the city upon a successful completion of more than a decade of agitation designed to keep the prospective role of the port "before the Dominion Government".[98] However, the Board of Trade left little doubt as to what it believed its role had been in this most recent and important part of the agitation:

> . . . the Board have been *ably seconded* by His Worship the Mayor and Common Council, as well as the representatives in the House of Commons and has been successful in securing for this port a fortnightly freight and passenger service direct to the port of Liverpool.[99]

For its part, the Common Council authorized an additional expenditure in the Sand Point area.[100] This was not done, however, before the city asked the C.P.R. to incur the expense of purchasing a piece of property through which the track extension would have to be made. The C.P.R. said the city would have to handle the land aspect and it would build the track through the city-owned land.[101]

Instead, the city decided to buy the land and absorb the cost of laying the additional track, thus guaranteeing greater control over the total extension.[102] This incident of increasing West Side facilities and determining fiscal responsibility for them was the forerunner of future clashes in the uneasy shared stewardship between the Common Council and the C.P.R.

At the company-sponsored luncheon held December 10th, the Beaver Line Manager, Mr. Campbell, intimated that much would be decided in the coming season regarding the future of Saint John as a winter port.[103] He reportedly appealed to the Common Council as provider of facilities on the one hand and to the C.P.R. as provider of the means of bringing freight to the port on the other, to assist him in making this venture a success. In his luncheon address, he thus alluded to the triumvirate of agencies — City Council, Railways, Steamships — whose cooperation was essential in establishing the Port of Saint John as the winter port of Canada.

The years between 1879-1895 had been a transitional period for the port. Beginning in 1879 with the port no longer successfully functioning as an Atlantic timber and shipbuilding port, the period had ended with the port emerging as a potential national transport centre whose function would be based on grain and other railway associated freight handling capabilities. The spatial reflection of this larger process may be seen in the shifting emphasis of importance assigned to particular areas within the harbour. Prior to moving over to the West Side, initial railway construction had been planned for the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area of the main peninsula. By 1895, freight handling capacity was largely associated with existing or projected West Side development. In all of this, the civic and business elite had played a role which was in itself insufficient to garner the presence of either the C.P.R. or the Beaver Line. During the next period, that role would be further diminished as the railways and steamships increasingly exerted their influence in determining the direction of transport development and in a significant way the integration of the port and city into a national transportation system.

# PART THREE: 1895 - 1911

## THE WEST SIDE:
## THE CONTINENTAL YEARS OF A NATIONAL PORT


LOVITT'S POINT
FERRY
ST. JOHN
RIVER
LEE'S COVE
UNION POINT
Reversing Falls
MARBLE COVE
INDIANTOWN
Spar Cove
Creek
Main St.
Fort Howe
C.P.R.
I.C.R.
LILY LAKE
MARSH CREEK
HARBOUR
Navy Is.
Long Wharf
Market Slip
Douglas Avenue
Strait Shore Road
Suspension Bridge Rd.
FAIRVILLE
Prince St. Extension
LANCASTER HEIGHTS
King Square
Queen Square
ROONEY ST.
SAND POINT
REED'S POINT
COURTENAY BAY
CROUCHVILLE
DUCK COVE
—1896—
The City of Saint John
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923
1846
2769
3692
FT.
Port Development

Figure 3

## CHAPTER VIII

# *Recognition of a National "Export Function": Achieving the Role of Atlantic Winter Port, 1895-1900*

As mentioned earlier, each city within an urban system possesses an "export function" thus permitting it to make a particular contribution to the larger system of which it is a part.[1] Saint John's "export function" had emerged through the development of its harbour.[2] Throughout the 1870's and 1880's the port facilities had been augmented by the railways and finally in the mid-1890's by subsidized steamships. All of these later developments had built upon the city's basic "export function" — the importing and exporting activities carried on through its transport node.

As several geographers have suggested, Canadian East Coast ports developed in the first half-century of Confederation as railway ports, reflecting at once their immense distances from major population centres and the sparseness of their immediate provincial and regional hinterlands.[3] Since Saint John's provincial hinterland would not itself sustain such port facilities, the goal increasingly evident throughout the late-1880's and early-1890's had been to secure a position within the national transportation system.[4] In this way the "export function" previously based on the traffic of the Saint John River, the Atlantic coastal trade and the transatlantic lumber export market, would now be increased in scale to encompass a national level based on the grain and freight market of Continental Canada. The formal recognition of this national "export function" would come in the late 1890's. It would be accompanied by a series of processes each of which would underscore the diminishing of local autonomy. This proceeded apace with increasing integration into a national transport system and was symbolized spatially at the local level by the distance between the business centre of Saint John's elite — the Market Slip — and the new physical forces of transport primacy — the Carleton waterfront. By examining in this Chapter the city as a socio-spatial unit, the achievement of winter port status with its parallel loss of local autonomy emerges in a social sense through the increased federal presence at the port, the Common Council's involvement in the discussions regarding the West Side, and the emergence of the port as an I.C.R.-C.P.R. railway-port. Equally important, the process of achieving winter port status may be seen spatially through the increase of port facilities along the Carleton waterfront.

## Experiencing the New Linkage: The Beginning of an Intense and Visible Federal Presence

The spatial distance at the local level between the business locations of Saint John's elite and the Carleton waterfront[5] was not reflected in the political interaction between the city and Ottawa. Indeed as the election of 1896 approached some Saint John Conservatives may have expected a victory in return for the Beaver Line steamship subsidy granted in the fall of 1895. However, despite this subsidy, Saint John had been excluded from a proposed "Fast Line" tender offered in February 1896 by the last of Macdonald's successors.[6] This development had contributed to the formation of an Independent ticket which drew support from the Conservative Party and aided in the election of John V. Ellis, the Liberal candidate.[7] William Pugsley — a man whose name eventually would become synonomous with the Port of Saint John — ran on the Independent ticket, and urged in a public rally preceding the election that members elected from the city should resign their seats in Parliament "should Saint John be unfairly treated".[8]

With the election of the Liberals, the port began to receive immediate attention, reflecting a commitment at the federal level amply enunciated in the *Annual Report* of the Minister of Public Works.[9] In late July, Mayor George Robertson was advised by the Chief Engineer at Ottawa, Louis Coste, that the federal Department of Public Works would assist the city with its deep water service by supplying a dredge.[10]

While these endorsements were favourably received in Saint John, the Laurier administration did not escape local criticism. The continuation of the Allan Line contract to Portland, Maine for the winter season 1896-1897, raised some doubt as to the government's sincerity regarding the winter port aspirations of Saint John. Explaining that the Allans had not been notified in June 1896 regarding termination of their Portland contract, the administration claimed it felt obliged to continue the Portland service for another year.[11] Consequently, Laurier had to assure a worried Saint John delegation that the agreement would expire in spring 1897 and furthermore, that no subsidy would be issued to a steamer whose terminus was at a foreign port.[12] The very necessity of this assurance, and the delegation's perception of its importance, underscored the important role which Ottawa exercised in the functioning of Saint John's transport node.[13] Thus, the possibility of increased trade, which Laurier's government held out to the city, became a continued basis of Saint John's negotiation with outside agencies for aid to port development and integration into a national transportation system.

As in previous years, the inaugural address of every Mayor elected to office in this period focused to some extent on harbour matters. In 1897, newly re-elected Mayor George Robertson referred to Saint John as a possible national harbour and urged his civic colleagues to secure federal aid in the development of the West Side.[14] Aware of the attention which Ottawa was directing towards harbours, the Mayor was determined that the city's previous municipal efforts would not be overlooked. When the Minister of Public Works, Israel Tarte, made an inspection tour of Atlantic ports in the fall of 1897, the municipal leaders were zealous in their promotion of the harbour. Tarte, to the delight of Saint John, endorsed the idea of developing a Canadian Atlantic harbour and implied that Saint John's freight handling capacity made the port a prime contender for federal assistance.[15] It appeared that within the National Policy Canadian ports — Saint John included — would be encouraged as well as Canadian industries.

Saint John was inundated with federal visitors, particularly during Laurier's first years in office. Indeed the Prime Minister took a mid-September tugboat tour of the harbour facilities in 1897 during which he reportedly expressed ". . . willingness on the part of the Government to develop the harbour of Saint John . . ."[16] In addition to visits by Tarte and Laurier, the port facilities were inspected that same year by the Honorable A. G. Blair, who had resigned as Premier of New Brunswick to become Minister of Railways and Canals in the new cabinet.[17] While addressing a local meeting, Blair observed that Ottawa's commitment to building up the Intercolonial would be highly advantageous to the port, as the harbour would have the C.P.R. on the West Side, and the I.C.R. on the East Side — each, he declared, drawing "freight from different parts of Canada . . ."[18] With regard to the freight trade, Blair indicated that Saint John possessed advantages over Halifax. Specifically, the New Brunswick port was already the established terminus of the C.P.R.[19]

On March 1, 1898 the government extended the operations of the Intercolonial to Montreal.[20] Within a month the City Council had sent a memorial to the Governor General requesting the Dominion of Canada to take the necessary steps in creating a deep water terminus at the I.C.R. wharves. It was expected that the western grain trade would necessitate the use of the I.C.R. piers as well as those of the C.P.R. Thus, the city was anxious for Dominion development of the I.C.R.'s property in the North End — a section of the former City of Portland.[21] Visiting Saint John in October 1898, Blair promised that the improvements in the North End would be completed in time for the fall trade of 1899.[22]

Commencing with the winter port season of 1897-1898, subsidized mail steamers were removed from foreign ports. No doubt reflecting the enthusiasm for the burgeoning winter port business, the City of Saint John in cooperation with the Board of Trade issued a booklet entitled: *Saint John as a Canadian Winter Port and the Terminus of the Canadian Pacific and Intercolonial Railways.*[23] While the publication of this booster booklet underscored the satisfaction with the recently developed port, significantly the pamphlet recognized that:

> It would not, of course, be expected that the trade which had for years been carried on through United States channels would be at once diverted to a Canadian Port, but the rapid development of the winter trade through the Port of Saint John in the last three years . . . [and] . . . the prompt despatch and safe carriage of every description of cargo . . . have established beyond question the claim of Saint John to the first place in the consideration of Canadian and British shippers and importers.[24]

Continuing a tradition initiated with the opening of the first winter port season in 1895, an annual luncheon was held on board one of the liners at port. Hosting the occasion in December 1898, the Allan Liner *Parisian* provided a luxurious atmosphere for praising the progress of the port during the previous few years. The President of the Maritime Board of Trade, W. M. Jarvis of Saint John, claimed he spoke for both ". . . Saint John and Halifax . . . [and] the interests of the two cities were inseparably bound together and with them was linked the prosperity of Montreal".[25] Jarvis' comment at once perceived both the dependency of the maritime cities upon Montreal and that of Saint John and Halifax upon outside agencies for the growth and direction of their future prosperity within a national transportation network.[26]

By 1898 Saint John had secured freight and mail subsidized steamers, the trade had finally come, and the federal government was to undertake substantial dredging operations in the harbour. Despite the necessity of reliance on outside agencies, however, the business which the rejuvenated port handled contributed to a newer aspect of involvement by the Common Council in trade-related matters.

### Improving Sand Point: Increasing Aldermanic Involvement in the External Functions of the Port

Proceeding simultaneously with the federal presence was the increased role of the Common Council in the external functions of the port. This role was heightened because the federal government and the C.P.R. had to deal with the local political unit when negotiating for dredging, wharves, railway line extensions, and other developmental projects. Too, the very act of negotiation focused the Common Council's attention on the local physical plant of the current trade boom: the Carleton waterfront. This preoccupation drew the aldermen more and more into an active role regarding the external functions of the port. Nonetheless, while this new involvement lent to Council discussions a tone suggesting a closer cooperation in planning between the local municipal unit and outside agencies, it is important to recognize that the Council's increased activity with regard to the port's external functions was still largely restricted to the development of the local physical plant.

Improving the West Side facilities was a source of continuing tension between the city and the C.P.R. In the agreements signed in the early 1890's by both parties, the C.P.R. had promised to "promote" trade to the port. What constituted the nature of this promotion or encouragement proved to be a stumbling block. The railway, of course, wanted as many facilities obtainable for the least expense, while the city contended that the C.P.R. should assume financial responsibility for additional construction.[27] Under the terms of the original lease of the Sand Point property and the Carleton Branch of the C.P.R., the company was required to make improvements and provide for development which might occur in future trade. If these railway improvements were not made, the properties were to revert back to the city. While the aldermen complained about the C.P.R.'s handling of the facilities question, they realized that they could not single-handedly manage the local physical plant of trade activity and did not want to reclaim either the Carleton Branch or the Sand Point property.[28]

Under Robertson's leadership throughout the spring of 1896 several conferences were held between representatives of the city and the C.P.R. These meetings were designed to develop ways of expanding port facilities and clarifying the C.P.R.'s promise to encourage the trade. From the C.P.R.'s viewpoint it was essential that the city construct more facilities. As a result of these discussions a draft agreement emerged on June 3, 1896 which proposed to give the C.P.R. control of the Sand Point facilities. Although the aldermen had participated in these discussions, there was some hesitancy about selling the facilities to the railway, and thus, the Council decided to defer a final decision on the proposal. At the same time it was decided to proceed with other suggestions contained within the draft agreement. Specifically, the city agreed to construct new berths on the West Side, and the railway agreed to improve the grain elevator and add more trackage in Carleton.[29]

Most important to the development of the winter port business, the C.P.R. promoted trade by giving "the same [freight] rates to Saint John as the Grand Trunk Railway did to Portland".[30] It was recognized by the press as well as by the aldermen that regardless of the "great preparations and effective arrangements" made by the city for the winter port trade "the success of their enterprise in the end depended [ed] upon the railways".[31] Since the steamship companies would be interested in calling at ports guaranteeing substantial amounts of freight, the city had to ensure that both the railway and the steamships would be satisfied with the local physical plants across which this trade was to be transacted. To advertise the attractiveness of the Port of Saint John, William S. Fisher, the Board of Trade President, travelled through Central Canada asking that Canadian ports be given freight and shipping preference by Canadian shippers.[32] At the commencement of the winter port season of 1897-98, the city had completed the Sand Point improvements, and the port enjoyed both freight and mail steamship subsidies. In this atmosphere of prosperity, the harbour improvements committee of the Common Council met to discuss the draft agreement between the city corporation and the C.P.R.

The proposed agreement, composed of eighteen sections, gave the C.P.R. control of all "the wharves, warehouses, cattle sheds and other erections and appointments at Sand Point" for the payment of $56,500. This sum if invested by the city was calculated to earn $2,260 per year interest.[33] Furthermore, reflecting the C.P.R.'s concern over wharfage, the agreement provided that "no tolls or wharfage, except water consumption is to be charged the company on either freight or passenger traffic; that on one year's notice the city may terminate this arrangement, paying back to the Company the $56,500 if it does so within five years from November 1, 1898 or $50,000 if after the five years have expired".[34] In the opinion of the *Globe* ". . . the abstract of the contract conveys the idea that nothing can be done with [Sand Point] except by consent [of] the C.P.R. Company".[35] While this was essentially correct, it must be remembered that Robertson and the aldermen were anxious to secure a permanent winter port status for Saint John; they saw the presence of the C.P.R. having exclusive rights to Sand Point as a means of achieving this end. Too, the Saint John men were fully alive to the relative distances between Montreal and Portland, and Montreal and Saint John. Although not stating the C.P.R.'s position in terms of absolute *versus* functional distance,[36] Mr. Timmerman, the Company's local representative "more than once . . . had placed before the St. John public the fact that putting the freight rates between Montreal and Saint John on all fours with freight rates from Montreal to Boston or Portland is a heavy contribution by his railway to the winter ocean trade of this port".[37]

In early March the pending C.P.R. agreement was discussed at a joint meeting of the Common Council and the Board of Trade. At a well attended gathering Mayor Robertson addressed the civic and business elite recounting the process which resulted in the current pending agreement. Robertson, who like other Saint John men had been critical of the company, was most enthusiastic about the proposed C.P.R. occupancy of the Sand Point area.[38] Members of the Board of Trade were favourable to the agreement, suggesting only slight modifications in various sections. The Board's only concern, which they believed could be alleviated through the addition of another section, focused on that aspect of C.P.R.-city relations generally included under promoting or encouraging trade. The Board suggested that the currently proposed agreement could not be viewed as "a waiver on the part of the City of the obligations of the Company" made in the early 1890's.[39] The aldermen agreed with this suggestion and a section to that effect was added to the final draft of the contract.[40]

In late March the harbour improvements committee, comprised of the entire Common Council, met to discuss the C.P.R. contract. Mayor Robertson reminded the aldermen to "bear in mind the network of tracks on the wharves and the other work done and yet to be accomplished by the Railway, and without which the property would be to a certain extent useless'.[41] The entire agreement was read by the City Recorder and adopted by the committee of the whole. Essentially, the city retained practical control through its ownership of the Sand Point property while the C.P.R. became in reality tenants at will.[42] Within a few days the adopted contract was presented at a meeting of the Common Council and passed unanimously.[43]

Despite this endorsement from the Common Council some opposition had been voiced by several civic candidates, particularly those from Carleton. These sentiments were supported in a letter to the editor of the *Globe* signed by "Public Talk". Claiming that the C.P.R. was getting too much from the city, the writer implied that the current move to have the contract passed at this time reflected the interests of certain civic politicians whose terms in office were expiring and who wished to see the contract effected before leaving office: "if our Mayor and present Council are indifferent in this matter because their terms are about to expire, there should be some amongst them independent enough to propose to defer action till the new councillors are elected and they should be elected pledging themselves to the people and not the C.P.R."[44]

As both the civic elections of 1898 and the remarks of "Public Talk" suggested, the question of revenue in regard to the C.P.R. contract underscored the extent to which the external functions of the port had become integrated into the municipal political fabric. At the same time during which the C.P.R. contract was being discussed, the aldermanic and mayoral campaigns were under way. George Robertson, the three-term Mayor, had decided not to re-offer. Instead Alderman John W. Daniel, a Queens Ward physician who viewed port-related matters similarly to Robertson, offered himself as a mayoralty candidate. His opponent was Edward Sears, an estate agent described as a "vigilant economist" who had served two terms in the mid-1880's as a Queens Ward alderman.[45]

Campaigning for election on the same day on which the Common Council had passed the C.P.R. contract, Daniel claimed the most "important matter before the community was the question of the C.P.R."[46] Outlining the origins of the winter port idea, he essentially credited the C.P.R. with Saint John's new trade position within a national transportation system. However, possibly sensing the grounds on which his opponent would point to a weakness, Daniel assured the potential voters: "The City had gone to its limit in spending money on harbour improvements [and] the C.P.R. should provide any other improvements which might be needed".[47] Sears based his campaign on inaugurating a "policy of economy", which, in the context of the C.P.R. contract recently signed by the city, meant avoiding situations whereby the city would lose direct revenue.[48]

Sears won over Daniel: 2,189 (52.1%) to 2,014 (47.9%).[49] Of all the Council incumbents who re-offered (and all did so), only one was defeated.[50] The re-election of almost all the aldermen who had voted for the contract may suggest the importance with which the C.P.R. was regarded by the voting public. More important, the civic election of 1898 indicates the extent to which the Common Council as the local political unit had become concerned with and identified as a forum for discussion on the external functions of the harbour.

In his inaugural address, Edward Sears acknowledged the necessity of the C.P.R. presence within Saint John, but echoed a refrain which formed the crux of the railway-city relationship. Returning to the theme of encouraging or promoting the trade, Sears cited "there can be no doubt that the universal opinion was when the City handed over the property known as the Carleton Branch to the C.P.R. that Corporation was to have done just what the City has been seduced to do".[51] Concluding his commentary on the railway, Sears added, "The C.P.R. . . . will show its appreciation of what we have done for it by carrying out its agreement and by doing for Saint John what the Grand Trunk has done for Portland".[52]

That Sears appeared to be taking a more aggressive stance towards the railway company is evident in his first direct contact with the company as Mayor. In mid-June 1898, H. P. Timmerman, of the C.P.R., wrote to the Council outlining the railway's proposed extension for the West Side grain elevator.[53] Deliberating on the C.P.R. communication, Alderman Millidge suggested that the city give the C.P.R. a deed to the additional land it would need for construction. Sears countered arguing that a lease not a deed ought to be given, and that the C.P.R. ought to be responsible for any damages. This more stringent proposal was defeated, and Millidge's resolution was adopted.[54] It appeared that the Council, which had only two months earlier voted for the C.P.R. contract, was not about to be mollified by the newly elected Mayor. At the end of June the draft of the deed upon which the C.P.R. was to build its extension was accepted.[55] Even as work proceeded on this latest extension, however, the question of wharfage exemption for the C.P.R. — contained within the recently signed contract — continued to be raised, particularly on the grounds that it demonstrated too great a spirit of generosity on the part of the city.[56] Opposition from some local merchants to an exemption enjoyed by the C.P.R. but not extended to local importers illustrated the dilemma which the city faced in attempting to achieve the distinction "Atlantic Winter Port". In passing the C.P.R. contract which guaranteed the railway free wharfage on trade classified as western business, the city was merely taking one more step in making the port attractive to the trade of the West and to the C.P.R. In denying the same privilege to local importers, the city was recognizing its need for the revenue generated by wharfage. In short, the winter port trade had to be built up and encouraged; wharfage exemption was one way of assisting the success of this process of building.

The recognized means of gaining trade was improving the local physical plant. Robertson, as Mayor, had viewed the latest contract as one immediate means of securing facilities through the presence of the C.P.R.'s track building program. The Council members, who had agreed with Robertson, continued to welcome the C.P.R.'s suggested improvements and as mentioned above, voted for Alderman Millidge's suggestion rather than Mayor Sears' counter proposal regarding the grain elevator extension. Although Robertson was no longer a civic official, his interests in developing the port continued. Indeed, his long association with the C.P.R. through various discussions and conferences was recognized by the current Mayor, who endorsed Robertson's early 1899 trip made to solicit the railway's intentions regarding the port.

Returning from his meeting with Mr. Shaughnessy of the C.P.R., Robertson claimed to have reminded the railway's executive "that the C.P.R. by its agreement is morally and legally bound to provide facilities and to encourage trade".[57] Shaughnessy reportedly replied that the company "had already made large expenditures to that end and would continue them".[58] These expenditures included, of course, the track building and elevator construction. In addition, Robertson was reminded of the "improvement of the Short Line [and] the fact that they carried freight in competition with Portland . . ."[59] With this Robertson could not quarrel. Instead, he took up the city's position and asked Shaughnessy to construct wharves south of the Sand Point facilities. Shaughnessy was evasive, no doubt not wishing to commit the railway to the expense of wharf construction. He proposed that the city secure assistance from the federal government. He would not agree to a plan by which Ottawa might assume financial responsibility for dredging while the city and the C.P.R. built additional wharves.[60]

While all of these city-C.P.R. meetings had focused on the Common Council, the Board of Trade had not been inactive. In fact, it too desired that the C.P.R. increase facilities at the port. During the Board's monthly meeting in February, a letter was read from Shaughnessy containing essentially the same view expressed earlier by the C.P.R. executive to Robertson: harbour facilities at Saint John should be provided by the federal government.[61] Although the Board did not respond to Shaughnessy's comment, a detailed statement of the city's expenditure on Sand Point was presented which reflected a cost of approximately $750,000.[62] At a Common Council meeting held a week later Hurd Peters, the city engineer, claimed further work at Sand Point could cost more than one-half million dollars.[63] The city, once again, faced the question of increasing its port facilities to retain its competitive position as a transshipment centre.

In March the Board of Trade formally requested that the Common Council appoint a committee to meet with a committee of the Board of Trade consisting of the President, Messrs. W. F. Hatheway, W. S. Fisher, J. A. Likely and George Robertson. Its proposal would be "to take into consideration the question of further terminal facilities at Sand Point, Carleton".[64] Despite the fact that two from the proposed committee had served on the Common Council, Mayor Sears "did not think any outside body should ask the Council to appoint a Committee to confer with them with regard to any civic works".[65] The Mayor's opinion narrowly prevailed.[66] Instead, the Common Council retained its stature as the local unit primarily responsible for dealing with outside agencies, appointed its own committee, and invited the members of the Board's committee to offer suggestions but without participating as members of any joint committee. The Board of Trade regretted this new relationship with the Common Council, which was a departure from the previous close formal cooperation of the two bodies during Robertson's tenure. While the contrast between the Sears and Robertson administrations towards the Board of Trade reflected in part the closer ties which Robertson had with the business elite, it also illustrated the degree to which aldermanic involvement in the external functions of the port had grown. As the local political unit with which outside agencies had to negotiate for the use of the West Side physical plant, the Common Council at least momentarily felt confident enough to reject this offer of cooperation from the Board of Trade — the local organization which had previously dominated decision-making regarding the external functions of the port. What may have not been completely apparent to either local unit was that the power held by each or shared jointly on an informal level was rapidly diminishing as Saint John became increasingly integrated into a national transportation system.

### An I.C.R.-C.P.R. Railway Port: The Local Consequences of National Control

The achievement of winter port status pointed to both the presence and importance of the railways in Saint John. Although the construction of the Short Line by the Canadian Pacific Railway had been viewed by the city as a means by which integration into a national system was to occur, as early as 1897, when A. G. Blair had visited the city, the eventual importance of the Intercolonial Railway was acknowledged. Then the Minister of Railways admitted that he "... regarded the I.C.R. as a competing line ..."[67] A year earlier, however, the Mayor had recognized the role of the government railway when the city requested an alternate transport facility following a Sand Point landslide in November 1896 which had interrupted the C.P.R.'s operation.[68] At the Common Council meeting of November 27th, Blair's letter "agreeing to free use of the I.C.R. harbor tracks and wharves for the handling of the winter business when the Carleton wharves are full . . ." was read.[69] Underscoring the future competitive stance of the two railways Blair had added "on condition that it is not considered a precedent".[70]

When Blair visited the city he claimed that the development of the I.C.R. should be a prominent way of sending Canadian winter exports to the seaboard. Perhaps to minimize any suggestion of competitiveness between the government railway and the C.P.R., Blair remarked that the I.C.R. would tap Grand Trunk Railway territory, and thus the C.P.R. would not be threatened as much as the Port of Portland, Maine.[71]

Following Blair's October 1897 visit, newspapers reported that the government planned to purchase new facilities for the I.C.R. in the Long Wharf vicinity. This would facilitate the extension of the I.C.R. operation already located in Kings Ward, and by adequately preparing the already existing waterfront area would enable the construction of three or four deep water steamship berths.[72]

In the same month during which the Common Council signed the C.P.R. Agreement — April 1898 — the aldermen also sent a memorial to the Governor General requesting "that the necessary steps be taken . . . for the purpose of creating a sufficient deep water terminus for the Intercolonial Railway at the Port of Saint John, to enable the Department of Railways to carry on Canadian business in this harbour".[73] The memorial acknowledged the ability of the I.C.R. to handle New Brunswick's lumber exports. However, the city now wanted to increase the local physical plant of the I.C.R. to enable that railway to partake of the winter port business and enhance Saint John's role in the carrying out of this function.[74] The aldermen believed that the railway property in the North End was the best place for such development. This location would give Portland a substantial stake in the railway activities of the port. In the fall of 1898, the Minister of Railways again visited Saint John, and assured the city that the Long Wharf improvements would be ready for next year's business.[75]

With the impending prospect of having its winter port function served by two railways and various steamship lines, the Common Council decided in the spring of 1899 to meet with representatives of the C.P.R., I.C.R. and the Furness Line to discuss traffic arrangements between the railways. The civic elite desired to have its physical plant maximized to the full advantage of the city, while also guaranteeing that the outside agencies utilizing the port would work harmoniously. T. G. Shaughnessy assured the delegates that when a satisfactory agreement regarding traffic arrangements was reached between the C.P.R. and the I.C.R., "the movements of the company in regard to business through Saint John would be on a greatly enlarged scale to what they had been . . ."[76] The C.P.R. desired "to give and receive from the I.C.R. at Saint John freight and passenger business, while the I.C.R. want[ed] the point of transfer to be at Montreal".[77]

The dispute between these railways resulted from the termination of a traffic agreement which the government had struck with the C.P.R. following the decision not to construct the Harvey-Salisbury section of the Short Line. As points east of Saint John were to be thus without the direct service of the Short Line, the Canadian Pacific had been given permission to solicit trade from these areas and carry it west.[78] Late in the summer of 1899, when Robert Reford of the Shipping Federation explained the steamships would not accept subsidies to come to Saint John because the Canadian

Pacific Railway threatened not to guarantee freight to the port, it appeared that the entire winter port trade would be jeopardized.[79] Although Blair had succeeded in making the I.C.R. operational out of Saint John, now it seemed to be presenting a threat to the C.P.R. and indeed the entire winter port business.[80]

Confronting Blair with the C.P.R.'s threat to send its winter freight to Boston, an anxious city delegation implored the Minister to reconsider his position.[81] Although the Minister of Railways offered no assurances to the city's representatives, the local newspapers reported the terms of the I.C.R.-C.P.R. settlement within the week.[82] The C.P.R.'s former privileges had been reduced. The new traffic agreement permitted the railway to solicit only a percentage of the business east of the city. Within hours of the announcement of the settlement, the steamships had contracted for the coming winter port season.[83] The settling of difficulties between the two railways in 1899 only temporarily ameliorated the traffic dispute. The government restoration of the I.C.R., again in 1900, stimulated the C.P.R. to protest to the City Council regarding the westward carriage of freight.[84]

In July, with the approaching winter port season still undecided, T. G. Shaughnessy came to Saint John for an interview by a combined committee of the Common Council and the Board of Trade. Mayor J. W. Daniel advised the C.P.R. officer that the city wanted the differences between the I.C.R. and C.P.R. resolved favourably in the interests of Saint John's winter port business. During the interview Alderman J. B. M. Baxter affirmed the Council's sympathy with the C.P.R., but added ". . . that any wrong on the part of the I.C.R. ought not be acted upon as a reason by the C.P.R. for withdrawing from the City . . . that assistance which was promised originally".[85] The latter part of Baxter's remark referred to Shaughnessy's renewed threat to leave Saint John and go to Boston. Mr. Shaughnessy had also told the meeting that the I.C.R. could not handle the export traffic at Saint John as it had neither the territory nor the route to do so. Shaughnessy scoffed when told that some in the city believed the C.P.R.'s threat was a bluff.[86]

Mayor Daniel wrote Laurier advising him of the meeting as well as forwarding him a copy of the interview. As Daniel viewed it, ". . . the chief claim on the part of Mr. Shaughnessy is that he thinks the government should assist him to develop this business at the Port of Saint John — a Canadian port — rather than throw difficulties in their way".[87] The Saint John Mayor urged Laurier's attention to a settlement of the question and a consideration of the city's interests in "the immense stake we have in the steady prosecution of this really national undertaking."[88] The Prime Minister responded, professing that the matter "... is engaging our most serious attention".[89]

During the federal election campaign of 1900, A. G. Blair, the Saint John Liberal candidate, asserted that he was "... no enemy of the C.P.R."[90] He referred to Shaughnessy's July interview with the Mayor, and dismissed the occasion as simply the C.P.R.'s annoyance that it had a competitor. The Minister of Railways, reminding the C.P.R. of its contractual agreements with the city, accused the railway of attempting to abrogate its responsibilities to Saint John by threatening to leave the port. Blair stated confidently that the Canadian Pacific had no intention of leaving the Port of Saint John, and was merely applying pressure for concessions in an election year.[91] Able to point to the prosperity which had come to the port with the advent of the Laurier administration, the Minister easily defeated his opponent George Foster by a comfortable majority.[92] And although one commentator has characterized the election of 1900 as "full of fury signifying nothing in particular",[93] a correspondent from the *Manchester Guardian* wrote a month later than the Saint John campaign had been one of the most interesting because "railways was the issue in Canadian politics" and in Saint John the election had been openly fought between the I.C.R. and the C.P.R.[94]

The C.P.R. continued service to Saint John, and the newspapers did not reflect any surprise at the railway's uninterrupted presence. The sincerity of Shaughnessy's threat to leave the port is questionable, particularly in light of a comment he made during the discussions in July 1900. Then he had claimed that the amount of westward freight was small but the company was concerned with the principle of the question.[95] In view of Israel Tarte's letter to Laurier on September 17th, noting that the C.P.R. was willing to consent to arbitration, the threat may well have been designed, as Blair assumed, to gain a better arrangement for the C.P.R.[96]

The traffic problems between the railways were adjusted in the summer of 1901 through a compromise by which the C.P.R. could solicit traffic along the I.C.R. destined for points west of Montreal, but the I.C.R. would continue to carry the traffic as far as Montreal.[97] Expecting increases in the export traffic, the I.C.R. terminals were used in the winter port season of 1901-1902 by the C.P.R. and a rental fee was paid to the government.[98] The resolution of this dispute in 1901 may be viewed in retrospect as a benchmark in port development. Henceforth, in the period under study, the C.P.R. made no suggestion to abandon Saint John.

By illustrating the powerlessness of the local officials to direct the affairs of the port in any meaningful way other than a reactive one, the C.P.R.-I.C.R. dispute manifested the complexity of the new business operation upon which the port's survival was predicated. Having succeeded in achieving the role of Atlantic Winter Port, the Port of Saint John was now dependent upon transportation agencies controlled from outside the city. Integrating into a national transportation system had resulted in a diminishing autonomy as well as an increasing prosperity. Within Saint John, achievement of the role of Atlantic Winter Port through the recognition of a national "export function" had been accompanied by a federal presence, an increased involvement of the aldermen in the external functions of the port, and a railways' dispute. All these developments merely illustrated that the City of Saint John, although proprietor of the local physical plant of the winter port trade, was no longer in control of the prosperity of its property.

## CHAPTER IX

# *Retaining the Position of Winter Port Within a National Transportation System 1900 - 1906*

Saint John's elite at the turn of the century perceived the newly achieved winter port status as a fragile entity. During the 1890's they acknowledged that the Port of Saint John could never expect to garner all of the Western grain trade. Since the trading wealth of Saint John depended upon the railways and steamships, it was necessary for the city to attract and retain the participation of each outside agent of prosperity. Saint John was cast in this role of supplicant in part by the contrasts within Canada between the concentrated population and financial power of the "hinterland" and the relative sparseness of the "periphery." As one geographer has observed: "The periphery, because of its involvement with the friction of distance, must devote much more of its 'economic energy' to overcoming this friction."[1]

As several of the above Chapters have indicated, this preoccupation with the "friction of distance" was manifested in the numerous attempts to secure a function for the Port of Saint John within a national transportation system.[2] Between the years 1900-1906, the city's goal was to secure an element of permanency for its recently achieved status. Hence, based on the well established perception that the local physical plant had to be maintained and improved to meet the demands of an increasing trade,[3] the city's elite assessed the position of the port within the context of its role in the national hierarchy of transport nodes. As a result there emerged by 1900, an increasing tendency to project the needs of the Port of Saint John as emanating from its status as the winter appendage to the Port of Montreal.

### Seeking Additional Facilities: The Montreal Connection

When George Robertson had journeyed to Montreal in early 1899 to meet with T. G. Shaughnessy regarding the improvement of facilities on the West Side,[4] he was visiting not only the headquarters of Canadian Pacific Railway but also the centre of Canada's export trade. Montreal figured prominently in the thought of Saint John's elite not only because of its position within the Canadian system of cities but also because Saint John's winter port season was determined by the rhythm of the St. Lawrence. Indeed, Saint John's auxiliary status was illustrated in the accentuation of its newly developed winter port role — a contrast to the previous spring and summer emphasis which had charactrized the port during the Atlantic years.[5]

In Montreal Robertson had been told in general terms that the C.P.R. would continue its efforts on behalf of the winter port business at Saint John. However, T. G. Shaughnessy did not commit the railway to any specific improvements. Instead, although concern on the part of the city persisted in regard to facilities, the I.C.R.-C.P.R. dispute absorbed much of the energies of the local elite. When this dispute had been resolved, the C.P.R. required periodic access to the I.C.R.'s terminals and facilities. As part of that railway's transport development within Saint John, it acquired control of the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company through a stock purchase in 1905.[6] This move, however, only facilitated communication within a local transport node and did not meet the requirements of an expanded trade. The local elite were convinced that this could be achieved only by increasing facilities. Thus, further representations were made to the federal government.

In February 1902, the Dominion Engineer, Louis Coste, visited Saint John and, addressing the Board of Trade, remarked that most of the grain trade would go to Montreal but that "Saint John and Halifax would get their share."[7] Upon hearing Coste's comment, Alderman Baxter claimed ". . . it appeared Saint John is at the end where it must get a shore of the development of trade and . . . it could fairly call upon the nation to assist in making this a truly national port, relieving the municipality of the burden."[8] Baxter's comment is important because it clearly articulates an underlying sentiment held by several prominent men in the city. The Alderman's observation that the city "must get a share of the development of the trade" connotes a recognition of the peripheral status of Saint John within the Canadian system of cities.

Emphasizing the national significance of the port with a view to obtaining federal aid became fairly common in city affairs.[9] In May, Blair wrote Laurier asking that the federal government support Saint John's request for substantial assistance to construct a dry dock. In doing so, the Minister of Railways stressed the national significance of such an undertaking.[10] Shortly thereafter, the Common Council passed a resolution requesting the Dominion Government to make the necessary improvements at the port as "trade is a matter of national rather than local concern."[11] Hence, 1902 marks the year in which the city formally sought greater financial aid from the government for harbour facilities. As one contemporary had noted earlier: "Having proved their claim respecting the merits of the port, and made a very large expenditure in providing needful harbour works, the citizens feel that in the prosecution of what is, in a very important sense, a national enterprise, they deserve something more than the moral support of the country at large."[12]

When Israel Tarte returned in mid-August to inspect the existing facilities, he complimented the city on its patriotism. Offering more than praise, Tarte directed his assistant to prepare plans for a new wharf to be built at government expense at Sand Point on the West Side. Upon completion of the business end of the day, the Minister of Public Works was feted at a banquet. Addressing the local politicians and businessmen, Tarte observed: "Montreal must be the outlet in the summer and Saint John in the winter of the produce of the teeming West."[13] Undoubtedly his speech was received with enthusiasm by his listeners.

By early 1903, the City Council had reached a decisive turning point in the quest for assistance in harbour matters. Mayor W. W. White summed up the situation in a talk before a local trade group.[14] Probably the recent C.P.R. announcement that it would make no more improvements in the harbour was still in the Mayor's mind when he spoke to the gathering.[15] Stating that the C.P.R. would not and the city could not do any more for the harbour, the Mayor could only foresee some plan which would give Ottawa control of the port in return for facilities. Hence, White wanted to see the institution of a harbour commission for the West Side.[16]

In July 1903, the resignation of A. G. Blair from the cabinet left Saint John without the services of an influential voice in federal affairs.[17] Blair's increased interest in port affairs, manifested after the resolution of the I.C.R.-C.P.R. dispute, was the major reason his absence from the cabinet caused concern. Together with Tarte's departure from the Department of Public Works in late 1902, the port remained without the benefit of direct participation from any federal minister until William Pugsley joined the cabinet in 1907. In the meantime, the city continued to press for federal assistance, substantiating its demands, by presenting the role of the port as a winter appendage to Montreal, and thereby further securing its position with the national transportation system.

## Reciprocating Initiatives: The Transportation Commission's Report

With Blair and the federal scene still attracting considerable attention, the Common Council persisted in its attempt to convince the government that new facilities would have to be constructed by the Dominion. Consequently at a public meeting held in November a resolution passed ". . . asking the Federal Government to grant money to provide additional wharves and facilities at Saint John."[18]

The majority of the speakers argued that Ottawa should do for Saint John what was being done for Montreal. George Robertson, then serving as a member of the Provincial Legislature, reminded his audience that in building up the facilities at Montreal, the government had spent money "on Government works owned by the Government."[19] Robertson's remark focused the problem in Saint John: the city owned the wharves on the West Side but could not afford to undertake the necessary public works involved in increasing the facilities. The government, on the other hand, could not be expected to give fedral money for the construction of works belonging to the Corporation of the City of Saint John.

Determined to negotiate a plan for harbour construction including federal and C.P.R. aid, the city sent Hurd Peters, a city engineer since 1863, to Montreal.[20] There, discussing with the C.P.R. a proposal constituting a three-way participation by the city, the railway, and the government, Peters explained that Ottawa would be asked to finance the dredging while the city would construct the wharves. Under this plan the C.P.R. would pay a rental fee for the facilities.[21] By late 1903, the Canadian Pacific announced its support of the proposal which implicitly had absolved it of any construction responsibilities in connection with the agreements of the 1890's.[22]

Several months earlier a Transportation Commission had been appointed to investigate "... questions affecting the transportation of Canadian products to the markets of the world through and by Canadian Ports . . ."[23] The Commission's January 1904 interim report on Saint John stated "... the evidence ... proves the wharf space is inadequate for even the present traffic and that more accommodation is urgently needed."[24] This observation essentially concurred with previously expressed opinions of the Common Council and the Board of Trade. Commenting on the negotiations under way among the federal government, the city and the C.P.R., the Commissioners recommended that the Dominion carry out the necessary dredging but stipulated that the city should seek the approval of the government before it "... sells, leases or alienates in any way harbour frontages . . ."[25] This provision gave the government a voice in the harbour of Saint John.

Having secured the services of a federal dredge — thus involving a diminution in local autonomy — the Common Council proceeded to draw up the terms of the three-way agreement. In May 1904, the city forwarded the agreement to the C.P.R.[26] However, the city demanded that the C.P.R. return the 1,600-foot strip of harbour frontage which had been granted to it in the 1893 agreement.[27] The Company was reluctant to agree to this. Upon further negotiations Mayor White concluded that the city and the C.P.R. could not achieve a compromise.[28] In October, the Mayor announced that the city would resume control of the Sand Point Berths. In effect, since the C.P.R. would not relinquish the 1,600-foot strip, the city decided to terminate the 1898 agreement which had given the railway exclusive management of the Sand Point area during the winter season.[29] At least one local editor favoured this action as it meant city control of the berths would enable the aldermen to "... urge upon the Dominion Government the wisdom and necessity of nationalizing Saint John ..."[30]

The federal election of 1904 served as a temporary distraction from the harbour facilities question but, of course, not from the harbour. Campaigning on behalf of the Conservative candidate, Robert L. Borden visited the city, and declared himself in favour of nationalization of the port.[31] In the Liberal camp, Blair's resignation in 1903 sustained the disarray manifested in the bickering between the local Liberal newspapers. On the morning of November 3rd, the *Telegraph* advised its readers to vote for Dr. J. W. Daniel, the Conservative.[32] The latter's victory is not too surprising as he had won the previous February by-election thus replacing Blair who had resigned from Parliament. Referring to Daniel's February victory, H. R. Emmerson had asserted that the Opposition press dwelled on local issues. In fact, in Emmerson's opinion such a tactic was irresistible in "... a city like Saint John where the winter port view overshadows everything else."[33] Emmerson's explanation of the Conservative by-election victory is easily applicable to the results of the federal election. Despite the general level of prosperity, Blair's defection from the government coupled with the lack of an influential cabinet member advancing the cause of the port, had made it virtually impossible for the Liberals to recover in 1904.[34]

Meanwhile having given notice to the C.P.R. that it would resume control of the Sand Point berths following the conclusion of the current winter port season (1904-1905), the City Council renewed its efforts to secure another arrangement for the port. On March 6, 1905 the aldermen decided to reopen discussions between the city and the federal government to determine "what they may be willing to do by nationalizing this port and otherwise in furnishing increased facilities for the accommodation of national and international business through the harbour of Saint John."[35]

The proposed 1904 agreement involving the city, the C.P.R. and the government had been thwarted due to the disagreement between the first two arising from the 1893 contract. Mayor White and a delegation thus planned a trip to Ottawa to gain the services of a Dominion dredge. They wished to again discuss the possibility with both railway and federal officials of having another berth constructed at Sand Point for the coming 1905-1906 season.[36] White succeeded in committing the government to dredge the harbour in preparation for a new wharf which the city would construct.[37] At Montreal the delegates persuaded the steamship companies to pay a tonnage charge on export and import freight.[38] Since 1897 the city had charged no top or side wharfage on the trade from the West at the Sand Point berths. Now, according to Samuel Schofield, a Saint John steamship agent, ". . . a moderate charge would not hurt the trade or drive steamers away."[39]

In the summer of 1905 the Transportation Commissioners arrived in Saint John and were given a tour of the West Side wharf area. To many this return visit centred ". . . attention upon the one great feature of the general question before them, namely the handling of winter freight."[40] Meeting with the Commissioners, the Mayor contended that a primary need of the city was ". . . the opening of negotiations to make Saint John a national harbour."[41] The Common Council was supported in this stand by a prominent member of the Board of Trade, H. B. Schofield, who wanted to ". . . impress on the Commission that Saint John is practically a part of Montreal.[42] He echoed an opinion held by politicians and businessmen alike — that Saint John's transportation facilities were an adjunct to those of Montreal. This view had been expressed also by Israel Tarte when he was Minister of Public Works.[43]

In December 1905, when the Transportation Commission submitted its final Report to the Minister of Public Works, Charles Hyman, Saint John was among the thirteen ports recommended to be nationalized.[44] The Transportation Report was welcomed in the city by those who believed that dealing with the C.P.R. would be less difficult now that Saint John's national importance had been formally recognized by a national commission.[45]

Having actively sought to obtain financial aid from the federal government since 1902, the city now redoubled its efforts. In May, Edward Sears, a municipal politician long associated with the city and now its re-elected Mayor, suggested to his colleagues that the city draw up a definite plan to test Ottawa's commitment to the Port of Saint John. In regard to the nationalizing of ports, the Mayor declared "it would seem that sentiment must yield to practical and urgent necessity."[46]

Earlier in the year George Robertson, still a member of the local legislature, delivered a speech on the shipping history of the Port. Observing that he was "pleased" about the Transportation Commission's position recommending "our port among others for nationalization," Robertson added: "that Saint John made the winter port and that the winter port made Saint John."[47] For George Robertson the turning point in the history of the port had been 1876.[48] From that time until the mid-1890's the future of the port had been uncertain. Now, however, the position of the port was secure, and had been made so by the prospect of nationalization. This would formalize at a political and administrative level the integration of the port into a Canadian transport system — an integration which Robertson had been instrumental in initiating at the economic and financial level.

Echoing both Robertson's sentiment and that expressed by the Mayor on behalf of the City Council, Sir Thomas Shaughnessy declared while on a visit to Quebec that "under the present conditions Saint John is the only possible winter port [because] it gives the shortest railway haul."[49] Substantiating his position the C.P.R. executive remarked "no transportation man . . . would haul his freight the extra distance by rail if he could take it without risk by water."[50] Shaughnessy was not merely paraphrasing an opinion long held by Saint John spokesmen who advocated their city over Halifax. He was indeed uttering a commonly held opinion in transport circles both then and later — that "on a cost basis hauling a ton of goods a hundred miles on land was equal to hauling it hundreds of miles at sea."[51] The local Liberal newspaper, the *Telegraph*, dutifully reported Shaughnessy's comments, and its editor chose to ignore the C.P.R. executive's veiled threat to leave Saint John during the I.C.R.-C.P.R. traffic dispute.[52] Despite the political shading of the *Telegraph*, for it as well as others within Saint John, the development of the city's advantages as a distributing port had become "a settled policy" in the early 1890's.[53] Responding to the question of whether or not funds should be expended for the encouragement of factories or wharves, that newspaper accurately observed in 1903, "Ten years ago [Saint John] entered upon a course of action with the determination to make . . . [the City] the winter freight port of Canada."[54] By 1906 as the comments of Robertson and Shaughnessy indicate, it appeared that the "settled policy" had resulted in recognition of the port's role as a distributing centre by individuals involved in transport from within and outside the local area. Nonetheless, several prominent men from Saint John, including George Robertson, had embarked on another avenue designed both to insure the city's position of winter port within a national transportation system and capitalize on that function by developing a manufacturing enterprise which would at once enhance the winter port status and provide greater employment opportunities within the city.

## Encouraging Factories or Wharves: Shipbuilding as a Solution

It will be recalled that in both the 1870's and 1880's dry docks were widely touted as offering a means of both diversifying and recapturing part of the shipbuilding prosperity of an earlier era. It was mentioned also that several prospective dock builders, notably J. D. Leary of New York, engaged in serious negotiations with the city in the late 1880's regarding the specifications of particular proposals. The rejection of Leary's dry dock plans coincided with the beginning of the long C.P.R.-Saint John transport association.[55] And, as noted in Chapter VII, the dry dock matter had diminished somewhat in importance when it became apparent that the C.P.R. was interested in the port. Hence, in the late 1880's and early 1890's the dry dock question seemed to be a holdover from the past when measured against the prospects of a developing grain-railway port. By the turn of the century when it appeared that Saint John had achieved recognition as Canada's winter port, the dry dock regained popularity. In the context of the city's winter port status, it was not viewed as an anachronism. Instead, the most active campaigner on the merits of such enterprises, George Robertson, spoke encouragingly of it as a harbinger of an iron shipbuilding industry.

It is more than coincidental that Robertson chose the same Common Council meeting at which the April 1898 C.P.R. agreement had been approved to initially outline his hopes and plans for a dry dock.[56] Reflecting on the growth of the winter port business, Robertson argued the time had arrived for some judicious boosting in Great Britain of the port's advantages. Such publicity, he believed, might induce the Imperial Government "to come to our assistance" in the dry dock matter.[57] Completing his fourth term as Mayor and having chosen not to re-offer, Robertson claimed a desire to use his remaining weeks in office by undertaking an important mission for the port and city.

Ten days later, supported by most of the Council colleagues and the Board of Trade, the Mayor departed on the Beaver Line *Lake Superior* from Sand Point on the West Side.[58] Robertson had been instrumental both in gaining the services of the Beaver Lines to the port and in the construction of the Sand Point facilities. Departure from the latter in itself symbolized not only the degree of harbour development which had occured since the late 1880's but also demonstrated the new spatial relationships within the waterfront. Previously, overseas departures had been made from the East Side at Reed's Point.[59] National integration, however, and subsequent West Side improvements had resulted in a transfer of that function to Carleton.

Four months later, Robertson returned with, he claimed, a favourable response from the British Admiralty. Although no longer a civic official, his trip had been largely funded by the city, and so he made a formal report to the Council on 8 August 1898.[60] Focusing on the single most important reason for his trip — the dry dock — he pointed out that every port of consequence which he had visited while in Great Britain possessed such a facility. He added that the absence of such rendered a port, in British opinion, ill-equipped "for modern commerce."[61] From this premise he implied that Saint John had to construct a dry dock and then proceed to iron shipbuilding paralleling the development along the Clyde in Glasgow. Concluding, Robertson presented a view of an iron shipbuilding industry in Saint John reinforcing the current level of attainment which the port had achieved through its winter port status and employing a "vast army of mechanics and skilled artisans."[62] All of this awaited the construction of a dry dock which, of course, needed financial assistance from the city. Mayor Sears who had been elected that spring to his first term in office, congratulated Robertson, and confidently predicted that the city would submit "something tangible."[63]

Addressing a Board of Trade meeting, George Robertson spoke enthusiastically of a dry dock. He pointed out that the British Admiralty was willing to give £2,000 per year for 20 years to a company undertaking the construction of a dock capable of handling its largest warship. He reminded the business elite of the Dominion's existing commitment of $10,000 a year and the Province's promise of $2,500 a year for twenty years. Robertson himself offered to float a company if the city would give him a free site, a tax exemption and a $2,500 subsidy for forty years. The Board of Trade voted to assist him in this goal,[64] as Robertson pointed out that it would take $1,000,000 for such a project, and he doubted it was wise for the city "to undertake the management of this great work."[65]

In September, the City Council granted $2,500 per annum for twenty years to Robertson on condition that he "organizes a sound company and completes the dock to the satisfaction of the Council . . ."[66] The former Mayor was also to receive a site from property belonging to the city. Most of the aldermen who spoke were in favour of the motion. While the terms appeared generous from the Council's point of view, Robertson hoped the city would extend the subsidy to cover the forty-year period.[67] So enthusiastic about the prospect were the aldermen that Robertson's request was approved.[68] With the support of the city, Robertson went immediately to Ottawa for discussions with A. G. Blair and W. S. Fielding. Robertson was encouraged by their reactions, and claimed he would be organizing his company and securing the services of an engineer by November.[69]

In the summer of 1899, tests were made at several sites to determine the most suitable locality for the proposed dry dock. By August it appeared that the Mill Pond on the West Side would be chosen because of its easy approach, accessibility to the railways, and its city ownership.[70] In mid-December, 1899 the Council voted that the West Side site be granted.[71] Early in 1900 after achieving an understanding between the city and his new firm — the Imperial Dry Dock Company[72] — Robertson departed for England to begin soliciting funds for the dry dock.[73]

For more than a year little was reported on the Robertson project. Then in August 1901, John H. Kennedy, the chief engineer of the Montreal Harbour Commissioners, inspected the proposed site with George Robertson. Kennedy declared the natural facilities contained on the West Side "equal to any he ever saw . . ."[74] Robertson assured a reporter "you may say for me that the Saint John dry dock is an assured fact."[75] But in the fall the Common Council listened to Alderman Maxwell's report on his meeting with Robertson; they learned that the company had abandoned any hope of receiving an Imperial Government subsidy. However, as Robertson had scaled down his original proposal accordingly, he continued to believe that such a facility could be constructed for $800,000 instead of a possible $1,250,000.[76] The original subsidy offered by the city had been based on a concrete construction, but the absence of Imperial funding and necessary re-assessing of the work introduced the prospect of a wooden facility. For the aldermen the only remaining question concerned the appropriate material for construction: concrete or wood. Before deciding which material to endorse, the aldermen believed a committee should proceed from the city to inspect dry docks already existing.[77]

Several Atlantic coast cities were visited by two aldermen and the city's Director of Public Works, R. H. Cushing. They were accompanied by George Robertson and John H. Thomson, a prominent Saint John steamship owner and agent.[78] Following visits to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Newport News (Virginia) and the Brooklyn Navy Yard to determine the advantages of wooden *versus* concrete dry docks, the Saint John group returned just before Christmas Eve, 1901.

Early in January the dry dock committee met with the aldermen and recommended that the dock be built of wood "with an entrance of concrete and granite." The committee believed it would cost $800,000 to complete, and emphasized the importance of the dry dock project for achieving greater industrial growth. Newport News, they pointed out, "a scattered village, on what might be called a barren marsh has been built up to a large and prosperous city with a great shipbuilding plant and 8,000 men employed."[79] Such a growth, they argued, had been launched with the construction of a dry dock.

In February, the aldermen voted that the Imperial Dry Dock Company be granted "a free site and upon completion of the dock .

. . the sum of $2,500 per year for forty years and exempt the dock, sites and repair plant from all taxes and water rates for the same term . . ."[80] The Dominion Engineer, Louis Coste, had drawn up the plans in terms of a projected cost of $800,000. Since the Council believed that it had made a liberal contribution towards assisting a project having local and national implications, there was a desire among the aldermen to press the Dominion Government for the most generous grant possible.[81]

When the Saint John delegates visited Ottawa in early March, A. G. Blair "promised . . . to assist [in getting] . . . a subsidy for the dry dock."[82] Meeting with Prime Minister Laurier and several cabinet members, George Robertson asked that the Dominion guarantee the interest on a dock costing between $800,000 to $1,000,000. The terms, as outlined by Robertson, involved three per cent for twenty years which based on the proposed principal could range from $24,000 to $30,000 annually.[83] Despite the entreaties of the delegates and the support from local newspapers, however, the supplementaries respecting dry docks outlined by Israel Tarte early in May revealed that Robertson's request for three per cent was not to be granted. Instead, Mr. Tarte reportedly outlined the government's current legislation providing for two per cent, "and he hoped that Mr. Robertson of Saint John would be able to take advantage of that and build dry docks."[84] Although disappointed Robertson did not cease in his efforts. To a local reporter in November he reiterated the promise of support from the Province and the city, but added the enterprise could not proceed in the absence of a government subsidy of three per cent for twenty years.[85] The following spring Robertson received word from A. G. Blair that an Order-in-Council had been passed giving the terms requested by the Imperial Dry Dock Company for construction of a dock.[86]

By November, the Provincial Government passed an Order-in-Council making it possible for the Dry Dock Company to secure government aid for the construction.[87] Before tenders could be called, however, the C.P.R. raised some questions regarding the possible disruption of its Union Street tracks through the dry dock construction.[88] The C.P.R. at this time, of course, was also involved in continuing negotiation with the city regarding wharf extension, railway expansion and the general improvement of its West Side terminus. Its objection to the southerly boundary of the dry dock site was sufficient to cause a further delay in Robertson's plans. As the discussions above regarding the seeking of additional facilities and the outcome of the Transportation Commission's Report illustrate, throughout the initial years of this century the city was anxious to secure its position within a national transportation network. Thus, while desiring that the dry dock be completed there was genuine concern not to disrupt the more important linkages being secured through outside agencies.[89] The dry dock project in early 1904 was held in abeyance until what was perceived as more important for the development of the port had been achieved.

By late 1905 the city and the C.P.R. had settled their current round of negotiations. So prosperous was the winter port trade that the city had sent a certified cheque to the C.P.R.'s treasurer at Montreal terminating the agreement relative to Berths 3 and 4 at Sand Point under which the railway had been granted a wharfage exemption in the late 1890's to help in the encouragement of the trade.[90] As noted above, under the terms of the agreement signed in 1898 the city could terminate the free wharfage privileges and return the appropriate sum.[91] In addition to this alteration in city-C.P.R. relations, the Transportation Commission recommended that the port be included within a nationalization scheme. These events progressed simultaneously with the dry dock development, although the latter almost always represented a secondary item on any Council agenda which included C.P.R. business.

In mid-March 1906, the dry dock matter again emerged at a Council meeting.[92] Although two years had elapsed since it had been discussed in Council, Robertson had been busy attempting — unsuccessfully — to secure further aid.[93] Attempting to surmount a major difficulty in the dry dock matter, City Council decided to change the dry dock subsidy to twenty years at $5,000 per annum. In this way Robertson would have access to more capital. Indicating the stage which the matter had reached, the resolution altering the form of the city's contribution included a fixed date within which the work must begin. Moreover, the city was to repossess the site granted, if the work had not commenced.[94] In the fall a boundary difficulty regarding the proposed works was solved, and expropriation was to begin in November.[95]

Construction of such a facility would again be postponed and reintroduced within the context of nationalizing the port.[96] However, the willingness of the Common Council to secure an industry which would at once re-emphasize the winter port function of the city and eventually, it was believed, lead to a labour intensive shipbuilding industry, was demonstrated by its agreement to alter its financial contribution to the project.

So protracted had been the dry dock discussions and the parallel question of the city's responsibility in attracting industry through financial assistance that the Board of Trade at its annual meeting in late 1905 introduced the notion of tax exemption for new industries. Addressing the business elite, H. B. Schofield,[97] President of the Board, remarked that the Executive Council of the organization "has promptly appointed a vigorous committee for the purpose of interesting new industries, in our claim to be one of the cheapest manufacturing centres in the Dominion, by reason of our open Port . . . giving easy access to the markets and exporting the products and manufactured goods of the country".[98] For Schofield, at least, the city's future as a manufacturing centre was predicated on its asset as a distribution centre. Although the lumber industry in New Brunswick had not done well,[99] the winter port business resulted in $250,000 to $300,000 being "disbursed by the steamers" calling at Saint John.[100] J. A. Likely (currently between terms as an alderman) suggested that consideration should be given to exempting new industries from taxation, as the Common Council was doing for the Imperial Dry Dock Company.

Likely's suggestion was supported by his business associates when he moved "that . . . all new industries that could be induced to locate in the City should be exempt from City taxes for a period not exceeding ten years, provided such industry does not compete with any other industry of the same kind now established here."[101] To which T. S. Simms, the brush manufacturer, added: "The Winter Port was undoubtedly a great benefit, but he questioned if another good factory giving employment to two hundred men would not bring equal prosperity."[102]

In his advocacy of a dry dock facility, George Robertson had agreed implicitly with the sentiment expressed by Simms. Each man recognized the importance of the winter port function. Eight years earlier, however, Robertson had been convinced that this function was well enough established to encourage the development of supportive industries giving employment. For Robertson, therefore, the hoped-for-dry dock complex eventually leading to a shipbuilding plant was both an extension of the winter port function and an introduction of a new industry.

In the years between 1900-1906 the city had associated its winter port development with the trade of Montreal. As a result, in developing a strategy for securing facilities the civic and business elite had couched the negotiating tone within the context of Saint John's subsidiary relationship to the most important Canadian port. The associated status which the Port and City of Saint John derived from this link had strengthened its winter port position. Indeed the Transportation Commission's Report had acknowledged the reciprocal nature of this relationship by including the Port of Saint John among those suggested as integral to a national transport system. The dry dock scheme was a locally conceived project which, while demonstrating the perceived necessity of creating employment within the city, more importantly illustrated the significance of the winter port as the basis upon which the prosperity of the whole city depended. Each of these developments, however, merely underlined the frustration experienced by one centre on the "periphery" as it struggled to retain its recently achieved position of winter port within a national transportation system.

# CHAPTER X

## *The Emergence of a National Port: Effects of the Process of Integration, 1906-1911*

During the "Atlantic Years," 1867-1879, when Saint John was oriented towards the transatlantic and coastal trade, the city and port were characterized by the close affiliation existing between the local elite and the trading pulse of the waterfront. In the transitional period, 1879-1895, this equilibrium of a previous technological *and* organizational era had been disrupted. Although the earlier close affiliation between the elite and port-related trade continued, the increasing influence of outside agencies came to play a more significant role in altering the external functions of the port. As a result of these developments, the elite of the city sought a means of re-establishing the port and city within the emerging new technological and political order. Both of these emphasized a greater scale of organization than that which had characterized the earlier period. By the late 1880's and early 1890's the direction of port participation in an altered transportation system had been established. From 1895 to 1906 the contours of a national port increasingly became visible.[1] In the years between 1906 and 1911, some of the effects of this process of integration could be discerned in city-federal relations and within the waterfront labour situation. Moreover, since the physical focus of these two was the West Side, the process of integration into an externally based system had helped to alter internal transport relationships within the city, and this was manifested in the bridge issue.

The platform from which the city launched its demands regarding the port focused upon the perceived appendage status joining Saint John with the Port of Montreal.[2] This framework at once recognized Montreal's pivotal position as the central Canadian city most accessible to the largest ships afloat and Saint John's position as the East Coast Canadian city possessing the shortest railway distance from its Quebec transport ally.

No doubt, in part at least, the elite of Saint John could justly congratulate itself in December 1905 when the Transportation Commission submitted its final report. Their city had been among the thirteen ports recommended for nationalization. Encouraged by this recognition which appeared to have justified the financial sacrifices made by the city since the 1890's, the aldermen pressed Ottawa for some concrete example of this symbolic recognition.

They were rewarded with the federal government's decision to renew the dredging contract at Sand Point in September 1906.[3]

Although the federal government was receptive to suggestions involving dredging, the Common Council, particularly in light of the Transportation Commission Report, continued to think in more expansive terms. Early in 1907 the treasury committee of the Common Council recommended that the city-owned harbour properties be transferred to the government "on our |the City| receiving a sum equal to the bonds that have already been redeemed and also an annual payment to provide for interest and sinking fund on the outstanding bonds."[4] Another delegation made the familiar trip to Ottawa hoping to arrive at some solution which would enable Saint John to cope financially with the expenses and demands of a port being supported by a local community and yet, serving a national community.[5] Meeting with the Prime Minister, the delegates were assured of continued dredging support; however in regard to more general expenses, Laurier could only offer the possibility of lending the city money to carry on with the construction improvements.[6] Further significant negotiations between the city and the federal government would await the appointment of William Pugsley as Minister of Public Works.

## Formalizing the Integration: William Pugsley and the Agreement of 1911

Not since Andrew Blair's resignation in 1903 from the federal cabinet had Saint John a representative who could present its case to this influential audience. Blair had resigned over the Grand Trunk Pacific affair,[7] after which Saint John had petitioned the Prime Minister alerting him to the "danger of |diverting| . . . the trade . . . of Canada to the foreign centres . . ."[8] In the years between 1903-1911, the Common Council, Board of Trade and press vacillated between praise of, and ambivalence towards, this project which proposed a railway between Moncton and Winnipeg. Even though the city tried to get "its way"[9] with the construction of the Saint John and Quebec Railway (the Valley Line) — a railroad designed to link Saint John and Grand Falls, N.B. — the Grand Trunk Pacific scheme or National Transcontinental as its eastern section was called, was never to approximate the role played by the C.P.R. within the port. Consequently, throughout the years 1905-1911 while the projected railway did receive attention, it occupied a secondary position to the negotiations commenced with the arrival of William Pugsley in 1907.

William Pugsley entered Parliament in May 1907, becoming Minister of Public Works in August of that year.[10] Interviewing Pugsley in mid-November, the city's Board of Works learned that a scheme was under consideration in Ottawa by which the federal government would build the necessary wharves and then turn them over to the city. Under this plan, the site would become government property, but the city would be responsible for regular maintenance expenses derived from the wharfage income. Favouring this idea and cognizant of the city's nearly five million-dollar bonded debt, the aldermen, at Pugsley's suggestion, decided to open negotiations with the government.[11]

Subsequently, in February 1908, Pugsley and the West Side improvements committee discussed the deed which would convey to the federal government the South Rodney wharves.[12] Not until May when the City Recorder went to Ottawa was it discovered that the government had been reconsidering the South Rodney wharves transfer. Reportedly, the Minister of Public Works now favoured government control of the Sand Point area.[13] In general, the Common Council and the Board of Trade were open to any suggestion which would alleviate the financial burden of the harbour. Published accounts reported that the discussions in Ottawa touched the possibility of placing the West Side of the harbour in commission. Such a scheme, if approved, would result in the city receiving repayment of all its investment in the winter port facilities.

On June 12, 1908, the *Sun* headlined "commission approved for Saint John harbour."[14] The delegation consisting of Mayor Thomas Bullock,[15] Aldermen Frink, Elkin and Baxter, together with H. B. Schofield of the Board of Trade, had discussed the matter thoroughly with Pugsley. The terms of the transfer were acceptable to the city. Most important, the city would receive payment for its previous expenditures on the West Side. Referring to a 1600-foot strip of harbour frontage which the C.P.R. controlled, it was reported that the city and the government agreed to cooperate in inducing the C.P.R. to relinquish the area.[16]

Upon returning home, Alderman Baxter affirmed ". . . the present occasion was the first time in a generation that a proposal had come before the Council for a harbour commission in a form which gave a chance of its being adopted."[17] Less than two weeks after the Ottawa trip, the city forwarded to Pugsley a proposed bill to establish a harbour commission at Saint John.[18] Alderman Baxter, chairman of the city treasury committee and a key figure at Council, believed, from the trend of the negotiations, that a transfer of the properties could occur within two years.[19] In fact, the city was three years away from any transfer, and when it finally occurred it was a compromise measure.

Federal elections held in Saint John since 1896 had served to rivet attention on port affairs. The election of 1908 provided no exception. In September, while speaking to a local gathering, Louis Coste, a Dominion engineer and a familiar visitor to the city, advised his audience that Saint John offered the best opportunities on the Canadian Atlantic coast for the handling of freight. Disregarding for a moment the election ring of the remarks, Coste's listeners could not deny the visible efforts of the Minister of Public Works for the Port of Saint John. The city sent two strong port men to Ottawa in 1908. William Pugsley, a Liberal, was elected from the City and County of Saint John, while J. W. Daniel, a Conservative, was re-elected to represent the City of Saint John.[20] Although they represented different parties, each shared a commitment to the well being of his port and city.[21]

Pugsley immediately directed his attention to the harbour commission question. Meeting the city Board of Works committee, the Minister suggested that the Council prepare a bill which would put the entire harbour in commission. Explaining the reason for this change, Pugsley said some members of the cabinet had wondered why the July 1908 proposal limited the commission only to the West Side. Pugsley claimed to have responded that the emphasis on the West Side had been made to reflect the "national rather than local" character of the business conducted in that area. However, he now believed that the proposed Courtenay Bay development, which included the Grand Trunk Pacific scheme, altered the situation. Thus, he favoured placing the entire harbour in commission. According to Pugsley, preparing a bill which would encompass the entire harbour would allow the government to study the alternative proposals.[22] Accepting the Minister's advice, the aldermen drew up another bill.[23] Meanwhile, Pugsley committed his Department to the extension of the Sand Point wharf by entering a contract with D. C. Clark, a local builder.[24]

While the city was attempting to transfer the harbour to the federal government, the C.P.R. was venturing to solidify its position on the West Side. In June 1908, when the delegates had travelled to Ottawa, they had also met with Mr. D. McNicoll, the Vice President of the C.P.R.[25] McNicoll wanted assurance that the railway would still be allowed to expand its rail yard facilities, and that excessive rates for shunting cars would not be charged under a commission form of administration.[26] Now with a harbour commission scheme appearing imminent, the C.P.R. offered to relinquish control of the 1600-foot harbour frontage acquired from the city in a previous agreement.[27]

The Minister of Public Works advised the city to cooperate with the C.P.R. in its request.[28] This advice suited neither the Common Council nor the Board of Trade, both of which distrusted the C.P.R. Viewing their suspicion as unfounded, Pugsley urged the city not to delay the proposed harbour improvements until a commission was appointed. Consequently at the Common Council meeting of February 1st 1909, the Mayor as Chairman of the harbour facilities committee recommended that a delegation visit Pugsley in Ottawa ". . . in order to get a better idea of the Government's intentions . . ."[29]

Meeting also with the C.P.R. in regard to the 1600-foot harbour frontage the delegates learned that the railway wished to gain exclusive control of the rail yard facilities. Mr. T. H. Estabrooks,[30] an influential member of the Board of Trade, favoured the C.P.R. proposal if it was sanctioned by the Minister of Public Works.[31] The Common Council apparently concurred in the view expressed by Estabrooks because on March 1st it recommended that —

> . . . Council do favorably consider the transfer by the City to the Crown of the portion of land asked for by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company upon the Canadian Pacific Railway at the same time conveying to the Crown the 1600 foot of property on the Harbour Front acquired by it . . . and the Crown transferring to the City the wharf property of the Canadian Pacific Railway which lies southward of Berth No. 1 . . .[32]

During the meeting Alderman Baxter reminded the Council that the delegates had been sent to Ottawa to get more information on the harbour commission scheme but instead all discussion was centring on the C.P.R. land transfer.[33] Baxter had raised a legitimate point. His objection was partially answered in May when Mayor Bullock, delivering his inaugural address, mentioned that the government ". . . does not seem desirous of taking over our harbour or a portion thereof since the net earnings are much less than the interest charges."[34] Bullock asserted "nothing will suffer if the matter of Harbour Commission stands over for the present, and we are content to know that the government's fixed policy is to annually appropriate a large sum of money for dredging and wharf construction in the harbour."[35] This statement contained the first confirmation that the government was hesitating on the proposed harbour commission scheme.

In September, Bullock reported to the Council that the Minister of Public Works "would be glad to submit the matter of a harbour commission to the Cabinet if he could assure them there would be no deficit."[36] The Common Council *Papers* contain no exchange of letters between Pugsley and the Mayor on this question. However, it appears that Pugsley urged acceptance of the C.P.R.'s land offer because that proposal would enable the federal government to gain control of a substantial portion of the harbourfront. Hence, the Minister could proceed with his plans for extensive development south of the C.P.R. wharf. As well, the railway could afford to transfer the 1600-foot harbour frontage in return for a less valuable piece of property because the government was assuming responsibility for the wharf construction which the city had often attempted to have the C.P.R. undertake.

Following the disclosure in September 1909 that the federal government would not participate in a harbour commission scheme, the land transfer question entered a new phase. At a lengthy meeting of the city Board of Works in June 1910, Alderman Baxter again reiterated his objections to transfering the rail yard property to the C.P.R. Arguing that the city could not be sure of the C.P.R.'s commitment in developing the area, Baxter suggested the railway would hold it for years as it had done with the 1600-foot strip, which it was now proposing to return. James Frink, newly elected Mayor of Saint John, countered Baxter's objections noting that he had been assured by Mr. McNicoll that the company fully intended to develop the land. In Frink's opinion the endorsement of the transfer by the Minister of Public Works provided ample assurance for the city.[37]

By February 1911, the Council had adopted a land transfer agreement which the C.P.R. claimed it could not accept. The railway found unsatisfactory a provision which implied that it would have to begin improvements immediately.[38] During the spring, Mayor Frink, anxious for the transfer to be processed, arranged a compromise between the city and the C.P.R. in which the railway would develop the land acquired within ten years of the date by which the government had completed its work.[39] This arrangement satisfied the dissidents on the Council who had insisted on some way of guaranteeing the C.P.R.'s commitment.

The final papers were signed in September 1911. Involving the city, the C.P.R. and the federal government, this agreement resulted in the city yielding to the C.P.R. a parcel of land to be used for railway purposes, the C.P.R. returning to the city a 1600-foot harbourfrontage acquired in 1893, and the city subsequently transferring to the federal government the necessary harbour front on which to construct docks and piers required to handle the trade of the port.[40] Thus, the C.P.R. could expand its freight rail yards; the city, while still maintaining the old West Side facilities, would no longer have to incur further debt in the construction of wharves south of Berth No. 1, on the West Side; and the federal government acquired a substantial piece of harbour frontage by simply committing itself to constructing additional wharves.[41] For the Port and City of Saint John the tri-partite agreement formalized the integration of it as a local transport node into a national transportation system. Paralleling this integration, however, was the relinquishing of control over the West Side — a process which would culminate in the port nationalization scheme of 1927.[42] By 1911, interaction between the local elite and outside agencies — the federal government and the C.P.R. — had resulted in the formalization of a relationship focusing on transportation and re-affirming the subsidiary role of the local elite in future decisions involving the prosperity of the port.

Similarly as the tri-partite agreement at once illustrated the increasing scale of organization within Canada and the diminishing font of local control, so also did the altering strike pattern among waterfront workers reflect the newer transportation system of which the port was a part.

## Waterfront Labour as an Index of Change in the Process of Integration

In a series of articles commemorating its fiftieth anniversary, the *Globe* noted in 1911 that longshoremen "... are as essential today as they were fifty years ago."[43] That statement underlined not only the persistence of an occupational activity within the city, but also the economically critical role which the port continued to play nearly one-half century after Confederation. Of equal importance, however, were the changes in the relationship between the longshoremen, or ship labourers as they were frequently known, and the rhythm of the port. Indeed the years 1867-1911, and especially 1895-1911, when viewed through the ship labourers' experience, once again mirrored the new basis of the externally-dominated winter port prosperity.

During the 1860's and 1870's, ship labourers routinely gathered at Tisdale's Corner (Water Street and South Market Wharf) off the Market Square to learn of immediate employment available on incoming or outgoing vessels.[44] Their working season, reflecting the rhythm of the Atlantic years, was concentrated largely in spring and summer — commencing after the spring freshet and ending in mid- to late fall.[45] Then, the city's prosperity focused upon lumber and shipbuilding, and the sundry activities associated with these industries. The ship labourers worked largely on the East Side of the harbour almost exclusively for local merchants. Every aspect of their port-related work reflected a scale of activity characteristic of the pedestrian commercial city of the nineteenth century. The seasonal rhythm corresponded to local weather and production conditions. The close proximity between the ship labourers and the merchants heightened the face-to-face relationships of the pedestrian city. And lastly, the East Side locales at which most of the work was done suggested the level of integration along the waterfront and within the city.

By 1911, these aspects of their port-related work reflected the scale of activity characteristic of a city integrating into a national system of cities and consequently having much of its economic rhythm determined from outside the immediate locale. Perhaps most evident in the altered conditions of the ship labourers was the seasonal source of employment. Previously it had been summer — determined by New Brunswick lumber. Now it was winter — determined by Western grain.[46] Formerly, the local merchants had guided much of the port's economic activity. Now, the longshoremen dealt with agents from steamship companies headquartered outside of Saint John. And finally, much of the work and strike activity of the earlier period occurred on the East Side. By 1911, strikes focused on the centre of port life — the West Side.

The introduction of a labour contract in 1888 for the services of longshorement did not spell the end of waterfront labour disputes.[47] Throughout the 1890s representatives of the labourers and the vessels trading at the port continued to encounter difficulties over the issue of hourly *versus* daily rates[48] and the question of employing non-city residents at the port.[49] Superimposed on these labour-management disputes was the internal labour problem focusing on alleged religious bias in the hiring of ship labourers. So divisive was this issue that by 1898 the Ship Labourers Union contained two factions: one Protestant and the other Roman Catholic. Charging that the Ship Labourers Union, composed largely of Roman Catholics, gave preference to its coreligionists when assigning work, the leader of the minority Protestant group no doubt helped to split the waterfront union. By early 1899, Saint John had two waterfront unions[50] — the original union and the newly formed Ship Labourers Society (initially known as the Protestant Ship Labourers Society). By May 1903, the two unions, through the influence of the Trades and Labor Council of Saint John, had reunited to form the Longshoremen's Association.[51]

During the period in which the waterfront workers had been two groups, the Common Council remained uninvolved in their negotiations with the shippers and steamship company agents over the question of wage rates or schedules. A noticeable change occurred, however, in the spring of 1903. In that year the local Trades and Labor Council had received its national charter. As well, a strike in Montreal prompted the reported rumor that the city's longshoremen would call a sympathy strike or "make common cause" with the strikers.[52] The Liberal *Telegraph* urged the dock workers not "to overestimate the importance of the newly created labor body [Trades and Labor Council] as it relates to the body politic."[53] The waterfront men, then in the process of amalgamating their two groups, did not strike. But the Common Council, seeking ways to improve the harbour, demonstrated its recognition of organized labour within the city by inviting for the first time a member of Trades and Labor Council to appear before a joint Board of Trade-Common Council committee investigating port development.[54]

The Common Council could no longer ignore local labour organizations, but significantly its formal recognition followed rather than preceded national affiliation. Similarly, after the amalgamation of the waterfront groups into the Longshoremen's Association, William Daley, whose labour career included service on the executive of both the Ship Labourers Union and the Trades and Labor Council, decided to stand for municipal office. Perhaps, his election for one term in 1904 gave greater legitimacy to the union movement within the city; more importantly, in the context of port development it underlined the significance of the transport node in the economic life of Saint John.[55]

In the fall, the newly formed Association negotiated a contract with the shippers and steamship companies for the coming winter port season — 5 November 1904 - 30 April 1905. No new salary demands were made and partly "in consideration of this steamship companies are not to employ other than members of the Longshoremen's Association . . . during the time of the contract".[56] A few days before the contract terminated in April, the longshoremen announced their demand for increased wages.[57] Currently receiving thirty cents ($.30) per hour,they asked for a forty cent ($.40) per hour wage and argued "that a ship labourer is not too well paid at the best, turning out very early in the morning and getting to Sand Point to stand his chance for work — often not getting it, and when he does having to labor hard".[58] Responding to the hardening position of the Association on the wage question, the shippers within the city hastily formed a federation determined to unite as one body against the union's demand.[59] Essentially the union was demanding an immediate increase for working the summer season. Work at the port was divided into two seasons with the hourly wage for winter generally being five cents ($.05) per hour less than the summer rate. The union could afford to demand, and generally receive, a little more for the summer because the bulk of the winter port waterfront labour force preferred the steadier mill work. Thus, although the shipping federation succeeded in avoiding the forty cent ($.40) per hour rate and also avoiding a strike, the union took a harder line during the fall of 1905 when the new winter port season opened. The Longshoremen's Association demanded a thirty-five cent ($.35) per hour wage. In anticipation of having to deal with outside labourers, the union "wired advertisements to the Montreal newspapers . . . notifying longshoremen of . . . [that] port that there is a strike of ship laborers in Saint John, and urging them not to come here to take the places of local men . . ."[60]

The union representatives met with the Allans largely because the first ship of the winter port season was the *Parisian* — ironically the ship on which the progress of winter business had been celebrated in 1898.[61] As the ship labourers refused to unload the vessel, several officers of the Allan Steamship Company came to Saint John. When their presence at the wage discussions apparently failed to mellow the union, Hugh A. Allan left Montreal to pressure Mayor White by reminding him that "the present condition of affairs might make it necessary to withdraw their boats from this Port."[62] The immediate consequence of this meeting was White's proposal that the steamship people meet with representatives of the union. Both sides agreed. However, the meeting proved ineffectual with the Allans being especially adamant regarding the preservation of the thirty cent ($.30) per hour wage. Presenting a more moderate posture, the union offered to let the entire dispute go to a board of arbitration "composed of leading businessmen of this City."[63] Declaring that they were "quite able to do their own business,"[64] the Allan people declined — thus demonstrating at once in yet another way, the extent to which outside agencies determined the rhythm of business at the port.

As had been promised, the Allan Company sent for Montreal labourers, described only as Italians, to handle the work of the striking Saint John union. Whether they were part of the ordinary Montreal waterfront labour force or merely recruited from the general labour force is unknown. Their presence at Sand Point necessitated police protection and the exclusion of unauthorized persons while the *Parisian* was being unloaded.[65] In a further attempt to break the strike, members of the Longshoremen's Association of Montreal were transported to Saint John. However, a number of these reportedly joined the ranks of the idle Saint John dock workers "amid the cheers of the strikers congregated on the wharf".[66] The Allan Line, the Donaldson Line, and others continued to import men from Montreal. Within a week the steamship companies had succeeded in breaking the strike.[67] The union offered a compromise rate between the current thirty cents ($.30) per hour and the desired thirty-five ($.35) per hour. The offer was declined.[68] The union men then offered to return to work at last year's wages. The strike had been broken through the importation of workers from Montreal.[69] The question remained, however, of what to do with the latter, many of whom had two-week contracts. Hugh Allan announced that $1,000 would be sufficient to indemnify the steamship companies for cancelling the outsiders' contracts, thus releasing the jobs to the local men. Two Saint John newspapers — the *Telegraph* and the *Times* — each contributed $500.00 and the Montreal men were sent home. On November 30, representatives of the union and the shippers met to sign the labour contract for the winter port season of 1905-1906.

This strike, which had lasted for more than a week and had witnessed the failure of the union executive to either secure the desired increase or achieve a compromise hourly rate, was followed in the winter port season of 1906-1907 by the steamship companies' announcement that there would be no recognition of the Longshoremen's Association. The companies would hire the labourers they chose rather than have only union men employed on their ships.[70] Apparently the 1905 strike created enough dissension within the amalgamated Longshoremen's Association that the Ship Labourers Society was rejuvenated.

A week after the first notice of potential waterfront trouble reached the press, the union declared that formal recognition of their association was unnecessary because "every man doing longshore work this winter will belong to the Longshoremen's Association". Moreover, the union executive issued a statement which was at once both conciliatory and assertive. Declaring that the union was in fact being recognized by the steamship companies when they accepted the proposed wage scale (even though it was the same as the preceding year), the executive was reasserting its claim to the allegiance of the dock worker community. At the same time, however, and especially since the Ship Labourers Society had re-formed, the union did not wish to adopt a hard line on formal recognition which might then stimulate some of its membership towards joining the re-established Society. The middle and less militant road was to interpret acceptance of the proposed wage scale as *de facto* acceptance of the proposing agency, the Longshoremen's Association.[71]

The middle road, however, was not enough. The Ship Labourers' Society composed of the men who had seceded from the union following the termination of the 1905-1906 winter port season had begun to publicize the availability of its members to the steamship companies. Furthermore, the newer group made no mention of recognition or indeed conditions other than concluding wage contracts similar to those in effect during the preceding season. Their position meant, of course, that the union did not possess within its ranks all of the city's waterfront workers. When the first ship of the season arrived, the shippers offered to pay the wages but not sign any contract, because a contract might commit them to higher wages than another group or union might offer.[72] The shippers and other steamship companies could afford to adopt this position because the Allans had already made arrangements with the Ship Labourers Society to handle their vessels. While this Society reportedly was numerically smaller than the union, the "division in the ranks" of the dock workers was sufficient to weaken the position of the Longshoremen's Association in regard to either formal recognition or even the prestige of being the only waterfront labourers group. Within twenty-four hours this brief strike was being described as a mere interruption of activities. The President of the Longshoremen's Association accepted the steamship companies' offer with the proviso that "while they were willing to employ all members of the Union who came to work, they would not discriminate between one man and other".[73] Recognition of the union was thus not conceded; under the circumstances — specifically the re-emergence of the Ship Labourers Society — "it was generally regarded as a point they could . . . well afford to drop".[74]

The extent to which integration into a national transportation system was reflected in the waterfront labouring situation continued to be demonstrated as the winter port commenced operations in the fall of 1907. Now with almost predictable regularity the arrival of the first steamer occasioned a "hitch over labourers' wages".[75] That season the Longshoremen's Association sought an increase from the previous thirty cents ($.30) per hour to a desired forty cents ($.40) per hour. Although the union executive would not speculate on the potential success or failure of the demand, one newspaper observed "whatever happens today it is understood that the wages question as far as it affects the steamship lines will be settled in Montreal".[76] From the viewpoint of the Longshoremen's Association the resurrected presence of an active Ship Labourers Society, which again had been contracted by the Allan Steamship Lines, weakened the position of the older and larger union. To fill the gap created in the dock workers force, the steamship companies began mentioning the possibility of bringing labourers from Montreal. Following this report, a meeting at the Longshoremen's union hall revealed that many in attendance were willing to work for a compromise rate of thirty-five cents ($.35) per hour.[77] The executive, however, continued to stand by its forty cent ($.40) per hour demand. As the strike dragged into its fourth day, it appeared that the port was to witness a repetition of the 1905 disturbances.

From Montreal came word that the steamship companies had access to "plenty of men." At Saint John the Ship Labourers Society contracted without negotiating a change in the previous wage scale.[78] Throughout the first few days of the strike, it appeared that the companies did not want to import the Montreal men immediately. Such a step they regarded as a last resort and as a threat. However, as the strike persisted into the sixth day, men arrived from Montreal to take the place of the membership of the Longshoremen's Association.

On the eve before they arrived the union executive convened, and after evening session, it was rumored, was willing to compromise and settle for thirty-five cents ($.35) per hour.[79] The offer was refused: some companies steadfastly maintaining that no increase over last year's wages would be enacted. Underlining this commitment to the wage *status quo*, more than fifty additional Montreal men were brought to work the West Side piers. D. McNicoll, the general manager of the C.P.R., the cargo of which was awaiting transshipment on the West Side, informed the local press that "1000 men would be sent if necessary . . ."[80]

Perhaps it was the deteriorating climate between the union and the steamship companies which prompted Mayor Edward Sears to offer his services as a mediator in the dispute. In contrast to the opinion held in 1905 by Mayor W. W. White, Sears consulted wtih representatives of the steamship lines and the C.P.R. Although the details of what transpired during this meeting were not made public, at its conclusion the Mayor had the support of these outside agencies to meet with the Longshoremen's Association and offer that group thirty-two and one half cents ($.32½) per hour.[81] Sears met privately with the union executive. They presented this proposal to an estimated 800 members, who ratified it and thus ended the strike.[82] The city refunded the license money paid by the strike breakers from Montreal and they were returned home. Once again the appendage status to Montreal, upon which the winter port trade had been established, revealed itself in the vulnerability of the waterfront labour movement to outside pressures. Seemingly at every level of development, port-related activities continued to emphasize the implications in a scale of organization characterized by a national transport system, and moreover, peripheral position of Saint John's transport node in this newly emerged system.

Every year since the winter port business had commenced there had been some degree — however slight — of anxiety concerning the wage scale. In the two major strikes of 1905 and 1907, the Longshoremen's Association had learned that its men could be substituted by outsiders while the steamship companies, despite their posturing to the contrary, expressed concern for transshipment business. As the winter port season of 1908 approached, an announcement relieved dock worker and shipper alike. The Longshoremen's Association signed a five-year contract with the Donaldson Line and the C.P.R. to do the work of loading and unloading on the West Side. Although the contract — the first of its kind on the waterfront — did not include the Allans, Elder

Dempster Line, Head Lines, Manchester, or Furness Lines, it did represent about two-thirds of all business handled during the winter.[83] As well as symbolizing an introduction of greater regularity into management-labour relations, the contract also underlined the significant role of the C.P.R. in the West Side business and the major role of the Longshoremen's Association in claiming the allegiance of the majority of Saint John's waterfront workers. The Allans subsequently contracted with the Ship Labourers Society for thirty cents ($.30) per hour — the same rate which it agreed would prevail under the five-year contract negotiated by the Longshoremen's Association.

Introduction of a long-term contract for the winter port season 1908-1909 was followed the next season by a movement towards re-uniting the two local unions. As the same wage scale prevailed for each, continued separation was no longer viewed as beneficial. On April 4, 1911, the Saint John Longshoremen's Association was granted a charter by the International Longshoremen's Association and thus became known as I.L.A. Local 273.[84] Hence, during the same year in which the tri-partite agreement that relinquished the city's control over the West Side was signed, the waterfront workers too became integrated into an externally-based association. Port management and labour were now intimately linked to externally-based systems of organization.

### West Side-Main Peninsula Relations: The Bridge Issue as an Index of Change in the Process of Integration

Both the political negotiations between Ottawa and Saint John which resulted in the tri-partite agreement of 1911, and waterfront labour which also reached an organizational flowering in 1911, had their local physical focus on the West Side. In each case the winter port had been the principal stimulus, and, in this way, each illustrated an effect of the process of integration. However, the West Side became more than just the physical focus of this newest function which had emerged in connection with the city's transport node. Residents of this peninsula were also more closely integrated into the city as a whole through the extension of the street railway system.[85] Nonetheless, it was the city-managed ferry which continued to be patronized by most Carleton residents desiring to visit the main peninsula. For most, this mode of travel was quicker than the street railway which moved leisurely through Carleton and then passed through the Portland peninsula before reaching the Market Square-King Street business district. It is not surprising that early in the twentieth century West Side agitation for a bridge linking the main peninsula with Carleton again emerged.

The subject was not new. In the 1870's and 1880's the necessity for such a facility, which some believed would assist in making Saint John one integrated city rather than two disparate peninsulas, had been advanced by residents. Usually the exponents had been newspaper editors. West Siders too had argued for a bridge location incorporating Navy Island rather than the Falls in the early 1880's.[86] The intensive harbour development occurring in Carleton through the 1890's at least visibly diminished the image of the West Side as the subsidiary waterfront. Sand Point and the C.P.R. had combined to project Carleton as the primary locus of transshipment activity within the Port of Saint John. Carleton's new significance as the the local physical pivot of the port's external functions thus contributed to rekindling the old theme of a harbour bridge.

The Navy Island site had always been a favourite with West Siders. As Figure 4 illustrates the construction of a bridge through Navy Island meant linking the local business district of Carleton (Water, Prince and King Streets),[87] drawing on the winter port and other waterfront activities traversing Union Street, and lastly connecting the main peninsula in the vicinity of the Long Wharf-Market Square area. Such a route, it was presumed, would establish the necessary linkage between both peninsulas. The perception of this route had not appeared to alter through the last decades of the nineteenth century. The bridge question re-emerged in the fall of 1901,[88] but was shelved by the Common Council in 1903 due to the potential costs involved. Instead the aldermen decided to call for tenders for a new ferry boat.[89] In the summer of 1905, a new ferry boat, the *Ludlow*, was launched from Thomas Hilyard's shipyard.[90] Perhaps even more important, a principal participant in any bridge matter would have been the C.P.R. One month prior to the launching of the *Ludlow* the railway had secured controlling interest in the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company, thus eliminating its preoccupation with the tolls charged at the Falls.[91] Again the presence of outside transport agencies had contributed at once to both the necessity for the *Ludlow* and the temporary silencing of the bridge question.

Three years later within the realm of discussions which would eventually lead to the tri-partite agreement of 1911, Alderman-at-large William E. Scully, then a West Side railway agent, reintroduced the bridge matter at Council.[92] No doubt Scully's timing was influenced by the larger port-related questions facing the aldermen. In addition to recanting the litany of West Side reasons for such a facility Scully concluded "if we are to do a Winter Port business all railways communicating with Saint John must be able to handle cars easily to and from the steamers whether they are on the East or West Side."[93] Apparently his colleagues were willing to accept his suggestion, as it was decided to "investigate and discuss the matter with the Dominion government and the transportation companies."[94]

Throughout the summer and fall of 1908, while the city sought to chart a new course in port development, the bridge committee too tried to determine the means by which such a facility could be incorporated into the general development of the port. In November Aldermen Scully and Baskin of the West Side met with Premier J. D. Hazen with a proposal for constructing a bridge through Navy Island. Hazen expressed caution advising the committee to determine the costs before requesting provincial support. Indeed, it appeared as if the provincial premier viewed the project as a matter for Saint John and the transportation companies rather than just the New Brunswick government.

Pursuing the goal of a Navy Island Bridge, Scully organized a petition among Saint John residents in support of the project.[95] He also interviewed C.P.R. representatives, receiving assurance that the company would use such a facility provided a fair rental was charged. Scully also solicited the advice of William Pugsley, the Minister of Public Works, who maintained a high profile in all the discussions involving port development. In regard to the bridge question he believed the federal government, the province, and the City of Saint John should equally bear the cost of construction.[96]

At a Common Council meeting in December 1908, Alderman Scully stressed Pugsley's support of the bridge project when the motion was made requesting that his committee appoint an engineer who would provide a cost analysis of such a facility. After some discussion, largely informational, the aldermen approved the $1,000 sum needed to hire the professional engineer.[97] Circumstances had changed since 1903 when Council by a close vote had shelved the bridge idea. Now the demands of the winter port business forced a less reluctant Council to consider the bridge as integral to port development. The presence in cabinet of a friendly Minister of Public Works almost assured Scully and the other bridge proponents of support within the Council.

In January of the new year, Mr. F. W. Holt was contracted for $750.00 to plan a bridge which would extend from the West Side *via* Navy Island and have its East Side terminus in the Long Wharf vicinity.[98] Three months later the Common Council adopted a bridge bill outlining the terms and conditions under which a new harbour bridge was to be built and operated.[99] In mid-April, Alderman Scully, described as the pioneer of the bridge project, headed a delegation to Fredericton.[100] Scully found no opposition to the bill among the legislators he interviewed.[101] However, after the bill was passed authorizing the city to build a bridge not exceeding $750,000, Premier Hazen appeared uneasy about the projected costs. His timidity intensified after F. W. Holt, the engineer in charge, was advised by a construction firm that the bridge could not be built for less than $787,500.[102]

Although support remained strong for the bridge within the Council and especially on the West Side, it was apparent by the fall that Hazen was changing whatever initial favourable attitude he had once held towards the project.[103] In mid-October, Pugsley advised Scully that he was prepared to ask that one-third of the cost of the bridge be placed in the federal estimates provided the province and city promised to do likewise. For Ottawa the proposed bridge meant that the I.C.R. would have access to the West Side wharves. It appeared that the Council was disposed to do so but Hazen's government was backing down, alleging that the C.P.R. was not really interested in using such a facility.[104] Moreover, Hazen suggested that his government would be anxious "to hear from Saint John" before acquiescing to a project which would increase the provincial tax burden borne by all, including residents of the city.[105]

Perhaps suspecting that the delay in Fredericton would affect adversely their projected bridge, Alderman Scully's bridge committee announced in December that new data regarding the costs of the project would be presented in January. Most important in the committee's view was to maintain costs below $750,000. Even the Scully committee acknowledged that the single most probable objection to the scheme rested on the necessity of including a drawbridge designed to enable large vessels to proceed along the Straight [Strait] Shore. Before the Common Council meeting at which the issue was to be discussed, proponents of the bridge insisted that it would cost no more than $750,000. Opponents argued that the necessary private land appropriations in the vicinity of the approaches at each end of the structure plus the virtually predictable incidental costs arising from potential construction delays would practically double the expense involved.

Leading the voice of opposition was the Board of Trade. At its meeting in January several members argued that the volume of business transacted on the West Side and carried between both sides had increased substantially during the past years. But most appeared to agree with Alderman Frank L. Potts, an East Sider, that the running of two ferry boats during a five-hour period each day would "accommodate" Sand Point. Others who spoke at the meeting addressed the question of submitting the issue to a plebiscite. William H. Thorne, speaking for the majority, strongly opposed placing the issue at the discretion of the public before "the cost shall have been obtained as nearly as possible . . ." That the Board as a body felt so committed to condemning the plebiscite idea —

originally suggested by bridge supporters — may indicate the degree of support the project had among the residents, especially West Siders.[106]

Within the Common Council there was also discussion. The tenor of the remarks made by the aldermen suggested that, while most recognized its eventual necessity, few seemed willing to incur the expenses of constructing and maintaining it. Some favoured a bridge but not the current proposal. In January 1910 Alderman Scully moved that two new members be added to the bridge committee to review the entire issue.[107] Throughout the rest of the year the bridge question received relatively little attention as Council concentrated primarily and sometimes almost exclusively on the negotiations which were to result in the agreement of 1911.

Finally in February of 1911, the Common Council decided to put the bridge question on the civic ballot in April. The question simply asked: "do you favour the City expending $300,000 toward the construction of a bridge across the harbour?" The emergence of the issue at this time may be attributed to several factors. Perhaps most important was the impending resolution of the West Side negotiations. In addition, the Council was about to undergo further expense on the ferry system,[108] and the two issues had always been linked since the opening of the winter port. As well, the feeling prevailed that the bridge issue should be resolved one way or the other. In the civic elections held April 18, 1911 the bridge proposal was approved.[109] The majority of the residents in every Ward voted approval with the exception of Dukes and Victoria Wards. In Queens the vote was evenly divided. The successful conclusion to the bridge campaign, which was largely organized and co-ordinated by Alderman Scully of Carleton, demonstrated the degree to which a Navy Island bridge was perceived as a necessity within the total local community. Although the West Side showed the strongest support, recognition of the need for a bridge linking Carleton more securely within the local urban community had emerged as an ancillary development with the winter port business.

By 1911 the tri-partite agreement and the I.L.A. affiliation illustrated the process of vertical integration by focusing upon the managerial and labour aspects of a transport node based on the West Side. Similarly, the bridge issue demonstrated the accompanying integration at the local level which had been stimulated, in part, through the integration of the Port and City of Saint John into a national system of cities.

# PART FOUR: 1911 - 1927

## THE PORT OF SAINT JOHN:
## THE NEW YEARS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION


LOVITT'S POINT
ST JOHN RIVER
FERRY
Spar Cove
Creek
INDIANTOWN
MARBLE COVE
LEE'S COVE
UNION POINT
Reversing Falls
Douglas Avenue
C.P.R.
Shore Road
Strait
Main St.
Fort Howe
Rockland Rd.
Wellesley Road
Sandy Point Road
Mount Pleasant Avenue
LILY LAKE
INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY YARD
MARSH CREEK
I.C.R.
Union Depot
HARBOUR
Navy Is.
Long Wharf
Market Sq.
King Square
Queen Square
FERRY
RODNEY SLIP
REED'S POINT
SAND POINT
COURTENAY BAY
CROUCHVILLE
Prince St. Ext.
Charlotte St. Ext.
LANCASTER HEIGHTS
BAY SHORE C.P.R. YARD
ILLE
0
923
1846
2769
3692 FT.

—1911—

The City of Saint John

Port Development

## CHAPTER XI

# *The Quest for Expansion: Fruitless Dreams, 1911-1918*

Throughout the preceding Chapters a gradual, but cumulative, level of integration of the city's transport node into a national system of transportation occurred through each successive period. This process of integration underlined the subsidiary position of the City of Saint John. The business of the port was now directed by outside agencies, in particular, by the C.P.R. And as the strikes of 1905 and 1907 indicated, waterfront labour had been made vulnerable to external pressures. Even affiliation with the I.L.A. meant some loss of autonomy for the local union. In September 1911 vertical integration, as an achieved status with the federal government's formal participation, commenced. The tri-partite agreement signalled a plateau in the process of vertical integration. No longer would the city be completely responsible for wharf construction. According to the terms of the agreement, the federal government agreed "to build upon lands conveyed . . . so many docks or piers as may be necessary for the handling of trade through the Port of Saint John — subject to the provision of funds therefor [sic] by vote of parliament — . . .[1] The tri-partite agreement, however, applied only to one section within the harbour — that located on the West Side, south of Berth No. 1. And although the federal government was to commence work on Berths Nos. 14, 15 and 16, within the City and County of Saint John, attention was now being directed towards Courtenay Bay. Spurred by the prospect of attracting the National Transcontinental Railway to its harbour, the local elite revived the always nascent dry dock projects, and embarked on a campaign to complete the development of the total harbour by advancing Courtenay Bay as the site of the future dry dock and terminus of a third major railway. Their grandiose plans appeared ever more attainable in the flush of euphoria produced by the agreement of 1911. By 1918, however, the hoped-for National Transcontinental connection would be a memory. The Port and City of Saint John would emerge from the intrusion of the war years with little evidence of its quest for expansion. This Chapter considers the attempts made by the city's elite — the Common Council and the Board of Trade — to advocate on behalf of a port which continued to be theirs geographically, but as a result of the process of integration less and less under their control. The formalization of the agreement of 1911 cast the local elite in the role of advocates for an increased level of port function within a national system of transportation rather than in that of owner-managers of a local harbour. The most immediate example of this not necessarily new but rather expanding role for the local elite was demonstrated in the first efforts to develop Courtenay Bay.

### The Courtenay Bay Development 1911-1918: Expanding the Port of Saint John

Interestingly, for most of the pre-1911 history of the port Courtenay Bay had never really been considered as an integral part of the harbour. Although the Simonds, Hazen and White firm had employees living there as early as 1775,[2] the Loyalist arrivals and the subsequent spatial development of the City of Saint John enhanced the area containing the harbourfronts of the Main Peninsula, the Carleton Peninsula and the Portland Peninsula. As a glance at any of the Figures reveals, the Bay served as an outlet for the Marsh Creek. Plagued by mud flats, Courtenay Bay was always viewed as the lesser body of water. However, in the mid-nineteenth century and "until some years after the great fire" of 1877 ships were built there. Among the most famous ever constructed was the *Marco Polo*. Many of the city's legendary businessmen, among them the Wright Brothers, and Robert and James Reed, had their shipbuilding operations located along the Bay's edge.[3] By 1911, this activity had largely ceased and many city residents awaited a future of "railway terminals, grain elevators, dry dock work and eventually the construction of ships of steel."[4]

Contributing to the lack of integration of the Courtenay Bay area more securely within the activities of the Port of Saint John was the Bay's eastern boundary. Located within a part of the County of Saint John, called East Saint John, the eastern boundary was not governed by the Common Council of the City of Saint John.[5] Serious interest in the Bay or East Saint John on the part of the city's elite was kindled in the early twentieth century when the federal government announced plans for a new transcontinental railway. This pattern resembled closely the situation which developed between the cities of Saint John and Portland, pending the arrival of the Short Line in 1889.[6]

Extending from Moncton, N.B. (mid-way between Saint John and Halifax) to Prince Rupert, B.C., the Transcontinental implicitly recognized the existence of a dual primate port-city in the Maritimes, but did not provide for an eastern harbour outlet for the anticipated freight to be carried on this all-Canadian route to the Canadian port. In Saint John the I.C.R. had terminal facilities in the Long Wharf vicinity, and the C.P.R. had a considerable grain handling capability in Carleton. Now the Common Council and especially the Board of Trade viewed the potential wedding of the new Transcontinental with a proposed scheme of Courtenay Bay harbour development as the vehicle for integrating the Bay as a functioning part into the total harbour of Saint John, and thus attaining for the port an increased function within the national system of transportation. The city's federal advocate in this promising scheme was William Pugsley — architect of the tri-partite agreement. About a year after he joined the Laurier cabinet in 1907, Pugsley began to publicize his intention to have federal money used to establish a deep water facility in Courtenay Bay. By 1911 the federal Department of Public Works called for tenders to cover "the construction of a break-water, two quays, and related dredging of an entrance channel and basin in Courtenay Bay . . ."[7] The lowest bidder was Norton Griffiths and Company, a firm which a year earlier had determined that the Courtenay Bay area would be an excellent location for a dry dock. Although the Laurier government was defeated nationally in the election of 1911, Pugsley was re-elected from Saint John. He pressed the Borden cabinet to make good on its election promises.[8] The new Minister of Public Works, Frederick Monk, stated "the situation in Courtenay Bay is very favorable", while reminding his parliamentary colleagues that the Grand Trunk Pacific was not yet at Saint John.[9]

Although regularly reporting Pugsley's complaints about the alleged dilatoriness of the government in commencing the Courtenay Bay work, port-city editorialists greeted the new year by announcing that the city was "facing prospects more cheering than [it] has experienced in a generation".[10] The growth of the winter port trade was noted, as well as the city's leadership in municipal reform, which would result in the 1912 launching of commission government in Canada.[11] The city was also pioneering in playgrounds for its neighbourhoods[12] and awaiting a later visit from the leader of the suffragette movement. Newspaper articles proclaiming "the awakening of the east, New Brunswick a land of great promise" attested to the climate of optimism characterizing 1912.[13] And the opening of new transport-related businesses, such as the first taxi service, in the city reinforced an image of progress.[14] Reflecting this general exuberance, the *Daily Telegraph* gladly reprinted a news item from one of the Port of Saint John's earliest competitors, the Port of Saint Andrews, N.B. Claiming "Saint John is alright", the Saint Andrews *Beacon* observed that the Liberal government had made all kinds of commitments to the city, and the Consevatives would "carry these out".[15] The following month the Norton Griffiths Company tender of $7,500,000 for the Courtenay Bay development including a dry dock was accepted by the federal cabinet.[16]

Dry dock proposals were not new in Saint John. George Robertson, former Mayor of the city and past President of the Board of Trade, had been associated with the Imperial Dry Dock Company since the 1890's. Reportedly his company had been several times "on the verge of success" in trying to acquire the necessary capital for the venture.[17] As mentioned in a previous Chapter, Robertson's plans had focused on a site in Carleton.[18] After the company had been incorporated in 1899, more than a dozen provincial statutes and amendments relating to its activities were passed by the Legislature. The Common Council of Saint John on the whole cooperated with Robertson, perhaps because he had been a local businessman since the 1860's and closely identified with the city's successful attempts in 1895 to secure the Beaver Line to Saint John, thus opening the winter port.[19] It was shortly after the winter port business had been inaugurated that Robertson had taken up what was to become a crusade and eventually earn him the title of "Father of the dry dock movement in Saint John". His continual approaches concerning the project to the Provincial Legislature were to be later remembered as "an annual offering [which] the members . . . must have gotten into the habit of hailing . . . as an old and valued friend".[20] Mayor James Frink remembered Robertson's commitment to dry dock construction. In 1906 he met Robertson on a business trip in Montreal, where the latter had an appointment with C.P.R. officials in the hope of securing the railway's financial backing for his venture. Like other hopeful excursions this also failed to bear fruit.

There is no evidence that Robertson's firm tendered for the Courtenay Bay works in 1911, or was widely considered to have been in the running. More important, there is no evidence that the Imperial Dry Dock Company had either the capitalization or the expertise to carry out such an undertaking. Whether or not Robertson's journeying to Great Britain in an attempt to interest investors in a dry dock indirectly contributed to the Norton Griffiths firm sending out an engineer to look over Saint John is purely speculative. John Norton Griffiths, M.P. of London, had sent one of his engineers on an Atlantic coast fact-finding mission in December 1910.[21] In any case, Robertson's continual efforts on behalf of establishing a dry dock operation in Saint John kept the issue alive for more than a decade, even though the lack of success he experienced may have cast him in the eyes of some as "a dreamer".[22] More important, Robertson's efforts as one of the most prominent members of the Board of Trade illustrated that organization's role in the expansionist hopes for the Port of Saint John during the early twentieth century. Moreover, that a local firm such as the Imperial Dry Dock Company was never able to raise sufficient capital within the city necessary to mount a dry dock project or succeed in convincing an adequate number of outside investors to assist in launching the project further demonstrates the subsidiary position of the port and city of Saint John within a national system of transportation and cities. Only when a federal member from Saint John could, in combination with the plans for a transcontinental railway, mount a Courtenay Bay development project within which a dry dock could be constructed was there any real hope of securing the latter.

The scope of planning for Courtenay Bay outstripped what, in retrospect, appeared to be the modest plans of a local firm. Robertson's earliest hope had been of constructing a dry dock on the West Side — the site of the winter port development, which he had been significantly instrumental in attaining. His spatial orientation was the West Side, his project a dry dock and his railway contacts — the C.P.R. — all bespoke, locationally at least, the Saint John port development thrust of the 1890's and early 1900's. Within the realm of personal experience he had witnessed numerous dry dock builders approach the city. No doubt he and his Board of Trade colleagues who incorporated the Imperial Dry Dock Company believed such a project could be anchored securely within the winter port locus of the harbourfront. By 1908, however, when attention was being directed to Courtenay Bay, the prospect of the Carleton dry dock had passed. The eventually proposed project meant incorporating the dry dock into a newly developed extension of the harbour of Saint John. Even the physical location did not conform with the most recently developed spatial orientation of the harbour. Robertson's belated recognition of this was acknowledged in the last Act passed by the Legislature regarding his project in April 1912. Now he had authority to build in Courtenay Bay or elsewhere in that Parish. As well, the Municipal Council of the County of Saint John, rather than the Common Council of the City of Saint John, was authorized to make grants to his company. It all came too late. Robertson died in October of 1912, within six months after the last Legislative Act relating to the Imperial Dry Dock Company had been passed.[23] While Robertson was credited with having filled "an important place both in the commercial and political life of St. John",[24] it was William Pugsley who was to be remembered as having interested ". . . Old Country capitalists, under the leadership of Norton Griffiths, in undertaking the construction of a first class dry dock and repair yard at St. John".[25]

Opening day ceremonies at Courtenay Bay on July 11, 1912 were preceded by requests that a civic holiday be declared to celebrate the importance and magnitude of the undertaking for the city.[26] Joined by numerous public figures including William Pugsley and

Premier J. K. Flemming, the civic and business elite of the city and hundreds from the area watched as the Hon. W. T. White detonated the TNT which marked the beginning of site preparations for the dry dock construction.[27] Choosing to detonate a charge of dynamite afforded a thrilling initiation to the work being commenced. However, the first part of the Norton Griffiths's contract focused on the less exciting but more basic task of dredging the channel and basin. As no dredges substantial enough to attempt this work were located in the city, the dredging company — a subsidiary of the Norton Griffiths enterprise — delayed work until November when these were obtained. Inclement weather plus the challenge of the mud flats caused frequent breakdowns. These, in turn, caused delays which placed the burden on the contractor as it was the Company's duty "to make their own estimate of the facilities and difficulties attending the execution of these works".[28] In addition to its local difficulties the dredging company "had also incurred financial liabilities it could not discharge".[29] In July 1913 one of the dredging plants was attached by creditors. Two other dredging plants "slipped their moorings and disappeared".[30] The Courtenay Bay project, which had begun so promisingly only a year earlier, had become mired in the crux of the work — the dredging of the channel and basin. Under pressure from the Department of Public Works, the Norton Griffiths Company sent two dredges from Southampton, England. Dredging re-commenced in December 1913. In addition to the problems stemming from the dredging, the Norton Griffiths Company was also involved in negotiating a subcontract for the quays specified in their agreement with the Department of Public Works. Unsuccessful discussions with the primary contender for the subcontract — the Nova Scotia Construction Company — resulted in Norton Griffiths declaring that it would construct the quays itself.[31] In February of 1914 Ottawa agreed with this plan.

Progressing simultaneously with the dredging segment and the negotiations on the quays segment were the construction of the breakwater and the excavation for the dry dock. A Montreal firm was incorporated for the subcontract as The Courtenay Bay Construction Company. In May of 1912 workmen had begun work on the route from the dry dock area to the proposed breakwater. This work was intended to prepare the railbed for the tramway, containing self-dump cars designed to haul the rock from the dry dock excavation site to the breakwater where it could be used as fill.[32] By July, when the opening day ceremonies were held, progress on this aspect of the project had proceeded to the point where local newspapers carried photographs of the constructed railbed.[33] Many Saint John men secured work as construction workers at the project. Progress continued through December 1912, as rock was added to the breakwater from the continuous blasting taking place at the dry dock site. On several occasions residents complained to the Common Council, requesting that the Company cease blasting in the evening hours.[34] Despite what appeared in its initial stages to be the most successfully progressing aspect of the entire project, the dry dock work slowed down dramatically after May 1914 when the Company hit solid rock at a depth of twenty-five feet. Two years earlier John Norton Griffiths had spoken at the Union Club in Saint John, stating that although he accepted the Government's terms, he did not think "them sufficient to cover both construction and equipment". Now, in the spring of 1914, that suspicion had been confirmed.[35] In the fall of 1914 the breakwater was completed, but the quays had never been started. The dry dock was far from completion, as was the dredging. The outbreak of World War I brought a cessation of Public Works expenditures for projects defined as non-essential.

While the projected Courtenay Bay works had largely involved the federal government and the Norton Griffiths Company, the Common Council and the Board of Trade at the initiation of the company were included in the dry dock aspect of the project. Under the terms of the agreement between Ottawa and Norton Griffiths, the company was to build and operate a dry dock. The dry dock was to be 900 feet long and to be built at a cost of not more than $4,000,000, for which Ottawa would offer a subsidy of 3½ percent for 35 years. By January 1913, the company had already decided that a length of 900 feet was insufficient to handle the largest ships afloat, and that surely by 1917, when the total project was scheduled to be completed, the dry dock would be obsolete.[36] They approached the Board of Trade with the suggestion of extending the dry dock to 1,150 feet and of securing the necessary additional funding through the city and province.[37] Briefly, the company proposed to have the city and province guarantee a necessary sinking fund enabling the company to issue nearly five million dollars in bonds at four percent to be guaranteed by a federal subsidy. The company in turn would carry out the necessary work "to establish a ship building plant instead of a repair plant".[38]

The Board was receptive to any suggestion which would enhance the port, and decided to draw up a resolution urging acceptance of Norton Griffiths' proposed change by the city and province.[39] At a later meeting containing members of the Common Council the city's representatives were divided on the merits of funding a private corporation. Some believed the Norton Griffiths Company should work out any alterations in its original contract with Ottawa and seek federal funding.[40] Nonetheless, in March the city joined with the county representatives in journeying to Fredericton to seek provincial aid for the amended proposal.[41] Possibly city support for the Board's approval of the Norton Griffiths' plan reflected the general spirit of harmony currently existing between the Common Council and Board of Trade. That harmony had been noted by Mayor Frink at a recent banquet, when the Mayor observed: "In the past there had been some feeling of antagonism between the two bodies [because] the Board of Trade had set themselves to direct the Common Council".[42] Frink continued: "if the Board of Trade is willing to submit their plans to the Common Council as recommended, there will be harmony and the hatchet will be buried".[43] Harmonious relations between the two city groups, however, were insufficient to persuade the Flemming government at Fredericton to commit provincial funds to Norton Griffiths, although the plans appear to have had the support of J. D. Hazen, Minister of Marine and Fisheries.[44] The Premier's action was a disappointment to Norton Griffiths,[45] but it was endorsed by those who believed that the dry dock matter and alterations to the original contract were between the company and the federal government.[46]

In mid-July 1913 the first of many problems which culminated in a cancellation of the company's contract occurred.[47] The dredge problem, as mentioned previously, prevented substantial progress until work could again be resumed. Throughout the summer dredging tie-ups, difficulties with the creditors and the continuing discussion over the proposed contract length of the dry dock *versus* the proposed Norton Griffiths changes contributed "to the anxiety" alleged to be fast developing.[48] In a similar vein a fall visit from W. I. Gear, vice-president of the Robert Reford Company and president of the Canadian Shipping Federation, brought a negative assessment on the entire Courtenay Bay development. Dismissing the project as a "great mistake" for the Port of Saint John, Gear claimed all "efforts and money . . . should be concentrated in the improvement and extension of the West Side facilities . . ."[49]

In November 1913 the Hon. Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, declared that the federal government would support the dry dock extension sought by Norton Griffiths "if the contractors were willing to build the additional length at a *pro rata* price . . ."[50] There was no mention of federal funding of a shipbuilding plant. In any case the record to date of the Norton Griffiths Company prompted one editor to observe: "Progress so far made leaves little ground for hope there will be much greater activity in the future but possibly some good will come from . . . the Minister's promises".[51] Essentially, however, since the provincial government had not been receptive to the sinking fund idea, the Norton Griffiths' proposed changes could not be carried out — unless the federal government wished to assume responsibility for both the sinking fund and the four percent subsidy. Ottawa did not do so.

After the war started, the Norton Griffiths Company lost hope of raising money in Great Britain, and consequently little or no work was completed through mid-1915. Attempting to defuse criticism of the project, the city's conservative organ, the *Daily Standard*, offered the hopeful suggestion that the government would complete the project in the event Norton Griffiths could not do so. One year later however, in April 1916, possible transfer of the contract was being discussed. Local newspapers claimed that the Saint John Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company, Limited was to receive the contract. John Moore and George McAvity of Saint John were reportedly associated with the new company. The transfer, however, could not be effected due to disagreement over the terms and financing. Moreover, "that Moore and McAvity were Liberals who received patronage under Pugsley may have been a relevant fact" to Prime Minister Robert Borden's government.[52] Certainly, Borden received enough anti-Pugsley letters from prominent Saint John Conservatives.[53]

In November of 1916 it was more than apparent that Norton Griffiths could not complete its contract by March 31, 1917. The Company was given its six-day notice, and on November 29, 1916 the Courtenay Bay work was terminated with the cancellation of the contract.[54] Remarking on this turn of events, the *Globe* observed: "there are no illusions about Courtenay Bay today". With a genuine sense of discouragement at what nearly five years of no progress had produced, the editor resignedly continued: "it is no exaggeration to say that many who then [1912] looked on the undertaking as evidence of coming prosperity are now convinced that the same money spent on development on the Carleton flats would prove of infinitely greater present and future benefit".[55] Throughout 1917, the local press carried reports on the Norton Griffiths Company's problems with several of its New York creditors and on the ensuing legal battle.[56] There were occasional references to Courtenay Bay, but in general interest had slackened considerably.

The Courtenay Bay development had been inaugurated in the climate of success generated by the new status enjoyed by the Port of Saint John following the tri-partite agreement of 1911. That agreement had largely formalized the role of the Common Council and Board of Trade as advocates for an increased level of function for the port within a national system of transportation. For the local elite, however, cancellation of the Norton Griffiths contract was only one of the disappointments jarring their shared expansionist dreams. News that the Grand Trunk Pacific would never reach

Courtenay Bay was even more devastating. By 1918, the earlier vision of a Courtenay Bay terminal development complete with quays, dry dock, warehouses and a transcontinental railway connection had evaporated. The first experience of the city's elite in its new role as advocates for the port — a role acquired through the process of integration — found them less than powerful.

### The National Transcontinental: The Goal of Attaining a Third Major Railway Linkage

In 1911 the Port of Saint John was the terminus for the Canadian Pacific Railway with its extensive West Side terminal development. On the East Side of the harbour the government-controlled Intercolonial laced the main peninsula with a passenger and freight facility in the Market Slip-Long Wharf area and freight facilities in the Reed's Point-Lower Cove section. The prospect of attracting to the shores of Courtenay Bay a third major railway through the National Transcontinental Railway stimulated, and was in turn stimulated by, the projected harbour works being undertaken in East Saint John.

The railway prospect envisioned in 1911 had resulted from the May 1903 Laurier government-sponsored enabling measure calling for a Canadian transcontinental railway to consist of two divisions: the Eastern Division to run from Moncton, N.B. to Winnipeg and the Western Division to traverse the potentially more lucrative area from Winnipeg to the Pacific coast. The instrument to be employed in achieving this feat was the Grand Trunk Pacific (G.T.P.) Railway Company. Under the terms of the contract the G.T.P. Company would build and own the Western Division. The Eastern Division or National Transcontinental would be built for the government, and on completion the company would lease it from the government for operation. Provision of the Eastern Division would assure the Laurier government supporters that the new railway would not feed its traffic to the Grand Trunk controlled New England ports, specifically Portland, Maine. An officer in the Grank Trunk Railway Company described "the primary idea" of his company's promotion of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway as the acquisition of a "road through the prairie districts". Referring to the Eastern Division, upon which the hopes of Saint John for the Courtenay Bay development were to be pinned later, he claimed it had "been grafted upon the original idea".[57]

After final decision on the route of the Eastern Division, construction began in May 1907 on the section between the Quebec boundary and Grand Falls, N.B. Commencement of construction activities on the line coincided with the entrance of William A. Pugsley to the House of Commons. Hereafter, Saint John would have an advocate for its additional railway linkage. When the route through New Brunswick had been settled upon in June 1908, protests from within Saint John resulted in the proposal of a line generally known as the Valley Railway (Saint John and Quebec Railway), which would connect with the National Transcontinental at Grand Falls, run through Woodstock on to Fredericton, and down to Westfield. Before the Valley Line finally reached Westfield, where it then ran on C.P.R. tracks to the piers in West Saint John,[58] the civic and business elite of the city were to have despaired of any hope for a terminus in Courtenay Bay.

In May of 1911, however, with the federal government's passage of legislation agreeing to support the initial costs of construction and promising a subsidy from Saint John City to Grand Falls, the long dreamed of railway link to Saint John, which would reinforce the traditional transportation and consequent settlement pattern of the Saint John River, appeared attainable. By 1912 the subsequent provincial support for the idea, with provision for bridges one each in Victoria County, Saint John County and Kings County, seemed to assume not only a long awaited Valley line, but a Valley line connected to the National Transcontinental and feeding a terminal development at Courtenay Bay. The bridge locations in Saint John and Kings Counties were designed to route the Valley Line through the Kingston Peninsula north of the City of Saint John[59] and down to Courtenay Bay, rather than through Westfield on to the West Side piers. In short, the Valley Line proposal would satisfy the dream of a Saint John valley railway, the goal of linkage to the transcontinental, which by 1911 extended from Moncton N.B. diagonally to Edmundston N.B., and the projected harbour development in Courtenay Bay.

That the Saint John Valley Railway was deemed as crucial to the Courtenay Bay development may be seen from the keen participation of the Board of Trade in all discussions touching on the anticipated route of the road as it approached Saint John City. In September 1912,[60] and again two months later, the Board criticized the proposed location of the Kings County bridge, arguing instead for a location at Gondola Point.[61] At a lengthy Board of Trade meeting in early January 1913, the relative merits of a West Side (Carleton) entrance to Saint John *versus* a Courtenay Bay entrance to Saint John were discussed. Some members urged the Westfield C.P.R. route because it would traverse a more potentially lucrative area in contrast to the Perry's Point or Gondola Point route, which was only a four-mile passage through the Kingston Peninsula. Reporting on the general discussion, the Board's Acting Secretary M. O. Magee noted: "some of the members [thought] that the route which would be of most benefit to the transcontinental roads seeking a terminal here should be considered and other[s] . . . [thought] . . . that the local territory" should be considered first.[62]

By July the Board of Trade had learned that the route to be taken by the Valley Line would come through the Kingston Peninsula. W. Frank Hatheway, now one of the Board's most senior members, regretted not the overall choice of the route but rather the specific location in Kings County at which the bridge was to be built. The Board had requested that a survey be made of the Gondola Point area, which it favoured as a bridge site. For various reasons this had not been done, and the original Perry's Point site remained the final choice.[63] The local business elite could only offer ineffective protest.

Discussions which focused on routes or especially a route involving the Courtenay Bay, however, were of necessity predicated on a terminal development at the Bay. In mid-1913 the inspector for the National Transcontinental, E. P. Goodwin, stated the G.T.P. Railway would re-route freight from its Moncton terminus provided Saint John would offer it adequate harbour facilities. To this the Minister of Railways added that the Borden government "did not know when, or if, the Grand Trunk Pacific would commence work on its proposed terminus in Courtenay Bay".[64] By the fall of 1913, the city learned that the Grank Trunk Pacific would not attempt to come into Saint John unless or until the Valley Railway was completed and it had secured running rights over that line into the city. Mayor James Frink had visited Montreal, and conferred with officials of the Grand Trunk Pacific.[65] There he had learned that they were "in no rush to establish terminals right away".[66] Among the reasons offered for the railway company's lack of enthusiasm, "practically no dredging had been done in Courtenay Bay [and] the Valley Railway was not yet finished".[67]

The city elite could only advocate on behalf of completing the Valley Line. Beyond advocacy it was helpless. Within Saint John the perception of a Courtenay Bay terminal complete with a National Transcontinental Railway connection was inextricably linked to the outcome of the Valley Railway. As the Mayor had learned, that viewpoint also prevailed in Montreal. E. J. Chamberlin, president of the Grand Trunk Pacific, reportedly assured Frink that his railroad would come "if the Valley Road provides a means of entrance to the city".[68] However, that entrance had to be the Kingston Peninsula and then on to Courtenay Bay. In Saint John there had been a difference of opinion regarding the route to be selected. Generally, members of the Common Council had favoured the Valley Road taking the Westfield to Carleton route in the hope that this would stimulate a bridge through Navy Island, to be utilized by the National Transcontinental *en route* to its terminals in Courtenay Bay. Frink had been of this opinion, hoping that a bridge could be constructed which would link the eastern and western sides of the main harbour by containing, in addition to rail tracks, lanes for vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Such a bridge had been approved in the 1911 plebiscite. Frink's opinion, however, as he admitted in the city's *Annual Report* of 1913, was changed "by the statement made by official heads of the G. T. Pacific, that if this Valley Road is deviated from the east to the west side, coming into Saint John, that the G. T. Pacific would not use it".[69]

Within the Board of Trade, as noted earlier, there had also been discussion as to supporting an eastern (Courtenay Bay) or western (Carleton) approach to the city.[70] The business elite had settled on the former.[71] But both local bodies could only advocate that the Valley Railway be completed as quickly as possible. This was done again by the Board of Trade in the spring of 1914.[72] In April, Premier Flemming's government passed the Valley Railway Bill.[73] The Valley Railway's construction was practically halted at the outbreak of the World War I, and by 1915 the railway, under the direction of Arthur Gould, had failed to meet its contractual obligations.[74] That year the provincial government assumed control of the Valley Railway — a railroad which had been projected from Grand Falls to Saint John — but only extended from Centreville (twenty-one miles north west of Woodstock) to Queenstown (seven miles south of Gagetown). Moreover, in March of 1915 the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company decided not to lease the National Transcontinental Railway, therefore negating any possibility of the G.T.P. Railway ever establishing a terminus in Courtenay Bay. The contemporary perception in Saint John was generally pessimistic. Nonetheless, one editor viewed the provincial government's takeover of the Valley Line and the legislation passed in May 1915 as indicating cause to hope that the Valley Railway would "form the connecting link between the deep water terminals here and the National Transcontinental".[75] Similarly, the Board of Trade forwarded resolutions to Ottawa and Fredericton, urging the former the importance of hastening the Valley Railway construction, and entreating the latter "to expedite . . . the connection between the Transcontinental Railway and the Port of Saint John by the shortest possible route . . ."[76] In June the Quebec Board of Trade sent a report to the Saint John Board outlining the details of a recent interview with Sir Robert Borden and with other members of the government. The Quebec Board urged the government to build a grain elevator with a capacity of 10,000,000 bushels in Quebec, Halifax and Saint John, thereby assuring business for Canadian seaports and the new railway. Borden reportedly claimed "that . . . the unfortunate circumstance of the war . . . forced [the government] to limit its expenses for public works to the most urgent actual needs".[77]

In 1914 the Board of Trade reflected its disappointment over the lack of progress in the Valley Line and the ensuing political scandals within the provincial government, which may have been perceived as further threatening the ultimate completion of the line. Beginning a commentary on the Valley Line in its *Annual Report* of 1914, the Board lamented: "It is a matter for regret that the Board is not in a position to present a more encouraging report with respect to the Valley Railway, and the possibility of an early connection with this port".[78] The Board did claim credit for having kept the issue alive in Fredericton and Ottawa. The next year, following another twelve month delay in the Valley Line and even more discouraging developments on the Courtenay Bay works, the Board's *Annual Report* noted that engineers had submitted their preliminary report to the provincial government on the "reasonable cost" for crossing the Saint John and Kennebecasis Rivers in order to bring the Valley Line into Saint John by the eastern or Courtenay Bay route.[79] Despite the fact that work on the Courtenay Bay harbour had run into difficulties, the Board of Trade had not given up pressing for a Valley Line connection to the National Transcontinental.

In 1915 when the federal government had asked the Grand Trunk Pacific to take over the National Transcontinental and the G.T.P. refused, the former began to operate the National Transcontinental itself. This action "inferentially released the Grand Trunk Pacific from its contract and consequently the government acquired another railway besides the Intercolonial".[80] Early in 1916, with the Intercolonial now operating the National Transcontinental, the Board of Trade feared that Saint John would not get its share of grain shipped on the National Transcontinental because the I.C.R. grain elevator at Saint John had been destroyed by fire in late 1914 and had not been rebuilt.[81] In a comprehensive resolution which touched on the business elite's principal port concerns, the Board reminded Prime Minister Borden's government that the Port of Saint John's "strategic situation has been recognized by the foremost transportation company of the empire," — the C.P.R. Building on the city's status as the winter port of the Canadian Pacific, the Board reminded Ottawa that, while there was no grain elevator in Courtenay Bay or on the I.C.R. area in Saint John, "on the western side of the harbour there were ample grain elevator facilities for any grain that might be routed over the National Transcontinental Railway for export at Saint John this winter . . ."[82] It is difficult to assess whether or not the Board mentioned the Carleton facilities because it suspected that these would be the only "ample" facilities at Saint John within the foreseeable future. In any case two months later, in early April, the provincial government announced that the Valley Railway would be constructed to Saint John by the West Side.[83] That month in the House of Commons, F. B. Carvell (Liberal-Carleton County), blamed the provincial government's decision to route the line through the West Side of Saint John on the federal government's "unwillingness to make the heavy expenditure involved in the construction of the St. John-Kennebecasis River bridges".[84] Carvell noted the extensive funding by the province in the Valley Line, and referred to the federal government's role in the "whole construction of the road [as being] attended with delusion, insincerity, and deceit".[85] The Hon. Robert Rogers responded that although Carvell sought to blame the government for the Valley Line situation, "the real blame, if any, must rest with the Laurier government [because] the terminus of the N.T.R. . . . should have been St. John and the difficulties of the Valley road were due to the misplaced location of the National Transcontinental".[86] Rogers added that, since the I.C.R. was now operating the Valley Line, there was no reason to secure an extension to Grand Falls as the Valley Line would have a connection to the Transcontinental through the I.C.R.'s McGivney-Fredericton line. Moreover, he reiterated the expensiveness of the proposed bridges which would have brought the Valley Line into Saint John *via* Courtenay Bay.

In late March 1916 the Board of Trade reacted to the proposed route change for the Valley Line condemning the "diversion as neither in the national interest, nor in the interest of the Province of New Brunswick, or the Port of St. John and respectfully urg[ing] . . . the government of New Brunswick in conjunction with the federal government to proceed with the construction . . . by the eastern route in accordance with its pledges".[87] Once again the Board's resolution was to have little result. In April a bill was introduced in the local legislature providing for the extension of the Valley Line to Saint John by the western approach. When passed a few days later not one voice was raised in opposition.[88] Within a week the House of Commons had made the appropriate changes in the Saint John Valley Railway Bill. The railroad was not to be extended to Grand Falls. It would connect with the Transcontinental at McGivney, and arrangements would be made with the C.P.R. for running rights from Westfield to the West Side piers in Saint John. The Saint John newspapers carried William Pugsley's assessment of the implications for the port and city of this "new arrangement as a sorry ending of what had once been planned as a great undertaking destined to make St. John the terminal of the National Transcontinental".[89]

By 1916 the promise of the Valley Line was finished. Throughout the summer work was undertaken on the final link between Gagetown and Westfield.[90] Because of wartime needs rails were unavailable, and the approximately 38-mile distance was not completed until after the armistice. In 1919, the line, which in 1911 had been projected to tap the Transcontinental, inaugurated "an irregular schedule between Saint John and Centreville".[91] At the end of World War I Courtenay Bay was still undeveloped, and, instead of a link with the National Transcontinental, Saint John had a local railway line connection, the operation of which the province only too happily surrendered to the Canadian National Railways a decade later. Despite the dismal returns from the projected Courtenay Bay terminal developments, the Port of Saint John enjoyed a certain degree of expansion during 1911-1918. This, however, focused largely on the West Side, and was a product of the tri-partite agreement of 1911.

## The City's Elite: Advocates for an Increased Level of Port Function within a National Transportation System

Between 1911-18 the civic and business elite of Saint John had to content themselves with improvements made largely on the West Side, and with smaller scale work undertaken on the eastern side of the harbour. Reflecting in 1917 on the meaning of the tri-partite agreement, the Board of Trade recalled: "In 1911, when the city had demonstrated the capabilities of the port as a traffic point for world commerce, and when its permanence as the premier winterport of Canada had been firmly established, the federal government assumed the responsibility for construction of additional docks and for the general development of the port".[92]

Having achieved a formal entry into a national transportation system, however, did not insure immediate government-initiated improvements on the West Side. The Board of Trade and Common Council late in 1912 and early 1913 began to press Ottawa to undertake the extension of wharf construction in Carleton.[93] By the end of 1917 Berths 14, 15, and 16 (see: Figure 5) had been completed. Although the initial plans which William Pugsley advanced in 1911 for the West Side had envisioned a line of piers extending down from the vicinity of Berth No. 1 to a point opposite the C.P.R.'s Bay Shore Yard,[94] the Board of Trade and the Common Council appeared pleased with the wartime progress of the wharves they had succeeded in convincing Ottawa to build.[95]

While this aspect of the new formalization served to enhance the port's function within a national transportation system, the Borden government's plan of making the Intercolonial "a paying proposition"[96] had repercussions in Saint John. In 1913 a former Canadian

Pacific official, Frederic P. Gutelius, became general manager, succeeding David Pottinger.[97] Gutelius proceeded to increase the freight rate on the road.[98] In Saint John the rate increase was a somewhat less bothersome aspect of the new policy than Gutelius' arrangement with the C.P.R., in which the latter was to withdraw its *Empress* lines from Saint John to serve the I.C.R. at Halifax.[99] As Mayor Frink noted in 1913, the West Side piers of Saint John had been built by the city for the C.P.R., and "Saint John was working for the Canadian Pacific business and they received it". The Gutelius agreement, Frink noted "could only be accomplished if the Intercolonial Railway would make specific rates for through and specialized traffic, from Saint John to Halifax".[100] In response to criticism addressed to him regarding the arrangment, Gutelius claimed: "I made the agreement with the C.P.R. regarding knowledge of special trains to the *Empress* boats at Halifax without consulting anybody |the City Council or Board of Trade| . . . because it was a good business arrangement".[101]

In the House, William Pugsley asserted that under the Gutelius agreement freight was being hauled from Saint John to Halifax at less per ton than the I.C.R.'s actual cost of operation.[102] Despite Gutelius' declaration that "any talk of political interference in the matter is all nonsense",[103] the Prime Minister's response to criticism of the agreement appeared not entirely apolitical. Claiming "it was but natural that the people of Halifax should feel that they should not be excluded from all the benefits which have accrued to Canada as a result of the construction of the C.P.R.," Borden remarked "he was convinced that the agreement does not discriminate either against Halifax or St. John".[104] This observation may have been difficult for Saint John's elite to accept, considering Borden's promises in Halifax a year earlier. On that occasion, the Prime Minister had pledged to give Halifax terminal facilities to compete with any in continental North America.[105] Certainly, as the Halifax Ocean terminals were then in the process of construction, and the Intercolonial had just received guaranteed shipments from the C.P.R. at Saint John, the port's position in a national system of transportation appeared less than stable.

The Board of Trade protested the Gutelius agreement made between representatives of the C.P.R. and the federal government, but the arrangement was renewed again for the season of 1914-1915. It is difficult to ascertain the C.P.R.'s role in this freight arrangement. Thomas Shaughnessy insisted that "St. John was the C.P.R.'s winter port", but at the same time his own protests to the agreement appeared to have been stilled.[106] In the fall of 1913 Shaughnessy wrote Borden regarding Courtenay Bay, criticizing the government's spending on the construction of terminals "which |he claimed| will be little used during the next ten or fifteen years".[107] Borden had Gutelius suggest a route through Saint John which would enable the C.P.R. to use the I.C.R. to reach the projected Courtenay Bay terminals.[108] Possibly the secrecy with which the Gutelius agreement was effected reflected not only the informal relationship between Gutelius and his former employer, but more important the opportunity for the C.P.R. to cover all its potential terminal bases.

Nonetheless, despite the build-up of Halifax and the prosperity which the Intercolonial enjoyed during the last year of World War I,[109] the Saint John Board of Trade could boast that the port was second, in volume of trade, only to Montreal during the years 1915-1918.[110]

The Gutelius agreement, which involved close cooperation between the I.C.R. and the C.P.R., illustrates the newer system of organization within which the port was now operating. More than a decade earlier, when the I.C.R. and C.P.R. had engaged in dispute over freight rates, T. G. Shaughnessy had come to Saint John and met with the Common Council to discuss the matter.[111] The city, however frivolous the C.P.R.'s threat might have been at that time, was able to participate in working out an arrangement between the railways. Now, the system of national transportation further removed the City Council and the Board of Trade from having an effective role in the Gutelius-C.P.R. arrangement. This merely underscored the consequences of vertical integration for a port-city on the periphery.

The effects of the Gutelius arrangement may have caused additional concern in Saint John, as well, in the fall of 1914. With the outbreak of World War I, the Gutelius arrangement, providing for freight transfers from the C.P.R. to the I.C.R., had been in effect for a year. Now in 1914, in addition to this unwelcome freight transfer arrangement, the ports of Saint John and Portland, Maine, were put in "much the same position"[112] regarding the shipments of war material. Portland until 1917 was part of a neutral nation, and thus munitions, but not troops, were shipped from Montreal through the Maine port. The C.P.R. *en route* from Montreal to Saint John passed through northern Maine, and thus that route would be "closed to military traffic".[113]

By October of 1914, there was speculation that Saint John would become a mobilization point for troops. In preparation, the Armoury, located at the foot of the main peninsula near the Lower Cove, was being kept "in readiness" for 1,200 men.[114] These, presumably, would be transported on the I.C.R. It is apparent that the Board of Trade was anxious to have troops quartered in the city. In the fall of 1915 J. A. Likely, President of the Board, and R. E. Armstrong, the Board's energetic secretary, met with J. D. Hazen, who assured them "that St. John would be the mobilization point for one battalion".[115] The Saint John Retail Merchant's Association voiced its displeasure ten days later, when it was learned that 4,000 men were being quartered at Halifax including the battalion promised to Saint John. The city's only hope for securing troop business during the coming winter rested upon the formation of a new battalion: "which will not be recruited up to strength until late in the winter and shortly before they leave the city". Consequently, such a unit would be "considerably under strength . . . have a much smaller payroll . . . and the money coming into the city would be correspondingly less".[116] Pressure from the businessmen and the Mayor resulted in the quartering of 2,000 troops at Saint John during the winter of 1915-16.[117] While the city appeared to have to solicit the presence of troops since they were not transported through Maine, its export activities in foodstuffs and war material increased appreciably.[118] There is also the suggestion that the war helped indirectly to contribute to the building of Berths Nos. 14, 15 and 16.[119] Every aspect of the Port of Saint John's role in the war was continually advanced by the Secretary of the Board of Trade, whose articles appearing in the New York journal *Shipping Illustrated*[120] and in the *Monetary Times* were generally reprinted in local newspapers.[121] Armstrong's advocacy of the port's capabilities was, no doubt, in part boosterism, but a careful reading of his work reveals the basis of a philosophy which would later be incorporated into the demands of the Maritime Rights movement. Arguing that "since the beginning of the war the port of St. John, New Brunswick |had| . . . fixed itself more firmly on the map of the world," Armstrong advocated "Canadian exporters and importers taking fuller advantage of the eastern ports of Canada rather than of the United States".[122] The Secretary's position echoed the message from the Board of Trade's *Annual Reports* — 1914 through 1917. The *Reports* of 1914 and 1915 had painted a fairly dismal portrait of local business, an image sustained in part by the Gutelius arrangement. In 1916, however, a more enthusiastic *Report* reflected the boom enjoyed by the port. Noting, "so far as St. John is concerned the war has given a decided stimulus to commerce and industry", the Board proclaimed: "Our slogan henceforth should be "Canadian Ports and Canadian Railways for Canadian Business".[123] At the end of 1917, the Board of Trade expressed concern over the war-generated prosperity. Stating that "the whole country is sharing in the artificial prosperity thus created", the Board queried "what would be the effect" on the port and city following a cessation of hostilities and wartime inspired economic activity.[124]

Fairly recent experience within Saint John may have provided the basis for this circumspect observation. At the onset of 1912, so enthusiastic had the predictions been of a Courtenay Bay development that real estate agents in the City of Saint John expended much effort and money in advertising the allurements of East Saint John. Extensive maps of planned subdivisions competed for space in local newspapers with articles advertising the attractiveness of East Saint John and its proximity to the coming Courtenay Bay developments. In the Common Council the possibility of incorporating East Saint John into the City of Saint John was discussed. The street railway in the city was extended to provide transportation to the area — all of this in preparation for, and encouragement of, the anticipated Courtenay Bay development. So rapid was the subdivision development that the Board of Trade passed a resolution, later supported by the Common Council,[125] which resulted in the 1912 passage of the first Town Planning Act in Canada. Although a Town Planning Commission was eventually established in the city by 1915,[126] the immediate stimulus for the Town Planning Act — Courtenay Bay — had already begun to experience difficulties. Moreover, a constricted wartime money situation helped to produce an "inactive" real estate market.[127] The real estate activity in East Saint John, again, serves to illustrate the effect within the city of vertical integration of the port into a national transportation system.

With respect to the anticipation of the city's elite regarding the 1911 tri-partite agreement, here too there were disappointments. While the federal government had completed construction of Berths 14, 15, and 16, the work had not been Ottawa-initiated, but rather resulted from nudging on the part of the city and compliance in the face of needed warehousing and piers for wartime exigencies. Again, construction of these West Side Berths reinforced the city's relationship with the C.P.R. On the East Side of the harbour, the Atlantic Sugar Refinery had been established near the Lower Cove. The achievement of several years work on the part of the City Council and the Board of Trade, this Montreal-managed refinery helped to reinforce the primacy of the principal harbour in the Port of Saint John. Lastly, depite the fondest dreams and attempts to establish a secondary harbour in Courtenay Bay, the firm of Norton Griffiths had proven unable to surmount the tight money markets of the war years; a similar fate had befallen the Grand Trunk Pacific.

At the end of World War I the dreams of Saint John's business and civic elite had been tempered by the wartime and post-wartime realities of the larger system of transportation in which the port was integrated. By 1918 a heightened sense of patriotism, coupled with a realistic anticipation of a peace time economy, helped launch the city's elite into a newer and more urgent advocacy of the port as a fully integrated member of a national system of transportation — a campaign which, in combination with the Maritime Rights movement, resulted in port nationalization by 1927.

## CHAPTER XII

# *Vertical Integration through Regional Association: Nationalizing The Port Of Saint John, 1918 - 1927*

Between the years 1918-1927 the city's elite continued their advocacy on behalf of the port. In this period, too, the usage and expansion of port facilities, as well as maintenance of the port's position as a railway destination, would be advanced. The tone of this post-war advocacy was to be influenced, however, by both a decline in export trade and by the consequences stemming from the nationalization of the railways. In its turn, each of these occurrences caused the local elite to reflect on the tenuous position of the port in a developing transportation system and on the urgent need for expanded facilities to remain competitive within a national transportation system.

For the Common Council and Board of Trade, these issues invariably were to focus on the continuing question of harbour control. The tri-partite agreement of 1911, while giving the federal government a level of control on the West Side, left the city still the owner of the largest portion of the harbour — the East Side and Portland wharves and a few slips on the West Side. However, federal government control focused on the busiest berths, those located at the Sand Point vicinity. Although vertical integration had been achieved through the tri-partite agreement, the spatially limited focus of federal participation continued to underline the unresolved question concerning future control over the entire harbour. Immediate resolution of the issue was to emerge eventually in 1927 within the general recommendations of the Duncan Commission, appointed to investigate Maritime grievances.

Schemes for port nationalization, or harbour commission as the earlier proposals were commonly called, had been articulated before the emergence of the regional Maritime Rights movement. The particular development of the 1920's which affected the Port of Saint John made nationalization of the total harbour a perceived necessity to compete as a fully integrated member of a national system of transportation.

Certainly from the 1890's, when the city first determined to undertake the task of making the port a competitive transport node with the assistance primarily of C.P.R. freight, the issue of eventual control of the harbour was most frequently associated with the question of whether or not it was local or national in character. For the Common Council and Board of Trade, the arrival of the C.P.R. in 1889 and the achievement of winter port status in 1895 pointed to the national character of the port. The transport node of the city — the Port of Saint John — had become the point at which freight-laden trains provided ocean-going vessels with cargo from the port's extensive hinterland.

In the first decade of the twentieth century the idea of port nationalization had been discussed as a means of transferring the upkeep, expansion and management of a local facility serving a national community to the federal government. However, the question of transferral or sale of harbour properties presented the local elite with a dilemma. Could relinquishing the expense and control of Saint John's most visible Charter-granted property be weighed satisfactorily against the real possibility of severely reducing, perhaps eliminating, the city's already shrinking influence over the business generated through the port by outside agencies.

This Chapter, through a consideration of harbour commission schemes, railway developments and the port consequences of the Maritime Rights movement, examines the efforts of the city's elite in grappling with the dilemma of harbour control, the implication of diminished autonomy in port matters and the circumstances contributing to local acquiescence of port nationalization in 1927.

## Harbour Commission: Wrestling with a Familiar Dilemma

Harbour commission discussions in Saint John were always influenced by the peninsula structure of the city, which contributed to the city's ownership of the harbour, and by the relationships between the two elite groups within the city: the Common Council and the Board of Trade.

Before the City of Saint John received its charter in 1785, the harbour of Saint John belonged to, and was under the control of, the Crown. When the residents on the East Side of the harbour and those of Carleton on the West Side petitioned for a charter of incorporation, there were no bridges connecting the two sides of the proposed city. Nor at that early date, as mentioned in Chapter I, was there any regularized ferry service. Residents from both sides of the harbour contended that the body of water between them was the only means of inter-peninsula communication. Because of the particular geographical configuration of the city and the position of the harbour in relation to the East Side and the West Side, the harbour was integrated into the original charter. Thus the latter identified "the said districts |East Side and West Side| . . . the land . . . the water . . . within the lines, limits and boundaries aforesaid", and vested control and ownership of the harbour in the City of Saint John.[1]

The other constant variable in harbour commission discussions focused on the Common Council, which represented the city on all matters concerning the harbour, and on the Board of Trade, many of whose members had port-related business interests. During earlier negotiations between the city and Ottawa, the Board of Trade generally believed that the City Council tended to set too high a value on property being transferred. The businessmen were concerned that Ottawa, having to pay too much for the actual property rights, would either reduce the funding for expansion and management, or in an attempt to recoup the expenses of the purchase price, set a high charge for use of the port by vessels. The tension between the city aldermen and the Board of Trade was particularly acute in the first two decades after Confederation, when the role of outside agencies was not as firmly established as in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Evidence of this local divisiveness surfaced during the harbour commission discussions of the 1870's when the Common Council was prepared "to dispose of its property and privileges in the harbour".[2] The Board of Trade, although in agreement with the principle of harbour commission, feared untoward consequences for the port if the aldermen got their way financially from Ottawa.[3] Throughout the 1880's the issue again emerged, when federal control appeared as an attractive alternative to port management and development during those depressed times. However, then too, unity within the city could not be achieved on terms suitable to the Council and the Board of Trade.[4] Rejection by plebiscite of a harbour commission in 1889, was followed by the beginnings of city initiative in the development of the West Side. Throughout the 1890's, when the port began to enjoy a rejuvenation, the idea of harbour commission was not entertained.

By the early years of this century, however, harbour commission again began to emerge, but now the term was used interchangeably with port nationalization. Moreover, as a result of the gradual erosion of local control through the railways and steamship agencies, the Common Council and Board of Trade were more inclined to join forces on behalf of the port rather than splinter the position of the port and city in an emerging national system of transportation.

In 1902, Louis Coste, the Dominion Engineer, had alluded to port nationalization for Saint John and Halifax.[5] By 1905 the *Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation* had recommended that Saint John be nationalized. But the Commission's *Report* contained a cautionary note. Observing that the harbour "is the property of the city", John Bertram, chairman of the Commission advised the federal government to enter "some agreement" with the city in which the latter would consult with Ottawa and "secure its sanction" before selling, leasing or otherwise alienating any of its harbour fronts as conditional to receiving "further public aid" towards additional dredging in the harbour.[6]

The Common Council, in consultation with William Pugsley, began discussions with the federal government which, although touching on the possibility of a harbour commission, terminated with the compromise measures of the tri-partite agreement in 1911. For the city, this agreement meant the federal government would construct berths south of Berth No. 1. As critics of the agreement and advocates of later harbour commission schemes were to accurately point out, the city was still largely responsible for the port as a whole "since the 1911 agreement did not relieve taxpayers or the port traffic from the burden of interest and [the sinking] fund" accruing from the city's development of the port.[7] The tri-partite agreement covering only one section of the harbour on the West Side, had resulted by the end of World War I however, in three additional berths. Moreover, the combined effect of the agreement and the wartime boom in port business led to a persisting consideration of the harbour commission idea.

Throughout the period immediately following the signing of the tri-partite agreement and during World War I, successive *Annual Reports* from the city claimed that three classes of ownership present in the harbour — government, civic and private — were unsatisfactory, and contributed to a friction "that could be eliminated under single ownership".[8] Viewed as "the gateway to our city [and] perhaps our greatest asset",[9] it was suggested by Alderman James V. Russell that after the war steps should be taken "to nationalize the Port as far as the Winter Port business is concerned".[10] Russell had visited Halifax where the city council had no jurisdiction over the harbour, and where the wharves were all privately owned, and the harbour controlled by the Dominion of Canada. The Saint John alderman was apparently impressed by the calibre of workmanship undertaken by Ottawa in the construction of government docks at Halifax.[11] No doubt the Halifax visit strengthened Russell's desire for a similar form of management to be implemented at Saint John.

Concurring in the view held by the Common Council, the Board of Trade believed that the progress of the port "as a national winter port" focused the government's attention upon the importance of nationalizing it "so that it may be developed along permanent and comprehensive lines".[12] In March 1918 the Board of Trade advised Ottawa that it favoured the city's interests in the harbour being taken over by a federal commission under conditions acceptable to the City Council.[13] That summer Mayor Robert T. Hayes met with the Hon. F. B. Carvell, Minister of Public Works, and with members of the Board of Trade to discuss among other port matters, harbour commission. By October C. C. Ballantyne, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, visited Saint John. After meeting with the Mayor and members of the Board of Trade, Ballantyne declared himself favourably disposed to a harbour commission, and promised "to expedite the matter" as soon as the city submitted to Ottawa a proposed scheme to be placed before the citizens in a plebiscite.[14] Alderman Thomas Bullock endorsed the idea of port nationalization, and noted in the *Annual Report* the possibility "of the negotiations with the federal government being brought to a successful termination".[15]

By February 1919 Rupert W. Wigmore, M.P. for Saint John, and a former alderman, reported to the Board of Trade that a proposal on harbour commission would be forthcoming shortly from Ottawa.[16] Underlying the urgency for a harbour commission, Thomas Bullock advised his civic colleagues at a gathering attended by representatives of the principal shipping firms engaged at the port that "definite word from the government . . . in regard to a harbour commission or operation of increased harbour rates" faced the city and its port facilities users. Steamship officials went on record as favouring the abolition of "dual control" (i.e., city and federal) and adoption of the commission for the harbour.[17] The Common Council was urging the steamship agents to join with it and the Board of Trade to convince Ottawa of the need to implement a commission at the Port of Saint John.

Early in March, Mayor Hayes and Alderman Thomas Bullock journeyed to Ottawa to confer with the Acting Minister of Marine and Fisheries, A. K. McLean.[18] Their object was to have Ottawa increase the valuation of the harbour properties from $1,125,000 — believed within the city to be extremely low — to $2,500,000, the City Council's evaluation. Negotiating on behalf of the city, together with Hayes and Bullock, R. W. Wigmore and the Hon. F. B. Carvell reportedly had convinced Ottawa to raise the valuation to $2,250,000.[19] A later report claimed the government was willing to fix the price at $2,200,000. The city, however, was holding out for an additional $330,000 — a capitalization of the anchorage and harbour master dues for a period of five years. This latter condition was being objected to by Ottawa contending that it did not represent revenue-earning property.[20] To adjudicate this difference Ottawa sent auditors to Saint John to review the city's books on harbour expenditures.[21] Following the audit, Ottawa offered $2,000,000 for the harbour. At a meeting of the Common Council Alderman Thomas Bullock reminded his colleagues that the city had fixed the price of the harbour at approximately $2,500,000. He claimed the bonded indebtedness was $1,332,000, that Ottawa had no right to arbitrarily reduce the valuation, and that under the circumstances "the city could continue operation of the harbour without difficulty".[22]

In the opinion of R. W. Wigmore $2,000,000 was all the city could get from the federal government and at that figure he claimed "it had been a difficult task . . . to induce [Mr. Ballantyne] to favorably consider the proposal that the harbour be put in Commission".[23] Wigmore and Stanley E. Elkin, M.P. from Saint John, met with the Board of Trade, and explained that the government's offer of $2,000,000 was as high as Ottawa would go. The Board of Trade voted overwhelmingly in favour of having Ottawa's offer accepted — the only dissenting vote that of Alderman Thomas Bullock. Among the Board's reasons for urging transfer to Ottawa was the belief that no system of civic government, regardless of its effective management, was capable of providing "a continuity of policy as the needs of the port require". In short, the Board, while also arguing for unity of harbour management, was once again recognizing the increasing scale of national transport developments and the need to have the harbour operated under a complementary form of management organization.[24]

In July 1919 the House of Commons passed the Saint John Harbour Bill.[25] However, J. D. Hazen, William Pugsley, W. H. Thorne and ex-Mayor J. H. Frink were reportedly against the proposed terms of transfer.[26] In July, Mayor Hayes claimed to be disappointed at the "small business" behavior of Ottawa in reducing the harbour valuation to $2,000,000. Hayes believed that Western Canadian opposition had been "responsible for the reduction in harbour valuation".[27] Moreover, City Council wondered what provision had been made for the ferry. The aldermen appeared critical of the Minister of Marine and Fisheries for not having answered Council's written enquiries. Control of the ferry appeared to be a real stumbling block, no provision in the Act having been made for its operation by the city or commission.[28] Despite this, however, R. W. Wigmore, father of the Act of 1919,[29] continued to favour commission because among its acknowledged benefits it would "relieve the city . . . of maintaining a sinking fund" for harbour expenditures.[30]

By early January 1920, when the city learned that the ferry approaches were also to be included in the commission scheme, harbour commission was temporarily "shelved".[31] A city delegation, however, conferred at Ottawa with the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and returned claiming the Minister had promised to safeguard the ferry interests. For the Hon. C. C. Ballantyne this "assurance" meant that the ferry properties were not to be exempted from a commission purchase, but should a commission be formed the government would request the commissioners to lease to the city "such property as may be directly required for the purpose of a ferry across the harbour at a nominal rate".[32] Even for staunch supporters of a harbour commission idea, such a demand precluded a possibility of a commission being established. Similarly, a resolution passed by the City Council favoured a harbour commission only if the Act of 1919 was amended to allow the city free use of the present ferry landings and approaches, and be supplied with other landings and approaches should the commission desire the present locales at some future date. Council also wanted it stipulated that the rates levied at the port not exceed those at any other Canadian winter port. Board of Trade support for the currently proposed harbour scheme was also diminishing. Members expressed concern over the ferry question and the port charges.[33] In an attempt to publicize the needs of the port, R. E. Armstrong, the Board's Secretary, sent a message to every member of parliament urging the advantage to Canada in providing facilities at Saint John. In March a delegation of M.P.'s, largely from the West, arrived in Saint John. Among them was the Hon. Arthur Meighen, who warned against "expecting too much at a time when it is so difficult to raise money", but he claimed he and his parliamentary colleagues would return to Ottawa with "a better understanding of the seaboard end of the great transportation problem".[34]

In May following his election, Mayor E. Allan Schofield, and his predecessor, expressed a desire that something be done about the harbour commission situation. It was generally believed that the port had handled a capacity business during the preceding year and winter, and that further business was dependent on the addition of new facilities. Moreover, there was a fear that failure to construct adequate berthing would discourage trade.[35] These issues were intimately tied to the question of harbour commission.

By July there still was no progress on the ferry matter in relation to the harbour commission. Schofield reported that C. C. Ballantyne would give the city ferry rights but "would not put the assurance in 'black and white' ". Alderman Frink, again serving on the Council, believed the government would not "interfere with the ferry service". Furthermore, he observed that Carleton residents would not permit "anyone . . . to interfere with their [ferry] rights".[36] In August Mayor Schofield visited Montreal to meet with members of the C.P.R. and C.N.R. regarding their opinions on harbour commission. The city representative was hesitant to make any decision which would be unfavourable to the railway companies. The C.P.R. was indifferent; the C.N.R. favoured a commission. After meeting also with the representatives of the Montreal Harbour Commission, the Saint John Mayor returned, convinced that some form of harbour commission would greatly benefit the port.[37] Despite Schofield's enthusiasm, however, his Council colleagues prohibited holding a plebiscite on the matter unless the ferry issue was resolved.[38]

Little more discussion was held on the issue until the following June when City Council decided to hold a plebiscite on August 1st.[39] Mayor Schofield announced that weekly public meetings would be held to acquaint the citizens with the proposed scheme and invite discussion of the issue. At that first meeting the Mayor claimed to be personally in favour of the harbour commission. Schofield attributed the City Council's delay on the plebiscite to "not knowing just what the citizens wanted to do, or would do on the question of transferring the harbour . . . ."[40] While Schofield's explanation was a weak excuse for possible Council indecisiveness, one reason for introducing the harbour commission issue at this time may have been the heightened attention being directed regionally to transport questions in general, particularly those concerning freight rates and competition from Portland, Maine.

In advocating the transfer, Schofield warned that increased taxes would have to be levied within the city to repair the wharves, if the federal government did not assume responsibility for the port. He dismissed the suggestion that government would "rob the city of its ferry privileges . . ." Alderman Thomas Bullock, convinced that a commission was necessary, addressed the assemblage and endorsed the Mayor's position, adding: "let the government do it . . . and all Canada will have to pay the bills".[41] Alderman Frink, who opposed the currently proposed scheme, claimed entreaties from the other civic members had not altered his view. H. R. McLellan, who would eventually serve as Mayor of Saint John, criticized the scheme as inadequately recompensing the city for its property while at the same time removing control from the local area. For McLellan the question was not one of a harbour commission, but whether the present Act was adequate to warrant surrender of the port.[42]

The Board of Trade President, William Burditt, and others in that organization believed it would be detrimental to Saint John's development if electors voted against commission.[43] Their view was undoubtedly influenced by the dismal business conditions prevailing in the country, by the freight rate concerns of the Maritime manufacturers, and by the knowledge that many of the oldest wharves built in the late nineteenth century were in need of repair. Moreover, the underlying crux of the whole port question — that it had never been a money-making proposition when viewed in terms of revenue derived against expenditures — may have convinced the business elite to let the government assume the task of expanding and maintaining the harbour.

As the election approached, shipping men began intensifying their pro-commission letters to the local newspapers. The argument for federal government control was strengthened by the knowledge that the city insured its pier warehouses for about $190,000 — hardly sufficient for replacement. Nor did it carry any insurance at all on its wharves because adequate coverage would cost about $50,000 a year in premiums — a sum the city could not afford as harbour revenues already showed a deficit.

The harbour commission scheme was supported by J. B. M. Baxter, W. H. Thorne, W. S. Fisher, and by an array of others long associated with the port and city. A few days before the vote, Baxter, in rendering his opinion as City Recorder, declared that the plebiscite was not on the Act itself but rather on the "principle of harbour commission". A positive vote would permit the City Council to negotiate an agreement with Ottawa. The Mayor added the customary pro-commission assurances regarding the ferry.[44]

The difficulty with the Mayor's assurances, however, was that they could not be supported by any communication from Ottawa. The apparent last-minute stand by the pro-commission people, that the vote was a plebiscite on the principle of harbour commission and not on the Act of 1919 appeared to win few converts. Too, the City Council had not acted upon the harbour commission Act for two years: during the first a questionable arrangement regarding the ferries had been discussed, and through much of the second, with the exception of the two months preceding the vote, little public discussion of harbour commission had occurred. Voter turnout was miserably disappointing to pro-commission advocates. Only twenty percent of the electorate registered an opinion, the majority of whom voted against commission.[45]

Lamenting the result of the plebiscite the pro-commission Editor of *The Globe* concluded the citizens wanted "title of the harbour kept in the city". Such title, he continued, while retaining civic authority and control did not increase "by one cent" the ability of the city "to bear the responsibility of that authority and control".[46] To the arguments made by those few who believed defeat of commission would mean the federal government would be unlikely to assist the Port of Saint John, an anti-commission Editor reminded his readers that under one government |Laurier| when the city was strongly represented in the Cabinet, "we saw the beginning of a policy of real nationalization here |tri-partite agreement| while under the next government |Borden| that policy of constructing piers of national revenue at Saint John was continued".[47] Following the plebiscite it appeared that pro and anti factions of the commission issue now favoured turning towards working out an arrangement which would benefit the Port of Saint John, although all lacked concrete proposals.

Commenting in the City's *Annual Report*, Alderman Thomas Bullock touched on the distinction between external and internal port functions as spheres of civic control, when he noted it was time to recognize "the fact that port affairs require special consideration and must be treated separately from the paving, repairs, cleaning, and lighting of streets and the construction of sewers or other similar municipal affairs".[48] The introduction of new business for the port through the completion of bulk storage facilities for fuel oil at Courtenay Bay and through the export traffic in potatoes only confirmed Bullock's view that a form of unified control and management was needed at the Port of Saint John.

That need would become more apparent as the port and city encountered the oppressive economic difficulties of the mid-1920's.[49]

## Harbour and Railways: The Pivotal Relationship

Emerging simultaneously with proposals for improving the port were concerns about the post-war railway reorganization with Canada and its effect on Saint John. As the harbour commission issue appeared to have been temporarily dissipated, attention of the Board of Trade in particular turned to the railway-related issues which had been steadily coming to the foreground, and eventually became the focus of much of the economic dissatisfaction of the period.[50] While Saint John contained many of the proponents of the Maritime Rights movement, notably J. D. McKenna, A. M. Belding and A. P. Paterson,[51] who joined their regional colleagues particularly those from Nova Scotia in decrying the threat to the area through alterations in the freight rate structure and the acquisition of the Grand Trunk by Canada, the concern with these regional issues was inextricably linked to the historical role of the railways in developing the Port of Saint John — a port which was owned and being supported by the local citizens.

Two railway-related issues concerning the Port of Saint John emerged after World War I. Each threatened to dash any hopes the port had of expanding or retaining its export-import position within Canada. The first was the freight rates issue which saw them increased, beginning in 1912, until the post-war period when a parity had been achieved with Central Canada. The second concerned the effect of the Canadian government's takeover of the Grand Trunk Railway — a railroad which gave Ottawa "a vested interest" in Portland, Maine and a line which Saint John had always viewed as its competitor.[52]

By the spring of 1921, frequent editorials, revealing an underlying theoretical sophistication, discussed the role of freight rates in a system of transportation. *The Standard* for example noted "under present business conditions [the freight rate structure] practically controls manufacturing and other lines of production everywhere".[53] The plight of Maritime industries struggling in the constricted circumstances of the early 1920's was summed up by W. S. Fisher, who had been prominent in the Board of Trade since the 1890's. Reminding his business colleagues that the region was not gaining in population, and that its local manufacturers would have to sell more outside the Maritimes, Fisher asserted that "some preference in rates must be granted in order to help our industries".[54] This meeting five years prior to the establishment in 1926 of the Duncan Commission, urged Ottawa to appoint a Royal Commission to study all aspects of the freight rate schedule as it applied to the Intercolonial.

In the summer, a combined Maritime Provinces delegation visited Prime Minister Meighen on the question of freight rates. H. R. McLellan of Saint John returned less than optimistic and annoyed that Meighen allowed only slightly more than an hour for the presentation. City-wide response to the lukewarm reception at Ottawa revealed some of the intense acrimony occasioned by the post-war freight rates and by the regional differences in Canada. Commenting on the futile meeting an editor observed that Saint John and other Maritime areas "do not see why they . . . should have to stand aside and take what they can get, while the Doukhabors, Mennonites . . and the scum of Eastern Europe who dwell in the new western provinces should have the right of way".[55] A year later when Western Progressives were depicted as not supporting the winter ports of Canada, the East-West breech on freight rates seemed irreparable.[56]

The 1923 removal of the freight rate differential, in effect between Halifax and Saint John since the late 1890's engendered little dissatisfaction within the city. In the spirit of co-operative complaint being generated towards the rest of Canada, the business community believed both Maritime cities could prosper if more export freight from Western Canada was routed through Maritime ports.[57] Periodic review of various agreements signed between the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway [1903] and the Canadian Northern [1914], both now part of the Canadian National System were constantly cited in support of greater utilization of Canadian ports and consideration in the freight rate structure, particularly as both were seen as crucial to the development of Saint John.[58] By the spring of 1924, Saint John, Halifax and other east coast ports had received a rate reduction on flour, but the Maritime ports were still in the same class as Portland and Boston. Disputes between East and West over the freight rate question continued with eastern newspapers chiding Western M.P.'s "to take a national view of the situation so that they may realize that the benefits of national railway transportation are as much the right of the Maritime Provinces as they are of those on the prairie".[59] Taking the case of the Maritimes and Saint John to Central and Western Canadian cities in 1925, A. M. Belding presented the reasons why Canadian exporters should use Canadian ports.[60]

Railway spokesmen, however, particularly the Canadian National Railway's President Sir Henry Thornton, argued that the control of the port of export rested not with them but with "the grain pools and the owners of the grain".[61] An editorial from the Boston *Transcript* outlined the problem for Canadian east coast ports. Assessing the growth in production of Canadian wheat, the American newspaper observed that Canadian Atlantic ports, as well as Montreal and Quebec, simply could not handle the magnitude of Canadian wheat production while the generally lower freight rates "combined with the greatest expedition" attracted the wheat exporters. Noting also that Norfolk, Virginia was able to successfully compete for Canadian wheat against Canadian ports, the Boston reporter concluded this situation occurred because "the facilities of Canadian ports have not kept pace with the enormous growth in the Canadian export business".[62] Lack of having "kept pace", of course discriminated against Maritime ports but also the existing situation had made import business attractive to U.S. ports as export cargoes were always available and without the associated delay which increasingly characterized Canadian ports. J. D. McKenna, publisher of the *Telegraph-Journal* reprinted this American editorial, arguing contrary to Sir Henry Thornton "that control of the routing, in reality, rests in the hands of those who make the rates".[63] McKenna's views appeared to have the support of the *Grain Grower's Guide* of Winnipeg, which claimed "no one knows better than Sir Henry that the port through which wheat is shipped to the world market is regulated by service, and of that service freight rates constitute the outstanding factor".[64] In January of 1926 a delegation of business and civic leaders from Saint John and Halifax met with the C.N.R. President, who promised "more freight, additional facilities . . . and ample tonnage to handle traffic" at Canadian ports.[65] The consensus of this meeting was that the work of 1925, during which all of Canada had been aroused to the plight of the maritimes, had "at last forced the issue to the point where it cannot be ignored".[66]

The decision to investigate ways of routing more Canadian exports through Canadian ports became even more pressing following the bumper wheat crop of autumn 1925. Proportionally more found an outlet through U.S. ports — a condition which encouraged demands in Saint John and Halifax for greater port facilities to handle the traffic. To the allegation made by some workers that Atlantic Canadian ports could not provide adequate tonnage, evidence was presented by steamship agents in Saint John, charging that bookings to the port had to be cancelled due to a lack of freight.[67]

Within Saint John the entire freight rate question and use of Atlantic ports always turned eventually to the city's historical nemesis — the Port of Portland, Maine. The takeover of the Grand Trunk by the Government of Canada placed an additional strain on the railway question. In 1919, the Saint John Board of Trade adopted a resolution viewing "with grave apprehension" the acquisition by the government of the Grand Trunk Railway, "including that feature which would involve the owning and operating of a railway in a foreign country".[68] Moreover, the Board was well aware of the need to make the McGivney connection and the Fredericton Bridge stronger links in the National Transcontinental system.

The fears of Canadian government ownership of the Grand Trunk appeared legitimate late in 1920 when newspapers carried reports of grain being shipped to Portland, Maine. A local railway official at Saint John offered the opinion that "it was only natural" for the Grand Trunk Railway to route grain on its own lines and to Portland, where the railway had its own terminals.[69] Reiteration of this theme continued in the city's newspapers when it appeared that Ottawa, in order to pay for the Grand Trunk, would have to see to it that freights were provided at Portland. This development caused some to wonder what the National Transcontinental was built for, and called to mind the now accurate assessment of the N.T.R. as "two streaks of rust and a right of way".[70] With such criticism of the federal government's railway policies, defeat of the Conservative candidates in the 1921 federal election might have been expected. However, J. B. M. Baxter and Dr. Murray MacLaren were successful partly because William Pugsley had not entered the contest, thus depriving the Liberal Party of a strong port man.[71]

By mid-1922, Saint John and Halifax were urging joint cooperation between their respective Boards of Trade "to pull together against Portland".[72] Consistently, the practice of routing Canadian export traffic through Portland, Maine over a Canadian government-owned railway was criticized. George E. Barbour of the Saint John Board of Trade moved a resolution that freight rates on the National Transcontinental Railway be adjusted to permit routing of Canadian grain to the "open ports of the Maritimes" in the winter.[73] H. C.

Schofield, the Board's president, received promises that the C.P.R. and the C.N.R. would provide all the trade the port could handle for the winter season of 1922-23.[74] That Saint John had to campaign for, and urge, the routing of Canadian grain through the port was constantly impressed on the business and civic elite by its counterparts in Portland. For example, in the fall of 1923, perhaps in response to the pressure Maritime centres were placing on Canadian railways, a trainload of Portland businessmen, led by Henry F. Merrill, travelled through Western Canada to advertise their port and to solicit business for its facilities. The progress of this group of American boosters was carefully charted and assessed in Saint John. To the declared astonishment of Saint John, the President of the Winnipeg Board of Trade, T. R. Deacon, urged closer ties between Portland and the West. At the very moment when Saint John and its sister city Halifax were clamoring for more western freight, the West was being courted by Portland.[75] The reported number of tons of freight handled by the C.N.R., at Portland, Halifax and Saint John for 1922 and 1923, which clearly demonstrated Portland's use by the Canadian National, continued to be criticized in Saint John, although the latter fared better than Halifax because of the traffic hauled to the West Side by the C.P.R.[76] The issue of Portland continued to agitate Maritime M.P.'s. J. B. M. Baxter declared that Canada should make a choice: the Canadian National's Grand Trunk Railway route to Portland or the C.N.R.'s route to Halifax and Saint John. Baxter believed there was insufficient traffic to build up both. Arguing that a heavier charge on the freight to Portland would benefit Atlantic Canada, Baxter claimed "let the country bear the difference for the sake of building up the National Railway".[77]

By the end of 1925, protest from Saint John and Halifax over the diversion of Canadian wheat to foreign ports — especially Portland — had become so intense that the Maine city's newspapers were regularly commenting on the agitation and its threat to Portland's business.[78] The continuing attempts by Portland to secure Canadian export freight caused an extensive controversy between the C.N.R. and the Maritime cities. Halifax believed its losses to Portland were greater than Saint John's because the latter had the service of the C.P.R. Attempts were made to ameliorate the differences caused by the freight rates issue and the competition of Portland through a joint meeting held in January between representatives of the C.P.R. and delegations from Saint John and Halifax.[79]

For Saint John and the rest of the Maritimes, however, the most promising announcement came from the government's revealed intention to establish a Royal Commission to investigate Maritime claims — a commission which would address itself to, among other issues, freight rates and the allied question of port development.

### Maritime Rights and Port Nationalization: Partially Realized Goals

Although both the Board of Trade and the Common Council had campaigned against the existing freight rates and the use of foreign ports for Canadian exports, it was the business elite who led the city-wide agitation for better treatment from the C.N.R. In cooperation with the local newspapers, particularly the *Telegraph-Journal* of J. D. McKenna and his chief editor, A. M. Belding, the Board of Trade appeared to have been the more vigorous local organization in the railway related issues of the 1920's.

Following the harbour commission plebiscite of 1921, Saint John's business and civic elite had been galvanized by the freight rate issue. While this question tended to dominate all other questions because it was central to the time/cost element of modern transportation, it also highlighted the needs of the port — initially and particularly as these affected Courtenay Bay. In December of 1922, W. F. Burditt, the retiring President of the Board of Trade, remarked that internal matters such as the hydro question had prevented the Common Council from pursuing the harbour commission matter further. He urged both local bodies to improve railway connections to the port, particularly the C.N.R., and the development of C.N.R. facilities at Courtenay Bay.[80]

Early in 1923, a joint committee from the Common Council and the Board of Trade met to consider means of developing the port. J. B. M. Baxter claimed that he always favoured harbour commission, that Saint John's "real rival" was Portland and "that the battle of the ports was organization and equipment".[81] Baxter and the majority believed the organization should be national and that equipment should be funded from Ottawa. The Mayor, G. Frederick Fisher and the others present believed the formation of a committee was necessary. By February the committee, which included William Scully, R. E. Armstrong, G. E. Barbour, E. A. Schofield, H. C. Schofield, W. F. Burditt, Premier Walter E. Foster, and J. B. M. Baxter, decided to solicit the advice of the Dominion harbour engineer Alexander Gray. The latter claimed a comprehensive plan for Saint John Harbour was being prepared at Ottawa.[82] In June, the federal government granted funds towards improving the channel entrance to the harbour.[83] Although an encouraging sign, the continuing need at the port was expanded facilities. The Board of Trade's campaign seemed to be gaining adherents in August, when E. W. Beatty, president of the C.P.R., endorsed the city's need for additional berths. However, the Hon. J. H. King, Minister of Public Works, claimed extensive new works could not be undertaken, but that the dry dock currently being completed in Courtenay Bay would be receiving financial aid.[84]

Assistance to the dry dock, undertaken by the Saint John Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company in the fall of 1918, was welcomed, but the entire National Transcontinental and Valley Railway Line connection, which was to have coincided with the development of terminals at Courtenay Bay, had been such a disappointment the news of dry dock progress was greeted with considerably less enthusiasm than had been the case twelve years earlier. When the National Transcontinental had become part of the C.N.R. system, the city had hoped that the McGivney to Fredericton connection would have been upgraded. This was not done, and hence, "freight from the west |had| not been sent over the Transcontinental and down the Valley Railway to the port of Saint John . . . ."[85]

Nevertheless, the anticipated opening of the dry dock facilities in October 1923 again directed attention to the Courtenay Bay area. The occasion was heralded as the greatest day since the winter port business had begun.[86] The dry dock had been constructed by Canadian capital with the Saint John Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company taking "up the task where the Norton Griffiths Company left off".[87] Opening of the dry dock occasioned a renewed sense of optimism for the port. Alexander Gray claimed plans were being developed to construct railway terminals at the head of Courtenay Bay along the lines originally planned by the Grank Trunk Pacific. Such plans could mean either abandoning or limiting the development of the Reed's Point area. Although those plans were publicized, the C.N.R., the agency in charge of carrying out the extension of trackage to the head of Courtenay Bay as well as the transferral of its operations at Reed's Point to that area, never committed itself to such a development scheme in Courtenay Bay. Opening of the dry dock provided a needed port-related industry for Saint John, and contributed to the port function of the city. It did not diminish or disguise the need of Saint John to secure a more stable position in a national system of transportation through adjusted freight rates or more efficient organization of harbour facilities.

The first public meeting of the port committee, formed in February 1923, met in May 1924 and decided to press the C.N.R. for more freight business to Saint John and improved C.N.R. facilities at the port. The meeting included F. M. Ross, the on-site manager of the Saint John Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company. His presence indicated the continuing attempts throughout 1924 to have the C.N.R. construct terminals and trackage at the head of Courtenay Bay.[88] Attempts to increase the utilization of the port and further develop its facilities had the support of the local branch of the International Longshoremen's Association, whose business agent, John McKinnon, promised J. D. McKenna "the undivided support of the organization".[89] However, possibly with some knowledge that the C.N.R. would not be constructing such terminals, Alexander Gray, following a return from an inspection of European harbours, advised that the port needed "not so much enlarged facilities as more business".[90] He recommended a strong advertising campaign on the part of the City Council and the Board of Trade. In essence, Gray was suggesting that the local bodies merely intensify their advocacy efforts. In July, a joint delegation from the city visited Sir Henry Thornton on behalf of the port. That month, R. E. Armstrong went to Victoria, B.C. On this cross-Canada tour Armstrong met with members of the boards of trade at Vancouver, Winnipeg and Montreal. Returning, he declared his trip had convinced him of the necessity of giving wider publicity to the port and its facilities.[91]

In the fall of 1924, Sir Henry Thornton visited Saint John, endorsed a commission form of administration for the harbour, and outlined plans for a new C.N.R. railway depot in the city. Moreover, Thornton's suggestion that all the Martime Provinces unite to discuss the economic ills of the region, particularly "transportation difficulties", suggested to the Board of Trade and to the City Council that at last the C.N.R. had recognized publicly the existence of difficulties.[92] Moreover, the prospect of C.N.R. work in the Market Slip-Long Wharf area stimulated hope that the company was about to engage in terminal construction in the Courtenay Bay area as well. Within the City Council, the West Side bridge idea, which had been approved in a plebiscite in 1911 was again discussed as a means of linking not only the West Side and East Side communities, but also providing a rail link between the Valley Railway and the hoped-for terminals in the Courtenay Bay area.[93] All of these plans were entertained at the local level on the strength of Thornton's visit, while the bridge idea was being re-introduced into the transport arena by W. E. Scully. Although the C.N.R. officials had far more modest intentions than the civic and business elite of Saint John, Thornton's suggestion of a meeting among Maritime Provinces came when in Saint John at least, the City Council and the Board of Trade were committed to publicizing the port throughout Canada.

It is not surprising then that in early January 1925, as mentioned above, A. M. Belding and J. D. McKenna set out on their campaign of "selling the Maritimes to the West".[94] Regional publicity was to be the vehicle for nodal transport development. The Port of Saint John would be advertised through its regional association, and would thus finally attain complete vertical integration.

In February, the City Council and Board of Trade made plans for all New Brunswick to join in a large deputation to Ottawa regarding the routing of Canadian goods through Canadian ports.[95] In the succinct words of McKenna's newspaper: "First of all we want the principle established that Canadian trade shall flow through Canadian channels and then we wish our outlets so modernized with facilities for the handling of shipments that no shippers can claim that it is to their advantage to go elsewhere".[96] Returning from the conference without tangible commitments from the government, members of the delegation believed the people of Canada now knew the position of the Maritimes on the transportation issue. Thomas Bullock of the Common Council thought that additional pressure would be necessary to secure tangible results. L. W. Simms of the Board of Trade also felt the delegation's trip was a first step, which would have to be followed by successive "efforts in this direction".[97]

In this respect, the Board of Trade decided to engage the services of F. Maclure Sclanders, who would work full time for the Board promoting the interests of the city. Sclanders' appointment was formally announced the same night A. M. Belding returned from his Western trip. Belding was praised by Mayor Frank L. Potts and by members of the Board of Trade for having advocated use of Canadian ports throughout Canada, and for having brought the services of the Port of Saint John to the attention of the country.[98] The advocacy role of the Board of Trade was to be strengthened by Sclanders. Possibly, it was an attempt by the Board's executive to counter charges that it was not receptive to ideas from younger men or newer members. In a reflection of the state of the Maritime economy and the opportunity structure within Saint John, the Board's executive since the mid-1890's had shown little dramatic turnover.[99]

Throughout the summer, the Board continued its promotion of the port's facilities. In November, the Shipping Federation of Canada wrote the City Council advising the civic elite to have additional berths constructed to avoid any possibility of congestion due to the anticipated wheat crop and additional tonnage to be expected. The City Council decided to forward copies of that letter to Prime Minister King and the Minister of Public Works.[100] Equally important to the support of the Shipping Federation for expanded facilities at the port were the resolutions passed at the Maritime Conference held in Charlottetown, which outlined the demands of the Maritimes in a number of areas including freight rates and port development. The Charlottetown Conference was a prelude to the National Economic Conference held in Winnipeg later that month. Saint John was represented by L. W. Simms, W. S. Fisher, J. D. McKenna, A. M. Belding, and F. Maclure Sclanders.[101] In Winnipeg McKenna presented Saint John's cause and that of the Maritimes concerning the need of freight rate adjustments and port developments.[102]

In January of 1926, the King government announced a Commission on the Maritime case, an action described in a recent study, as "defusing the agitation".[103] Within Saint John the news that investigation into Maritime claims and conditions was to be undertaken resurrected the always latent port nationalization ideas. In May, Mayor W. W. White addressed the annual convention of the Engineering Institute of Canada, which was meeting in the city's newest hotel, the Admiral Beatty. White advocated that the port be nationalized and modernized. He observed "the present time was one of depression". He lamented, the dwindling of industries in the area, and argued that Saint John should no longer be just a winter port but rather have an extensive shipping business all year round. This would come through development — one financed by necessity from outside the city. White continued to advocate port nationalization, and it seems apparent from his reprinted comments that a proposal for such a plan might be attainable within the larger context of the current Maritime investigations. He claimed publicly and, perhaps opportunely, "there was a tendency throughout the rest of Canada that justice to the Maritimes should be done".[104] He returned to this theme again in a later speech that month before a gathering of 300 Board of Trade men in Saint John.[105] In a synopsis of economic ills which had befallen Saint John, the Mayor enumerated the end of wooden ship building, the end of the lumber industry in the city's surrounding area, and the lack of increase in the city's population. Noting that in the last thirty years the tax rate had doubled while the population "at best" remained the same, White claimed to believe that part of the answer in making the city attractive to new residents was nationalizing the Port of Saint John. Nationalization would both remove the responsibility for expansion and maintenance and reduce the burden of the debt now being assumed by the citizens of Saint John for past port development. Pointing to the one bright spot on the transport horizon, White added "if it had not been for the C.P.R., we would have had to close up our books long ago".[106]

In August, the Duncan Commission came to Saint John. Summarizing the Board of Trade's case, J. D. McKenna pointed to the inadequately equipped ports and the trade seeking U.S. coastal outlets. He concluded that "the Canadian partnership has not been fairly operated".[107] Premier Baxter, long an advocate of port development, addressed among other issues the freight rate question and the Valley Railway, describing the latter's construction as an attempt to overcome a defect "in a scheme of national enterprise [the National Transcontinental]". He believed the railway "should be dealt with on that basis".[108] In short, the province wanted the federal government to take over the Valley Line — an acquisition which would free the former of a financial burden and integrate a local road into the C.N.R.

Two months later Sir Henry Thornton visited Saint John as the guest speaker at the first annual convention of the Canadian Board of Trade. In the course of his remarks, he stated the Port of Saint John "should be nationalized and put under the administration of a proper harbour commission". Thornton also repeated a common refrain heard within Saint John's civic and business circles and now increasingly a part of the Maritime Rights agitation: "the port . . . belongs not to Saint John not to the Maritimes, but to the whole of Canada.".[109]

When the Duncan Report was tabled in the House of Commons in December, Saint John welcomed several of the transport-related proposals: the granting of differential freight rates within the Maritimes; the determining of whether or not the Valley Railway should be made part of the C.N.R. system, and especially the suggestion that a harbour board be formed for the port.[110] Regarding the fate of the freight rates, a reduction of twenty percent was recommended for freight originating and terminating within the Atlantic division of the C.N.R. Although the reduction was implemented by the Maritime Freight Rates Act of 1927, redefinitions of long-haul destinations effectively reduced the decrease to less than the suggested twenty percent.[111] As for the Valley Railway, it was eventually purchased by the C.N.R. in 1929, thereby removing a tremendous financial burden from the Province of New Brunswick.[112]

For the City of Saint John, however, the immediate transport-associated recommendation of the Duncan Report was the nationalization of the harbour. At last, vertical integration of the transport node into a national system of transportation was to be realized. In February 1927 the Common Council communicated to the Hon. P. J. Veniot the terms and conditions under which the city was prepared to have the harbour placed in a commission.[113] This action was followed by a trip to Ottawa by Mayor White and Alderman T. H. Bullock to represent the city's interests in drawing up a document of transfer.[114] A month later the Mayor outlined the content of the proposed bill to nationalize the Port of Saint John, and urged its acceptance by the citizens.[115] The ferry centred federal-local sparring, which characterized the sessions of acrimonious negotiating in 1919-1921, was now absent. Nor was there any evidence of a romantic longing to retain the city's ownership of the harbour. By 1927 the economic plight of the region, despite a marginal upturn in the export and import figures for 1926 and

1927,[116] made port nationalization a desperately needed mechanism to relieve the city of a responsibility it could no longer afford to bear. Sixty years after Confederation, the nation's diamond jubilee celebrations were to be marked in Saint John by a final willing surrender of the city's transport-based autonomy to an outside agency.

On May 3rd a record majority (7,106 - 101) voted in favour of nationalization.[117] The purchase price of $2,135,118 covered the bonded debt incurred over the years for harbour works and other associated expenses. In essence, the purchase price represented "a shifting of responsibility" from the city to the federal government for future development.[118] By July three local men had been named to comprise the Saint John Harbour Commission: Walter E. Foster, William E. Scully and Alexander McMillan.[119] The first Harbour Commission of Saint John embracing all sections of the harbour began to operate on August 1, 1927.

From the Duncan Commission's viewpoint, nationalizing the harbour recognized "that the development of a port is as much a matter of mechanical and technical equipment, business organization and practical administration as is the development of any extensive manufacturing or industrial business and that port development must be built upon the basis of a balanced and diversified traffic and on the basis also of diversified markets".[120] In retrospect the process of nodal integration, initiated in 1867 and, no doubt, assisted by regional association, had been completed. At the level of spatial development, the Market Slip-Long Wharf area, Reed's Point-Lower Cove and the West Side would be unified under a single administrative body, each member of which possessed strong personal and community links to the Common Council and the Board of Trade. However, as a national harbour, the harbour commissioners were subordinate not to the city but rather to the federal Minister of Marine and Fisheries. The era of local control had ended.


—1927—

**The City of Saint John**

**Port Development**

0
923
1846
2769
3692 FT.
LOVITT'S POINT
ST. JOHN RIVER
FERRY
LEE'S COVE
UNION POINT
MARBLE COVE
Reversing Falls
INDIANTOWN
Spar Cove
Creek
Main St.
Wellesley Road
Somerset Street
Creighton Street
Ninth St.
Eighth St.
Seventh St.
Sixth St.
Fifth St.
Fourth St.
Third St.
Second
First
Park St.
Sandy Point Road
Mount Pleasant Avenue
LILY LAKE
Burpee St.
Fort Howe
Rockland Rd.
MARSH CREEK
C.N.R. RAILWAY YARD
Loch Lomond Road
C.N.R.
UNION DEPOT
Douglas Avenue
C.P.R.
Strait Shore Road
HARBOUR
Navy Is.
Long Wharf
Market Slip
Courtenay Ave.
Edith Ave.
Park Ave.
Mount Pleasant Ave.
CROUCHVILLE
Spruce Ave.
COURTENAY BAY
ST. JOHN DRYDOCK & SHIPBUILDING COMPANY LTD
DRY DOCK
Red Head Road
King Square
Queen Square
Prince William St.
Union St.
St. David St.
Armoury Grounds
Sugar Refinery
REEDS POINT
Suspension Bridge Rd.
VILLE
Prince St. Extension
King Square
Queen Square
ROONEY SLIP
SAND POINT
1
2
3
4
5
6
14
15
16
LANCASTER HEIGHTS
Charlotte Street Ext.
C.P.R.
C.P.R. BAY SHORE YARD
COURTENAY BAY BREAKWATER

# CONCLUSION

For most of this century, the symbiotic development of transportation systems and systems of cities has been generally accepted. Within Canada the first cogent statement of the relationship between transportation and the organization of a society appeared in Harold A. Innis' *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway*. That study incorporated explicit applications of a modern ecological approach in an essentially regional analysis of Canadian development. Such a regional emphasis, however, resulted in minimal attention being given to Maritime centres. Consequently, the role of transport development in the process of integration by which at least one Maritime city became part of a Canadian system of cities could be, and was, obscured. Retaining the broader theoretical outlines of Innis' pioneering study of a research question as compelling now as it was in 1923, but adjusting the focus from a regional to a nodal emphasis, has permitted an examination of the role of transportation development in the process of integration as it applied to Saint John. Thus from this study, guided by a theoretical perspective clearly linked to Canadian historiography, several conclusions can be drawn about Saint John as a socio-spatial unit by focusing on a primary institution within the city: the port.

As noted earlier, each city in an urban system possesses an "export function" which permits it to make a particular contribution to the larger system of which it is a part. The City of Saint John's "export function" emerged through the development of its harbour. Between 1867 and 1927 the city was to become integrated into a Canadian system of cities through the participation of its port in a national system of transportation. Presiding at the local level over this process of integration were two elite groups: the Common Council (civic elite) comprised of the Mayor and aldermen, especially concerned with the internal urban system, and the Board of Trade (business elite) comprised of the officers and executive council of that organization, in contrast concerned with the external urban system.

During the "Atlantic Years" of 1867-1879, each elite group attempted to maintain its sphere of influence in relation to the port. The civic elite managed the city-owned and/or leased harbour properties, while the business elite established and maintained trade contacts outside the city. The activities of both groups, however, focused within the harbour on the Market Slip-Long Wharf area. Immediately following Confederation, the Common Council made major street repairs on Prince William, Dock and Water Streets, while also upgrading the Market Slip wharves. These improvements enabled the general traffic patterns along the

East Side or main peninsula to be integrated more smoothly from the Market Slip to the Reed's Point-Lower Cove at the southern end of the peninsula. Council's developmental emphasis clearly indicated the dominant position held by the Market Slip area within the harbour and the city.

While the civic elite was developing the port's serviceability from within the city, members of the Board of Trade continued to develop the external or railway connections to Saint John. Almost all of the officers of the recently incorporated Western Extension Railway were members of this group's executive council. Prior to the Western Extension's August 1869 completion, the Directors decided that the original Fairville terminus would be too inconvenient to the Market Slip-Long Wharf area. As the railway directors were unable to raise funds to bridge the Reversing Falls, a group of Carleton (West Saint John) businessmen formed a railway company to construct a line from Fairville to the Carleton waterfront. Agreeing that a Carleton waterfront railway connection was better than no waterfront connection, the Common Council invested $40,000 in the project.

By the early 1870's, therefore, the City of Saint John through the activities of its local elite groups had developed the physical outlines along which the future integration would be achieved. But in keeping with the immediate post-Confederation orientation within the city towards the Market Slip, the Western Extension Railway had leased the local ferry service in order to anchor its official terminus on the East Side or main peninsula, then the focus of internal and external port-related transport.

Future railway development along the waterfront was to involve a mixture of local businessmen and the federal government until finally local participation would be eventually overwhelmed by the presence of the government and the C.P.R. This process began in 1869 when Ottawa approached the City Council regarding the possibility of extending the European and North American Railway in a southerly direction through the west side of Courtenay Bay and then on to the Barrack Grounds to the Ballast Wharf in Sydney Ward. By the end of 1876, the Common Council with the support of the Board of Trade had drawn up the deed authorizing the transfer of the Ballast Wharf area to Ottawa, thus formalizing what would be a continual national presence at the port.

The Common Council, which had previously addressed itself to the internal functions of the port, and the Board of Trade, which had been previously concerned with the external functions of the port, were now constrained to cooperate by circumstances emanating from within the continent. By acquiescing to the presence of the federal government at the waterfront, both local elite groups were beginning to acknowledge their diminished ability to direct either the technological or organizational influences affecting the Port of Saint John and thus the city's place in a system of cities. Moreover, three years after the Intercolonial had reached the Ballast Wharf it was apparent that the railroad was not the expected panacea for the economic malaise of the 1870's. Although symbolizing a potential link to the interior, the absence of a route across the continent cast the I.C.R. as the agent of competition between Halifax and Saint John, thus reinforcing the emerging significance of the city's place within a national rather than a provincial or even regional system of cities.

In short, in a situation analagous to the political scale of organization which followed Confederation, the railway had changed forever the territorial dimensions of the Port of Saint John's hinterland. Tacitly recognizing that the fortunes of their port had been entrusted to Ottawa, the Common Council sent a Memorial to the Governor General seeking his assistance in the granting of a steamship subsidy to Great Britain to encourage agricultural production within New Brunswick as well as transshipment of that produce from Saint John. Their Memorial, as had the Ballast Wharf transfer, indicated the means by which the city would enter a larger system of cities — through the development of its port facilities.

Hence by the late 1870's, it was apparent that the outside agencies would eventually play a major role in directing the development of port facilities enabling Saint John to become the transport axis between Atlantic water and Canadian soil. This larger scale of organization within which the port was to be developed had ramifications at the local level as well. The Ballast Wharf area — the use of which in itself was stimulated by the presence of an outside agency — suggested the introduction of a changing emphasis in the physical focus of external port activity.

Of equal significance the events which occurred during 1867-1879 were reflected in the spatial structure of the city. From the founding of the city, Carleton and the main peninsula had developed as separate economic units. At Confederation this separation was reflected spatially. Moreover, not until the advent of the railways would Carleton begin to be viewed as a section within Saint John rather than as a unit distinct from the main peninsula. In contrast, Portland, although a separate political unit from Saint John, was more closely intertwined with the city than was Carleton. Geographical proximity had encouraged social and economic integration prior to municipal union. Indeed much of this period was politically characterized by attempts to reinforce the dominant position of the Market Slip area as the focus for transport related activities within the waterfront.

In the transitional years of 1879-1895, the spatial emphasis along the waterfront remained on the main peninsula but greater attention was directed towards the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area — a development which reflected both the presence of an outside agency, the government controlled I.C.R., and the desire of the local elite to retain the focus of trade on the East Side. In this period the relationship of each elite group to the harbour continued as it has previously, but increasingly outside agencies came to play a more important role in the external trade functions of the port. Such a development initially sharpened the different perspectives from which each local elite group viewed the port, but gradually as outside agencies assumed a more pivotal role in the port, the local elite groups were compelled to cooperate further in the interest of gaining a place for their port and city in the newly emerging national transportation system.

During this transitional period the port moved from a position by which it was identified as a trading unit within an Atlantic system to one within a national system. This transition was effected by 1895, anchoring Saint John in the continental transatlantic trading network based on railway development and federal government steamship subsidies. The first concrete step towards achieving the latter occurred in the early 1880's when the two local elite groups, began to address the problem of "diminishing functional distance," or, more simply, attempted to secure more efficient transportation linkages between their city and the rest of the country.

Between 1880 and 1885, when the railway bridge at the Falls was opened, members of the Common Council and the Board of Trade agreed both as to the necessity of diminishing functional distance and as to the means by which this would be achieved -- a railway bridge spanning the Saint John harbour and eliminating the necessity of using the harbour ferry in the transfer of freight and passengers. Conflict arose between the two because of the fundamentally different perspective each took as it viewed the railway bridge solution. Focusing almost exclusively on the external urban system into which the port was to be integrated through the bridge, the Board of Trade largely ignored the local political concerns of the Carleton peninsula and argued for the more direct and more easily constructed bridge at the Falls, which would link Fairville with the Market Square vicinity railway station. Holding a $40,000 investment in the Carleton Branch Railroad, the aldermen in focusing on the internal or local urban system argued for a Navy Island route commencing from the Union Street vicinity of Carleton then through

Navy Island and finally on to the main peninsula railway station. Such a route they believed would effectively integrate the port into an uninterrupted railway system *and*, at the same time, help to integrate the Carleton peninsula more fully into the life of the city as a whole.

The railway bridge incorporators of the St. John Bridge and Railway Extension Company, among whom were Board of Trade members, sought and were successful in obtaining funds for construction of their project from Ottawa. Sir Leonard Tilley, who had been instrumental in gaining support for the project in the House of Commons, could not ignore the city's concern over the Carleton Branch Railroad or the fact that for the immediate future the Falls bridge would negate any possibility of use for the railroad. Hence, the federal government through Tilley's influence purchased the $40,000 stock held in the Carleton Branch Railroad by the City of Saint John. In this way, by 1885 Ottawa, an outside agency, had ameliorated both local elite groups. The Falls bridge issue illustrated how transport development decisions would be based primarily on the demands of the larger or external urban system into which the city was integrating.

In the years between 1885 and 1889, the city's elite groups jointly forced the Macdonald government to recognize Saint John as a potential link in the developing national transportation system. Against this background of political development centring on the Short Line and Winter Port questions, the Cities of Saint John and Portland united in 1889, thus bringing an entire harbour under one municipal body. Both amalgamation and the Short Line's arrival forced the city to face the problem of actively participating in the necessary revitalization of its waterfront. Although the eventual decision was to centre a concentrated effort upon the Carleton waterfront, the developments of the late 1880's prior to this undertaking served to illustrate both the perceived importance of the East Side main peninsula and the transitional nature of this period of harbour development.

At the same time that the role of an outside agency — in this case the Short Line — was recognized as a factor in the development of the port, the electorate of the new City of Saint John chose to retain its harbour property ownership in September 1889 by defeating a proposed harbour commission scheme which would have given the federal government the management of most of the waterfront area. While at first it might appear incongruous that outside control be accepted in railway matters but rejected in port facility matters, in fact the decision to retain the city's harbour properties resulted from several factors. First, the railways were only one element in the development scheme needed to securely guarantee Saint John's position in a national transportation system. The second prerequisite was a firm guarantee of federally subsidized steamships calling regularly at the port. And the third was, of course, port facilities. Since the city did not possess an adequate number of subsidized steamships, it could not risk relinquishing the only element in the transport complex over which it still retained some degree of authority, the waterfront land area. Thus for Saint John rejection of a commission structure at this time meant going ahead with harbour improvements previously set in motion and predicated on the arrival of the Short Line.

The Short Line which had arrived at the I.C.R. station in June 1889 reinforced the earliest dominance within the port of the Market Slip-Long Wharf area — a dominance particularly illustrated through the ecological structure of the area. Indeed, for many members of the newly created city's civic and business elite this railway was seen as not simply providing a potentially fruitful connection to Central Canada but rather as also stimulating a development within the city of an extensive rail and port complex on the East Side. The I.C.R. station site, located within the Market Slip-Long Wharf area, was envisaged as a potential passenger station. In turn, the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area containing the federally-owned Ballast Wharf would become the future focus of a steamship cargo facility. But even these plans, particularly the important freight handling projection which focused on the Reed's Point area, were not wholly satisfactory. Upon learning that the I.C.R. might be extending its tracks along certain streets in Sydney Ward, several residents objected to the changes in their environment such an alteration would make. In addition, the question of expense in the matter of expropriation was raised. Consequently, the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area seemed fraught with difficulty.

In part at least, it was against this background of tension surrounding Reed's Point that Carleton interests were again able to introduce their section as a desirable terminus for the Short Line. As early as 1887, during a West Side public meeting, the suggestion emerged that the Dominion Government, as owner of the Carleton Branch for which it had paid $40,000, should develop it and the adjacent waterfront property in Carleton to handle the increased freight which would come to Saint John as a result of the Short Line. Lending support to this sentiment were the well publicized comments of C.P.R. executive Cornelius Van Horne, who criticized the bridge at the Falls because it claimed a toll on trains passing over it and hinted that Carleton might be developed for a terminal trade. Interpreting Van Horne's remarks in the context of both railway and harbour development, a local paper intimated that Carleton's time had come.

In the fall of 1889, the Common Council wrote to the federal government asking Ottawa to outline what plans it might have for developing its Sand Point, Carleton facility to accommodate large ocean vessels. The directness of the Council's message underlined the city's dilemma: The Short Line was now a scheduled part of the national transportation system into which Saint John was integrated, but the harbour facilities were not yet ready to receive large amounts of trade or to encourage the shipment of large cargoes through Saint John. As well, the federal government was firmly established through the I.C.R. in both the Market Slip-Long Wharf area and the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area — the latter of which was still not completely reconciled with local wishes. The only remaining area of initiative to which the Council had any recourse was the West Side, and here too the federal government through its earlier Carleton Branch purchase had an, as yet, undeveloped interest.

Claiming no desire to develop Sand Point, the government offered to transfer the Carleton Branch to Saint John. The Common Council accepted. In addition, Cornelius Van Horne of the C.P.R. promised that if the railway were given the Carleton Branch, it would be put in shape, the necessary wharves repaired and made "ready for the import and export trade". The aldermen accepted Van Horne's offer and the Carleton Branch with its associated waterfront properties became part of the C.P.R. Shortly thereafter and with the Board of Trade's encouragement, the Common Council concluded a cost-sharing agreement with the C.P.R. towards the erection of a grain elevator. These negotiations became the foundation upon which the C.P.R. would play an important role in the development of transport facilities at Saint John and in anchoring the focus of the city's external transport system on the West Side.

The presence of the railways and the promise of facilities met two of the three requirements needed to establish Saint John within a national transportation system. There now remained the acquisition of adequate steamship service to the port. During the excitement generated by the C.P.R. build-up on the West Side, little specific reference had been made to the overall purpose of these efforts, establishing the Port of Saint John as the Winter Port of Canada. In the early 1890's the Board of Trade began to assume a more aggressive posture in extolling the benefits of Saint John as a freight port. By mid-1894, a combined delegation from both elite groups visited Ottawa, and demanded that the Country minimize its efforts in the fast Atlantic passenger business and instead address the freight question. The delegates, including George Robertson, the Mayor and former President of the Board of Trade urged the designation of one Atlantic terminal based on freight and augmented by mail and passengers.

As the winter season of 1895 approached bringing the depressing prospect of idle West Side facilities, George Robertson addressed his civic colleagues, enumerating the efforts of the city towards securing the trade of the West to the Port of Saint John. The Mayor chastised the government for "not doing anything" for the port, and he recommended that the aldermen meet with federal officials, the C.P.R. and the Maritime Board of Trade in order to correct his situation. His decision to reintroduce the question at this time had been prompted by the knowledge that the Beaver Line Steamship Company, currently near bankruptcy, was interested in establishing a line of freight steamers from Saint John. In Robertson's view the port needed the company to help launch its reputation as a winter port as much as the company needed the potential freight-attracting facilities now at the West Side. With the Board of Trade's assistance, Robertson successfully solicited a subsidy allowing the Beaver Lines to commence service during the season of 1895-1896. During a company sponsored luncheon, the Beaver Lines Manager appealed to the Common Council as provider of facilities and to the C.P.R. as provider of the freight to assist him in making this venture a success. Such an appeal at once underlined the delicate balance of agencies — City Council, Railways, and Steamships — whose cooperation was essential in establishing the Port of Saint John as the Winter Port of Canada, and the diminished influence which local agencies had in directing the affairs of the port.

The years — 1879-95 — which had begun with the port no longer functioning successfully as an Atlantic timber and shipbuilding centre ended with it emerging as a potential national port whose function would be based on grain and other railway-associated freight handling capabilities. The local ecological counterpart of this larger process may be seen in the shifting emphasis of importance assigned to particular areas within the harbour. Prior to moving over to the West Side, initial railway construction had been planned for the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area of the main peninsula. By 1895 freight handling capacity was associated almost exclusively with existing or projected West Side development. In all of this the civic and business elite had played a role which, in itself was insufficient to attract either the C.P.R. or the Beaver Line.

Throughout the next period in the process of integration — the Continental Years of 1895-1911 — both local elite groups ceded a number of their port-related functions to the federal government and the C.P.R. The Common Council now shared its previous almost exclusive direction of the waterfront land areas with Ottawa and the Montreal-based C.P.R. The Board of Trade's members determined less of the ebb and flow of trade across the city's piers. This was done increasingly by the railways and the steamship companies. Moreover, in these last years the most important focus of port activity was not the main peninsula but the West Side.

Throughout the first euphoric years of this period 1896-1900, however, the aldermen were drawn into contact with the government and the C.P.R. Their role was heightened because the federal government and the railway had to deal with a local political unit when negotiating for dredging, wharves, railway line extensions and other projects. Nonetheless, while this new involvement lent to the aldermanic discussions a tone suggesting a closer cooperation of planning between the local municipal unit and outside agencies, it is important to recognize that the Council's increased activity with regard to the port's external functions was still largely restricted to the development of the local physical plant, the Carleton waterfront.

In the years between 1900-1906, the city strenuously associated its winter port development with the trade of Montreal. In developing a strategy for securing facilities, the civic and business elite in their negotiations emphasized Saint John's appendage relationship to the most important Canadian port in the national transportation system. This argument at once recognized Montreal's pivotal position as the Central Canadian city most accessible to the largest ships afloat and Saint John's position as the East Coast Canadian city possessing the shortest railway distance from its Quebec transport ally. The associated status which the Port and City of Saint John derived from this posture strengthened its winter port position. Indeed the *Transportation Commission's Report* of 1905 acknowledged the reciprocal nature of this relationship by including the Port of Saint John among those suggested as integral to a national ransport system. Encouraged by this recognition which appeared o have justified the financial sacrifices made by the city since the 1890's, the aldermen pressed Ottawa for some concrete results rom this symbolic recognition. They were rewarded by the federal overnment when it was decided to renew the dredging contract at Sand Point in September 1906.

Although the federal government was receptive to suggestions nvolving dredging, the Common Council, particularly after the *ransportation Commission Report*, pressed for more substantive nprovements involving outside agencies. Early in 1907 the Treasury ommittee of the Common Council recommended that the city-wned harbour properties be transferred to the government. A elegation made the familiar trip to Ottawa hoping to arrive at ome solution which would enable Saint John to cope financially ith the expenses and demands of a port being supported at the local level and yet, serving a national community. Between 1908 and 1910 the City Council with the cooperation of the Board of Trade met on several occasions with representatives of the federal government and the C.P.R. Attention was directed to the West Side in particular because that section of the waterfront participated in a business more "national rather than local" in character.

Involving the city, the C.P.R. and the federal government, the tri-partite agreement of September 1911 resulted in the city yielding to the C.P.R. a parcel of land to be used for railway purposes, the C.P.R. returning to the city a 1600-foot harbour frontage acquired in 1893, and the city subsequently transferring to the federal government the necessary harbourfront on which to construct docks and piers required to handle the trade of the port. Thus the C.P.R. could expand its freight rail yards; the city, while still maintaining the old West Side facilities, would no longer have to incur further debt in the construction of West Side wharves, and the federal government acquired a substantial piece of harbour frontage by simply committing itself to constructing additional wharves.

For the Port and City of Saint John the tri-partite agreement formalized the integration of it as a local transport node into a national transportation system. Coterminous with this integration, however, was the accompanying relinquishing of control over part of the West Side. Thus by 1911 interaction between the local elite and outside agencies — the federal government and the C.P.R. — had resulted in the formalization of a relationship focusing on transportation and re-affirming the subsidiary role of the local elite in future decisions involving the prosperity of the port. That subsidiary role was underlined by an emerging new concept of territoriality, occasioned by rail and steam, accompanied by a particular organizational structure and illustrated within the Port and City of Saint John by the absolute distance which separated the West Side facilities from those directing the business operations.

The last period — 1911-1927 — the "years of vertical integration", witnessed the formalized role of the local elite as advocates for the port. During these years membership on the Common Council was reduced through the institution of a Commission form of municipal government, in the interest of managing the city in a more efficient "business-like" manner. Introducing this form of civic administration had the effect of drawing the Board of Trade and the Common Council even closer on issues involving dealings with outside agencies. Differences of opinion between the two local bodies appeared to be more temperate in tone than in former periods.

Between 1911 and 1918, the first major venture towards expanding the physical plant of the Port of Saint John focused on Courtenay

Bay and the attendant development of the National Transcontinental. Emphasizing the Bay involved a spatial refocusing which perhaps best illustrated one effect of vertical integration into a larger system: areas previously not considered for port development by the local elite were now being touted through the influence of outside agencies. The Valley Line disappointment and the resultant failure of the city to realize its dreams for Courtenay Bay all underlined the continuing diminished ability of the local elite to significantly increase the level of port function. Although hoping for greater expansion through a combined National Transcontinental, Valley Line and Courtenay Bay development, the local elite by 1918 had to content itself with the government's construction of three additional berths on the West Side. Essentially the waterfront focus within the harbour continued to be Carleton, with supportive development occurring in the areas of Reed's Point-Lower Cove and the Market Slip-Long Wharf.

During the war the port had enjoyed increased levels of business. With the commencement of the post-war reduction of trade levels, the local elite began to re-investigate the possibility of a harbour commission scheme. Discussions on that issue had been launched during the war, when the need to transfer responsibility for the harbour became apparent to those who recognized that repairs and replacements were imminent, and when the city was unable to carry out any large scale improvements. Harbour commission failed to win approval in the plebiscite of 1921 for a variety of reasons — not the least of which was the city government's uncertainty about the local implications of such a structure on the internal functions of the port. In the intervening years between 1921 and 1927, regional decline affecting the port's immediate hinterland, and coupled with the freight rates situation and competition from Portland, Maine jeopardizing the port's western grain hinterland, combined to threaten the port's fragile position in a national system of transportation. By 1927, through the recommendations of the Duncan Commission, the city had a chance to reduce the port-incurred debt, while simultaneously insuring future development of a major "industry" which it had subsidized since the 1890's. Port nationalization became the perceived vehicle for sustaining the hope that trade would be generated through the facility, thus offering local employment, while at the same time stabilizing the port at a competitive niche within a national system of transportation.

Throughout the late 1880's and early 1890's, when Saint John had recognized the means by which it could become integrated into a national system, the city sustained the dominance of its "export function", focusing on the potential of the harbour. In developing the port, the local elite had determined a triad of components (harbour facilities, railways, and steamships) necessary to the production of trade through a transport node. As the process of integration, however, was accomplished only through outside assistance, when the port had become the agent of integration into a national system of cities, the city was largely relieved of the direction and control of its "export function". Thus, the example of Saint John suggests that integration into a larger system through one sector or institution, such as the port, alters both the control and, as the changing areas of port activities indicated, the spatial focus of that institution. By 1927, railways and steamships had passed years earlier to agencies located outside the city. The transfer of the third — in reality, the physical plant of the transport node — resulted from both an immediate regional outcry and a logical sequence in the maturation of national transportation development.

In the contemporary context of the Maritime Rights movement, the local relief with which port nationalization was effected in Saint John epitomized the desperate circumstances of a port and city within a disaffected region. More generally, within the context of technological and organizational development, port nationalization in 1927 marked the completion of the process of vertical integration within a national system of transportation — this, in a city of a less than prosperous periphery.

# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| *C.H.R.* | *Canadian Historical Review* |
| *C.J.E.P.S.* | *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* |
| H.I.L. | Harriet Irving Library, U.N.B. |
| N.B. Mus. | New Brunswick Museum |
| P.A.C. | Public Archives of Canada |
| P.A.N.B. | Provincial Archives of New Brunswick |
| *T.R.S.C.* | *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* |

# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. See: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City: Saint John, N.B. (1867-1911) and the Process of Integration" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1979), pp. 2-36.

2. See: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "Veblen, Durkheim and Innis: The Evolution of a Canadian Ecological and Historiographical Perspective". Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for Cultural and Intellectual History, June 1977. See also: James W. Carey, "Culture, Geography, and Communications: The work of Harold Innis in an American Context", in William H. Melody, Liora R. Salter, Paul Heyer (eds.), *Culture, Communication and Dependency, the Tradition of H. A. Innis* (New Jersey: 1981), pp. 73-91.

3. H. A. Innis, *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* (Toronto: 1923).

4. H. A. Innis, *The Cod Fisheries — the History of an International Economy* (Toronto: 1954 [1940]), p. ix.

5. A node represents a functional unit within a system of cities; a city as a node therefore, signifies a particular functional niche within a network of cities.

6. See: R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology", *The Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XX (1926), 144. "Ecological distance . . . is a time-cost concept rather than a unit of space". Hence, "distance is variable changing with every modification in the speed and cost of transportation. This variableness of distance gives to every large city and region an unstable economic position in intercommunal relations that is not adequately represented by city's actual geographic location". See also: R. D. McKenzie, *The Rise of the Metropolitan Community* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967 [1933]), pp. 144-145. In short, as Amos Hawley has noted: "The railway completely overhauled the pattern of territorial relationships". See: Amos Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach* (New York: 1971), p. 79. See: H. A. Innis, *Political Economy in the Modern State* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1946), pp. 251-256.

7. See especially: Scott Greer, *The Emerging City* (New York: 1965), pp. 43-48; R. D. McKenzie, *The Rise of the Metropolitan Community*, p. 143. See also: Lee F. Schnore and Gene B. Peterson, "Urban and Metropolitan Development in the United States and Canada", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 316 (March 1958), 64; Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), pp. 214-215; C. D. Harris and E. L.Ullman, "The Nature of Cities", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 242 (Nov. 1945), 9; D. Michael Ray, "The Spatial Structure of Economic and Cultural Differences: A Factorial Ecology of Canada", *The Regional Science Association Papers*, XXIII (1969), p. 14; W. T. Easterbrook, "Innis and Economics", *CJEPS*, 19 (1953), 294. For a nineteenth-century viewpoint see: J. Edward Boyd, *Narrow Gauge Railways* (St. John, N.B., 1865), p. 3.

8. James W. Simmons, *Canada as an Urban System: A Conceptual Framework* (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for Urban and Community Studies), Research Paper #62, pp. 1-6. See also: James W. Simmons, "The evolution of the Canadian Urban System", in A. F. J. Artibise and G. A. Stelter (eds.), *The Usable Urban Past* (Toronto: 1979), pp. 4-33.

9. W. S. MacNutt, *The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of a Colonial Society* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965), pp. 108-109, 100-101.

10. Jean Gottman, *Megalopolis* (New York: The Twentieth-century Fund, 1961), p. 103.

11. Graeme Clifford Wynn, "The Assault on the New Brunswick Forest" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1974), pp. 41, 62, 277-279. See also: Graeme Wynn, *Timber Colony* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

12. See: P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 26 November 1879, Memorial to the Governor-General. For contemporary theoretical implications see: Amos Hawley,

*Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 236 and Melvin M. Webber, "The Post-city Age", *Daedalus* 97 (Fall 1968), 1093.

13. A. M. Belding, "St. John as a Winter Port", *Canadian Magazine*, 12:5 (1898-1899), 398-399. See also: Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 9. More recently, L. S. Bourne has suggested Saint John's appendage to Montreal. See: "Urban Systems in Australia and Canada: Comparative notes and research questions", *Australian Geographical Studies*, 12 (Oct. 1974), 166.

14. See especially: N. S. B. Gras, "The Development of Metropolitan Economy in Europe and America", *American Historical Review*, XXVII (July 1922). Despite the opinion contained in the previously cited article, Gras believed ". . . that the Maritime Provinces of Canada would be better off in the metropolitan region of Boston". See: N. S. B. Gras, "Regionalism and Nationalism", *Foreign Affairs*, 7 (1928-1929), 466. See also: Donald Kerr, "Metropolitan Dominance in Canada", in John Warkentin (ed.), *Canada: A Geographical Interpretation* (Toronto: 1965), p. 531.

15. Saint John Common Council and Saint John Board of Trade, *Saint John as a Canadian Winter Port and the Terminus of the Canadian Pacific and Inter-colonial Railway* (Saint John, N.B., 1898).

16. For discussion on dual primate city, see: Donald Kerr, "Metropolitan dominance in Canada", pp. 531-555. In regard to Maritime dual primate city see: S. A. Saunders, *Studies in the Economy of the Maritime Provinces* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1939), pp. 173-174.

    For discussion of functional hierarchy see: Walter Christaller, *Central Places in Southern Germany*. Translated by W. Baskin. (Englewood Liffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966 [1937]). For contemporary comment see: Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, pp. 227-239 and John N. Jackson, *The Canadian City* (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1973), pp. 186-192. See also: A. F. Burghardt, "A Hypothesis About Gateway Cities", *Annals Association of American Geographers*, 62 (June 1971), 272-273.

17. Canada, *Report of the Royal Commission on Maritime Claims* (Ottawa: 1937). Sir Andrew Rae Duncan was the Chairman. F. M. Sclanders of the Saint John Board of Trade was the Commission's Secretary.

18. See: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . .", Appendix A-26.

19. Ibid., Appendix B, Key to Appendices B and C.

20. Roland L. Warren, *The Community in America* (Chicago: 1972), p. 12.

21. Harlan W. Gilmore, *Transportation and the Growth of Cities* (Illinois: The Glencoe Press, 1953), p. 82. See also: N. S. B. Gras, "Why Study Business History", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 4 (1938), 320-340.

22. See especially: Samuel P. Hays, "The Changing Political Structure of the City in Industrial America", *Journal of Urban History*, 1 (November 1974), 6-38. See also: M. Gauvin, "The Municipal Reform Movement in Montreal 1886-1914" (M.A. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1972), which views late nineteenth-century politics in a reform context.

23. These distinctions are not intended to represent a social reality but are merely a set of temporal designations which conveniently lend themselves to the period under investigation.

    For further comment regarding the imprecision of stage theory see especially: Wilbert E. Moore, *Social Change* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1974), pp. 2, 37-39. See also: Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 333.

24. J. M. S. Careless, "Somewhat Narrower Horizons", *Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers*, 1968, p. 7. "But where are the studies of the attempts of Halifax or Saint John to cope with their changed situations, or the accommodations they partially achieved as continental winter ports!"

    Part of this Introduction appeared earlier in: Elizabeth McGahan, "The Port of Saint John, New Brunswick, 1867-1911: Exploration of an ecological complex", *Urban History Review* 3-76 (February 1077), 3-12.

## CHAPTER I

1. William F. Ganong, "A Plan for a General History of the Province of New Brunswick", *T.R.S.C.*, 2nd Series, I (1895), Sec. II, p. 93.

2. *Illustrated London News*, 48 (May 12, 1866), p. 468.

3. Donald Kerr and Jacob Spelt, *The Changing Face of Toronto* (Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, 1965), p. 29.

4. H. A. Innis, *Problems of Staple Production in Canada* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1933), p. 33.

5. Georges Potvin, *City of Saint John Urban Renewal Study* Citizens Research Institute of Canada, 1957), p. 9.

6. See: Figure 1. Street names (Figures 1-5) based on 1911 city map by City Engineer.

7. Frances N. Mellen, "The Development of the Toronto Waterfront During the Railway Expansion Era: 1850-1912" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1974), p. 10.

8. See: Figure 1. These streets converged on the open area known as Market Square. The square was located at the head of Market Slip.

9. Clarence Ward, "St. John's Merchants — Something About the Men Who Started the Trade of this City," *The New Brunswick Magazine*, IV (Oct. 1904), 67. As late as about 1815 ". . . all that part of the City eastward from Charlotte Street was almost a common." *St. John Daily News*, 22 April 1876.

10. D. R. Jack, *Centennial Prize Essay on the History of the City and County of St. John* (Saint John, N.B.: J. & A. McMillan, 1883), pp. 62-95.

11. Alexander Munro, *New Brunswick; With a Brief Outline of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island* (Halifax, 1855), p. 127.

12. For a brief discussion of the functions of these men, see: Fred Mitchell Jones, *Middlemen in the Domestic Trade of the United States: 1800-1860* (Urbana: Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 1937), pp. 5-13; 64.

    James E. Vance, *The Merchants World: The Geography of Wholesaling* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970), Chap. 2. The Nature of Wholesaling.

13. Harlan W. Gilmore, *Transportation and the Growth of Cities*, p. ii.

14. W. M. Jordan, "An Old St. John Boy," *The New Brunswick Magazine*, II (April 1899), 181.

15. *The Maritime Provinces: A Handbook for Travellers* (Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1875), p. 16.

16. Obituary Notice: *Saint John Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal* (24 April 1873), Lauchlan Donaldson, b. in Scotland, came to Saint John in 1804, entered mercantile establishment of Messrs. John Black & Co., 1809 founded his own business: shipowner and general merchant. Appointed Mayor in 1829 and 1842, each time holding office for 3 years. For many years chairman of Chamber of Commerce.

17. *Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Examine Into the Present Condition of the Harbour of Saint John and to Report the Same to His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province with Various Documents Relating Thereto.* Saint John: Printed by Henry Chubb (Saint John, N.B., 1839), p. 11.

18. See: W. M. Jordan, "An Old St. John Boy," 179.

19. J. Clarence Webster, *Historical Guide to New Brunswick* (New Brunswick: Government Bureau of Information and Tourist Travel, 1936), p. 99. See also: "Reminiscences of St. John," *St. John Daily News*, 22 April 1876.

20. *The Bay State Excursion of 1871, A Record and a Souvenir of Eight Days' Pleasure on the Eastern Coast* (Boston: Published by the Excursionists, 1871), p. 28. See also: Canada, *Census of Canada 1890-91* (Ottawa: 1893), I., p. 19.

21. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 5.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 274-303.

23. D. R. Jack, *Centennial Prize Essay* . . ., p. 64.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

25. See: Figure 1.

26. "Reminiscences of St. John," *St. John Daily News*, 22 April 1876.

27. Mayor of Saint John 1837-1840.

28. *Journal of the House of Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1837), Appendix, p. xii.

29. *The Maritime Provinces: A Handbook for Travellers*, p. 17.

30. "Reminiscences of St. John," *St. John Daily News*, 22 April 1876.

31. See: Figure 1.

32. *The Maritime Provinces: A Handbook for Travellers*, p. 18.

33. Mary Q. Innis, *An Economic History of Canada* (Toronto: 1948), p. 180. See also: George A. Nader, *Cities of Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975), I, p. 151.

34. T. T. Vernon Smith, *The Past, Present and Future of Atlantic Canada Steam Navigation* (Fredericton: J. Simpson, Royal Gazette Office, 1857), pp. 7-9.

35. John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances," *The New Brunswick Magazine*, IV (1904), 82.

36. *Reports on the Accounts of the Corporation of the City of St. John for the Year ending 31st December 1865: Message of the Mayor to the Common Council and Reports of City Officials of Sundry Accounts in Detail.* Published by order of the Common Council, Saint John, N.B., 1865, p. 1.

37. *McMillan's New Brunswick Almanac and Reporter 1867* (Saint John, N.B., 1867), p. 117.

38. W. F. Burditt, "Railroad Development in the Maritime Provinces of Canada, with Particular Reference to Lines tributary to Saint John, New Brunswick." A brief memorandum compiled by Mr. W. F. Burditt at the suggestion of the Saint John Board of Trade, August 1931. Typescript—Saint John Regional Library, p. 7.

39. J. S. Martell, "Intercolonial Communications 1840-1867", p. 51.

40. Jno. R. Hamilton, *New Brunswick and Its Scenery*, p. 104. See also: St. John and Its Business, pp. 39-42.

41. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 287.

42. *Ibid.*

43. William Murdoch, "The Saint John Suspension Bridge," *New Brunswick Historical Society Collections*, IV (1919), 105.

44. John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances", 78.

45. *Ibid.*, 78.

46. *Ibid.*, 78. N.B. Mus., Documents loaned by the City of Saint John, Lease of Land for Wharf at Ferry Slip, Princess Street, Box 1, Packet 7, Shelf 88, 2 November 1840.

47. See: Figure 1.

48. John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances", 78.

49. William Murdoch, "The Saint John Suspension Bridge", 105.

50. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 315.

51. One post-Confederation ferry was called the *Ouigoudy*, which was popularly thought to be the Micmac word for highway. See: Canadian Government Railways, *St. John, the City of the Loyalists*, 3rd edition (Moncton, 1913), p. 5.

52. Fred J. Hamilton, *A Trip Over the Intercolonial Including Articles on the Mining Industries of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick With a Description of the Cities of Saint John and Halifax* (Montreal: Gazette, 1876), p. 58.

53. George Johnson, "Place Names of Canada: The Carletons," *Canadian Magazine*, Vol. 12 (1899), 289.

54. Canada, *Census of Canada 1870-71*, 1, pp. 66-67.

55. Jno. R. Hamilton, *New Brunswick and Its Scenery*, p. 113.

56. *The Morning Telegraph and News*, 6 March 1871. See: Figure 1.

57. W. F. Burditt, "Railroad Development in the Maritime Provinces of Canada, With Particular Reference to Lines Tributary to Saint John, New Brunswick", p. 9—"The Carleton Branch Railway was begun September 8, 1870, and completed April 5, 1871 . . ."

    This line was designed to give the Western Extension waterfront access. See: Footnote #65 below.

58. Charles I. Hubbard, "Political Reconstruction in New Brunswick (1867-1870)" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1963), pp. 21-23.

59. James L. Miller, "A Study of New Brunswick Politics at the Beginning of the Era of Free Trade and Reciprocity" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1950), p. 273.

60. Michael J. Sheehy, "John Alfred Poor and the International Railroads, the Early Years to 1860" (M.A. Thesis, University of Maine-Orono, 1974), p. 71.

61. For discussion of this event see: Alfred G. Bailey, "The Basis and Persistance of Opposition to Confederation in New Brunswick," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXIII (December 1942), 382-383; W. M. Baker, "No Shillelagh: The Life, Journalism and Politics of Timothy Warren Anglin" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1971), p. 292.

62. W. S. MacNutt, *New Brunswick, A History 1784-1867*, pp. 410-411.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 412.

64. E. R. Burpee, "Report of the Survey of Extension of the European and North American Railway to the American Boundary and the Branch Line to Fredericton," *Journal of the House of Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1865), pp. 1-19.

65. These routes as described by Burpee in the above survey were:
    1. A line running from the E. & N.A. station on the East Side of the Harbour, through Portland and requiring a railway bridge at the Falls (This was built in 1885. See: N.B. Mus., Fred H. Hoben, *Reports of theSaint John River Valley*, Shelf 30, p. 191);
    2. A line running from Fairville to the Carleton waterfront which incorporated the ferry as part of its system to transfer passengers across the harbour (This was completed in 1871 and was known as the Carleton Branch Railway).

66. W. S. MacNutt, *New Brunswick, A History 1784-1867*, p. 413.

67. C. W. Anderson, "An Historical Sketch of the European and North American Railway", *Canadian Rail* (1969), 12.

68. See above: Footnote #65. In his *Report*, p. 12, Burpee had advised against bridging the Falls or Navy Island because of the expense.

69. Carl M. Wallace, "Sir Leonard Tilley, a Political Biography" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta, 1972), p. 241.

70. James Hannay, *History of New Brunswick* (Saint John: John A. Bowes, 1909), Vol. II, 269.

71. J. M. and Edw. Trout, *The Railways of Canada* (Toronto: The Monetary Times Office, 1871), p. 123.

72. *The Morning Telegraph and News*, 6 March 1871.

73. John W. Reps, *The Making of Urban America* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. 5 and Chapter II – "Gridiron Cities and Checkerboard Plans," pp. 294-324.

74. William Murdoch, "The Saint John Suspension Bridge," 104.

75. Allan Pred, *The Spatial Dynamics of Urban-industrial Growth: 1800-1914*, p. 200. Pred has noted that extensive consumers of waterfront acreage such as shipbuilders were driven to the periphery of cities. At Saint John this phenomenon was apparent in both the location of shipbuilding operations and lumber mills.

76. *The Maritime Provinces: A Handbook for Travellers*, p. 24.

77. *St. John and Its Business*, p. 106. These brushes were sold almost exclusively in the Saint John store of Logan and Lindsay on King Street. *The Morning Telegraph*, 16 February 1867.

78. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, pp. 283-287.

79. John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances", 78. See: Figure 1.

80. The Rev. W. Christopher Atkinson, *A Historical and Statistical Account of New Brunswick B.N.A. with Advice to Emigrants* (Edinburgh: Printed by Anderson and Bryce, MDCCCXLIV), p. 38.

81. N.B. Mus., *Bridges Over the Reversing Falls*, Cb. File, p. 1. See also: N.B. Mus., Fred H. Hoben, *Reports of the Saint John River Valley*, Shelf 30, p. 191.

82. William Murdoch, "The Saint John Suspension Bridge", 106-107.

83. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 296.

84. Andrew Learmont Spedon, *Rambles Among the Blue-noses, or Reminiscences of a Tour Through New Brunswick and Nova Scotia During the Summer of 1862* (Montreal, 1863), p. 64.

85. *St. John and Its Business*, p. 42.

86. M. H. Perley, "The Progress of New Brunswick With a Brief View of Its Resources, Natural and Industrial", in H. Y. Hind, *et al.*, *Eighty Years Progress of British North America* (Toronto: Published by L. Stebbins, 1863), p. 603.

In 1875 the Provincial Government bought the Suspension Bridge and made it a free highway.

87. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 301. See also: Figure 1.

88. Allan Pred, *The Spatial Dynamics of Urban-industrial Growth: 1800-1914*, p. 200. See above: Footnote #75.

89. See: Donald Ross, "A History of the Shipbuilding Industry in New Brunswick" (Harriet Irving Library Archives, U.N.B.: James Simmonds Prize Essay, 1933), p. 1.

90. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 301.

91. C. K. Harley, "On the Persistence of Old Techniques: The Case of North American Wooden Shipbuilding," *Journal of Economic History*, 33 (1973), 374. See also: Robin Neill, *A New Theory of Value*, p. 68.

92. Peter Dean McClelland, "The New Brunswick Economy in the Nineteenth Century", p. 205.

93. *Morning Journal*, 16 March 1868. See also: Rev. J. W. Millidge, "Some Reminiscences of the City of Saint John and the Province of New Brunswick 1870-1880," *New Brunswick Historical Society Collections*, IV (1928), 326-341.

94. Esther Harrison Greaves, "Peter Mitchell: A Father of Confederation" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1958), p. 4. Greaves notes that Peter Mitchell had difficulty meeting expenses incurred through shipping in the 1850's.

95. Richard Rice, "William Wright," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. 10 (1972), p. 719.

96. Richard Rice, "Thomas Hilyard," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. 10 (1972), p. 349.

97. J. W. Lawrence, *A Letter on the Intercolonial Railway* (Saint John, N.B.: J. & A. McMillan, 1867), p. 15.

98. Richard Rice, "Thomas Hilyard", p. 349.

99. Moreover, the significantly increased shipowning in Saint John and throughout the Province particularly in the early 1870's (although this is not applicable to Hilyard) is viewed by at least one economist as revealing the possible inability of builders to sell their ships. Thus the increase in their personal tonnage occurred, perhaps by desire but also through default. See: P. D. McClelland, "The New Brunswick Economy in the Nineteenth Century", p. 206.

100. According to W. F. Ganong, Indiantown was "an early trading post established in 1779 as the 'Indian House' for trade with the Indians. Its position above the Falls at the mouth of the St. John [made] it the natural port for river traffic . . ." See: W. F. Ganong, "Monograph of the Origins of Settlement in the Province of New Brunswick", p. 140.

101. See: D. R. Jack, *Centennial Prize Essay* . . .. p. 65.

102. Jno. R. Hamilton, *New Brunswick and Its Scenery*, p. 110.

103. See: P.A.N.B., Walling Map of 1862 and *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*.

104. *Report of the Commissioners on the Union of the Cities of Saint John and of Portland*, p. 30.

105. Jno. R. Hamilton, *New Brunswick and Its Scenery*, p. 110.

106. Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 168.

107. *The Morning Telegraph*, 26 January 1867.

108. See: Figure 1.

109. *Report on the Commissioners on the Union of the Cities of Saint John and of Portland* . . .. p. 30.

110. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 253; 244.

111. John Rankin, *A History of Our Firm*, pp. 64-89.

112. *The Morning Telegraph*, 19 February 1768.

113. William F. Ganong, "A Monograph of the Place-nomenclature of the Province of New Brunswick", *T.R.S.C.* (1896), pp. 242, 243, 279.

114. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68*, p. 254.

115. James Neilson Lewis, "The Human Ecology of the St. John River" (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1939), p. 56.

116. See above: Footnote #100.

117. A. F. Burghardt, "A Hypothesis About Gateway Cities," *Annals Association of American Geographers*, 61 (June 1971), 270.

    For chronological survey of the lumber mills in Indiantown see: George I. Higgins, "The sentinels of Indiantown harbor," *The Maritime Advocate and Busy East* (Nov. 1942), 5-9; 30.

118. George I. Higgins, "From Horse Cars to Motor Busses in Saint John, New Brunswick," *The Maritime Advocate and Busy East*, SLI (September 1950), 19.

119. *The Morning Telegraph*, 14 February 1867.

120. Roderick C. Campbell, "Simonds, Hazen and White: A Study of a New Brunswick Firm in the Commercial World of the Eighteenth Century" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1970), Chapter II, pp. 35-77.

121. J. Russell Harper, *Portland Point: Crossroads of New Brunswick History* (Saint John, N.B.: New Brunswick Museum 1956), p. i. See: Figure 1.

122. W. O. Raymond, *The River St. John* (Sackville, N.B.: The Tribune Press, 1950), p. 189.

123. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-200.

124. *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory 1867-68* lists residents of Harrison Street as residing on Hazen Street, Portland.

125. D. R. Jack, *Centennial Prize Essay* . . ., p. 66.

126. John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances", 79.

127. The firm was originally known as Harris and Allan. See: *St. John and Its Business*, pp. 124; 128-129.

128. Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, pp. 88-91.

129. Allan Pred, "Industrialization, Initial Advantage and American Metropolitan Growth," *Geographical Review*, 55 (1965), 162.

130. *New Brunswick Society for the Encouragement of Agriculture, Home Manufactures, and Commerce Throughout the Province* (Fredericton, N.B., n.d., probably c. 1854).

131. James F. W. Johnston, *Notes on North America* London: MDCCCLI), pp. 36, 40.

132. Moses H. Perley, "Reports on Railways," *Journal of the House of Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton, 1847), Appendix, p. CXXXV.

133. *Ibid.*, p. cxlix.

134. W. S. MacNutt, *New Brunswick, A History 1784-1867*, p. 328.

135. Plan for Shortening the time of passage between New York and London, . . . including the proceedings of the Railway Convention . . . and the Charter of the European and North American Railway (Portland, Me.: 1850), pp. 129-130.

136. G. P. deT. Glazebrook, *A History of Transportation in Canada*, p. 152.

137. John Wilkinson, "Saint John and Shediac," *Journal of the House of Assembly* (New Brunswick: 1850), Appendix, p. ccxix. The Mill Pond was located near the Market Slip. See: Figure 1.

138. J. M. and Edw. Trout, *The Railways of Canada*, p. 121, and Fred H. Phillips, "Railways of New Brunswick," *The Maritime Advocate and Busy East*, XXIX (1939), 10.

139. Edward C. Kirkland, *Men, Cities and Transportation: A Study in New England History 1820-1900*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1948), p. 210 and Carl M. Wallace, "Sir Leonard Tilley: A Political Biography", p. 30.

140. Fred H. Phillips, "Railways of New Brunswick", 10.

141. J. M. and Edw. Trout, *The Railways of Canada*, P. 121.

142. I Allen Jack, "Old Times in Victoria Ward," *The New Brunswick Magazine*, II (1899), 133.

143. *New Brunswick Society . . . of Agriculture, Home Manufactures, and Commerce*, p. 215.

144. H.I.L. Archives, U.N.B., *Ketchum Papers*, R. Jardine to H. G. C. Ketchum, 19 August 1862. See also: A. Foster Baird, "The History of Engineering at the University of New Brunswick", in A. G. Bailey (ed.), *The University of New Brunswick Memorial Volume* (Fredericton, N.B.: 1950), pp. 79-80.

145. J. M. and Edw. Trout, *The Railways of Canada*, p. 121.

146. John Wilkinson, "Saint John and Shediac," *Journal of the House of Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton, N.B.: 1850), Appendix, p. ccxxvi. John Wilkinson was a member of the Surveyor-General's Office.

147. M. H. Perley, "Reports on Railways," *Journal of the House of Assembly . . ., 1847*, pp. cxlviii-cxlix.

148. Allan Pred, *The Spatial Dynamics of U.S. Urban-industrial Growth 1800-1914*, p. 168.

149. *St. John and Its Business, p. 99.*

150. *See: The Morning Telegraph* for 24 January 1867, 21 February 1867, inclusive.

151. W. H. Golding, "New Brunswick Was a Railroad Pioneer," *The Maritime Advocate and Busy East*, XXVI (1935), 17.

152. Geoffrey Bilson, "The Cholera Epidemic in Saint John, N.B., 1854," *Acadiensis*, IV (Autumn 1974), 89. See: Figure 1. See also: Geoffrey Bilson, *A Darkened House, Cholera in Nineteenth-century Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 104-108.

153. *Commissioners Report on the Mill Pond at Saint John, May 1855*, p. 2.

154. "Report of the Railway Commissioners of the Province of New Brunswick for the Year 1858," *Journal of the House of Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick*, 1859, p. 792.

155. "Seventh Annual Report of the Railway Commissioners of the Province of New Brunswick for the Year 1864," *Journal of the House of Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick*, 1865, Appendix, p. 15.

The Mill Pond eventually did become the freight terminus of the I.C.R. See: Figure 2.

156. Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 91.

157. James F. W. Johnston, *Notes on North America*, p. 39.

158. I. Allen Jack, "Old Times in Victoria Ward." See also: *Official Yearbook or the Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton, 1911), p. 25.

159. *Ibid.* 200. The Valley is that area located between the city proper and Portland. See: Jno. R. Hamilton, *New Brunswick and Its Scenery*, p. 104. See also: Figures 2 and 5.

160. I. Allen Jack, "Old Times in Victoria Ward," 200 and *Hutchinson's New Brunswick Directory, 1867-68*, pp. 241-273.

161. William F. Ganong, "A Monograph of the Place-nomenclature of the Province of New Brunswick," p. 209.

162. C. Warren Anderson, "An Historical Sketch of the European and North American Railway," 10.

163. Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 13.

164. *Lovell's Gazetteer of British North America* (Montreal, 1873).

165. C. F. J. Whebell, "Corridors: A Theory of Urban Systems," *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 59 (March 1969), 23.

166. Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 90.

167. Swan Wooster Engineering Co., Ltd., *Saint John Port Development Study*, Phase II, Research and Productivity Council (December 1970), p. 1.

## CHAPTER II

1. *Reports on the Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for the year ending 31st December 1867: Message of the Mayor to the Common Council and Reports of the City Officials with Sundry Accounts in Detail.* Published by Order of the Common Council (Saint John, N.B.: Barnes and Company, 1868), p. 7. See also: *Reports on the Accounts of the Corporation . . . year ending . . . 1868* . . .. p. 3.

2. Elite ordinarily refers to a collectivity. However, an individual member of such a group may also be identified as "an elite".

3. W. T. Jackman, *Economics of Transportation*, p. 12. See also: Thomas Adams, "Town Planning and Land Development", *Ninth Annual Report of the Commission of Conservation Canada* (Ottawa: 1918), p. 198.

4. See: Footnote #1.

5. *Reports on the Accounts of the Corporation . . . year ending . . . 1864* . . .. pp. xxvii-xxix.

6. *Reports on the Accounts of the Corporation . . . year ending . . . 1866* . . .. pp. 20 and 22-23. Peters was appointed city surveyor in 1861 and city engineer in 1863 when that office was established. See: I. Allen Jack (ed.), *Biographical Review Province of New Brunswick* (Boston: 1900), p. 62.

7. See: *The Morning Telegraph*, 28 February 1867, 14 March 1867, 21 March 1867.

8. *Report of the Commissioners on the Union of the Cities of Saint John and of Portland* . . .. p. 17.

9. In 1858 S. L. Tilley suggested that Carleton "be constituted a district in connection with Dukes and Sydney Wards." In response a Carleton resident advised that "a line drawn through the centre of Germain Street, Wellington Row and Carleton and Garden Streets . . . would place the opposite sides of the harbour in one district besides dividing the population much more equitably." See: N.B. Mus., Tilley Papers, Box 4, F. 3, No. 53, [A.H.] DeMill to S. L. Tilley, 3 May 1858.

10. See above: Chapter I.

11. *The Morning Telegraph*, 19 December 1867 and Common Council Minutes, 13 December 1867. See also: *Ibid.*, 4 April 1868. Rowan again wanted Carleton to pay one-fifth of engineer's salary but his motion was lost.

12. In 1889 the streets on both sides of the harbour were brought under the direction of one committee. See: *Report of the Commissioners on the Union of the Cities of Saint John and of Portland*, p. 27.

13. *St. John Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 12 January 1871.

14. *Ibid.*, 18 May 1971.

15. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 26 July 1871.

16. *Reports of the Accounts of the Corporation . . . year ending . . . 1871* . . .. p. 6.

17. *Ibid.*, 1874, p. 13.

18. George I. Higgins, "The Sentinels of Indiantown Harbour," *Atlantic Advocate and Busy East* XXXIII (November 1942), 6.

19. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 3 April 1868. In 1868 the Market Slip and Wharves brought $2,500 while the Charlotte Street Extension netted $1,120 for the city.

20. D. R. Jack, *Centennial Prize Essay* . . .. p. 111. See also: *Telegraph*, 5 June 1871.

21. John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances," 83-84.

22. See: Eric L. Teed, "Footprints of Benedict Arnold, Late Major General Congressional Army of the American Colonies; Late Brigadier General, British Army," *New Brunswick Historical Collections* 20 (1971), 81.

23. *Reports of the Accounts of the Corporation . . . year ending . . . 1868* . . .. p. 3.

24. *Ibid.*, 1860, p. 11.

25. See: D. L. Hutchinson, "The Saxby Gale," *Transactions of the Canadian Institute* IX (1911), 253-259, Toronto, 1912.

26. *The Morning Telegraph*, 21 April 1868.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Thomas Reed served between 1869-73.

29. John A. Bowes, "Civic Ownership," 113.

30. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 27 September 1871.

31. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 3 June 1868.

32. *Ibid.*, 17 September 1869.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*, 20 October 1869.

35. *The Morning Telegraph*, 21 October 1869. The Ballast Wharf was located in the Reed's Point-Lower Cove area. See: Figure 1.

36. Peter D. McClelland, "The New Brunswick Economy in the Nineteenth Century," p. 4. McClelland describes this period as demonstrating "the absence of alternatives capable of giving regional growth the sustaining force that timber was now losing . . ."

37. John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances," 84.

38. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 24 March 1871.

39. See: Figures 1 and 2 for comparison of wharf development between Queen and St. James Streets.

40. This tendency was undoubtedly reinforced by the continual Carleton ferry discussions.

41. For a comment on other places see: Alan F. J. Artibise, "The Urban Development of Winnipeg 1874-1914" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1972), p. 24 and Peter A. Baskerville, "The Boardroom and Beyond: Aspects of the Upper Canadian Railroad Community," (Ph.D. Thesis, Queens University, 1973), p. ii. External links refer to a city's vertical transportation linkage to the wider system of cities.

42. *Acts of the General Assembly of Her Majesty's Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1864), 27 Vic. Chapter 43, p. 99.

43. William Smith, *The History of the Post Office in British North America* (Cambridge: 1920), p. 258. Some of these men had played an important role twenty-five years earlier in another form of external communication.

44. *Acts of the General Assembly of Her Majesty's Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1866), 30 Vic. Chapter 23, p. 90.

45. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 14/15 June 1867.

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Telegraph*, 20 June 1867.

48. *Ibid.*

49. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 18 June 1868.

50. See: Chapter I, Footnotes #65 and #68.

51. *The New Brunswick Anthology, 1867-1900* (New Brunswick: 1973), p. 85.

52. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 6 January 1869; Payment was resumed when the Railway had been completed. See: Common Council Minutes, 8 October 1869.

53. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 3 February 1869.

54. *Ibid.*, 31 March 1869.

55. *Ibid.*, 20 April 1869.

56. *Ibid.*, 28 April 1869. They received a 1600' frontage.

57. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 17 May 1869.

58. *Acts of the General Assembly of Her Majesty's Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1866), 30 Vic. Chap. 23, p. 92.

59. *News*, 26 February 1870.

60. See: J. M. & Edw. Trout, *The Railways of Canada*, p. 124 and *Acts of the General Assembly of Her Majesty's Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1869), 32 Vic. Chap. 54, p. 103.

61. *News*, 25 February 1870.

62. *Acts of the General Assembly of Her Majesty's Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1870), 33 Vic. Chap. 39, p. 66.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

64. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 6 July 1870 and 15 July 1870.

65. *Ibid.*, 15 July 1870. See also: *Telegraph*, 16 July 1870.

66. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 31 August 1870.

67. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 27 September 1870.

68. *Telegraph*, 13 October 1870.

69. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 28 September 1871.

70. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 5 July 1871.

71. C. W. Anderson, "An Historical Sketch of the European and North American Railway," 12. See also: *Barnes' New Brunswick Almanack* 1872 (Saint John, N.B.: 1872), p. 106.

72. *Telegraph*, 12 February 1870.

73. See: Footnote #1.

74. *The Morning Freeman*, 20 December 1870.

75. *Ibid.*

76. *The Morning Telegraph*, 13 May 1869.

77. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 16 October 1868.

78. *Ibid.*, 9 September 1868.

79. *Ibid.*, 26 February 1869.

80. *Ibid.*, 10 March 1869.

81. *Ibid.*, 31 March 1869.

82. *Ibid.*, 18 June 1869 and *The Morning Telegraph*, 19 June 1869.

83. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 14 July 1869.

84. *Ibid.*, 17 September 1869.

85. *The Morning Telegraph*, 19 June 1869. See also: Figure 1.

86. *The Morning Telegraph*, 19 June 1869.

87. *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 26 May 1870.

88. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 6 July 1870.

89. *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 28 July 1870 and 11 August 1870.

90. *Ibid.*, 28 September 1870.

91. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 26 October 1870 and *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 27 October 1870.

92. *Telegraph*. 22 June 1871. See also: Gilbert Allardyce, "The Vexed Question of Sawdust: River Pollution in Nineteenth Century New Brunswick," *The Dalhousie Review* 52 (1972) 189. Footnote #12.

93. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 14 December 1870, and *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 15 December 1870.

94. *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 15 December 1870.

95. Although the question of religion did not surface, it may have been an underlying factor in the comments of T. W. Anglin, Catholic editor of *The Morning Freeman* and a friend John McSweeney, the ferry lessee. See: *The Morning Freeman*, 20 December 1970 and 24 December 1870, and *The Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 19 Decembr 1870 and 21 December 1870.

See also: Rev. M. B. Buckley, *Tour in America*, pp. 107-108, 110-111. Buckley wrote of religious antagonism between these newspapers and remarked also on visiting a "Mr. MacSweeney one of the wealthiest Catholic Irishmen in Saint John, New Brunswick."

96. *Saint John Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal*, 31 March 1871.

97. *Ibid.*

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Ibid.*

100. *The Morning Freeman*, 6 May 1871.

101. Michael H. Frisch, *Town into City: Springfield, Massachusetts, and the Meaning of Community, 1840-1880* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 109.

102. *Telegraph*, 5 May 1870. See also: *Reports on the Accounts of the Corporation . . . year ending . . . 1872 . . .*. p. 18. This situation contrasted sharply with Boston which was expanding its street railway service in the early 1870's. See: Sam B. Warner, *Streetcar Suburbs. The Process of Growth in Boston 1870-1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 22.

103. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 11 October 1871.

104. *Telegraph*, 14 July 1870. See also: 3 November 1870. Editor notes that the short route to Montreal is "of some importance to our citizens."

105. *Telegraph*, 27 August 1870. See also: Sanford Fleming, *The Intercolonial* (Montreal: 1876), p. 85. Fleming wrote that the existence of the Western Extension was seen as a competitor to the ICR and thus, further influenced the Chief Engineer against choosing the Saint John favoured Central Route.

106. *Barnes' New Brunswick Almanac 1872*, p. 106.

## CHAPTER III

1. John W. Alexander, "The Basic-Nonbasic Concept of Urban Economic Functions," Harold M. Mayer and Clyde E. Kohn (eds.), *Readings in Urban Geography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 85.
2. Jane Jacobs, *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 130.
3. S. A. Saunders, *The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces* (Ottawa: 1939), p. 3.
4. See: Chapter I. The Western Extension eventually became part of the C.P.R. See also: R. I. Stronach, "The European and North American Railway," *Canadian Rail*, No. 206 (1969), 19. In November 1872 the E. and N. A. Railway became part of the I.C.R. system.
5. See: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 22 April 1869.
6. *Ibid.*, 31 March 1869.
7. See: Figures 1 and 2.
8. See: Chapter II.
9. The terms Breakwater, Ballast Wharf and Ballast Wharf extension were frequently used interchangeably. However, the Ballast Wharf extension referred to the land area (eventually granted in 1876) which extended in a *southerly* direction from the Breakwater or Ballast Wharf. See: Figure 1.
10. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 17 May 1871.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Telegraph*, 15 February 1872.
14. *Ibid.*
15. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 14 February 1872.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Telegraph*, 15 February 1872.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.* 28 April 1870.
20. When the new Board came into existence the name of the organization was changed from the Chamber of Commerce to the Board of Trade.
21. "Samuel Plimsoll," *Dictionary of National Biography*, XXII (London: 1909), p. 1145.
22. *Telegraph*, 20 March 1873.
23. *Ibid.* 27 March 1873.
24. *Ibid.* 30 March 1873.
25. *News* 15 November 1875.
26. *Ibid.* 1 June 1876.
27. Kenneth Donovan, "New Brunswick and the Federal Election of 1878" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1973), p. 16.
28. James R. Rice, "A History of Organized Labour in Saint John, New Brunswick 1813-1890" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1968), Chapter III, pp. 53-90.
29. Jno. R. Hamilton, *New Brunswick and Its Scenery*, pp. 89-90. Hamilton claimed the head of the Market Slip to be the "centre of gravity for all unemployed . . . men and 'odd-job-men' of the city . . ."

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-50. See also: H. A. Logan, *Trade Unions in Canada* (Toronto: 1948), p. 21. For a comment on the Ontario situation see: F. W. Watt, "The National Policy, the Workingman and Proletarian Ideas in Victorian Canada," *C.H.R.* XL (March 1959), 5.

31. *News*, 7 December 1875. See also: Edward J. Chambers, "Late Nineteenth Century Business Cycles in Canada," *CJEPS* XXX (August 1964), 398. See also: Peter Dean McClelland, "The New Brunswick Economy in the Nineteenth Century," p. 228.

32. *Telegraph*, 11 March 1873.

33. *Ibid.*, 11 June 1873.

34. *Ibid.*, 16 October 1873.

35. *News*, 10 March 1874.

36. *Ibid.*, 24 April 1874.

37. *Ibid.*, 9 November 1874.

38. See: *Freeman*, 10 November 1874 and 13 November 1874. See also: *News*, 18 November 1874.

39. *News*, 26 April 1874.

40. By 1904 the labourers were sufficiently influential to elect W. S. Daley as alderman for Dufferin Ward. In this contest, "it was reported that the Hebrew residents had combined against . . ." his opponent. See: *Telegraph*, 20 April 1904.

41. *News*, 27 April 1875.

42. *Ibid.*, 7 May 1875.

43. *Ibid.*, 30 April 1875.

44. *Ibid.*, 3 May 1875.

45. *Ibid.*, 4 May 1875.

46. *Ibid.*, 5 May 1875.

47. *Ibid.*, 8 May 1875. See also: *Freeman*, 8 May 1875. The special constables were assigned to waterfront areas.

48. *News*, 6 may 1875.

49. James R. Rice, "A History of Organized Labour in Saint John . . .," p. 84.

50. *Telegraph*, 9 January 1873.

51. *Ibid.*, 9 January 1873. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 8 January 1873.

52. *Ibid.*, 30 October 1873.

53. *Ibid., 30 October 1873.*

54. *Ibid.*, 11 December 1873. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 10 December 1873.

55. *Telegraph*, 17 March 1874.

56. *News*, 21 January 1875. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 20 January 1875.

57. *News*, 21 January 1875.

58. P.A.N.B., Common Council papers, 17 March 1875.

59. *News*, 18 March 1875.

60. *Ibid.*, 29 March 1875.

61. William Nannary was listed in the City Directory of 1876-77 as a theatrical manager. Edward J. Russell was listed as a general agent. However, although Russell's immediate income may have come from that occupation much of the time of this immigrant from the Isle of Wight was undoubtedly spent painting the ships which sailed into Saint John. See: Huia G. Ryder, *Edward John Russell Marine Artist* Saint John, N.B.: The N.B. Museum, 1953), pp. 11, 14-17.

62. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 11 October 1871.

63. *Ibid.*

64. See Below: Footnote #94.

65. *Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada* (Ottawa: 1875), 38 Vic. Chap. 71, p. 64.

66. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 13 October 1875.

67. *Ibid.*, 29 December 1875.

68. See below: Chapter IV.

69. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 14 February 1872.

70. *Telegraph*, 27 February 1872. See also: *News*, 27 February 1872.

71. *Telegraph*, 27 February 1872.

72. *Ibid.*, 5 March 1872.

73. *Ibid.*, 7 March 1872 and 16 March 1872.

74. *Ibid.*, 20 April 1872.

75. *Ibid.*

76. *News*, 23 March 1875.

77. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 4 September 1873.

78. *Telegraph*, 13 September 1873.

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Ibid.*, 2 October 1873.

81. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 October 1873.

82. *Telegraph*, 15 October 1873.

83. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 29 October 1873.

84. *News*, 23 April 1873.

85. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 14 May 1874.

86. *News*, 27 March 1875.

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*, 30 December 1875.

89. *Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada* (Ottawa: 1876), 770-772. See: Figure 1. Rankin's Wharf was located near Sheriff Street.
Significantly both the Lower Cove and Rankin's Wharf areas contained a large number of Irish residents.

90. *News*, 1 April 1876.

91. G. R. Stevens, *History of the Canadian National Railways* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), p. 99.

92. *News*, 3 August 1876. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 2 August 1876.

93. *News*, 14 August 1876.

94. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 25 August 1876. See also: *News*, 26 August 1876. B. Coxetter claimed the new railway would be like the Western Extension — unprofitable. See: *News*, 3 August 1876.

95. *News*, 26 August 1876.

96. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 29 December 1876.

97. K. T. Rowland, *Steam at Sea, A History of Steam Navigation* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 115.

## CHAPTER IV

1. See: George Stewart, *The Story of the Great Fire in Saint John, N.B.* (Toronto: 1877) and R. H. Conwell, *History of the Great Fire in Saint John, June 20 and 21, 1877* (Boston: 1877). See also: *Report of the Saint John Relief and Aid Society* (Saint John, N.B.: 1879).
2. *The Story of a Crime, the Harris Land Job and Its Results* (Saint John, N.B.: 1896), p. 5
3. Eileen C. Cushing, "The Great Fire of Saint John, June 20th, 1877 and Its Effect on a Number of People," *New Brunswick Historical Society Collections* 17 (1961), 116
4. *News*, 30 December 1876. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 29 December 1876.
5. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 27 January 1877.
6. *Ibid.*, 21 February 1877.
7. *News*, 3 April 1877.
8. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 20 April 1877.
9. *News*, 30 April 1877.
10. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 16 July 1877.
11. *News*, 19 July 1877.
12. *News*, 27 September 1877.
13. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 7 November 1877.
14. *News*, 25 November 1877. See also: *Saint John Globe*, 15 January 1877.
15. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 28 November 1877.
16. *Reports of Cases Determined by the Supreme Court of New Brunswick*, Vol. II (Toronto: 1879), pp. 194-210.
17. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 8 November 1878.
18. *News*, 9 November 1878.
19. *Ibid.*
20. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 8 November 1878. See also: M. H. Frisch, *Town into City* . . ., pp. 42-47, and Robert M. Fogelson, *The Fragmented Metropolis, Los Angeles 1850-1930* (Cambridge: 1967), pp. 38-42.
21. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 20 December 1878.
22. *News*, 21 December 1878. See also: *Reports of the Accounts . . . of the City of Saint John . . . 1878*, p. 5.
23. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 20 December 1878.
24. *News*,2 March 1877.
25. *Ibid.*, 4 December 1877.
26. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 4 January 1878.
27. *Ibid.*, 19 March 1878.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *News*, 1 April 1878. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 2 April 1878.
30. *News*, 1 April 1878.
31. *Ibid.*, 13 April 1878.
32. *Ibid.*, 24 April 1878.
33. *Globe*, 24 April 1878.
34. *Reports of the Accounts of the Corporation . . . of Saint John for . . . 1878*, p. 7.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 12. Even before the fire of 1877, attention had been directed to "the numerous families living on one meal a day and . . . the great bulk of the laboring population . . . without work . . ." P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, John Livingstone to Macdonald, 23 February 1876.

36. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 13 March 1878.

37. *News*, 25 July 1879.

38. *Sun*, 24 April 1879.

39. John A. Bowes, "Civic Finances," 85.

40. *News*, 16 April 1879.

41. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1879, XII, No. 2, pp. 714-715 and 1880-81, XIV, No. 2, pp. 658-659.

| | Exports | Imports |
|---|---|---|
| 1878 | 2,937,714 | 7,366,610 |
| 1879 | 2,869,456 | 4,278,123 |
| 1880 | 3,249,317 | 3,197,568 |

42. *News*, 7 January 1879. See also: *Globe*, 25 April 1878.

43. *Globe*, 27 November 1879.

44. *Ibid.*, 22 August 1879.

45. *Ibid.*, 2 October 1879. See also: 29 September 1879. For a brief overview of emigration from the Maritimes during this period see: Alan A. Brookes, "Out-Migration from the Maritime Provinces, 1860-1900: Some Preliminary Considerations," *Acadiensis* V (Spring 1976), 26-55.

46. *Globe*, 4 October 1879.

47. *News*, 5 June 1879.

48. See: Andrew F. Burghardt, "A Hypothesis about Gateway Cities," 273. See also: Donald Kerr and Jacob Spelt, *The Changing Face of Toronto*, p. 29 and Norman Thompson and J. H. Edgar, *Canadian Railway Development from the earliest times* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1933), p. x. For a view from the 1930's see: R. H. Matheson, "Transportation in the Public Life of the Maritimes," *Public Affairs* 2 (December 1938), 87.

49. See: Kenneth Donovan, "New Brunswick and the Federal Election of 1878," p. 12. Footnote #47. See also: George A. Nader, *Cities of Canada*, pp. 190 and 237. James Hannay, "Why does St. John not grow?" *The New Brunswick Magazine* V (February 1905), 3. *The Official Yearbook of New Brunswick*, 1910 (Fredericton: 1911), p. 135.

50. Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 109. See also: C. N. Forward, "A comparison of waterfront land use in four ports: St. John's, Saint John, Halifax, and Victoria," *Economic Geography* 45 (1969), 157.

51. Grace L. Powell, *Foreign Traffic Hinterlands of the Ports of Halifax and Saint John* (Ottawa: National Harbours Board, 1968), p. 26. For a comment on Great Britain see: Jack Simmons, "The Power of the Railway," H. J. Dyos and Michael Wolff (eds.), *The Victorian City: Images and Realities* (London: 1973), p. 294.

52. A. R. M. Lower, *Great Britain's Woodyard, British America and the Timber Trade, 1763-1867*, p. 146.

53. O. J. Firestone, *Canada's Changing Economy in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century* (New York: 1957), p. 34.

54. S. A. Saunders, *The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces*, p. 3 and Peter B. Waite, *Canada 1874-1896, Arduous Destiny* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), pp. 75-76. See also: *News*, 13 November 1878. Robert Flaherty, a Saint John safe manufacturer claimed that the city suffered more from Ontario competition than any city in the world.

55. See: *Globe*, 29 October 1878. Mr. J. Walter Scammell the senior member of Scammell Brothers moved to New York City. See above: Chapter III. Ray eventually left Saint John. See: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City: Saint John, N.B. (1967-1911) and the Process of Integration", pp. 264-265, Footnote #83.

56. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 26 November 1879. See also: Donald Leslie Poynter, "The Economics and Politics of New Brunswick, 1878-1883" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1961), pp. 95-97.

57. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 26 November 1879.

58. For example see: Samuel P. Hayes, "The Changing Political Structure of the City in Industrial America," 8-16,

59. For a comment on Liverpool, England at this time see: John R. Kellett, *The Impact of the Railways on Victorian Cities* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 176-207. See: Figure 2.

## CHAPTER V

1. See above: Introduction. and also R. D. McKenzie. "The Scope of Human Ecology." p. 144 and R. D. McKenzie. *The Rise of the Metropolitan Community*. pp. 144-145.
2. See: Canada. *Census of Canada 1870-71*. 1. pp. 66-67: *1880-81*. 1. pp. 16-18: *1891*. 1. p. 18.
3. Peter B. Waite. *Canada. 1874-1836. Arduous Destiny*. pp. 108-109.
4. *Saint John Telegraph and Morning Journal*. 3 November 1870. See also: Robert Dorman. *A Statutory History of the Steam and Electric Railways of Canada*. 1836-1937 (Ottawa: Kings Printer. 1938). p. 237.
5. *Saint John Globe*. 30 November 1880.
6. See: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan. "The Port in the City . . .." Introduction. pp. 43-44. See also: Allan Jeffrey Wright. " 'The Method of Friendly Approach': Portland. Maine. as Canada's Winter Port" (M.A. Thesis. University of New Brunswick. 1976). Chapter 2. "Portland as a Canadian City." pp. 14-32.
7. Robert Dorman. *A Statutory History of the Steam and Electric Railways of Canada*. p. 533. See: Figure 2.
8. *Saint John Globe*. 7 April 1881.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*. 5 January 1881.
11. *Ibid.*. 22 February 1881.
12. *Ibid.*. 6 August 1881.
13. *Ibid.*. 30 December 1881.
14. *The Daily Sun*. 3 March 1881.
15. See: Figure 1. The Straight Shore referred to the Saint John harbour shore line of the Portland Peninsula. The wharves in Portland were comprised primarily of the Camden and Acadia Street development.
16. *The Daily Sun*. 3 March 1881.
17. *Saint John Globe*. 2 December 1883.
18. *The Daily Sun*. 3 March 1881.
19. *Ibid.*.3 March 1881. C. H. Fairweather (1826-1894) had reorganized the Saint John Board of Trade in the early 1870's.
20. *The Daily Sun*. 3 March 1881. For reference to James Holley. see: George I. Higgins. "Indiantown Harbour." New Brunswick Museum typescript. 1956.
21. *Acts of the General Assembly of Her Majesty's Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton. 1881). Chapter 44 Vic. 43. p. 93.
22. *Ibid.*.p. 94
23. *The Daily Sun*. 3 March 1881.
24. *Ibid.*. 10 March 1881.
25. P.A.N.B.. Common Council Minutes. 27 February 1880 and *Saint John Globe*. 2 March 1880.
26. P.A.N.B.. Common Council Minutes. 1 December 1880.
27. *Ibid.*. 14 September 1880.
28. *Ibid.*. 1 December 1880 and 5 November 1880.
29. *Reports of the Accounts of the Corporation for the City of Saint John. for the year ending 31st December 1880*. p. 23. See also: P.A.N.B.. Common Council Minutes. 23 January 1880. *Globe*. 24 January 1880. A number of businesses among them H. Chubb and Company had installed telephones in the late 1870's.
30. See above: Chapter IV.

31. *Saint John Globe*, 7 May 1880 and 15 September 1880. In the fall of 1880 and winter of 1881, the Province spent money upgrading the Suspension Bridge; see: N.B. Legislative Library, "Saint John Suspension Bridge, 1881," p. 53-55.

32. *Saint John Globe*, 18 September 1880.

33. *Ibid.*, 2 October 1880.

34. *Ibid.*, 4 January 1881.

35. See above: Chapter I.

36. *Saint John Globe*, 10 February 1881.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *The Daily Sun*, 24 February 1881. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 February 1881.

39. *The Daily Sun*, 24 February 1881.

40. See: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . .," Appendices C-1 and C-21.

41. *The Daily Sun*, 24 February 1881.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*, 3 March 1881.

44. *Saint John Globe*, 24 February 1881.

45. *The Daily Sun*, 3 March 1881.

46. *Saint John Globe*, 14 March 1881. The *Globe* reprinted the Western Extension's letter dated 17 July 1868 to Mr. Charles Ketchum of the Carleton Citizens Committee.

47. See above: Chapter II.

48. *The Daily Sun*, 9 March 1881.

49. See above: Chapter I.

50. *Saint John Globe*, 12 March 1881 and 14 March 1881.

51. For further discussion of this point see: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . .," pp. 299-303.

52. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 26 April 1881.

53. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 February 1881 and *The Daily Sun*, 24 February 1881.

54. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 19 April 1881.

55. *Ibid.*

56. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 November 1881.

57. *The Daily Sun*, 12 March 1881.

58. *Saint John Globe*, 21 December 1881.

59. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, S. L. Tilley to John A. Macdonald, 31 December 1881.

60. *Saint John Globe*, 5 March 1881 and 28 January 1881.

61. *Ibid.*, 11 March 1881.

62. *The Daily Sun*, 10 March 1881.

63. *Ibid.*

64. Articles on the winter port question were carried in various issues of Saint John's daily newspapers during January 1882.

65. *Saint John Globe*, 20 January 1882.

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*, 23 March 1882.

69. *Ibid.*, 24 April 1882 quoting from a letter of bridge incorporators to Tupper dated 27 January 1881.

70. *Saint John Globe*, 24 April 1882, quoting from *Telegraph*.

71. *Ibid.*, 3 May 1882.

72. Although the Grand Southern also ran to the water, it used Carleton Branch Railroad tracks. See: Malcolm MacDonald Somerville, "The Grand Southern Railway" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1976), pp. 77-78. For discussion of implications of this railroad for Maine see: Deane S. Whitney, "A history of the Maine Shore Line Railroad" (M.A. Thesis, University of Maine—Orono, 1961), pp. 15-18.

73. *Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada*, First Session, 5th Parliament Volume XIV (Ottawa, 1883), 15 May 1883, p. 1333.

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Ibid.*

76. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 2 May 1883.

77. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 30 January 1884.

78. On an earlier occasion in late 1880, Tilley had written Sir John A. Macdonald that Halifax appeared to be getting greater consideration from Ottawa than did Saint John. He reminded Macdonald that "New Brunswick has no coal or iron interests to be benefitted by the tariff and but a limited ocean trade with the West Indies" . . . [Furthermore] "My presence is an injury rather than a benefit to New Bk [sic]" P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Tilley to Macdonald, 15 November 1880 marked private.

79. *Saint John Globe*, 23 September 1884.

80. *Ibid.*

81. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 16 January 1884, F. Langelier to the Mayor of Saint John, 13 December 1883.

82. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 16 January 1884.

83. *Ibid.*, 27 February 1884.

84. W. Kaye Lamb, *History of the Canadian Pacific Railway*, p. 169.

85. P. B. Waite, *Canada, 1874-1896, Arduous Destiny*, pp. 135 and 143.

86. W. Kaye Lamb, *History of the Canadian Pacific Railway*, p. 170 and P. B. Waite, *Canada, 1874-1896, Arduous Destiny*, p. 135.

87. *Saint John Globe*, 17 July 1885 remarks of W. D. Baskin, A. C. Smith, Charles Emerson and S. L. Brittain, all from Carleton.

88. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 20 November 1885, Message from J. H. Pope to Alderman W. D. Baskin, dated 9 November 1885, Ottawa.

89. *Saint John Globe*, 29 September 1885.

90. Glasgow's performance in this position was generally well received, see: T. Nisbet Robertson, *Report on the Financial Position of the City of Saint John at 31st December 1884*, (Saint John, N.B., 1885), p. 27.

91. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 15 April 1884.

92. *Saint John Globe*, 21 April 1885.

## CHAPTER VI

1. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 21 April 1885.
2. Murray E. Angus, "The Politics of the Short Line," (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1958), p. 131.
3. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Short Line Subsidy, File #54091.
4. Michael MacKay, "Saint John Federal Politics, 1885-1887," (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1973), pp. 30-31 and Murray E. Angus, "The Politics of the Short Line," pp. 124-131.
5. Allan Jeffrey Wright, "'The Method of Friendly Approach': Portland, Maine, as Canada's Winter Port," Chapter 2, pp. 14-32.
6. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, John Stairs to Sir John A. Macdonald, 18 September 1885.
7. *Ibid.*
8. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Sir John A. Macdonald to C. A. Everett, 19 November 1885. For biographical note on C. A. Everett, see: J. K. Johnson, ed., *The Canadian Directory of Parliament 1867-1967*, p. 193.
9. Michael Mackay, "Saint John Federal Politics, 1885-1887," p. 31.
10. *Globe* and *Sun*, 27 October 1886.
11. C. W. Weldon quoted in the *Globe* of 29 October 1886. For biographical note on Weldon, see: J. K. Johnson, ed., *The Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867-1967*, p. 596.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Globe* and *Sun*, 9 November 1886.
14. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Saint John Delegation, November 1886.
15. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 16 November 1886.
16. *St. John City Directory*, 1885-1886, p. 230.
17. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 16 November 1886. For biographical note on F. E. Barker, see: J. K. Johnson, ed. *The Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867-1967*, p. 22.
18. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Saint John Delegation, November 1886.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, John Stairs to Sir John A. Macdonald, 25 November 1886.
22. Michael MacKay, "Saint John Federal Politics, 1885-1887," pp. 40-49.
23. *Globe*, 17 March 1887. See also: *Journals of the House of Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1887), p. 56.
24. Murray E. Angus, "The Politics of the Short Line," p. 86.
25. Sir Charles Tupper quoted in *Sun*, 17 February 1887.
26. Murray E. Angus, "The Politics of the Short Line," pp. 141-42.
27. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Robert Cruikshank to George Foster, 23 November 1889.
28. Robert Dorman, *A Statutory History of the Steam and Electric Railways of Canada*, pp. 408-410.
29. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Saint John Board of Trade to Sir John A. Macdonald, 29 and 30 April 1889.
30. *Ibid.*, Saint John Board of Trade, 30 April 1889.
31. Murray E. Angus, "The Politics of the Short Line," pp. 166 and 173.

32. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Joint Resolution from the Common Council and Board of Trade, Saint John, N.B. to Sir John A. Macdonald, 23 February 1889.

33. *Ibid.*, D. McNicoll to W. C. Van Horne, 4 July 1889.

34. *Ibid.*, W. C. Van Horne to Sir John A. Macdonald, 17 May 1889.

35. *Ibid.*, C. N. Skinner to Sir John A. Macdonald, 17 May 1889.

36. N.B. Mus., Hibbert Papers, Lease of New Brunswick Railway to C.P.R., 1 July 1890. See also: Murray E. Angus, "The Politics of the Short Line," p. 177. John P. Heisler, "Sir John Thompson, 1844-1894" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1955), p. 248: Heisler notes that for Halifax the Short Line without the Harvey-Salisbury connection "merely diverted trade to Saint John and the U.S."

37. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 30 July 1886.

38. *Globe*, 27 August 1886 and *Sun*, 28 August 1886.

39. *Globe*, 15 June 1887 and *Sun*, 16 June 1887.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Globe*, 23 June 1887.

43. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 February 1888 and *Globe*, 2 February 1888.

44. *Globe*, 3 February 1888 and *Sun*, 2 February 1888.

45. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 12 September 1888.

46. *Ibid.*, 21 September 1888. See also: *Sun*, 22 September 1888.

47. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 March 1889.

48. *Globe*, 11 September 1889 and *Sun*, 11 September 1889.

49. *Telegraph*, 6 September 1889.

50. *Globe*, 18 April 1884.

51. *Ibid.*, 13 September 1889.

2. See above: Chapter V.

3. *Globe*, 18 January 1887.

4. See above: Chapter III.

5. *Globe*, 27 January 1888.

6. *Ibid.*, 19 June 1888.

7. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 February 1888.

8. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 20 July 1888. See: Figure 2. Robertson Wharf was located directly north of the Market Slip.

See above: Chapter I.

*Globe*, 18 May 1889. See also: *Report of the Commissioners on the Union of the Cities of Saint John and of Portland in the City and County of Saint John*, p. 3.

For a view of municipal organization in Toronto in the 1880's see: Stephen F. Spencer, "Municipal Triumvirate: Politics, Services and Economy in Late Nineteenth Century Toronto: (Paper presented at the C.H.A. Meetings, Montreal, 1972), p. 1.

P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 November 1881.

This component would not be realized until the mid-1890's. In fact the government could not make such guarantees in the late 1880's as a transcontinental Canadian grain export trade was only developing.

Sydney Ward aldermen were against granting the I.C.R. use of the city's streets for railroad track extension. See below: Chapter VII.

64. See above: Chapter V.
65. *Globe*. 18 January 1887.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.* 16 March 1889.
68. *Ibid.*
69. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 19 September 1889.
70. *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER VII

1. See: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . .," Introduction, pp. 22-31.
2. See above: Chapter VI.
3. N.B. Mus., Tilley Papers, St. John City Railway Company, Box 19, Packet 7, No. 4. See also: George I. Higgins, "From horse cars to motor buses in Saint John, New Brunswick," 19-20.
4. See above: Chapter VI.
5. See above: Chapter I.
6. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 19 September 1889. See above: Chapter VI.
7. Throughout the 1880's various promoters had proposed dry dock facilities for the harbour.
8. *Globe*, 29 November 1889.
9. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 22 November 1889.
10. *Ibid.*, and *Globe*, 22 November 1889.
11. *Globe*, 29 November 1889.
12. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 13 December 1889, and *Globe*, 14 December 1889.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Michael Gordon, "The Andrew G. Blair Administration and the Abolition of the Legislative Council of New Brunswick, 1882-1892" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1964), p. 155.
15. *Globe*, 18 January 1890. See also: *Sun*, 20 January 1890.
16. *Globe*, 18 January 1890.
17. *Ibid.*
18. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 29 January 1890.
19. *Ibid.*, 7-8 March 1890.
20. *Ibid.*, 7 March 1890 and *Globe*, 8 March 1890.
21. *Ibid.*,8 March 1890.
22. *Ibid.*,See also: *Globe*, 10 March 1890.
23. *Globe*, 29 April 1890. See also: *Sun*, 30 April 1890.
24. *Globe*, 29 April 1890.
25. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 12 May 1890.
26. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 12 May 1890, and *Globe*, 13 May 1890.
27. *Ibid.*, See also: *Sun*, 13 May 1890.
28. *Globe*, 21 May 1890 and *Sun*, 21 May 1890.
29. *Globe*, 13 June 1890 and *Sun*, 14 June 1890.
30. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 13 June 1890.
31. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes and Papers, 13 June 1890 and *Globe*, 14 June 1890. See also: *Sun*, 14 June 1890.
32. Reprint of Leary's letter contained in the 4 July 1890 issue of *Globe*.
33. *Globe*, 26 June 1890 and 7 July 1890.
34. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 19 December 1890.
35. *Globe*, 14 August 1890. See also: *Sun*, 15 August 1890.

36. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 19 December 1890 and *Globe*, 20 December 1890. See also: *Sun*, 20 December 1890.

37. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 December 1890.

38. *Globe*, 18 March 1891. See also: *Sun*, 19 March 1891.

39. *Globe*, 20 March 1891.

40. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 27 March 1891.

41. *Globe*, 14 April 1891.

42. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 21 April 1891 and *Globe*, 21 April 1891. See also: Alister Roy Clark, "The Intercolonial: Its influence on Canadian development" (M.A. Thesis, Acadia University, 1946), p. 175. For an example of railway influence on the development of Toronto's waterfront see: Frances N. Mellen, "The development of the Toronto Waterfront during the Railway expansion era, 1850-1912," p.2.

43. *Globe*, 20 October 1891. See also: *Sun*, 20 October 1891.

44. *Ibid.*

45. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 5 May 1892 and *Globe*, 6 May 1892.

46. See: *Reports of the Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for the year ending 31st December 1895* (also 1893 and 1894).

47. See Common Council Minutes for any month of January. See also: *Globe*, 13 February 1881.

48. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 14 May 1891.

49. *Ibid.*

50. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 22 November 1889.

51. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, F. W. Cram to Sir John A. Macdonald, 21 October 1889.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*, George Foster to Sir John A. Macdonald, 29 October 1889.

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*, Sir Leonard Tilley to Sir John A. Macdonald, 22 October 1889.

56. *Ibid.*, Sir George Stephen to Sir John A. Macdonald, 2 June 1890.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, George Foster to Sir John A. Macdonald, 7 July 1890. See also: Fred H. Phillips, "Railways of New Brunswick — No. 5," *The Maritime Advocate and Busy East* II (1941) 14-15, 31. In addition see: "The Port of Saint John, New Brunswick," *Canadian Transportation* 4 (1936), 36-40.

59. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes and Papers, 27 October 1890. See also: *Globe*, 27 October 1890.

60. *Globe*, 28 October 1890.

61. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, George Foster to Sir John A. Macdonald, 29 October 1890.

62. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 5 November 1890.

63. *Ibid.* See also: *Globe*, 6 November 1890.

64. *Ibid.*

65. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 26 November 1891.

66. *Ibid.*, 23 June 1892.

67. *Globe*, 24 June 1892 and *Sun*, 24 June 1892.

68. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 June 1892.

69. *Ibid.*, 9 August 1892.

70. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 29 September 1892 and 13 October 1892.

71. *Globe*, 2 November 1892. See also: *Sun*, 2 November 1892.

72. *Globe*, 2 November 1892.

73. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 3-4 November 1892.

74. *Globe*, 4 November 1892 and *Sun*, 4 November 1892.

75. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 3 November 1892.

76. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 9 November 1892.

77. *Globe*, 12 October 1891.

78. *Globe*, 2 December 1891.

79. *Globe*, 11 December 1891. See also: Randolph Carlyle, "An Epoch in Canadian Shipping," *Canadian Magazine* 28 (1906-1907), 481-490 for a turn-of-the-century view of the freight *versus* passenger question. See also: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . . ." Introduction, pp. 43-44.

80. Edward Forbes Bush, "The Canadian 'Fast line' on the North Atlantic 1886-1915" (M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1969), p. 7. See also: Dalhousie University Library, Special Collections, Halifax Railway Extension, printed 1875, Pamphlet Box H1.3 No. 16, p. 12, and Gordon MacKay Haliburton, "A History of Railways in Nova Scotia" (M.A. Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1955), pp. 165-167 and 479-481.

81. See above: Chapter VI.

82. Edward Forbes Bush, "The Canadian 'Fast Line' on the North Atlantic, 1886-1915," pp. 40-41. See also: Randolph Carlyle citation in Footnote #79.

83. *Globe*, 30 December 1891. The significance of having the port established as the Canadian freight port through the use of not only railways but equally important of steamships becomes apparent by glancing at the export statistics from Saint John in the years before the Short Line had arrived (1895-1889), the years after it had arrived but prior to the Beaver Line Steamships Subsidy (1890-1895) and the first few years during which the Port was serviced by both railways and steamships (1896-1900).

Exports from Saint John

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1885 | $3,813,116 | 1890 | $3,595,877 | 1896 | $4,380,271 |
| 1886 | 3,901,495 | 1891 | 4,170,090 | 1897 | 3,354,067 |
| 1887 | 3,646,871 | 1892 | 3,464,424 | 1898 | 7,063,992 |
| 1888 | 3,950,741 | 1893 | 3,943,867 | 1899 | 6,565,836 |
| 1889 | 3,984,638 | 1894 | 3,480,849 | 1900 | 9,733,534 |
| | | 1895 | 3,310,215 | | |

Source: Compiled from Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1887, Vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 774-775; 1890, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, pp. 764-765; 1893, Vol. XXVI, No. 5, pp. 526-527; 1896, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, pp. 534-535; 1899, Vol. XXXIII, No. 5, pp. 16-17; 1902, Vol. XXXVI, No. 5, pp. 16-17.

84. W. Kaye Lamb, *History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1977), p. 241.

85. Edward Forbes Bush, "The Canadian 'Fast Line' on the North Atlantic, 1886-1916," pp. 69-70. See also: *Globe*, 6 March 1894.

86. *Globe*, 7 March 1894.

87. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 26 April 1894.

88. *Globe*, 11 June 1894.

89. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 24 October 1895. See above: Footnote #83 for Export Statistics.

90. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 25 October 1895.

91. *Sun*, 25 October 1895.

92. *Globe*, 30 October 1893.

93. Edward Forbes Bush, "The Canadian 'Fast Line' on the North Atlantic, 1886-1915," p. 26. See also: Henry Fry, *The History of North Atlantic Steam Navigation* (London: 1969 [London, 1896]), pp. 204-206.

94. *Globe*, 5 November 1895. For biographical notes on John Chesley and J. D. Hazen see J. K. Johnson, *The Canadian Directory of Parliament, 1867-1967*, p. 115 and p. 265 respectively.

95. *Globe*, 11 November 1895. See also: John Howard Thomson, "Mackenzie Bowell: Orangeman and Politician" (M.A. Thesis, University of Guelph, 1971), pp. 79, 106, 130.

96. *The Telegraph-Journal and the Sun*, 3 March 1925.

97. *Sun*, 3 December 1895. Hatheway mentioned he had heard from a friend in Montreal that it would be to Saint John's advantage to investigate the Beaver Line possibility.

98. *Globe*, 2 December 1895.

99. *Ibid.*

100. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 22-23 November 1895.

101. *Globe*, 19 November 1895.

102. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 November 1895.

103. *Globe*, 11 December 1895. See: Gerald Childs, "The Saint John Port Controversy," *The Atlantic Advocate* LVIII (March 1968) 12. See below: Chapters VIII and IX.

## CHAPTER VIII

1. See above: Chapter III.

2. *Ibid.*

3. See: Marion H. Matheson, "The hinterlands of Saint John," *Geographical Bulletin*, II (Ottawa, 1955), 100, Grace L. Powell, *Foreign traffic hinterlands of the ports of Halifax and Saint John* (Ottawa, National Harbours Board 1968), p. 1, and J. A. Rayburn, *The origin and destination of foreign traffic of the Port of Saint John* (Ottawa, National Harbours Board, 1964), pp. 49-53.

4. This process has been discussed at length in Chapters V-VII.

5. Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . .," pp. 453-493.

6. See: E. F. Bush, "The Canadian 'Fast Line' on the North Atlantic 1886-1915," p. 73. See also: P.A.C. Tupper Papers, Charles Tupper to T. G. Shaughnessy, 11 April 1896.

7. John I. Little, "New Brunswick Reaction to the Manitoba Schools' Question," *Acadiensis* I (1972), 55.

8. *Globe*, 20 May 1896. For contemporary sketch of Pugsley see: James Hannay, "The Honorable William Pugsley," *Canadian Magazine* 23 (1904), 537-538. See also: M. Wardell, "Saint John Revival," *Atlantic Advocate* LIX (March 1969), 18-19.

9. Canada, Sessional Papers, 1901, No. 19, pp. 1-28.

10. *Globe*, 29 July 1896.

11. *Sun*, 22 September 1896. The role of Portland, Maine in the winter port activities of the East Coast has been briefly sketched in a recent work. See: Thomas E. Appleton, *Ravenscrag: The Allan Royal Mail Line* (Toronto: McClelland and Steward 1974). See especially: Allan Jeffrey Wright, "The Method of Friendly Approach," Portland, Maine as Canada's Winter Port," Chapter 2.

    For an American viewpoint see: *Report of the Portland Port Commission Appointed by Governor Louis J. Brann, to Study Conditions Affecting the Port of Portland, Maine* (Portland, Me., 1935), p. 86.

12. *Globe*, 23 September 1896. Although the prestigious Allan Lines did not sail from Saint John during 1896-1897, the port did benefit from the federally subsidized Beaver, Head, Furness and Donaldson Lines. See: *Canadian Pacific Luncheon* publicity material issued 5 December 1923.

    The press continued to be sensitive to the position of the port *vis-à-vis* Portland. For example, the *Globe* reminded its readers that the Grand Trunk owned 300 miles of rail between Montreal and Portland which, of course, was still the shortest route to the sea. Thus that paper concluded "that there are no grounds for hope that the entire business of Canada will find an outlet at Saint John in winter," 22 September 1896. See also: James Croil, *Steam Navigation and its relation to the commerce of Canada and the United States*, p. 345.

13. Several scholars have noted the importance of local leadership in securing particular positions for a city within a system of cities. See, for example: Andrew F. Burghardt, "A hypothesis about gateway cities," p. 278 and Wilbur R. Thompson, "Urban growth and development in a national system of cities," in P. M. Hauser and L. F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 439-440. See also: I. H. B. Cornwall, "A geographical study of the Port of Vancouver in relation to its coastal hinterland" (M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1952), p. 3 and J. R. Lumby, "The Port of Western Canada," *Canadian Magazine* 28 (1906-1907), 33-39. The national nature of ports is stressed in this contemporary viewpoint.

14. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 3 May 1897 and *Globe*, 4 May 1897.

15. *Globe*, 16 September 1897. Tarte's role in the development of Montreal is discussed in Paul-André Linteau, "Le development dú Port de Montreal au debut du 20e siecle," *Canadian Historical Assn. Meetings* (Montreal 1972), pp. 18-29.

16. *Globe*, 16 September 1897.

17. For biographical note on Blair see: James Hannay, "Premiers of New Brunswick," *Canadian Magazine* 9 (1897), 213-221 and T. G. Marquis, "Honorable Andrew G. Blair," *Canadian Magazine* 24 (1904), 144-147.

18. *Globe*, 14 October 1897.

19. *Sun*, 14 October 1897.

20. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1901, No. 20, p. xi.

21. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 1 April 1898 and *Globe*, 1 April 1898. See also: W. Lovatt, "The Port of Saint John," *Atlantic Advocate* LIII (March 1963), 19.

22. *Globe*, 3 December 1898.

23. Saint John Common Council and Saint John Board of Trade, *Saint John as a Canadian Winter Port and the Terminus of the Canadian Pacific and Intercolonial Railways* (Saint John, N.B., 1898).

24. *Ibid.*, p. 5. See also: A. M. Belding, "St. John as a Winter Port," *Canadian Magazine* 12 (1898-1899), 395-404.

25. *Globe*, 3 December 1898. See also: L. M. Fair, *The Transportation of Canadian wheat to the sea*, McGill University Economic Studies (Toronto, 1925), p. 49. Fair identifies Montreal as the leading continental grain port of North America. In Saint John the necessity of being associated with the Montreal transport nexus was never underestimated.

For brief synopsis of movement towards winter port status, see: F. W. Wallace, *The Romance of a great Port* (Saint John, N.B., 1935).

26. For a discussion of the theoretical significance of this phenomenon see: Roland L. Warren, *The Community in America*, p. 53, Amos H. Hawley, *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach*, p. 239 and Donald P. Kerr, "Metropolitan dominance in Canada," p. 531.

27. *Globe*, 5 November 1896 and *Sun*, 5 November 1896. See also: P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Interview of T. G. Shaughnessy by Mayor and Members of the Common Council and the Board of Trade, 20 July 1900.

28. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 13 February 1896.

29. *Ibid.*, 4 June 1896.

30. *Globe*, 25 September 1897.

31. *Ibid.*, 1 October 1897.

32. *Ibid.*, 29 November 1897.

33. *Ibid.*, 26 February 1898.

34. *Ibid.*, 16 February 1898.

The $6,500 difference reflected the expense to which the City had gone in rectifying the Sand Point work following a landslide in November 1896 attributed to the ineptitude of the C.P.R.'s engineer. See: *Telegraph*, 13 October 1904.

35. *Globe*, 26 February 1898.

36. See above: Chapter V.

37. *Globe*, 26 February 1898.

38. *Ibid.*, 3 March 1898.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Sun*, 1 April 1898.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

43. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 5 April 1898.

44. *Globe*, 10 March 1898.

45. *Ibid.*, 2 April 1898.
46. *Ibid.*, 5 April 1898.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*, 20 April 1898.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 3 May 1898.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1898.
54. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 13 June 1898, and *Globe*, 14 June 1898.
55. *Ibid.*, 28 June 1898.
56. *Globe*, 4 and 5 January 1899.
57. *Ibid.*, 30 June 1899.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*, 8 February 1899.
62. *Ibid.*
63. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 16 February 1899.
64. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 9 March 1899.
65. *Globe*, 10 March 1899.
66. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 9 March 1899.
67. *Sun*, 14 October 1897.
68. *Globe*, 9 November 1896.
69. P.A.N.B., Common Courcil Papers, 27 November 1896.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Sun*, 14 October 1897.
72. *Globe*, 16 October 1897.
73. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 1 April 1898.
74. *Ibid.*, See also: O. J. Firestone, *Canada's Changing Economy in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 34.
75. *Globe*, 15 October 1898.
76. *Ibid.*, 2 June 1899.
77. *Ibid.*
78. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, John V. Ellis to Wilfrid Laurier, 6 September 1899.
79. *Globe*, 1 September 1899 and 4 September 1899.
80. *Ibid.*, 5 September 1899.
81. *Sun*, 12 September 1899.
82. *Ibid.*, 16 September 1899. See also: P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Wilfrid Laurier to A. G. Blair, 18 September 1899.
83. *Globe*, 16 September 1899.
84. *P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 2 May 1900.*
85. *P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Interview of T. G. Shaughnessy, 20 July 1900.*

86. *Ibid.*

87. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Mayor J. W. Daniel to Laurier, 26 July 1900. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 21 September 1900 for a copy of this letter.

88. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 21 September 1900 for letter dated 26 July 1900.

89. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, 30 July 1900.

90. *Telegraph*, 13 October 1900.

91. *Ibid.*, 13 October 1900 and 24 October 1900.

92. Brian F. Smith, "Federal Politics in Saint John 1900-1904" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1971), pp. 30-37.

93. J. Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power. Canada's Federal Elections* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 87.

94. Cited in the *Telegraph*, 29 December 1900.

95. *Telegraph*, 21 July 1900.

96. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, J. I. Tarte to Laurier, 17 September 1900.

97. *Telegraph*, 14 November 1901.

98. *Sun*, 12 November 1901.

## CHAPTER IX

1. J. W. Maxwell. "The functional structure of Canadian cities: A classification of Cities," 96.

2. See above: Chapters V, VI and VII.

3. In 1908 under the auspices of the Board of Trade, statistics were published illustrating the increases in the total value of exports from the major Canadian Ports:

| | Montreal | Halifax | Quebec | St. John |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1898 | 61,117,703 | 6,219,820 | 6,001,140 | 7,063,992 |
| 1899 | 65,018,544 | 6,293,927 | 5,405,418 | 6,565,836 |
| 1900 | 64,071,590 | 6,758,403 | 5,173,843 | 9,733,534 |
| 1901 | 65,632,086 | 6,936,940 | 5,055,336 | 11,094,903 |
| 1902 | 70,737,832 | 7,589,957 | 4,438,492 | 14,273,846 |
| 1903 | 78,527,078 | 7,983,155 | 6,445,727 | 15,364,735 |
| 1904 | 76,056,830 | 9,203,245 | 5,095,034 | 13,318,058 |
| 1905 | 80,345,420 | 8,444,149 | 4,163,567 | 13,548,041 |
| 1906 | 89,376,256 | 10,192,631 | 4,518,354 | 23,337,505 |

Source: I. J. Isaacs (Compiler). *The City of Saint John, the Metropolis of New Brunswick, Canada* (Saint John, N.B.: Barnes and Co., Printers, 1908), p. 23.

4. See above: Chapter VIII.

5. See above: Chapter II. See also: Philip W. Oland, "Container Port Saint John," *Atlantic Advocate* LX (December 1969), 23. Oland refers to Montreal groups operating within modern ports. See also: Chapter X, Footnote #46. The greatest proportion of Saint John's Trade came from grain with wheat occupying the major role. See: *Official Yearbook of the Province of New Brunswick Canada 1910* (Fredericton, N.B.: 1911), p. 124.

6. Robert Dorman, *A Statutory History of the Steam and Electric Railways of Canada, 1867-1937*, p. 536. Aside from extending its facilities within local transport nodes, the C.P.R. was simultaneously consolidating its international transport system. H. A. Innis has observed that "the increase in through traffic stimulated and was stimulated by the improvements of ocean services." (p. 169). The pressure of Atlantic seaboard traffic therefore, resulted in the C.P.R. acquiring in 1903 the fourteen steamships of the Beaver Lines from the Elder-Dempster Company. By 1915 the Allan Line of steamships had been acquired. See: H. A. Innis, *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway*, pp. 169-70.

7. Louis Coste quoted in *Telegraph*, 8 February 1902.

8. J. B. M. Baxter quoted in *Telegraph*, 8 February 1902.

9. Report of City Board of Works Meeting contained in *Telegraph*, 18 April 1902.

10. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, A. G. Blair to Laurier, 6 May 1902. Blair's role in issues of particular interest to the port increased following the end of the I.C.R.-C.P.R. dipute. See also: this Chapter, discussion on shipbuilding.

11. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 3 June 1902.

12. A. M. Belding, "St. John as a Winter Port," 398-399.

13. *Telegraph*, 13 August 1902.

14. For biographical note on Walter Woodworth White, M.D., see: *Prominent People of New Brunswick*, p. 36. Mayor White previously had served as alderman. He was active in various professional medical societies and fraternal orders. In the 1920's as Mayor, he again presided over the City's negotiations regarding port nationalization. See below: Chap. XII.

15. *Telegraph*, 13 December 1902. The C.P.R. had claimed it would make no more improvements until "the people of Saint John take hold of themselves and do something further in the way of increasing their harbour facilities."

16. *Telegraph*, 23 January 1903. Various harbour commission schemes had been proposed in the past. See above: Chapters III, IV and VI.

17. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, A. G. Blair to Laurier, 10 July 1903. Blair resigned in a dispute with Laurier over the Grand Trunk Pacific scheme. See: R. C. Brown and R. Cook, *Canada 1896-1921, A Nation Transformed*, pp. 152-153.

18. *Telegraph*, 12 November 1903.

19. *Ibid.* See also: Paul-André Linteau, "le développement du Port de Montréal au debut do 20e siècle."

20. I. A. Jack (ed.), *Biographical Review*, pp. 61-62. Hurd Peters, employed by the city since 1861, became city engineer in 1863 and was involved with the reconstruction of public works following the fire of 1877. In 1903, his most active working years were over and he served as advisory engineer for the city. See also for obituary notice: *Telegraph*, 10 August 1909.

21. *Telegraph*, 13 November 1903.

22. *Ibid.*, 19 December 1903.

23. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1906, No. 19a, p. 48.

24. *Ibid.* Wharf improvements in Saint Point had been made in the late 1890's (Chapter VIII). However, new berths had not been constructed since then although the trade had significantly increased (see Footnote #3). The city's elite wished to have facilities capable of efficiently handling the current volume of traffic.

25. *Ibid.*

26. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 2 May 1904.

27. *Telegraph*, 11 June 1904.

28. *Ibid.*,23 July 1904.

29. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 19 October 1904. See also: Common Council Papers, 12 October 1904 for a copy of the agreement in 1898 between the City and the C.P.R.

30. *Telegraph*, 12 October 1904.

31. *Ibid.*, 24 October 1904.

32. *Ibid.*, 3 November 1904. See also: pre-election issues of *Globe*.

33. *Telegraph*, 4 February 1904.

34. Brian F. Smith, "Federal Politics in Saint John 1900-1904," p. 100.

35. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 6 March 1905.

36. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 31 March 1905.

37. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1906-07, No. 19, p. 7. Contract had been entered with Gershon S. Mayes of Saint John, 30 September 1905.

38. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 20 April 1905.

39. *Telegraph*, 21 April 1905.

40. *Ibid.*, 26 July 1905.

41. *Ibid.*, 27 July 1905.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*, 13 august 1902. See also: H. Blair Neatby, *Laurier and a Liberal Quebec: A Study in political management*, p. 132.

44. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1906, No. 19a, p. 31.

45. *Telegraph*, 17 January 1906.

46. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 1 May 1906.

47. *Telegraph*, 2 February 1906. For a biographical note on James Hannay, see: *Prominent People of New Brunswick*, p. xxxi.

48. See above: Chapter III.

49. *Telegraph*, 21 May 1906.

50. *Ibid.*

51. See: George C. Wells, "The Transportation System of Canada," *Canadian Magazine* 38 (1911-1912), 386-92. See also: Harlan W. Gilmore, *Transportation and the Growth of Cities*, p. 29. Gilmore writes: "On a cost basis hauling a ton of goods a hundred miles on land was equal to hauling it hundreds of miles at sea."

52. *Telegraph*, 21 May 1906.

53. *Ibid.*, 20 November 1903.

54. *Ibid.*

55. See above: Chapter VII.

56. See: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 5 and 6 April 1898.

57. *Sun*, 6 April 1898.

58. *Globe*, 20 April 1898.

59. The coastal steamships continued to use the Reed's Point pier but the transatlantic lines used the West Side and eventually the Long Wharf also. See: Figures 3, 4 and 5.

60. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 8 August 1898.

61. *Globe*, 9 August 1898.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.* See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 8 August 1898.

64. *Globe*, 8 September 1898.

65. *Ibid.* See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 24 September 1898. In 1882 the Dominion Parliament had passed an Act authorizing financial assistance in the construction of dry docks.

66. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 8 September 1898.

67. *Globe*, 26 September 1898.

68. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 3 October 1898.

69. *Globe*, 8 October 1898.

70. *Ibid.*, 26 August 1899.

71. *Ibid.*, 13 December 1899.

72. *Telegraph*, 30 January 1900. The Imperial Dry Dock Company of Saint John, N.B. had been incorporated on the 28 April 1899. In addition to Robertson, several prominent businessmen also participated: Thomas McAvity, Daniel J. McLaughlin, William H. Thorne, G. Wetmore Merritt, John Sealy, John H. Thomson and Howard D. Troop. According to its charter the company had to commence construction with *three* years [April 1902] from the date of incorporation and complete construction "within eight years from the passing of this Act." See: *Acts of the General Assembly of Her Majesty's Province of New Brunswick* (Fredericton: 1899), p. 353.

73. *Telegraph*, 3 March 1900.

74. *Ibid.*, 6 August 1901.

75. *Ibid.*

76. *Ibid.*, 27 November 1901.

77. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 5 December 1901.

78. *Telegraph*, 24 December 1901.

79. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 6 January 1902.

80. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 21 February 1902. See also: *Telegraph*, 22 February 1902.

81. *Telegraph*, 22 February 1902.

82. *Ibid.*, 10 March 1902.

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Ibid.*, 6 May 1902.

85. *Ibid.*, 17 November 1902.

86. *Ibid.*,27 April 1903.

87. *Ibid.*, 5 November 1903.

88. *Ibid.*, 25 November 1903.

89. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 February 1904 and *Telegraph*, 2 February 1904.

90. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 2 October 1905.

91. See above: Chapter VIII.

92. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 12 March 1906.

93. *Telegraph*, 8 November 1905.

94. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 15 March 1906.

95. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 27 October 1906.

96. See below: Chapter X.

97. Herbert B. Schofield was a member of Schofield Brothers, dealers in wholesale paper and local agents for the E. B. Eddy Company.

98. *Telegraph*, 5 December 1905.

99. A recent study has observed that during 1890-1914 "some sectors [of the Canadian economy] notably the forest industries, did not receive much attention from British entrepreneurs." See: Donald Greig Paterson, "British direct investment in Canada, 1890-1914: Estimates and determinants" (Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Sussex, 1971), p. 384.

100. *Telegraph*, 5 December 1905.

101. *Ibid.*, 13 December 1905.

102. *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER X

1. See above: Chapters VIII and IX.
2. See above: Chapter IX.
3. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1907-08, No. 19, p. 79.
4. *Telegraph*, 15 January 1907.
5. *Ibid.*, 25 January 1907 and 9 February 1907.
6. *Ibid.*, 20 February 1907.
7. See above: Chapter IX.
8. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, 13 May 1903, cited in R. M. Coutts, "The Railway Policy of Sir Wilfrid Laurier: The Grand Trunk Pacific-National Transcontinental" (M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1968), p. 3.
9. G. R. Stevens, *Canadian National Railways* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, Ltd., 1962), 2, p. 319.
10. Captain Ernest J. Chambers (ed.), *The Canadian Parliamentary Guide* (Ottawa, 1908). William Pugsley joined the Privy Council on 29 August 1907; elected by acclamation 18 September 1907 to represent the City and County of Saint John. Pugsley's elder brother Gilbert had served as a member of the Saint John Common Council in the early 1870's. See: *The Telegraph-Journal*, 10 February 1950.
11. *Telegraph*, 19 November 1907 and 22 November 1907.
12. *Ibid.*, 14 February 1908.
13. *Ibid.*, 27 May 1908.
14. *Sun.*, 12 June 1908.
15. Thomas H. Bullock served as a Queens Ward alderman from 1902 to 1907. The local manager for the Imperial Oil Company's Saint John Branch, Bullock was elected Mayor in 1908 and 1909.
16. *Sun*, 12 June 1908.
17. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 18 June 1908. See also: *Telegraph*, 19 June 1908.
18. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 2 July 1908.
19. *Telegraph*, 15 July 1908.
20. See: Newspapers for 27 October 1908.
21. In earlier elections a candidate's "port position" had been viewed as the pivot of his politics. See above: Chapters VI and IX.
22. *Telegraph*, 24 November and *Sun*, 24 November 1908.
23. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 27 November 1908 and Common Council Papers, 25 January 1909.
24. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1901, No. 19, p. 9.
25. James S. Brierley, "Mr. D. McNicoll—Assistant General Manager, C.P.R.," *Canadian Magazine*, 14 (1899-1900), 42-44. McNicoll became Vice-President at the turn of the century.
26. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 18 June 1908.
27. *Sun*, 18 January 1909.
28. *Telegraph*, 18 January 1909.
29. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 1 February 1909.
30. Theodore H. Estabrooks a tea importer and blender for Red Rose Tea, served on the executive of the Board of Trade during 1899-1900, and 1902-1908. In 1910 and 1911 he was President of the organization.

31. *Sun*, 12 February 1909 and *Telegraph*, 12 February 1909.

32. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 1 March 1909.

33. *Telegraph*, 3 March 1909.

34. Corporation of the City of Saint John, *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John year ending December 31, 1909* (Saint John, N.B., 1910), p. 12.

35. *Ibid.*

36. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 13 September 1909.

37. *Ibid.*, 17 June 1910.

38. *Ibid.*, 13 February 1911.

39. *Ibid.*,13 April 1911.

40. Corporation of the City of Saint John, *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John year ending 31 December 1911* (Saint John, N.B., n.d.), p.224.

41. See: Figure 4.

42. *The Telegraph-Journal*, 4 May 1927.

43. *Globe*, 13 December 1911.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Grace L. Powell, *Foreign traffic hinterlands of the ports of Halifax ans Saint John*, p. 1.

46. See: *Official Yearbook of New Brunswick 1910* (Fredericton: 1911), p. 124.

Total value of winter exports 1910-1911: $25,384,206

| | |
|---|---|
| Wheat | $6,656,132 |
| Oats | 227,757 |
| Buckwheat | 6,662 |
| Barley | 40,645 |
| Corn | 172,736 |
| Lumber standards | 730,959 |
| Other timber | 554,652 |

47. James R. Rice, "A History of Organized Labour in Saint John . . . ," p. 107.

48. *Globe*, 27 March 1890.

49. *Ibid.*, 25 April 1896.

50. *Ibid.*, 2 January 1899.

51. *Telegraph*, 5November 1903.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*

54. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 27 April 1903.

55. There were other labour candidates but Daley was the only successful contender.

56. *Telegraph*, 18 October 1904.

57. *Ibid.*, 28 April 1905.

58. *Ibid.*, As well, they received double time on Sundays.

59. *Ibid.*,5 May 1905.

60. *Ibid.*, 21 November 1905.

61. See above: Chapter VIII.

62. *Telegraph*, 22 November 1905.

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*, 23 November 1905.

66. *Ibid.*, 25 November 1905.

67. *Ibid.*, 28 November 1905.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*, 29 November 1905.

70. *Ibid.*, 17 October 1906.

71. *Ibid.*, 24 October 1906.

72. *Ibid.*, 22 November 1906.

73. *Ibid.*, 23 November 1906.

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Ibid.*, 22 November 1907. Although the *Sun* also covered the strike, the *Telegraph's* reporting was more comprehensive.

76. *Ibid.*

77. *Ibid.*, 23 November 1907.

78. *Ibid.*, 25 November 1907.

79. *Ibid.*, 27 November 1907.

80. *Ibid.*, 3 December 1907.

81. *Ibid.*, 4 December 1907.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.*, 18 September 1908.

84. Saint John Trades and Labor Council and Subordinate Unions, *History of Saint John Labor Unions*, p. 17.

85. See above: Chapter VIII.

86. See above: Chapter V.

87. See above: Chapter I, Carleton section.

88. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 7 November 1901. See also: *Telegraph*, 8 November 1901.

89. *Telegraph*, 23 December 1903.

90. Mohan Juneja, "A treasure unearthed," *Camera Canada* special edition (1977), 4. An Isaac Erb photo reveals the Ludlow's comparable spaciousness.

91. Negotiating on behalf of the Bridge Company was J. Murray Kay, a Boston resident and officer in the Company, who twenty years earlier had been a prominent Saint John businessman.

92. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 June 1908.

93. *Telegraph*, 2 June 1908.

94. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 June 1908.

95. *Telegraph*, 27 November 1908.

96. *Ibid.*, 2 December 1908.

97. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 7 December 1908.

98. *Telegraph*, 15 January 1909.

99. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 31 March 1909. See also: *Telegraph*, 1 April 1909.

100. *Telegraph*. 16 April 1909.

101. *Ibid.*

102. *Ibid.*, 13 August 1909.

103. *Ibid.*, 13 October 1909.

104. *Ibid.*, 4 December 1909.

105. *Ibid.*, 9 December 1909.

106. *Ibid.*, 8 January 1910.

107. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 31 January 1910, and *Telegraph* 1 February 1910.

108. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 6 February 1911 and *The Daily Telegraph and Sun*, 7 February 1911.
On March 14, 1910 the *Telegraph* and the *Sun* had merged.

109. *Telegraph and Sun*, 19 April 1911.

## CHAPTER XI

1. *Telegraph-Journal*, 27 November 1925.
2. W. O. Raymond, *The River St. John*, ed. by J. C. Webster (Sackville, N.B., 1943), pp. 198-200.
3. *Telegraph-Journal*, 29 October 1923.
4. *Ibid.*
5. H.I.L., Hazen Papers, J. D. Hazen to James King Kelly, 8 November 1912.
6. See above: Chapter VI.
7. Ernest Russell Haynes, "The Development of Courtenay Bay, Saint John, New Brunswick, 1908-1918" (M.A. Thesis, U.N.B., 1969), p. 15.
8. *Daily Telegraph*, 4 January 1912.
9. Ernest Russell Haynes, "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 24. In June 1911 the city transferred its Courtenay Bay harbourfront to the federal Department of Public Works.
10. *Daily Telegraph*, 1 January 1912.
11. In 1912 the City of Saint John adopted a Commission form of municipal government. Instead of having 17 aldermen and a mayor, the city now had four commissioners and a mayor.
12. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 5 February 1912.
13. *Daily Telegraph*, 17 January 1912.
14. *Ibid.*, 18 January 1912.
15. *Ibid.*, 5 January 1912.
16. *Ibid.*, 5 February 1912.
17. *Telegraph-Journal*, 29 October 1923.
18. See above: Chapter IX.
19. See above: Chapter VII.
20. *Telegraph-Journal*, 29 October 1923.
21. Ernest Russell Haynes, "The development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 16.
22. *Telegraph-Journal*, 29 October 1923.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Globe*, 19 October 1912.
25. *Telegraph-Journal*, 29 October 1923.
26. See: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 May 1912 and N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes, 30 April 1912.
27. *Globe*, 11 July 1912. See also: Ernest Russell Haynes, "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 32.
28. Ernest Russell Haynes, "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 36.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
33. *Globe*, 11 July 1912.
34. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 28 April 1913, 30 April 1913, 16 July 1914.
35. Ernest Russell Hayes, "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 61.

36. *Globe*. 16 January 1913. P.A.C., Borden Papers. Norton Griffiths Company to Hon. Robert Rogers. 7 February 1913.

37. N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes. 13 January 1913.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*, 16 January 1913.

40. *Globe*. 22 January 1913.

41. *Ibid.*, 8 March 1913.

42. *Ibid.*, 29 January 1913.

43. *Ibid.*

44. H.I.L., Hazen Papers. J. D. Hazen to J. K. Flemming. 14 February 1913.

45. Ernest Russell Haynes. "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 61.

46. *Globe*. 18 March 1913.

47. *Ibid.*, 28 July 1913.

48. *Ibid.*, 7 August 1913.

49. *Ibid.*, 3 October 1913. P.A.C., Borden Papers. T. G. Shaughnessy to J. D. Reid. 12 August 1913.

50. *Globe*. 13 November 1913.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Ernest Russell Haynes. "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", pp. 68-73.

53. P.A.C., Borden Papers. typewritten synopsis of Pugsley's N.B. political career. undated.

54. Ernest Russell Haynes. "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 75.

55. *Globe*. 1 December 1916.

56. *Ibid.*, 1 February 1917.

57. G. R. Stevens. *Canadian National Railways*. Vol. II (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, Ltd., 1962), pp. 121, 130, 139, 147.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 320.

59. Charles M. McK. Ferris. "The New Brunswick Elections of 1917" (M.A. Thesis, U.N.B., 1974), p. 14.

60. N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes. 4 September 1912.

61. *Ibid.*, 4 November 1912.

62. *Ibid.*, 2 January 1913

63. *Globe*. 2 July 1913.

64. Ernest Russell Haynes. "The Development of Courtenay Bay . . .", p. 63.

65. *Globe*. 23 September 1913.

66. *Ibid.*, 1 October 1913.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*, 9 October 1913.

69. City of Saint John. *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for year ending December 31st*, p. 17.

70. H.I.L., Hazen Papers. Murray and Gregory, Ltd., and James Holly and Sons, and sixteen others to Hon. Frank Cochrane. Minister of Railways and Canals, 29 October 1913; F. Cochrane to J. D. Hazen, 6 November 1913.

71. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report, 1914*, pp. 13-14.

72. *Globe*. 25 March 1914.

73. Arthur T. Doyle, *Front Benches and Back Rooms* (Toronto: Green Tree Publishing Company, Ltd., 1976), p. 41.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

75. *Globe*, 5 May 1915.

76. *Ibid.*, 4 June 1915.

77. *Ibid.*, 10 June 1915. N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes, 17 December 1915.

78. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1914*, p. 13.

79. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1915*, p. 11.

80. A. W. Currie, *Canadian Transportation Economics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 407.

81. N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes, 13 January 1916.

82. *Ibid.*, 3 January 1916. A fire had destroyed the I.C.R. facility.

83. *Globe*, 4 March 1916.

84. *Ibid.*, 21 March 1916.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*

87. N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes, 28 March 1916.

88. *Globe*, 29 April 1916.

89. *Ibid.*, 4 May 1916.

90. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1916.

91. G. R. Stevens, *Canadian National Railways*, Vol. II, pp. 320-321.

92. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1917*, p. 4.

93. H.I.L., Hazen Papers, J. M. Robinson to J. D. Hazen, 17 October 1913. See also: *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for the year ending December 31st 1912*, p. 42.

94. See: Figure 4. See also: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . .", Figure 32.

95. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1917*, p. 7.

96. Howard Darling, *The Politics of Freight Rates, the Railway Freight Issue in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1980), p. 90.

97. G. R. Stevens, *Canadian National Railways*, Vol. II, p. 270.

98. Howard Darling, *The Politics of Freight Rates, the Railway Freight Issue in Canada*, p. 90.

99. J. Castell Hopkins, *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs 1913* (Toronto: 1914), p. 693.

100. City of Saint John, *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for year ending December 31st 1913*, pp. 20-21.

101. J. Castell Hopkins, *The Canadian Annual Review . . . 1913*, p. 683.

102. *Globe*, 12 June 1914.

103. J. Castell Hopkins, *The Canadian Annual Review . . . 1913*, p. 693.

104. *Globe*, 12 June 1914.

105. Robert Craig Brown, *Robert Laird Borden, a Biography, Vol. I: 1854-1914* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p. 222.

106. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1914*, p. 14-15.

107. P.A.C., Borden Papers, R. L. Borden to F. P. Gutelius, 2 October 1913.

108. *Ibid.*, F. P. Gutelius to R. L. Borden, 13 October 1913.

109. G. R. Stevens, *Canadian National Railways*, Vol. II, p. 278.

110. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1918*, p. 9.

111. See above: Chapter VIII.

112. Allan Jeffrey Wright, "'The Method of Friendly Approach'", p. 51.

113. G. R. Stevens, *Canadian National Railways*, Vol. II, p. 278.

114. *Globe*, 26 October 1914.

115. *Ibid.*, 15 October 1915.

116. *Ibid.*, 26 October 1915.

117. *Ibid.*, 20 November 1915.

118. H.I.L., Hazen Papers, A. H. Harris to J. D. Hazen, 8 May 1916.

119. *Ibid.*, R. E. Armstrong to J. D. Hazen, 27 April 1917.

120. R. E. Armstrong, "The Port of St. John, N.B.", *Shipping Illustrated* (February 6, 1915), pp. 132-135.

121. *Globe*, 12 January 1917.

122. *Ibid.*

123. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1916*, p. 6.

Exports from Saint John

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1914 | $21,359,760 | 1916 | $120,042,590 | 1918 | $200,783,647 |
| 1915 | 43,872,932 | 1917 | 190,586,561 | 1919 | 149,986,167 |

Source: Compiled from Canada, *Sessional Papers*: 1917, Vol. LII, No. 7, pp. 22-23; 1920, Vol. LVI, No. 4, pp. 19-20.

124. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1917*, pp. 6-7.

125. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 15 February 1912.

126. Saint John Town Planning Commission, *The Saint John N.B. Town Planning Scheme 1922* (Saint John, N.B.: March 1932), p. 34.

127. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1915*, p. 5.

## CHAPTER XII

1. *Globe*, 27 July 1921. See also: Eric L. Teed, *Canada's First City, Saint John*.
2. *Globe*, 30 July 1921.
3. See above: Chapters III and IV.
4. See above: Chapter IV.
5. See above: Chapter IX.
6. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1906, No. 19a, pp. 48-49.
7. *Globe*, 14 September 1920.
8. City of Saint John, *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for the year ending December 31st, 1912*, p. 42.
9. *Ibid.*, 1914, p. 215.
10. *Ibid.*, 1916, p. 164.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
12. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1918*, p. 20.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
14. *Ibid.*
15. City of Saint John, *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for the year ending December 31st 1918*, p. 141.
16. *Globe*, 8 February 1919.
17. *Ibid.*, 15 February 1919.
18. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 25 February and 1 March 1919.
19. *Globe*, 5 March 1919. Carvell claimed to believe that Canada had devoted too much attention to railroads and not enough to water transport. Thus, in his opinion "a terrible mess" existed in port development. See: *Globe*, 30 March 1919.
20. *Globe*, 8 March 1919.
21. *Ibid.*, 1 April 1919.
22. *Ibid.*, 20 April 1919. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 29 October 1918.
23. *Globe*, 23 April 1991.
24. *Ibid.*, 24 April 1919.
25. Canada, *Statutes of Canada* 1919, 9-10 Geo. V, Vols. I-II, pp. 615-625.
26. *Globe*, 28 July 1919 quoting from the *Standard*.
27. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 29 July 1919. See also: *Globe*, 31 July 1919. East-West tensions in Canada had been referred to earlier in Saint John, see: *Daily Telegraph*, 27 February 1912.
28. See above: Footnote #25.
29. *Daily Telegraph*, 1 August 1921.
30. *Globe*, 27 August 1919.
31. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 5, 7 January 1920.
32. *Globe*, 25 January 1920. Among Ballantyne's previous work experience was several years as a member of the Montreal Harbour Commission. See: Col. Ernest J. Chambers (ed.), *The Canadian Parliamentary Guide* (Ottawa: 1919), p. 109.
33. *Ibid.*, 19 February 1920. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council minutes, 18 February 1920.
34. *Ibid.*, 13 March 1920.

35. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 28 April 1920, 3-4 May 1920. See also: *Globe*, 3 May 1920. Schofield was president of Schofield Paper Co. Ltd.

36. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 7 and 9 July 1920. See also: *Globe*, 7 July 1920.

37. *Globe*, 26 August 1920.

38. *Ibid.*, 9 September 1920. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 1 and 7 September 1920.

39. *Standard*, 3 May 1921.

40. *Ibid.*, 15 June 1921.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, 20 July 1921.

43. *Ibid.*, 15 July 1921.

44. *Globe*, 24, 26, 27 July 1921.

45. *Telegraph*, 2 August 1921. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 2 and 9 August 1921.

46. *Globe*, 2 August 1921.

47. *Telegraph*, 2 August 1921.

48. City of Saint John, *Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Saint John for year ending December 31st 1921*, p. 214.

49. Some city residents still recall the hard times of the 1920's. See: *Telegraph-Journal*, 15 August 1981, p. 17.

50. Ernest R. Forbes, *Maritime Rights, the Maritime Rights Movement 1919-1927 a Study in Canadian Regionalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1979), p. 99.

51. Paterson wrote *The true story of Confederation* (Saint John, N.B., 1926). See also: N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes, 11 November 1926.

52. Ernest R. Forbes, *Maritime Rights*, p. 26.

53. *Standard*, 4 May 1921.

54. *Ibid.*, 10 May 1921.

55. *Ibid.*, 2 June 1921.

56. *Ibid.*, 2 April 1922.

57. *Telegraph-Journal*, 24 December 1923.

58. *Ibid.*, 24 March 1924.

59. *Ibid.*, 13 May 1925.

60. See: *Telegraph-Journal*, January-March 1925. Years before a Maritime Rights movement had emerged Belding had become an apologist for the Port of Saint John. See above: Chapter VIII, footnote #24. Belding's 1925 trip followed an example set in the late 1890's by the, then President of the Board of Trade W. S. Fisher.

61. *Telegraph-Journal*, 23 December 1925.

62. *Boston Transcript* quoted in the *Telegraph-Journal*, 30 December 1925.

63. *Telegraph-Journal*, 30 December 1925.

64. *Ibid.*, 8 January 1926.

65. *Ibid.*, 11 January 1926. See also: N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes, 23 January 1926.

66. *Telegraph-Journal*, 11 January 1926.

67. *Ibid.*, 11 and 24 February 1926.

68. N.B. Mus., *Saint John Board of Trade Annual Report 1919*, p. 13.

69. *Standard*, 11 December 1920.

70. *Ibid.*, 16 September 1920.

71. Allan Mark Trueman, "New Brunswick and the 1921 Federal Election" (M.A. Thesis, U.N.B., 1975), p. 146.

72. *Daily Telegraph*, 29 July 1922. Eventually this agitation from the Maritimes had some effect. See: *Report of the Portland Port Commission*, p. 17.

73. *Daily Telegraph*, 10 October 1922.

74. *Ibid.*, 27 October 1922.

75. *Telegraph-Journal*, 12 September 1923.

76. *Ibid.*, 6 May 1924. C.N.R. freight activity at three Atlantic Ports. (in: received in — out: hauled from)

C.N.R., Portland (tons)

1922 in. 787,739;
1922 in. 810,667;
out. 121,658
out. 121,879

C.N.R., Halifax (tons)

1922 in. 594,508;
1923 in. 602,210;
out. 104,786
out. 106,765

C.N.R., Saint John (tons)

1922 in. 392,151;
1923 in. 381,624;
out. 159,433
out. 161,123

C.P.R., Saint John (tons)

1922 in. 798,033;
1923 in. 929,882;
out. 373,929
out. 393,107

77. *Ibid.*, 31 May 1924. See also: Michael Hatfield, "J. B. M. Baxter and the Maritime Rights Movement" (B.A. honours Thesis, Mount Allison University, 1970), p. 70.

78. *The Portland Express*, quoted in the *Telegraph-Journal*, 28 December 1925.

79. See above: Footnote #65.

80. *Daily Telegraph*, 5 December 1922.

81. *Ibid.*, 22 January 1923.

82. *Ibid.*, 26 January and 6 February 1923. Alexander Gray became the first port manager at Saint John under the National Harbours Act of 1936.

83. *Daily Telegraph*, 12 June 1923.

84. *Telegraph-Journal*, 21 August 1923.

85. *Ibid.*, 2 August 1923. In 1931 William F. Burditt continued to lament the underutilization of the National Transcontinental. See: William F. Burditt, "Railroad development in the Maritime Provinces of Canada with particular reference to lines tributary to Saint John, New Brunswick," pp. 20-22.

86. *Telegraph-Journal*, 1 October 1923. See also: P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 23 October 1923.

87. *Telegraph-Journal*, 29 October 1923.

88. *Ibid.*, 17 May 1924.

89. *Ibid.*, 13 May 1924.

90. *Ibid.*, 29 May 1924. During almost a thirty-year association with the Port of Saint John (ending upon his retirement in July 1946), Alexander Gray, in addition to his

formal association with the port, was an active advocate and publicist on behalf of the port. See for example: Alexander Gray, "Saint John Harbour, New Brunswick," *Excerpt Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers* (London: Published by the Institution, 1936), pp. 597-617.

91. *Telegraph-Journal*, 7 July 1924.

92. *Ibid.*, 28 November 1924.

93. *Ibid.*, 20 December 1924. See above: Chapter X.

94. *Telegraph-Journal*, January - March 1925.

95. J. Castell Hopkins (ed.), *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1925-26*, pp. 396-397.

96. *Telegraph-Journal*, 17 February 1925.

97. *Ibid.*, 2 March 1925.

98. *Ibid.*, 24 March 1925. F. Maclure Sclanders (b. 1868 Glasgow, Scotland) had previously been attached to the Colonial Service in Africa before coming to Canada. In Canada he had served on the Board of Trade in Windsor, Ontario prior to assuming his position with the Saint John Board of Trade.

99. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1925. See also: Elizabeth M. W. McGahan, "The Port in the City . . .", for data on individual members of the Board of Trade between 1896-1911, pp. 766-773; 781-795. Between the years 1911-1927 personnel turnover was also fairly static.

100. P.A.N.B., Common Council Papers, 3 November 1925.

101. J. Castell Hopkins (ed.), *The Canadian Annuel Review of Public Affairs, 1925-26*, pp. 398-399.

102. *Ibid.*

103. Ernest R. Forbes, *Maritime Rights*, p. 158. Moreover, Howard Durling has contended that the "usual instability in the federal political situation" provided "bargaining power" for the Maritimes. See Howard Durling, *The Politics of Freight Rates*, p. 107.

104. *Telegraph-Journal*, 6 May 1926.

105. *Ibid.*, 28 May 1926.

106. *Ibid.*, see also: 10 June 1926. The Board of Trade was also meeting and discussing future schemes of port management. See: N.B. Mus., Board of Trade Minutes, 12 July 1926.

107. *Telegraph-Journal*, 2 August 1926.

108. *Ibid.*, 3 August 1926. See also: Michael Hatfield, "J. B. M. Baxter and The Maritime Rights Movement", p. 98.

109. *Telegraph-Journal*, 20 October 1926.

110. *Ibid.*, 11 December 1926.

111. Ernest R. Forbes, *Maritime Rights*, pp. 122 and 188.

112. G. R. Stevens, *Canadian National Railways*, Vol. II, p. 321.

113. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 15 February 1927. Peter John Veniot a New Brunswick Liberal had been Premier of the Province until 1925. He was elected to the House of Commons in 1926 and was Postmaster General of Canada in 1927. See: Major A. L. Normandin (ed.), *The Canadian Parliamentary Guide* (Ottawa: 1927), p. 219. See also: E. R. Forbes, *Maritime Rights*, p. 217, footnote #70.

114. *Telegraph-Journal*, 18 February 1927.

115. Canada, *Prefix to Statutes, 1927* (Ottawa: 1927), pp. 301-313. See also: *Telegraph-Journal*, 31 March 1927 and H.I.L., Documents Collection, Saint John Harbour Commissioners, 31 January 1928.

116. Exports and Imports Saint John 1920-1927

| | Exports | Imports |
|---|---|---|
| 1920 | $114,257,976 | 26,990,916 |
| 1921 | 81,440,495 | 32,857,033 |
| 1922 | 49,749,273 | 21,369,385 |
| 1923 | 55,127,568 | 20,687,800 |
| 1924 | 57,326,588 | 20,622,689 |
| 1925 | 58,841,556 | 19,245,490 |
| 1926 | 76,853,203 | 20,151,989 |
| 1927 | 79,149,671 | 21,338,672 |

Source: Compiled from Canada. *Sessional Papers*. 1923, Vol. LIX, No. 9, pp. 16-17; Canada. *Annual Departmental Reports*. 1924-25, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 16-17; 1927-28; Vol. II, No. 8, pp. 20-21.

117. P.A.N.B., Common Council Minutes, 4 May 1927.

118. *Standard*, 26 August 1919.

119. *Telegraph-Journal*, 2 July 1927.

Walter E. Foster, chairman of the commission, had served as Premier of the Province and had represented the province in the King Cabinet as Secretary of State. In 1927 he was president of Vassie and Company, one of the largest dry goods firms in the Maritimes.

William E. Scully, president and general manager of the Union Ice Company, had served on the Common Council and had represented the city in the provincial legislature. His work on behalf of a harbour bridge was legendary within the city.

Alexander McMillan, general manager of J. and A. McMillan, represented one of Saint John's oldest local firms.

120. Canada. *The Maritime Provinces in their Relation to the National Economy of Canada* (ottawa: 1934), p. 125.

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